

EGYPT

1879-1883

THE RIGHT HON.  
R EDWARD MALET, BART, G.C.B.



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EGYPT  
1879-1883







Edward Mallet

1884

# EGYPT

1879-1883

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
SIR EDWARD MALET, BART., G.C.B.

EDITED AND ARRANGED AT THE REQUEST  
OF LADY ERMYNTRUDE MALET  
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## PREFACE

SOME three years before his death—that is to say in or about the year 1905—Sir Edward Malet began to write an account of the part which he took in Egyptian affairs from the time of his first arrival at Cairo as British Agent and Consul-General in 1879 down to the conclusion of his mission by his promotion to the post of Minister at Brussels in 1883. The motives which induced him to undertake this work are set forth in the following prefatory sentences:—

“If Egypt continues to prosper for many years at its present rate, it is probable that its subjection to British influence will hereafter be considered as one of the most important events in the reign of Queen Victoria, and when, in future years, the history of that reign is written, the circumstances which preceded and led to the establishment of our supremacy will create a livelier interest and attract

a more detailed scrutiny than they have hitherto received.

“Having been one of the principal actors in the Drama, I feel competent to give a consecutive narrative of the part I played, and I am impelled towards this course because, in so far as the public is concerned, I shall in no way be treading on familiar ground. Several books on Egypt have been written. Lord Milner, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Mr. Arnold Royle, Mr. E. Dicey and many others have contributed to the literature on the subject, but, if the book which I propose to write, extends to half a page, it will exceed in length all that these works contain, bearing on the action of the Representative of the Queen’s Government in Egypt from the advent of the Khedive Tewfik in 1879 to the overthrow of the rebellion of Arabi in 1882. I shall not therefore be sending my wares to a surfeited market.”<sup>1</sup>

Sir Edward was ill and suffering, and the work progressed slowly. It had not gone beyond a

<sup>1</sup> This was of course written before the appearance of Lord Cromer’s masterly work on *Modern Egypt*, which appeared only in 1908.



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single introductory chapter, recounting incidents of his previous residence at Constantinople as Secretary of Embassy, when he was stimulated to increased effort by the publication in the summer of 1907 of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's book, *The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*. Sir Edward was not unnaturally incensed by the manner in which his actions and views were misrepresented in that work, and he resumed his pen with the object of replying to charges which, in his opinion, affected not himself alone, but the Ministers who had approved and defended his conduct, and had subsequently marked their opinion of him by promotion to posts of the highest importance and responsibility. The work in consequence assumed more of a controversial tone, parts of it being devoted to a critical analysis and refutation of Mr. Blunt's statements. These are in themselves sufficiently convincing. But it is scarcely to be supposed that if the writer had lived he would have cared or thought it desirable to give them to the world. At any rate, now that he has passed from among us, it would be a breach of respect

for the whole tenor of his active life that one who was so singularly unostentatious and to whom personal susceptibilities and quarrels were so abhorrent should appear in the part of a controversialist on his own behalf.

The narrative portion of the work is, however, interesting—it throws a new light on various phases of the Egyptian drama, and it seems a pity that it should be altogether lost or suppressed.

The passages contained in this small volume have therefore been printed for private circulation. They suffer from having been written when their author was oppressed by a mortal illness, and from not having undergone final revision at his hands. A certain personal note which may be noticed here and there, and which was rather foreign to his natural disposition, is to be explained partly by the fact that Sir Edward considered himself to be on his defence, partly by the circumstance that the materials are largely taken from letters written at the time to his parents, to whom as having themselves had a long experience of the diplomatic

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service he could write with perfect freedom and without any fear of indiscretion.

The work was cut short by death, and the narrative comes to an abrupt close in the autumn of 1881, two months before the presentation of the so-called "Dual Note" by the British and French Agents, which was at the time the occasion of so much comment.

Sir Edward had, however, written a note of the points which he desired to establish, and extracts from this paper are added with passages selected from his correspondence and papers in support of the statements made in them.

Some of these will explain, to those at least who knew him, how it came about that he was in some degree misunderstood by correspondents of the Press and others who were present in Egypt during the events referred to in this volume.

Though amiable in disposition and a warm-hearted friend, Sir Edward Malet was by nature cautious and somewhat uncommunicative. He had served for upwards of eleven years under Lord Lyons, who possessed in a high degree the art of

diplomatic reticence, relieved by a certain fund of native humour, which his disciples might emulate but could scarcely hope to equal. Sir Edward was a scrupulously loyal and discreet Agent ; he was too honest to equivocate or dissemble ; and when he did not altogether share the views of his Government, or when he thought it conducive to the success of their policy that his personal initiative should not appear, he concealed his feelings behind a wall of impenetrable silence. You might hammer the rock, but you could not make it ring. To men whose whole life was passed in eloquent dissertations, who prided themselves on their power of extracting confidences and of penetrating beneath the surface, so complete a reserve was scarcely intelligible. They were apt to conclude that where they could elicit nothing there was nothing to elicit, and they formed hasty judgments which in later years and under other circumstances some of them at least learned to correct.

As time goes on, and the confidential correspondence of that period comes to light, his reputation will not suffer. In the meanwhile the

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estimation in which he was held by those under whom he worked has been sufficiently shown by his subsequent career. A man is not promoted to and maintained in the most responsible positions nor employed in the negotiation of the most thorny questions unless he has shown himself to be possessed of the intelligence, capacity and other even rarer moral qualities which are requisite for success in the field of diplomacy. At each transfer his departure elicited a chorus of regret from the colleagues with whom he had worked and the Court and Government to which he had been accredited. Indeed, on the occasion of his final retirement from the Embassy at Berlin this regret almost assumed the form of personal reproaches from those who could not believe that his health had really become so broken as he felt, and as the event proved it to be. His subsequent selection to be one of the three Members contributed by Great Britain to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague was a final proof of the value in which Lord Salisbury held his firm honesty of purpose, and his calm impartiality and breadth of view.

It is on the presence in every branch of its public service of men such as he was, just, fearless and unselfish, studying accuracy of observation and soundness of judgment rather than brilliancy of thought or speech, indifferent to personal renown so long as the objects for which they are striving are attained, that the strength, the greatness and the solidity of the British Empire are founded. Those who have worked with them, and have essayed, each in the measure of his ability and opportunities, to follow their example, can wish for nothing better than to be deemed in some sort worthy of being associated with them in remembrance, as men who have done their best according to their lights to maintain the honour of their country.

SANDERSON.

*December, 1908.*

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# EGYPT

1879-1883

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY

CONSTANTINOPLE, 1865-6—  
AUDIENCE OF THE SULTAN—CEREMONY OF  
THE BAIRAM

**M**Y first acquaintance with the East dates from Thursday, the 12th of October, 1865, on which day I arrived at Constantinople as second Secretary on the staff of Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador.

A scene or two from my Constantinople experiences at that date will form a fitting introduction for the reader to the glitter, the glare, and the glamour of the East.

A word of explanation must precede the letter I am going to quote, which gives an account of Sir

Henry Bulwer's handing in his letters of recall and Lord Lyons his letters of credence as Ambassadors to the Sultan of Turkey. It is very unusual for two Ambassadors to be at the same post at the same moment, but the East is famed for the unexpected. Constantinople with its palaces and its konaks, the beauty of its scenery and other more solid delights, has such powerful attractions to those in high places that the volition and even the power to quit seems often to desert them when the time for surrendering the duties of their post to other hands arrives.

I fancy that this is what had happened in the case of Sir Henry Bulwer. Her Majesty's Government had decided to appoint Lord Lyons to succeed Sir Henry as Ambassador at Constantinople, and apparently the only way to avoid constant procrastination on the part of Sir Henry in making way was to send out his successor with orders to present his credentials on arriving.

Sir Henry received Lord Lyons with irreproachable courtesy.

The new Ambassador went straight to the splendid Embassy at Pera which had recently been built in the style of one of the great club houses in Pall Mall. For four days he was Sir Henry Bulwer's guest, and then came a shifting about; the servants of the departing Ambassador made way for those of the incoming one, and Sir Henry Bulwer became in turn the guest of Lord Lyons.

Thus it happened that the speeding of the parting Ambassador and the welcoming of the coming one took place on the same day and within a few minutes of each other.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 18th*, 1865.

“While the reception of Lord Lyons by the Sultan on presenting his credentials is fresh on my memory I will write you an account of it. It was settled that Sir Henry Bulwer should present his letters of recall and Lord Lyons his of credence on the same day. Carriages were sent to the Embassy by the Sultan, and we started this morning at about eleven o'clock, accompanied by Khamil Bey, the Sultan's Introducer of Ambassadors. The pro-

cession was headed by four Cavasses or guards of the Embassy. We went through the long street of Pera at a foot's pace. To go faster would have jolted us to bits, the pavement is villainous. In half an hour we reached the Gates of the Palace on the Bosphorus and left our carriages. There were two Courts to walk across, and Sir Henry stepped into his sedan-chair and was carried. In the first Court a guard of soldiers was drawn up, in the second, laid out as a garden, there was no one. Then we came to the Palace and the sight, as we stepped into the Hall, was striking and beautiful. A half-light gave it a mysterious air. The Hall is not lofty but very large and supported by innumerable slender columns. At the entrance the Ambassadors were received by Aali Pacha, Minister for Foreign Affairs; on either side were ranged at intervals Guards of Honour of the various nationalities of the Empire. Right and left, as we entered, were Persians with pointed fur caps and cartouche boxes on their breasts. Next to the Persians came Albanians with their white fustanellas and embroidered jackets. Next to these Bedouins dressed in red and gold silk, their long guns slung muzzle upwards behind their backs, the barrels and stocks and all their accoutrements inlaid with silver. Next

came a line of Turks on either hand in green turbans, a sign, I believe, of their being descendants of the Prophet; then other nationalities, Bulgarians, Circassians, Wallachians, and many more. At the end of the Hall was an arch, and beyond it a broad double staircase, down which poured a flood of brilliant red light. We were immediately shown into a drawing-room at the side of the Hall, overlooking the Bosphorus, and sat down while servants brought us pipes and coffee on a tray covered with a red velvet cloth embroidered with precious stones and gold; the cloth was removed and the coffee taken from the tray and handed to us. The coffee cup is the size and shape of an egg with its head cut off and fits into an egg-cup, encrusted in diamonds. Lord Lyons takes the pipe, which is a matter of courtesy, though it is not a necessity to smoke it.

“In twenty minutes we were informed that the Sultan was ready, and we went with Sir Henry to present his Letters of Recall through the Hall lined with the Guards towards the staircase with the red light; when we got to it we found this light to be caused by a dome of red glass, and as the sun was shining brilliantly the glare filled every corner of the stairway and the great Halls running off from

the landing-place. Traversing these we passed to the Sultan's room, and here was a considerable falling-off in splendour. A French-looking, square drawing-room with next to no furniture. On the right were six men in the plain, long-skirted coats called 'stamboulines.'

"The Sultan stood alone. He was dressed in loose blue clothes edged with red, not a becoming garb. On his head was a red fez of a singularly ugly shape, an inverted saucepan without the tail. He has a swarthy round face with a good deal of character in it; he looked ill and is so.

"Sir Henry spoke so low that it was impossible to hear what he said. The Minister for Foreign Affairs translated. The Sultan hesitated between each word as he spoke in reply. We then all retired, waited for Lord Lyons at the top of the staircase, and returned with him to the Sultan's presence, leaving Sir Henry Bulwer behind. The new Ambassador made a formal speech, received a formal answer, and the ceremony was over.

"As he went down the steps Sir Henry Bulwer, turning to Lord Lyons, said in somewhat mournful accents—

"'Now I suppose I may consider myself as a man in his coffin.'" Lord Lyons often has a happy



knack of restoring the balance of a conversation when it threatens to topple into an inconvenient groove. He deftly replied, 'In the sure and certain hope of a speedy resurrection.'

"And the shadow of a smile flitted across Sir Henry's bloodless and wrinkled countenance."

The next letter gives an account of the Imperial reception on the occasion of the Bairam, a religious ceremony which takes place yearly on the conclusion of the Pilgrimage to Mecca.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 15th*, 1866.

"We got up at a very early hour this morning to see the Bairam. The Sultan on these occasions goes to Mosque at sunrise, and afterwards receives the homage of the Chief Dignitaries of the State.

"Lord Lyons, accompanied by me and one of the Dragomans of the Embassy, went on foot to Tophana, the landing-place on the Bosphorus; thence we went in the Caique across the Golden Horn, landed in Stamboul, and eventually took our places in the Tribune set apart for the Diplomatic Body in the inner court of the old Seraglio where the ceremony takes place.

“ Presently, the sun having now risen, the Sultan returned from the Mosque and rode through a magnificent Gateway just in front of us, followed by a crowd of officials on foot. A large carpet of red silk, embroidered in gold, was now laid down in the Gateway. On this was placed a brass throne more the shape of a sofa than a chair. In front of it the Sultan took up his position and the Levee began. The sun was all that was wanting to make it a brilliant sight, for by this time the rain had ceased. The Ministers of State, headed by Fuad Pacha, the Grand Vizier, advanced first. They perform homage by numerous salaams as they approach. On the right of the Sultan stands a Chamberlain holding the end of a broad heavy ribbon fringed with gold. Those who attend the Levee take this fringe and press it to their foreheads, while the Sultan stands quite still and very seldom deigns to look at them. After the Ministers of State came the officers of the Army and Navy and the minor officials. Then came members of the Ulema, Imams, the Muftis, and the Cadis, headed by the Sheik-ul-Islam, a venerable figure, whose dignity requires that he should be held up under the arms by two retainers till he comes within ten paces of His Imperial Majesty, whose foot he

is permitted to kiss, and this privilege is accorded to all the members of the Ulema class. The dress of the Sheik-ul-Islam was very gorgeous—white and gold, a large turban with a gold coronet round it, broad bands of embroidery hanging over his shoulders, and diamond orders on his breast.

“His followers all wore very magnificent robes of some distinct colour, green, grey, lilac or purple, the collar, shoulders, breast and back heavily embroidered in gold, and the gold circle round the Turban.

“During all the ceremony the Sultan stood like a statue, paying no attention to any one and giving no one a sign of recognition. Presently he perceived Lord Lyons in the Tribune, and he told Aali Pacha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to salute His Excellency from him, and to say that he was much pleased to see him there. Aali Pacha immediately made his way through the glittering throng and delivered the message. At once every eye turned on Lord Lyons, who, buttoned up to his throat in an indiarubber mackintosh, made a contrast to the splendour of the Oriental officials. It is not the custom for the members of the Diplomatic Body to go to the Bairam in uniform, and it is only lately that Franks have been allowed to see the ceremony.

“When the Procession had come to an end, the Sultan, without a nod to any one, turned sharp round and walked off at a double quick pace, and so ended the Ceremony. Fuad, the Grand Vizier, came to pay some civilities to my Lord, and then we returned home, very glad to get back to breakfast about ten o'clock. To us the only drawback had been the rain, but fancy what such a ceremony must be to those who attend it when it freezes in the morning. They have to wait in their thin dresses from sunrise till nine with the thermometer below zero, perhaps the snow falling, or in a storm of cutting wind. I confess I think indoors a safer place for Levees than the Gate of the Seraglio, but what memories it evokes! All audiences were in ancient days given in this Gateway, and Justice was dispensed there. It acquired the name of the Sublime Porte, which by degrees, on account of the importance of the acts which took place within its precincts, became the style and title of the very Government of Turkey itself.”

## CHAPTER II

### INTRODUCTORY

CONSTANTINOPLE, 1878-9—SIR HENRY LAYARD—TOUR  
IN ASIA—IN CHARGE OF THE EMBASSY—THANKS  
OF TURKISH GOVERNMENT—SCHEMES OF REFORM

**I**N the spring of 1878 the "Chancelleries" of Europe were "all agog" as to what was to happen next. The Russo-Turkish War had come to an end. A treaty between the belligerents had been signed at San Stefano on the 3rd of March, but the Western Powers had made up their minds to intervene, and had decided to hold a Conference at Berlin to settle the situation resulting from the war. The Earl of Beaconsfield was Prime Minister in England and the Earl of Derby was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It cannot be said that there was entire harmony in their political views, but the Administration had come into power in 1874, and no open divergence had as yet manifested itself.

Lord Derby had no desire to represent Great

Britain himself at Berlin, and he proposed to Lord Lyons, who was at that time Ambassador at Paris, to be British Plenipotentiary at the Conference whenever it should take place, and Lord Lyons, under whom I had worked for many years at Washington, at Constantinople and at Paris, telegraphed on the 15th of March to Sir Augustus Paget, our Ambassador at Rome, where I was Secretary of Embassy, to know whether Sir Augustus would spare me to go as Secretary to the projected Conference at Berlin.

I was naturally overjoyed at the prospect of accompanying Lord Lyons on such a mission, and Sir Augustus Paget made no objection. On the following day I received orders from the Foreign Office to come to London at once, and on Wednesday the 20th of March I arrived at Norfolk House, St. James's Square, to join Lord Lyons, who was staying with his nephew, the Duke of Norfolk.

But, alas, there was a slip between the cup and the lip! Differences between Lord Derby and the Government became more accentuated, and he retired from the Cabinet at the end of March 1878.

After a few days of suspense Lord Salisbury was appointed Foreign Secretary, and the appointment of Lord Lyons to be the British Plenipotentiary at Berlin fell into abeyance. He went back to Paris and I dangled on in London.

I had passed a good deal of my time at the Foreign Office reading up papers to acquaint myself with matters bearing on the coming Conference at Berlin, and had thus seen a good deal of Mr. Philip Currie, who later on became Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office and ultimately Ambassador successively at Constantinople and Rome, and was raised to the Peerage as Lord Currie.

Lord Salisbury on coming into office appointed Mr. Currie to be his Private Secretary.

The Private Secretary of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has to suggest to his chief most of the minor appointments in the Diplomatic service, and Mr. Philip Currie suggested to Lord Salisbury that I should be sent to Constantinople as Secretary of Embassy.

On the 26th of March I was summoned to the Foreign Office, and, without any previous warning,

Lord Salisbury told me that he wanted me to go to Constantinople as Secretary of Embassy. He said that he knew that he was proposing something that he feared would not be agreeable to me, but that it was absolutely necessary to have a Secretary there upon whom the Government could depend, as Sir Henry Layard was overworked and might at any moment break down. I could have but one answer to an offer made in so flattering a manner, nor did I pretend to ignore that an offer made by one's official Chief is much the same as an order.

But I had been Secretary at Athens for two years shortly before. I had liked the post and had become imbued with a theoretical dislike to Ottoman rule, and I thought it fair to mention this to Lord Salisbury, lest he should consider it to be a disadvantage to me at Constantinople. I told him that my sympathies were known to be anti-Turk, and that my appointment might be unacceptable on that account. Somewhat to my surprise he only laughed and said that that was in my favour, as he should be glad to have a moderating influence at the Embassy. In short, the matter was quickly



settled, and he undertook to let me go with Lord Lyons to Berlin in case his appointment as Plenipotentiary was maintained, but I gathered from the way in which he spoke of it that this was not likely to be the case.

All my life I had been in the habit of writing letters very constantly to my father and mother, by whom they were kept, and I shall now frequently quote from them.

*“April 26th, 1878.*

“I do not know what you will say to it! Of course it is a great thing to be appointed to the post which for the time being is the most important of its class, but I do not pretend that I am not very very sorry indeed to leave Rome, etc.”

*“April 30th, 1878.*

“I have no doubt it will all turn out for the best. At least, if I prove equal to the work which I may have to do. I have not the same opinion of my powers that others seem to have; I cannot help feeling that my reputation has been acquired more by good luck than anything else; that, however, in itself is a quality—to be lucky—and I only hope it may continue.”

I arrived at Constantinople on the 2nd of June, 1878, and placed myself at the orders of Sir Henry Layard. He received me civilly but without warmth, and I soon found that I had next to nothing to do. Sir Henry was at the time engaged in active negotiation with regard to Cyprus, but he was so anxious to keep the matter secret that he admitted no one to his confidence as to what was going on but Mr. Alfred Sandison, the chief Dragoman, and I should probably have remained in ignorance of what was passing had it not been that neither Sir Henry nor Mr. Sandison had an exceptional knowledge of diplomatic French, and Mr. Sandison, with much hesitation and after imploring me not to betray him, consulted me as to the wording of the documents in regard to the reciprocal engagements of the two Powers. They were, of course, of supreme and lasting importance. I did not pretend to be a first-rate French scholar myself, but I was more versed in official forms and wording than the Ambassador or the Chief Dragoman.

As I had nothing to do I turned about to find something. First Secretaries were expected to

acquaint themselves with commercial matters, so I turned to the Turkish Customs institutions as fields for study and activity. I had been two years in China and had seen the admirable manner in which the Customs under the able management of Sir Robert Hart had been administered. I wrote to him, and in due time obtained from him a complete and valuable account of the organisation over which he presided. I worked it into form so as to suit existing requirements in Turkey, and with some misgivings I submitted it to Sir Henry Layard.

“THERAPIA, *September 5th*, 1878.

“Despatches have come this morning which shadow forth my having plenty to do immediately on commercial affairs. I have been urging the matter on Sir Henry for some time past, and if he puts it into my hands, my time will be more than occupied. The Foreign Office clearly contemplates his doing so, for it desires him to instruct me to draw up a circular on the subject to the Consuls and to report on the replies which we receive.

“I wrote recently to Hart, the administrator of the

Chinese Customs, to ask him to give me confidentially details of his work, and one of the despatches to-day instructs Sir Henry to give his opinion on the particular point as to whether such a system would work here, so that my instincts have directed me in the right groove, and the information which I hope to receive from Hart will be very useful."

"THERAPIA, *October 25th, 1878.*

"The answer about the Reforms in Asiatic Turkey has come at last. Sir Henry appears to be quite satisfied with it. He was very friendly to me at dinner. Speaking of some difficult case to manage and a claimant, an American, having come to Constantinople, he said the happy thought struck him to turn the whole matter over to me. Lady Layard remarked that one of my predecessors had looked after it. 'Oh!' said Sir Henry, 'we had not Mr. Malet then. It will all go smoothly now it goes into his hands.' This is the first time I have ever heard him say a word to indicate that he is satisfied with the way I have done the work he gives me to do.

"He seems anxious to push for the Custom Administration Reform on which I have drawn up

a scheme founded on the one existing in China. My memorandum is now being translated into Turkish, and Sir Henry means to give it to the Sultan himself so that there may be no question as to his reading it. Should it ever pass into execution I shall have done a better thing for Turkey than its best friends have done hitherto. But I fear there must be a few more assassinations of Pachas before the Government can be frightened into it."

Time slipt on, Sir Henry Layard's health gave no cause for anxiety, but he was not unwilling to go home provided he could get an extended leave. This, however, did not suit Her Majesty's Government.

" THERAPIA, *October 4th, 1878.*

"I can understand that they cannot make up their minds to leaving the place in my charge during all the winter months considering how very gloomy the prospects are. Everything is as black as ink. The Sultan is obstinate about making no convention with Austria except one naming the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as temporary. The finances are getting worse and worse. The distress is increasing. Revolts are gaining ground. There is a new one in Asia

Minor at a place called Adana, where an exiled Pacha has returned and taken possession of the country near Tripolitza. He has sent to the Porte to say that he does not wish to be regarded as a rebel, but that he means to retain possession and requests to be appointed Governor. I suppose the Porte will have to do it. Hobart Pacha has come back. Yesterday, talking casually, he suggested the general break-up of the Empire in about three months. Sir Henry has latterly been very desponding about the future, confessing that he does not see what is to save them (the Turks). When these ardent Philo-Turks talk in this way it is a sign that affairs are pretty well past mending."

But we were all false prophets. The winter was tided over. I obtained permission from the Ambassador to travel, and on the 13th of November I left for Smyrna. Then followed a delightful journey to the Holy Land and Jerusalem. I was most anxious to go to Cyprus, but for reasons which I never could fathom Sir Henry Layard desired me not to go there. I went, however, by his orders to Aleppo—a wonderful city built of stone and paved with stone.

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Where a malignant and a turbaned Turk  
Beat a Venetian, . . .  
I took by the throat the dog  
And smote him—thus.

The old old story—persecution of the Christians by the Mahometans. I was sent to inquire into a case 300 years after Othello's little difficulty and found things much the same. I decided in favour of the Christians and against the Governor-General, and eventually insisted on his recall. A few years afterwards he became Grand Vizier—one of the best, and a great friend of England—a quaint twist in the whirligig of Fortune.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 19th*, 1879.

“I arrived here yesterday. Sir Henry Layard seemed really glad to see me and was very friendly.

“I hear a good account of the new Grand Vizier, Khairuddin, who seems to be despotic with his Ministers.

“If he attempts to stop bribery the whole race of functionaries will naturally turn upon him. As yet he keeps the Sultan's favour, and as long as that lasts he is safe against everything but assassination.”

“CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 11th*, 1879.

“Sir Henry Layard’s nervous system has broken down from the long strain and overwork. He has taken to his bed since Saturday and has asked for leave which has been sent to him, accompanied by very handsome messages from the Government which have this morning been of good use in pleasing him and making him easier in his mind. It has been very sad to see him lying unable to do anything, all his restless energy gone, and merely thinking of little things of no importance and fancying they were great ones. I have, of course, done all that lay in my power to be of use to him and to Lady Layard. The doctor forbids him all work, so I have taken up the thread and get on as well as I can.”

“CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 18th*, 1879.

“I am to be Minister Plenipotentiary here during the absence of Sir Henry.

“This gives me another step upwards in my career and I am sure that you will be delighted. This afternoon I go with Sir Henry to the Sultan.”



“*February 21st, 1879.*”

“Sir Henry goes to-day and I begin my reign as Minister Plenipotentiary *ad interim*. I think people here are well disposed towards me. Last night at Prince Lobanoff’s ball the Minister for Foreign Affairs talked to me for about an hour and a half, so that at last the French Ambassador interrupted us and asked him not to go without speaking to him. Then he went and stood near and kept turning round, and finally I said to Caratheodori,<sup>1</sup> ‘Je vois que l’Ambassadeur de France s’impatiente,’ and begged him to go to him.

“I have written to-day to Lord Salisbury a letter which, if he accepts my suggestions, may make a considerable change in feelings at home about Turkey. They are so feasible that I hope he may accede to them.

“I am just starting to say good-bye to Sir Henry and Lady Layard on board the steamer.”

“*February 25th, 1879.*”

“I am in harness now, and I find that beginning work at 8 o’clock and going on with it steadily all day with a little air in the afternoon and another

<sup>1</sup> Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

turn after 11 p.m. till 12 p.m., I manage to keep it within bounds.

“My reign has begun well by my obtaining the dismissal of one of the Pachas of Asia Minor, which we have been pressing for a long time. I brought my personal evidence to bear and it was decided to accede to my request in the Council on Sunday. Next day I received a telegram to insist on redress for the harm he was doing, and it was satisfactory to be able to reply that I had secured his dismissal.”

“*February 23rd, 1879.*”

“I am in full swing now, and it is all I can do to keep the work down. Affairs have been drifting for so long that I have been obliged to turn about me to consider what could be done to put matters straight. It so happens that in the first week of being in charge I have had to suggest to our Foreign Office solutions of the Greek, Eastern Roumelian and Austrian questions and to give advice as to the financial question.”

“*March 18th, 1879.*”

“The Banquet given last night by the Sultan to the Officers of the Fleet was a success. The Sultan was very civil, and asked me a good deal about

myself—my age, observing that I looked young for so important a position ; then about my family, and desired me to say to you and my father that he wished you long life and prosperity. I sat on the Sultan's right hand, with the Grand Vizier on my right hand, and the Admiral, Sir Geoffrey Hornby, was opposite on the Sultan's left. The conversation was translated by the Sultan's chief Dragoman who stood and interpreted during the whole dinner. The Sultan proposed the Queen's health and I proposed the Sultan's. I had afterwards a long talk on business with the Sultan, at which only the Grand Vizier and my own Dragoman were present. The Grand Vizier afterwards thanked me most warmly for the good advice I had given, and particularly for what I had said regarding himself, which His Highness said would be of the greatest assistance to him.

“In short, so far all goes well for me, but not, I fear, for Turkey, where the prospect waxes no brighter, and incapacity and scoundrelism maintain the upper hand.”

“PERA, *March 25th*, 1879.

“I like the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Caratheodori Pacha), and, as things go, the Grand Vizier (Khairuddin Pacha) is the best man they could have.

The rest are cruel, mean place-hunters who, from day to day, plunge the country lower and lower in the mire. I was talking over the position of the Grand Vizier yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and asked whether he was not strong enough to form a Cabinet which should assist his policy, instead of going on with this one, which thwarted it at every turn. The Minister said he feared not, but he begged me to speak to His Highness on the subject, as he might tell me that the Grand Vizier had spoken of me in very high terms, and said he was glad that I was at the head of affairs, and that I had shown much good sense in my conversations, and had much distinction of manner, and he was sure His Highness would be influenced by what I might say to him. . . . I fear it is at present more likely that Khaireddin should fall from office than that he should be allowed to choose his own Ministers. He is regarded as a foreigner by the Turks, and his straightforward attempts to check corruption have surrounded him with enemies.

“Fournier (the French Ambassador) talks of going away. His policy here, which has been antagonistic to that of his Government, has made his position nearly untenable, as he has failed.

The Tocqueville Convention, which has come to nothing, was his own child. He seemed in low spirits yesterday, and told me he should retire and leave the field clear for me. We continue to be excellent friends."

*"March 28th, 1879.*

"I think things are going well for me and that my work is approved at the Foreign Office. Yesterday I went to the Sultan and had a long conversation with him about mixed occupation<sup>1</sup> and the financial situation. With regard to the latter, I made use of certain arguments which I considered advisable, and, on coming home, I found a telegram from Lord Salisbury telling me to speak to the Sultan almost in the very words I had used. . . . Though I had to say things to the Sultan, which in themselves could be in no way agreeable, he begged me to come again in a few days. I said I had not asked to see him, as it was not etiquette, and he replied that I was at liberty to come and see him whenever I liked.

"I have also had very convincing proofs of confidence in me on the part of the Grand Vizier, who

<sup>1</sup> Of Eastern Roumelia by contingents of the Great Powers, after withdrawal of the Russian troops. The project, after being strongly pressed, was for cogent reasons suddenly abandoned.

has gone so far as to say that if he is able to modify his Cabinet he will consult me as to whom he should take into it, and that he begged me to make any suggestion as to its formation which I pleased.

“This Cabinet question, however, is a very serious one. Is the Grand Vizier strong enough to get rid of the men who oppose him, or will he fall in the attempt? I think the next few days must show. I have told the Sultan that the future of the Empire depends on the maintenance of Khaireddin in office. In short, it is at present a struggle in which the Grand Vizier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I are on one side (I being fortunately Great Britain), and the majority of the Ministry on the other, and the Sultan, much troubled, in the centre, feeling that to side with us is to do away with corruption, but also to do away with the corrupt class of Pachas who form the dominant and powerful section of his subjects and at whose hands he may suffer dethronement and death.”

“CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 31st*, 1879.

“Philip Currie writes to me as follows under date of the 20th :

“Lord Salisbury is at Windsor to-day or I

would have urged him to write to you privately the entire approval which I am sure he feels of your proceedings. You seem to be doing admirably in every respect, and I must say I congratulate myself at your being at Constantinople. . . .’

“This I know will please you. It certainly did me, as one never knows how one’s work is taken.

“Yesterday Fournier sent me a hurried line to say that he had heard from the Palace that the Grand Vizier was to be dismissed this evening. If this has been done it will be all up. The Turks will lose Eastern Roumelia for good and get no loan. But I hope it was a *canard*. I am going to see the Sultan this afternoon at four o’clock.”

“April 4th, 1879.

“If I can only keep Khaireddin in power I hope to get the country into a little better condition. At present the Sultan will not dismiss him, as I have said that if he does we will not give him any assistance in the money difficulties, or rather that public confidence would be so shaken that it would be useless to try and help him any more, and that he might go to the devil his own way. . . . Sir Henry Layard announces his return for the 4th of May.”

"April 11th, 1879.

"This has been the hardest week I have yet had, but I continue, so far, to get what our Government wishes, which is by no means easy, as they want one thing one day and one another. The Grand Vizier wants rather too often to see me, as he lives far off. Last night owing to work I was late for a dinner at Count Corti's (the Italian Ambassador), and I had to come away immediately afterwards to telegraph a message from the Porte, and just as I was finishing I got a letter marked 'urgence' to ask me to make no use of the information which I had been requested to send to my Government. So you see that they are no less at sixes and sevens here than they are at home."

"April 18th, 1879.

"I have been suddenly, by the force of circumstances, called into the unexpected position of having to act as mediator between the Sultan and the Austrian Ambassador. The Sultan will not authorise the signature of the Convention with Austria,<sup>1</sup> and yesterday sent for me to the Palace to be present at a discussion with his Ministers, which

<sup>1</sup> For the occupation and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed April 25th, 1879. An account of an episode in these negotiations will be found in *Shifting Scenes*, p. 96.



ended in my being requested to make a new proposal to Austria. It is all very delicate work. I fear it will end in the dismissal of the Ministry, but I shall do my best to save it. The Austrian Ambassador is most grateful to me for what I have done, and the Sultan and Ministers, I presume, like me or they would not make use of me. I am now off to the Palace again."

" April 22nd, 1879.

" Lord Salisbury in a private letter dated April 10th says :—

" ' I fear we have severely tried both your patience and your power of labour during the last week. We have to thank you for the energy and ability with which you have conducted negotiations which were in themselves difficult, and to which what Schouvaloff calls "*le muddle télégraphique*" lent an additional perplexity.'

" So you see it is so far so good, but the signing of the Austrian Convention is my greatest triumph, for it really was in great measure due to me, and I have received the following telegram on the subject from Lord Salisbury :—

" ' I entirely approve your proceedings with regard to the Austrian Convention and congratulate you on the result.' "

Sir Henry Layard returned to his post as Ambassador at the beginning of May, and my conduct of affairs ceased. It had lasted from the 22nd of February to the 5th of May, and on its conclusion the Porte took the certainly unusual and, I think, unprecedented step announced in the following despatch to me from Lord Salisbury :—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 31st*, 1879.

“ It affords me much gratification to be enabled to communicate to you the accompanying copy of a Despatch addressed by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Ambassador in London, in which His Excellency has been pleased to record the sense which is entertained by the Imperial Government of the manner in which you have recently conducted the business of Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople.

“ I am, etc.,

“ SALISBURY.”

ENCLOSURE

*Translation.*

“ SUBLIME PORTE, *May 8th*, 1879.

“ M. l'Ambassadeur,—His Excellency Sir Henry Layard having returned to Constantinople, the

mission which Mr. Malet carried on during his absence as Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary has come to an end.

“On this occasion it is very agreeable to me, M. l'Ambassadeur, to mark my sense of the tact and the loyalty of which Mr. Malet has given proof in the relations which he has maintained with the Sublime Porte. He has thoroughly succeeded in gaining the esteem and sympathy of the Imperial Government.

“As Mr. Malet is going on leave to London I request your Excellency to be the interpreter of these views to Lord Salisbury.

“CARATHEODORI.”

I may add that during the time I was in charge the Sultan decided to appoint an English Minister of Finance. I communicated the offer to Her Majesty's Government and requested them to select a proper person for the post. I received a reply to the effect that the offer appeared to have been made to me personally and that therefore they would leave the selection to me. I at once chose Major Evelyn Baring (now Earl of Cromer), who was at

the time occupying the post of Commissioner of the Public Debt at Cairo. He made certain conditions, which were accepted, but I was not able to bring the matter to a close before Sir Henry Layard came back and Major Baring wrote to me as follows :—

“CAIRO, *May 15th*, 1879.

“My dear Sir,—Vivian has just communicated to me the telegram from Constantinople to the effect that ‘The Sultan will not avail himself of my services.’

“My brother will, no doubt, have told you that I expected that the matter would end thus and that I am personally not disappointed that it should be so. I doubt if I or any one else could do much good. I conceive the task of reform to be almost more hopeless at Constantinople than at Cairo, which is saying a great deal.

“In spite of this termination let me return you my best thanks for thinking of me as a candidate for the post. I hope that some day we may meet and that I may be able to thank you in person. In the meanwhile,

“Believe me, etc.,

“EVELYN BARING.”

In penning this note Major Baring forgot that he had met me at Washington during the Civil War. It was indeed in consequence of the impression that he made upon me at that time that I selected him to fill the post which the Sultan had decided to create, and had I remained in office at Constantinople for another month, I think that the appointment would have been made.

My scheme for the reorganisation of the Customs also fell into abeyance as soon as I retired, but notwithstanding the nonfulfilment of these two hopes, my work left a permanent impression, and years afterwards, when I was Ambassador at Berlin, I received a message from the Sultan to suggest my returning as Ambassador to Constantinople. It was impossible for me to change posts, and I remained at Berlin.

## CHAPTER III

EGYPT, 1879-80—AUDIENCE OF THE KHEDIVE—RIAZ  
PACHA—SIR E. BARING—GENERAL GORDON—MECCA  
PILGRIMAGE CEREMONY—CHANGE OF MINISTRY IN  
ENGLAND

**I**N beginning this sketch of my mission in Egypt, I desire to make a point of stating that the Conservative Government, during whose term of office I was appointed Agent and Consul-General, and their successors, the Cabinet of Mr. Gladstone, which came into power in April, 1880, were equally opposed to all idea of acquiring any position in Egypt not sanctioned by existing treaties and ordinances. The thought of armed intervention was odious to both political parties. Lord Salisbury said to me, "Remember that you will never have anything to back you but moral force," and Lord Granville was no less emphatic in his instructions to me to do nothing which might tend to armed intervention. It was the force of circumstances which ultimately rendered such intervention unavoidable, and I was well aware, when it did

become unavoidable, that that was happening which the whole of my efforts during my mission in Egypt had been dedicated to prevent. It lay with my superiors to determine whether this untoward result was in any way brought about by my acts or my attitude. It is quite certain that if, in their judgment, I had been in the slightest degree to blame for the miscarriage of their whole policy they would never have employed me again. An Agent who plunges his country into war when his instructions are to avoid it by every means at his command is beyond pardon, and when the supreme day came, and intervention was taking place, I laid no flattering unction to my soul that my stewardship was other than a failure. Happily I was serving under honourable men. Lord Granville had watched my proceedings step by step, and he was perfectly aware that no part of the fatality was due to me. Both he and Mr. Gladstone vindicated me from aspersions and attacks in Parliament, and as a mark of the unabated confidence which they reposed in me, they appointed me, as soon as vacancies occurred, to be Minister at Brussels and, again

within a year, to be Ambassador at Berlin, which at the time was the most important Embassy in the diplomatic service, for Prince Bismarck was then in the zenith of his power and controlled the political movements of Europe.

I arrived at Cairo to take up my new post on the 4th of November, 1879, and I saw the Khedive for the first time on the following day. My impressions were decidedly pleasant. He had a courteous and amiable manner. He was short and rather stout, his figure had no particular outline, it was blended into a series of cushion-like angles, his face was like a fresh peach with a pair of good and intelligent eyes. He was a little shy, but the sort of shyness which is gentle and attractive. In some persons shyness has a hard and repellent effect. In the Khedive it had just the reverse. He spoke French with sufficient fluency, but at that time no English. Later on he studied it, but was never so proficient in it as to speak it with ease.

“CAIRO, *November 17th*, 1879.

“ . . . My official reception went off very well.  
. . . A carriage and four came to take me to the



Palace with an escort of cavalry and we drove at a footpace through the crowd. I was received by the Khedive, the Ministers, and the Court. On leaving a sword of honour was girt round me and a magnificently caparisoned horse was at the door, and was led behind my carriage back to the hotel. The saddle is of red velvet embroidered in gold and the headgear enlivened with gold tassels. They will make a pretty object for the Hall at Wilbury. Afterwards the Minister for Foreign Affairs came in uniform to me at the hotel and five minutes later I returned his visit. In the afternoon my Commission was read out in the presence of British subjects resident in Egypt. This was in the Court-room at the Consulate. I stood in uniform on the lower step of the throne and made a speech, short and civil, and then, all present, about forty were introduced to me, a Levee. There was no hitch in any of the ceremonies. How I wish you were enjoying this marvellous climate. I have known nothing like it anywhere."

I will here venture to call the particular attention of the reader to the words of the speech I made to the Khedive on the occasion of my presenting my credentials to him. I am aware that such speeches are

often considered to be mere empty forms conveying no responsibility. I do not share this opinion. So long as the Khedive gave no cause for remonstrance I hold that I was bound to act in accordance with the solemn declaration which I made to him.

“ Monseigneur, — The Queen Empress, my August Sovereign, having deigned to appoint me to be Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, I have the honour to place in Your Highness’ hands the letter by which the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, announces this nomination to Your Highness.

“ I beg Your Highness to accord to me your kind support in the agreeable task which devolves upon me of maintaining in Egypt those bonds of friendship which have so long and so happily existed between Great Britain and the Sublime Porte.

“ On my part I shall neglect nothing within the limits of my duty which may contribute to the welfare of the country governed by Your Highness.

“ I am convinced that, under the wise and humane direction of Your Highness, Egypt will again rise to that prosperity to which my Govern-

ment attaches so much importance, and I pray God to keep Your Highness under His protection and to prolong your days for the happiness of your people."

I did not regard these words as empty phrases, and during the four years that I was in Egypt, passing through times of doubt, stress and danger—days when the support of the Khedive was looked upon by certain politicians as both a crime and a folly—I never wavered from acting in accordance with the statement I made in presenting my credentials.

Nor was the Prince, in whose support Great Britain was compelled eventually to send a fleet and an army and to spill the blood of her sons, unworthy of our assistance, of our sympathy and of the sacrifice which we made.

I am aware that my opinion on this point is open to question. I am therefore glad to be able to reinforce it by the deliberate and mature words of Lord Cromer in his speech on the 4th of May, 1907, after having given the twenty-four best years of his life to the amelioration of the lot of Egypt.

“In the first place I should like to say a word or two of one to whom, in my opinion, the public has never yet done sufficient justice. I allude to the late Khedive, His Highness Tewfik Pacha. Gentlemen, I am not going to use the language of empty compliment or to employ conventional phrases. What I say I mean. Tewfik Pacha understood his country and his countrymen well. He constituted an admirable link between the Reformers, whose zeal he at all times tempered, and the people whose ultra-conservative fears of reform he used his influence to allay. History will be unjust if it does not accord to Tewfik Pacha a somewhat important niche in the Valhalla of Oriental Potentates. He did not himself take any very active part in the regeneration of Egypt, but he was wise enough to encourage and support those who were working for its regeneration.”

It must not be inferred from these remarks concerning the Khedive that we went to war solely, or mainly, to maintain him in the position to which he had been appointed by the Sultan. The complicated issues which compelled us to intervene are well explained in Lord Granville's despatch to the

Earl of Dufferin of the 11th of July, 1882. It occupies thirteen pages of a Blue Book (Egypt No. 10, 1882) and is too long for quotation in a book which has no pretence to being a history of the British intervention in Egypt. But there are a few words in the fourth paragraph of the despatch which give the clue of the position :—

“ The situation of Egypt on the most direct maritime route between England and her Indian possessions and Australian Colonies gives to this country a special interest in Egyptian affairs. In addition to this, British capital and industry have been largely employed in the introduction into Egypt of the great works of modern improvement, and a large British community is resident in the country.”

Riaz Pacha was at the time President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and my first mention of him is a good moment to remark upon a peculiarity in the position of the Khedive with regard to foreign States which is unique. I have never made up my mind whether it is to his advantage or disadvantage. All the great Powers

and many of the minor ones are represented at Cairo, but there is no reciprocity. The Khedive, on his side, has no representatives at foreign Courts. The result is that what he has to say must be said to the Agent accredited to him. Other Sovereigns make their wishes known through their own Ministers at foreign Courts. This course is not open to the Khedive. It may be the case, and indeed has, I believe, frequently been the case, that the Khedive may have cause of complaint against the Agent himself, but the only person through whom he can bring his grievance to the knowledge of the Government of another country is through the Agent against whom his complaint lies. From this point of view it seems unfair, but on the other hand the system has its advantages especially to the Budget. It saves the expense of a diplomatic corps.

Riaz Pacha was a man of much ability and great experience in the methods of governing under Ismail Pacha, but he was somewhat too tenacious of his own methods and too sanguine. To the day of his fall he was convinced that he could cope

with and overcome every difficulty that arose. He was thoroughly honest and straightforward, and if he ever deceived others on any point it was not till after he had deceived himself upon it. He was always perfectly sure that he could master the military effervescence. If he had had his doubts about this early in 1880, there would have been time to negotiate and prevent.

“CAIRO, *November 22nd*, 1879.

“Baring, the Controller-General, came on the 20th. I like him and I think he likes me. I do not doubt that we shall get on very well together. I am not altogether satisfied with the Ministry, but one must not be surprised at their making a few struggles to extricate themselves from the vice in which they are held. Riaz Pacha, the President of the Council, is a pleasant, honest and sensible man, without the excessive sharpness of Nubar Pacha, and this has its advantages, for he inspires more confidence than the wily Armenian. . . .

“M. de Ring, the new French Agent and Consul-General, has arrived. I have known him for many years and congratulate myself on having a French colleague with whom I am on excellent

terms at a moment when harmony between the French and English representatives in Egypt is a matter of absolute necessity."

The general situation at this moment is well described in M. de Freycinet's book, *La question d'Egypte*, issued, I think, in 1905.<sup>1</sup>

"The first days of the Government of Tewfik were calm, as often happens after violent commotions. But to a vigilant observer there were clouds on the horizon. The complete submission of the new Khedive to the will of the Powers, the too evident interference of the latter in the government of Egypt, their incessant efforts in favour of the foreign creditors, the suppressed heart-burnings of the partizans of Ismail and, above all, the complete absence of control over the home administration were all germs of future complications."

It is strange that M. de Freycinet should omit the most potent factor in the future trouble, the already existing discontent in the army. The race struggle between the Egyptian officers and the Turkish and Circassian officers had been brought

<sup>1</sup> Page 183.



into play for political purposes by the Khedive Ismail and his predecessor Said, and I doubt whether it had ever slept since it was first aroused.

This, and no other, was the *causa teterrima belli*. The other grievances could have all been gradually allayed. It was to the interest of the foreign Powers that they should be allayed, and we—that is, Her Majesty's Government, both Conservative and Liberal—were of one mind as to their duty and their interest being alike engaged in gradually removing the burthens under which the people were labouring. The British panacea was naturally liberal institutions, a constitutional government and a representative Chamber; but before we could take in hand these larger aspirations it was necessary to adjust the national accounts, and this we did with what seems to me now to have been phenomenal rapidity.

“*January 3rd, 1880.*”

“Gordon Pacha has arrived. He is a man of very remarkable abilities, but he has a bee or two in his bonnet which I must try and prevent from buzzing too much. I sent the Clerk of the Agency

and my carriage to meet him at the station on his arrival, which pleased him, for he told me it was the first time a Consul-General had shown him such attention. He came to me yesterday evening while I was at dinner and had a good deal of business talk with me, which was inconvenient as I had a party, but necessary as he had to see the Khedive next morning. I asked him to dine with me to-night; he refused. 'Well,' I said, 'if not to-night, to-morrow or another night'; but he said 'No,' and gave me to understand that he never would dine with me at all. He is a little man, with no outward trace of the strong energy of character for which he is remarkable—a pleasant, quick, intelligent expression and the manner rather of a pretty little bird that hops from twig to twig. He has written me a long string of questions to which he wants immediate answers, and means to come to me to-day 'officially' to get them; they all require consideration and examination, and it is my messenger day too! . . .

“On New Year's Day Sir George Elliot gave a dinner of fifty at Shepherd's Hotel. It was very tiresome, and lasted three hours with speeches afterwards. I proposed Sir George's health, and what I said gave him satisfaction. He is, however,

I think a little doubtful about me. He said to me, 'I always told Lord Salisbury he must send here the strongest man he could lay his hands on, and when he appointed you he told me he had done the best he could.' Sir George said this as though he wished me to understand that he had doubts about the wisdom of the selection. You know he is a self-made man of great wealth with a vast stake in this country, where he has constructed the Port of Alexandria."

*"January 12th, 1880.*

"I have a great deal of work. What between Abyssinia, Col. Gordon, Alexandria Harbour, and the Judicial and Financial reforms, I have my hands as full as I can manage. I have written a letter to King John of Abyssinia forwarding a letter to him from the Queen, and I despatched them by a black gentleman who goes by the appellation of Naib Mohammed. He is duly impressed with the importance of his mission, and I hope the King will not cut off his ears or commit any other atrocity. Baring is a giant at work, and you see by the way in which Egyptian securities have risen that there is much confidence in what is being done here."

“CAIRO, *January 26th*, 1880.

“I see Baring now pretty well every day, so that I begin to feel as if I too had a hand in the liquidation. It takes my breath away to hear him explain the most intricate and extensive financial operations with perfect ease.”

I told Lord Salisbury when he offered me the post in Egypt that I doubted whether I ought to accept it, as I knew nothing at all about finance and that a schoolboy could do sums better than I could. He replied that I should have nothing to do with the technical part, which would be in the hands of the Controller-General.

“*February 9th*, 1880.

“Sir George Elliot has been paying me a visit. You know he is a self-made man and, having begun as a miner, is now worth hundreds of thousands. I was amused at his launching out as follows: ‘Well, you ought to be the happiest young fellow going. You have got a good constitution, good health, a pleasant place to live in. You enjoy the respect of everybody and the confidence of those whom you serve.’ The first time I saw him

two months ago he spoke to me rather doubtingly as to the propriety of my nomination."

On the occasion of the return of the Pilgrims from Mecca various religious ceremonies are gone through at Cairo. Among others there was one called the "Dosah." A very good account of it is given in Mr. Butler's book *Court Life in Egypt*, p. 38.

In a great open space in the centre of the fashionable European quarter numberless beautiful tents were put up, and in the evening the rich Pachas held receptions in them. They were hung with rich silks and satins and illuminated by countless little lamps. It looked like a fair and lasted for a week. On the last day of the week the ceremony of the Dosah took place. The Khedive always came, and it was usual for the members of the Diplomatic Corps to be present. A special tribune was reserved for them, and those who attended went, I believe, in uniform. The ceremony took place at noon. A hustling crowd of Dervishes, all more or less intoxicated with drugs, rushed on to the scene and threw themselves face downwards on to the ground,

side by side, till they were packed like sardines in a box. When they were all in place the Sheikh of the Dervishes, riding a magnificent horse and flanked by attendants, rode over the prostrate bodies. It was a cruel and sickening sight. Whether people were killed or not was asserted or denied according to the views of those who spoke, but it was quite clear that it was a revolting custom which fostered extreme fanaticism, and I decided not to countenance it by my presence. I was told that my absence would be much marked, and I replied that that was exactly what I wished. Still I did not remain away ostentatiously or announce my intention, as I had to guard against there being any semblance of a demonstration. If my colleagues had heard beforehand of my intended absence, they might have followed suit and an empty Diplomatic Tribune would have "set the wild echoes flying." It was good to keep in mind an excellent adage of our profession: "*Il faut faire les affaires de son Gouvernement, mais ne pas lui faire des affaires.*"

There was in the neighbourhood of Cairo a little watering-place called Helouan with a good hotel;

thither I betook myself and stayed two or three days. On returning to Cairo I visited the Khedive, and he remarked on my absence on the occasion of the Dosah and expressed the hope that I had not been indisposed. I then took up my parable and spoke. I said that I had absented myself purposely, because it was a cruel and degrading spectacle, and from what I already knew of His Highness I was sure that, though he was obliged to attend, he felt the same as I did in regard to it. I was right in my surmise. The Khedive entirely agreed, but he said that he was powerless to put an end to it. The religious feeling of the country would be outraged were he to attempt to do so. The only means by which it could be suppressed was by a decree emanating from the Sheikh-el-Bekri, and he could not hope to obtain such a decree from the present holder of the office; but he was an aged man who was not likely to live long. When, in the natural course of events, it should become necessary to name a successor, the Khedive assured me that he would choose a more enlightened functionary, and that with his assistance he hoped it might

be possible to suppress the Dosah. His Highness was as good as his word, and the following year the Dosah did not take place. Mr. Butler, whose book I have mentioned, was tutor to the Khedive's boys, and he also had spoken very earnestly to His Highness about the inhumanity of the ceremony. In recording its suppression, he says (p. 296): "The impossible was accomplished: and so was abolished a degrading and inhuman custom which for two centuries had been the principal feature in the most solemn of all the Mohammedan festivals of Egypt. No one who thinks what this statement means can refuse to the Khedive the admiration and honour which he deserves for his most noble courage. I, for one, who know how much evil he conquered, shall never cease to revere him for it." These words are well deserved.

In the winter of 1900 I was in Cairo and, talking with a Mussulman friend on the subject, I observed some displeasure in the tone with which he treated it. "Surely," I said, "you, of all persons, with your advanced and cosmopolitan views, could not blame the Khedive for doing away with the



Dosah?" "Perhaps not," was the reply; "but we resent its having been done at the behest of the English Consul-General!" I deprecated this view, and explained that the Khedive was anxious himself to suppress the Dosah, and always intended to do it, but it had all happened twenty years before. Impressions are cemented by time, and rumours grow into legends.

The month of March was occupied by the negotiations between the French and British Governments on the one side and the remainder of the great Powers of Europe on the other for the establishment of a Commission of Liquidation which was to settle the Egyptian financial question.

"CAIRO, *March 22nd*, 1880.

"... My affairs here all go well. The (Egyptian) Government feels safe with me and fortunately they seem easy to deal with as long as they are fairly treated. My favourable opinion of the Khedive increases, but he has so little power that one can hardly judge of what he would do if he were allowed to do as he liked."

“*March 31st, 1880.*

“ I hope this afternoon to sign the joint Declaration between England, France, Austria, Germany and Italy, which has to precede the issue of the Decree establishing the Commission of Liquidation. The Decree will be issued immediately afterwards. We shall have thus made a great step in advance. I can hardly say that any of us here gain much credit by it, as the negotiations have all been carried on between the Governments and all we have to do is to sign. M. de Ring and I were the only ones who seemed to know anything about how to draw up the instrument which we are to sign, and therefore I say only that I *hope* we shall do it to-day. I have rather hurried the matter, as I refuse to sign to-morrow on account of its being the 1st of April, and I don't want to expose ourselves to the ridicule which would attach to the signature of a serious Act on All Fools' Day. . . . I trust the Conservatives will keep in, for I hate changing masters.”

The document in question was duly signed, and the Khedivial Decree for the establishment of the Commission of Liquidation was issued on the 31st of March, 1880.

My hope that the Conservative Government would remain in office on the ground that I did not like "changing masters" was doomed to disappointment. Towards the end of April Mr. Gladstone came into power as Prime Minister and Lord Granville became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On leaving office Lord Salisbury wrote me the following letter :—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 23rd*, 1880.

*"Private.*

"Dear Mr. Malet,—As the telegraph will have informed you, the resignation of the Ministry took place yesterday. I therefore only write to thank you for the unwearying support and assistance you have given me; and to express the pleasure I have felt in working with you. The success of our Egyptian arrangements, so far as six months justify an opinion, has been very remarkable: and it is in no small measure due to the judgment and tact with which you have exercised the office of Her Majesty's Representative. I trust the new arrangements may be left under your care until the lapse of time and the influence of habit shall have given them a chance of durability. But

I fear, for Egypt's sake, that you are likely to be called away to more conspicuous functions before any considerable period has elapsed. In any case you will leave a valuable tradition.

“ Believe me,

“ Yours very truly,

“ SALISBURY.”

## CHAPTER IV

EGYPT, 1880-1—LORD GRANVILLE—THE LAW OF  
LIQUIDATION—OFFER OF THE K.C.B.

ON the 28th of April, 1880, Mr. Gladstone came into power, and he certainly little dreamt on that day that before he quitted office the Egyptian question under his guidance, or in spite of it, would have taken a turn which placed Great Britain in administrative possession of Egypt for an undetermined number of years. I am free to confess that I myself, acting under the orders of Lord Granville and of the Government of which Mr. Gladstone was the moving spirit, do not, to this day, feel that I held then, or have discovered since, the key to the enigma. I do feel perfectly certain that the Liberal Government did not desire to be obliged to intervene in a military sense in Egypt, but what it was that made them blind to fate I do not know and probably never shall know. The action of the Queen's Government in con-

junction with the action of the French Government made the necessity of intervention certain.

In extreme cases of this kind the truth often leaks out years afterwards, but in this instance, which was certainly an extreme case, nothing has been discovered; no hidden motive has been attributed either to Mr. Gladstone or Lord Granville, both of them had much to lose politically and nothing to gain by armed intervention. It was the negation of Liberal and Radical principles and most unwelcome to their political followers in both Houses. Had they not been the high-minded and honourable men they were, they would have turned on their Agents and laid the blame on them. They did nothing of the kind. They upheld us in all our acts and accepted what I suppose appeared to them to be inevitable and made the best they could of it.

A good summary of what had happened in Egypt is contained in Lord Granville's despatch to Lord Dufferin of July 11th, 1882, dealing with the state of affairs at the time that the Liberal Government came into office in 1880. Lord Granville says:—

“They inherited from their predecessors the principle of joint action with France in Egyptian affairs. . . . It was not necessary, nor indeed opportune, to inquire whether the system introduced by that action was one which would under all circumstances have been the best and the most convenient. It was undoubtedly working well for the material prosperity of the country, and promised to do so for the future. Her Majesty’s Government accepted it as a fact and gave it their unreserved support.”

I had worked under Lord Granville before, as he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1870 to 1874, and he had recommended me for my first honour of C.B. for my services during the time of the Commune at Paris, when I was in charge of the Embassy.

*Lord Granville to Mr. Malet.*

*Private.*

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 27th*, 1880.

“My dear Malet,—I am glad to have so judicious a man as yourself at Cairo.

“The arrangements do not appear to me (perhaps prejudiced) very favourable for continued harmony,

and it will require all the oil at your disposal to make things work. . . .

“Yours sincerely,

“GRANVILLE.”

By this time the Commission of Liquidation was well under way; Sir Charles Rivers Wilson was President. There were two English Members, two French Members and one Member each for Germany, Austria and Italy. Russia declined to appoint a Member. The Controllers-General, Major Evelyn Baring and M. de Blignières, assisted the Commission on behalf of the Khedive.

I did not take any part in the sittings, but I was kept aware of all that passed.

I thought the opportunity a good one to obtain the appointment of a Department for the suppression of the importation of slaves.

“CAIRO, *May 10th*, 1880.

“I am working away to get something done to prevent the importation of slaves. I hope I have succeeded. I have suggested the formation of a flying column dedicated to the task of watching the



oases by which the caravans arrive, and I have asked that the command should be given to an officer in whom I have confidence. I have fixed upon a certain Count della Sala, a man of iron health and immense energy, with a reputation for soldierlike qualities gained in Mexico under Maximilian."

"CAIRO, *May 12th*, 1880.

"Things are going pretty well. There is plenty for me to do as a go-between. . . . I have got all that I wanted done about the Slave Trade."

But by this time difficulties began to show themselves.

"CAIRO, *May 17th*, 1880.

"The Commission of Liquidation is just now beginning to give me a good deal of trouble, as its tendency is in conflict with my instructions. That is to say, our policy is to make the interest of the creditors subsidiary to the interests of Egypt, and the Commission, or a part of it, wants to get hold of more money out of the Revenues than the Government thinks it can spare. It is 'pull devil, pull baker'. I do not feel easy. It is a very nice point for me to judge where I am to step in."

“CAIRO, *May 24th*, 1880.

“One line to say that I am so bothered by the difficulties arising in the Commission of Liquidation that I have not time to write to you to-day.”

“CAIRO, *May 26th*, 1880.

“I have had my time more than taken up of late by the difficulty of bringing the Khedive's Government and the Commission into harmony in consequence of conflicting views. You may imagine that this has given annoyance and trouble; Riaz Pacha is furious. In addition numerous intrigues are afoot to upset the Government, including threats against Europeans, which became so impertinent that De Ring and I were obliged to go to the Khedive together to represent the matter. In short, I shall be truly glad when the Commission is dissolved.”

“CAIRO, *June 3rd*, 1880.

“After a very considerable fight things are now going smoothly here, and it is satisfactory to me to see that both Rivers Wilson and Baring attribute the altered state of affairs to my interference. It is, any way, certain that there is a marvellous alteration for the better, and that we may now

reasonably expect a happy issue to all our labours. The ring of Pachas has been broken up. The two principal ones have left Cairo ; two dangerous ones, who remain here, are under surveillance ; several arrests have been made, and we are, at present, enjoying entire relief from agitation. The difference between here and Constantinople is that here difficulties are surmountable, there they were not ; my work here brings fruit, there never."

*"June 10th, 1880.*

"I see there is a great deal of talk about the Slave Trade here. I felt certain that this would be the case and took measures accordingly, by which I think I have successfully warded off the blow which would otherwise have fallen on the head of the Egyptian Government. The Slave Trade is a red flag to so many people, and there is so little faith in any real intention on the part of the Turks to stop it, that I do not wonder at the anxiety of the Philanthropists."

A question had been asked in the House and Sir Charles Dilke, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had given an answer which had been regarded as satisfactory, but there was always

in my own home a jealous critic not only of what I did, but also of what was said about what I did, and Sir Charles Dilke's reply did not please my dear mother, because she considered that he ought to have explained that the steps which the Egyptian Government had taken were due to my insistence, and that I should have been given the credit.

“CAIRO, *June 14th*, 1880.

“I observe what you said about Dilke's answer in the House regarding the Slave Trade. I quite understand it, for I have been very careful to allow the Egyptian Government all the credit in the matter and to put them forward as acting on their own initiative; you see, my general object here is to gain their confidence and good will, so that my influence may be real. Had I blown my own trumpet and said that the Government acted under pressure from me, I might have obtained a result which might have been momentarily favourable to me, but not to my general aims here.”

The labours of the Commission of Liquidation were now drawing smoothly to a close, and Major Evelyn Baring had been offered and had accepted

the post of Financial Member of the Council to the Viceroy of India.

“CAIRO, *June 26th*, 1880.

“Baring leaves to-day and I confess I am exceedingly sorry. He was a sort of sheet anchor in all moments of doubt and difficulty, which are frequent enough. His successor, Colvin, is a good man but of a different stamp.”

This is the first mention in my letters of Sir Auckland Colvin. He had been in the Indian Civil Service and had recently acted as British Member on the Commission of Liquidation. He remained in Egypt as Controller-General and Financial Adviser to the Khedive until 1883, when he was appointed to the post of Financial Secretary in India in succession to Sir Evelyn Baring, who succeeded me at Cairo as Agent and Consul-General.

Sir Auckland Colvin and I passed through all the phases of the Egyptian revolt, and on two occasions, which I shall describe in their place, he played a prominent part, while I was absent from my post.

He was selected to be Controller-General on account of the financial and administrative capacity which he had displayed in his Indian career, and apart from these qualities he was a man of high mind and unflinching courage.

He has been accused of a deliberate intention to bring about armed foreign intervention, and I deeply regret that the recent and present state of Sir Auckland Colvin's health precludes him from making any reply, even if he were to think it worth his while to do so.<sup>1</sup>

A more unjust accusation was never made against a public official.

Sir Auckland's duties were well defined. Chief among them was the defence of Egyptian financial credit, and as this was in continual jeopardy through the ambition and the ignorance of the military party which controlled the Government in 1881-2, it became his duty to point out the ruin to which their demands were leading, and to do his utmost to avert it.

<sup>1</sup> This was written in 1907. Sir A. Colvin died March 24th, 1908, three months before Sir E. Malet's death.

“CAIRO, *July 3rd*, 1880.

“Rivers Wilson fears now that he shall not get through his work as quickly as he had hoped. I shall have to remain for a certain time after the Law of Liquidation is out, to see that there is no prospect of any one taking advantage of my absence to play tricks.

“Have you any plans for the summer? I have received a letter from Lord Lyons in which he says he is to take a ‘Luft Kur’ in some elevated spot in Germany at the end of this month, and I gather that he would like me to look him up on my way home. I might pay him a visit *en passant*. He says in his letter:—

“‘I am not surprised at the difficulties you have had (with the Law of Liquidation), but I should have been very much annoyed by them if I did not see that you had managed admirably and got so very well out of them.’”

On the 17th of July, 1880, the Law of Liquidation was presented by the Commission to the Khedive at the Ras-el-Tin Palace at Alexandria and His Highness sanctioned it at once. It is thus described in M. de Freycinet’s work on the Egyptian Question:—

“The Law of Liquidation which is still in force and which has been called, not without reason, the Financial Code or budgetary charter of Egypt. At the time of its promulgation the total recognised debt was £98,748,930 sterling.”—Extract from *La question d’Egypte*, 1904.

“CAIRO, July 18th, 1880.

“Thank Heaven we are out of the Liquidation wood at last and all has ended well. Wilson has worked hard and has shown a good deal of tact lately in turning ugly corners. He is worn out with fatigue and starts to-morrow for Constantinople, trusting to the sea voyage to set him up. I too have broken down a bit lately. I do not mind the heat, but it seems that the summer climate in Cairo is treacherous and gives you a kick when you least expect it. I have asked for leave and propose, if it is granted, to be off at the beginning of August.”

The success of the Law of Liquidation was immediate. Trade and agriculture revived and an era of prosperity loomed over the happy Egyptians. Everybody rejoiced, and the brilliant future in which they soon believed was attributed



to the Law of Liquidation and to the Members of the Commission who had framed it.

I took my leave of absence in August 1880, and found ample encouragement at home from my superiors. Lord Granville fully recognised the use I had been in the matter of the Law of Liquidation and wrote to me the following laconic and characteristic letter :--

*“ Confidential.*

“ Do you like a K.C.M.G. in the hand or a K.C.B. in a very thick bush?

“ G.”

The postmark on the envelope is August 31st, 1880.

In those days before the links between the Colonies and the Mother Country had been drawn so close as they are now, the Colonial Order of St. Michael and St. George was less coveted, and the Government had always a certain number of Knight Commanderships at its disposal for immediate use, whereas the ranks of the Knights Commanders of the Bath were serried and vacancies only occurred at long intervals. It had always

been the distinction most desired by Members of the Diplomatic Service, and I replied to Lord Granville that I preferred to wait for "the K.C.B. in a very thick bush."

The result was that, although I got the first vacancy, I was not appointed till October 1881—more than a year after the performance of the services for which it was granted. The delay had two inconveniences. Firstly, for a long while it seemed as though there was no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to take any special notice of my services in connection with the Law of Liquidation, and this lent confirmation to the view that I had had little or nothing to do with it; and, secondly, the moment at which it was eventually bestowed was not propitious. The star of peace in Egypt was on the wane and nobody could well understand why such a moment should be selected to give me a much-coveted honour.

However, my friends stood by me and I received a large number of letters of congratulation. Kind, generous and encouraging, they brought joy to my heart. I will only quote one or two of them,

selecting those written by the chiefs under whom I worked, and who were therefore the best qualified to give an opinion. The first is from the Earl of Derby, who had been my official chief two years previously.

“KNOWSLEY, PRESCOT, *October 4th*, 1881.

“Dear Malet,—Allow me to offer you my sincere congratulations on your new honour. It has been well earned, and the announcement of it, so far as I can judge, has given general satisfaction. May it be only the forerunner of other and greater distinctions. To me, among many others, it has given very real pleasure. I always felt sure that you would be at the top of the diplomatic tree some day ; and I am more sure of it now than ever.

“Very truly yours,

“DERBY.”

The second is from Sir Charles Dilke, who was Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Mr. Gladstone's Government.

*October 22nd*, 1881.

“My dear Malet,—I congratulate you on your K.C.B., which is some small mark of the opinion

people have about your being kept in a place which, in pay and rank, is so much below your abilities, only because it is really more important than an Embassy, and nobody else can be found to fill it. I knew the K.C.B. was in the bush when you refused the K.C.M.G. in the hand.

“Yours ever truly,

“CHARLES W. DILKE.”

The third is the most important because it is from Mr. Gladstone.

“10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL,

“*October 11th, 1881.*”

“Dear Sir Edward Malet,—I have received your letter of October 2nd. In reply to it I will only assure you that it gave me very sincere pleasure to act upon the recommendation of Lord Granville that you should be selected for a Commandership of the Bath: and, further, it is with great satisfaction that I reflect how well and ably we are represented in the present critical circumstances in Egypt.

“Believe me,

“Faithfully yours,

“W. E. GLADSTONE.”

## CHAPTER V

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL REFORMS—SIR A. COLVIN  
AS CONTROLLER-GENERAL—HIS RECOMMENDA-  
TION IN 1882 THAT ARABI SHOULD BE TREATED  
WITH CLEMENCY

NO sooner were the labours of the Commission of Liquidation finished than another Commission was organised to deal with Judicial Reform. It was not destined to have the same success as its predecessor. I fear indeed that it only proved to be a signal example of the disastrous result of trying to content too many different interests. It dragged its slow length along to the middle of March 1881, when it was temporarily suspended.

I had gone on leave during the autumn and returned to Egypt on the 28th of October. When in London I had urged on the Foreign Office the appointment of a lawyer of high standing and large experience to conduct the negotiations on behalf of the British Government, but my sug-

gestion was negatived on the ground of expense, and a strange arrangement was made instead. I was named chief of the Commission, but Mr. Cookson, British Consul-General at Alexandria, and Mr. Scott (afterwards Sir Charles Scott), Judge of the Court of Appeal, were to be the working members.

In addition an "Auxiliary Commission" was appointed in order to show the interest which Her Majesty's Government took in the matter, and it was to assist the British Delegates in their task.

Being merely the figure-head, I spoke at the opening of the Commission and then left the work to the two gentlemen of the Robe, between whom differences soon showed themselves—Mr. Cookson, backed by the Auxiliary Commission, worked in one direction, Mr. Scott, who was in correspondence with Mr. Reilly, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, worked in another. The British Delegates had of course to negotiate with their foreign colleagues, of whom there were thirty-two. Negotiation means compromise, but compromise was not in the vocabulary of the Auxiliary Commission,

which took no part in the sittings of the Commission and therefore no count of the difficulties of the Delegates, Mr. Cookson and Mr. Scott.

The organisation of our delegation proved to be completely unworkable, and when it was sufficiently proved, I wrote to Lord Granville and recommended, once more, my original suggestion and the suppression of the Auxiliaries, whose services were well intended but most embarrassing.

We profited by experience, and in the following year Sir Benson Maxwell was appointed, and under his able guidance the work progressed ; but it was a task which was not destined to see any conclusion during the time I was in Egypt, and I only make this passing mention of it to show that the British Government pushed forward with an almost feverish activity the reforms which seemed at the time to be the most pressing to benefit the country.

It had been a great satisfaction to me to be able to announce to Mr. Auckland Colvin that Her Majesty's Government hoped that he would accept the office of Controller-General in succession to Major Evelyn Baring. We were not intimate, but

I had seen enough of him to appreciate the wisdom of the choice. He was not a man of many words, nor had he a suave and all-embracing manner, but there was something about him which was attractive to those whom it did not repel; nor is this faint praise, for he inspired an instinctive feeling that those whom it did repel would be double-dealers, cranks and idlers, weeds with which the world can well dispense, but of which there is always a plentiful crop in places where the wheel of fortune counts for much in the ups and downs of life, and that had certainly been the case for many years in Egypt.

It has been made a matter of reproach to me that I fell under the influence of Sir Auckland Colvin.

Those who have taken the pains to understand the relative positions of the Diplomatic Representative and the Controller-General will understand that, on all questions of finance, it was the duty of the Agent to be guided by the Controller. When the military obtained the upper hand and decided to raise the army to 18,000 men I did not



combat the right of the Government to do so, because the right was conceded by the Firmans, but the Controller-General was responsible for the Budget and, on his informing me that the revenues were insufficient to meet the extra expenditure which would be necessary to pay for the increase of the army, it at once became my duty to protest. The financial question thus became the chief question for the moment. Sir Auckland Colvin's duty was to maintain the financial credit of the country, and it was mine to be guided by his advice in respect to the financial side of the question.

I may at once say that I do not think it would be possible for two officials to work together more harmoniously than Sir Auckland Colvin and I did during the difficult period which we traversed together. We were frequently obliged to weigh very carefully the counter-claims of diplomacy and finance, which we represented respectively, for, of necessity, they now and then clashed, but I do not believe that there was, on any occasion, a needless subservience of either to the other.

Sir Auckland Colvin is unhappily stricken by

severe illness, and has been unable, even if he had desired it, to take any part in the recent discussions of the Egyptian question of those days, and, apart from my sorrow at his failing health, I have keenly felt the loss of the valuable assistance he could and would have given me in endeavouring to string together a consecutive narrative of those times.

As we both lived at Cairo few letters passed between us, but the first letter that he wrote to me on his appointment as Controller-General and the last letter he wrote to me bidding me farewell are both sufficiently characteristic. They give a glimpse into the inner nature of the man, of his ideals, of the zeal with which he pursued them, and of the affectionate and gentle nature which was perhaps sometimes obscured to the superficial observer.

Errors, like straws, upon the surface flow ;  
He who would search for pearls must dive below.

“CAIRO, *June 22nd*, 1880.

“My dear Malet,—Many thanks for your note, which I have just found on my table, and for your kind way of putting the announcement.

“It is a hard thing to succeed Baring ; but I will

do what I can ; and I am perfectly sure that I shall have all the great assistance you can give me. You know, too, that you can count on my loyal co-operation in the common interests we have at heart.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ A. COLVIN.”

The next letter refers in the first paragraph to his appointment to succeed Sir Evelyn Baring in India as Financial Member of the Council of the Governor-General.

“ CAIRO, *Monday, June 25th, 1883.*

“ My dear Malet,—I did not at all expect this. My answer must be that ‘I accept with grateful thanks His Lordship’s offer,’ but I shall leave Egypt and our work here with infinite regret.

“ I had intended in any case to write to you this morning before going on leave (for I did not expect to find you here on my return) and to thank you for all the support and assistance you have given me throughout the trying times we have seen together.

“ You know how I have appreciated the unselfishness with which you have always put the public interest before personal considerations ; and I re-

joyce the more in the promotion which shows that your conduct and bearing have been appreciated.

“For my part I hope I have in a measure lightened your labours and responsibilities. I am deeply conscious of the measure in which I owe to you any success I have achieved.

“It has been a long and anxious business, but so far as fellow-working is concerned, I think we shall both look back with pleasure to the time we struggled through in Cairo.

“It is painful to me to snap the tie.

“Vive, Valeque ;

“Yours very sincerely,

“A. COLVIN.”

I do look back to our “fellow-working” with such a satisfaction as is rare in the retrospect of life. The question of whether it was successful or not is and must, perhaps, remain for ever a moot point. There may be those who hold that the objects for which we strove were wrong. To these the great weight of our combined action must obviously give offence. It was governed wholly and exclusively by our desire to promote the welfare of the land in which we represented respectively the tutelage of

the rulers of Great Britain and of Egypt ; no personal interests had a grain of weight in what we did. I acknowledge that the difficulty of reconciling the instructions which we received from our superiors with what, in our limited knowledge, we deemed to be the best in regard to the situation on the spot was often nearly and sometimes quite insuperable, but we worked lovingly through fair weather, of which there was very little, and foul, of which there was a great deal. We were indeed the sport of Fortune, and it played with us roughly, but in the end, deeming, I suppose, that we had suffered enough, she gathered us tightly in her arms and, carrying us through the surf, landed us on the sunny beach, where we rested and were thankful.

One of my most pleasant memories in regard to Sir Auckland Colvin is that almost before the smoke had cleared away from the battlefield of Tel-el-Kebir he wrote to me an urgent appeal in favour of dealing leniently with the vanquished and of not allowing Arabi to be shot.

Here are his words. It so happened that at the time he wrote them he was in England. The

capitulation of Cairo and Arabi's surrender to General Drury Lowe were announced in the *Times* of the 16th of September, 1882. Sir Auckland Colvin's letter, from which I make the following extract, is dated the 21st of that month :--

"I ventured to telegraph to you about an amnesty. The great thing is to try and re-establish confidence between the Khedive and the country. To this end I believe that clemency is the true policy. To cement their new relations with blood seems to me of evil augury. I would not even shoot Arabi or Sami or any of the ringleaders unless murder was brought home to them. Could not the Khedive make them over to us, and we intern them at Burmah or Andamans, Egypt paying the cost of internment? Whatever is done should, I think, be done *quickly*."

My view as to what it was best to do coincided with the view expressed by Sir Auckland Colvin.

At the time I received the letter party feeling was running very high, and I need not say that I had to be very careful to conceal what my own views were from everybody, which is another way

of saying that I was not blind to the eventuality being decided in Downing Street, not in Cairo.

Still, in my favour there were two points.

The Government of the Khedive had been put together by us and knew individually that we could unmake as well as make. I felt therefore sure that my advice, whatever it should prove to be, would be followed by them.

With regard to the Khedive I had no misgiving. He knew that he owed his life and his throne to us more than to any other factor in the complicated series of events through which he had passed. He trusted me entirely, and, as he was by nature good, he was grateful. I knew that whether he shared my views or not I could depend upon his granting what it might become my duty to ask, even though it should be Arabi's life.

## CHAPTER VI

### PROGRESS OF REFORMS—THE MILITARY REVOLT OF FEBRUARY, 1881

WHILE we were pounding along the dusty and interminable high road of Administrative Reform, composed of Justice, Taxation, Public Debt, the Slave Trade, Forced Labour and other matters too numerous to mention, occasional ominous sounds would come whistling across us which had strength enough to startle and sometimes make us pause in our labours and look to right and left to descry whence they came.

Foremost among these to attract our attention was the echo of the discontent of the army, and, as it proceeded rather from the officers than from the ranks, it attracted my anxious attention. The officers might control the privates, but who was to control the officers?

Already in the summer of 1880 the matter formed a subject of conversations between Riaz Pacha and



me in our constant interviews, and, unfortunately, he always treated it as a matter of small account with which he should be able to deal quite easily if it should tend towards giving trouble.

The other sound was the echo of the general unrest caused by what has since been given the name of "Nationalism," and in regard to it I felt no uneasiness, not because I did not appreciate its meaning, but because I had no dislike to it and no dread of it. When, at a later date, M. de Freycinet in *La question d'Égypte* wrote that "Tewfik, au contentement de Sir Edward Malet, devenait presque un Souverain à la mode Anglaise,"<sup>1</sup> the French statesman described my feelings accurately and summed up what had been my desire from the beginning, and also what I knew to be in conformity with the desire of Her Majesty's Government.

But the unrest in the army was a very different matter. It was not surprising, but it was disquieting. It dated from the close of the disastrous campaign of Egypt against Abyssinia, and cast

<sup>1</sup> *La question d'Égypte*, p. 223.

one of the numerous shadows which darkened the close of the Khedive Ismail's reign. Hundreds of officers found themselves suddenly without place or pay. It is really not to be wondered at that they should have behaved riotously on the 18th of February, 1879, and should have threatened and maltreated Nubar Pacha and the European Ministers. The question whether the riot was organised by the Khedive himself in order to get rid of his Ministry is still undecided. That it was very generally believed to be "by order" is undoubted. Arabi Pacha has stated positively in so many words that the Khedive Ismail did organise it, and I am inclined to think that this conviction on his part accounts for his also thinking that the Khedive Tewfik favoured the mutinous conduct of the colonels on the 1st of February and the 9th of September, 1881.

My own belief is entirely contrary to the latter supposition, and, notwithstanding the difficulty of proving a negative, I think I can show that Arabi must have been mistaken.

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“CAIRO, *December 15th*, 1880.

“I continue to have as much as I can manage to do here. This Judicial Commission gives me a deal of work, as things have to be foreseen before they come up for discussion. I have no doubt that I shall find the Commission a very useful experience.

“I have recently had the most satisfactory accounts of the energy of the Government officials in the Soudan in suppressing the Slave Trade from a perfectly independent source, Prince John Borghese, whom I used to know in Rome. He has only just come from the spot, and says that the activity of the Government authorities is beyond all praise. The Soudan, however, is a matter of anxiety as it does not pay its way, and there is no telling how long it will continue to be a drain on the Treasury.”

“*December 22nd*, 1880.

“I have had some unpleasant work here lately with my French colleague (M. de Ring), who is getting jealous of his Controller-General (M. de Blignières), and is upsetting the harmony of our general relations. However, I hope to be able to bring him round. He is unfortunately a

sickly and nervous man, and flies off at a tangent when one does not expect it. I am in very friendly correspondence with Colonel Gordon, and do not think he is at all likely to attack me. De Ring has made a calculation that if we continue to progress in the Judicial Commission at our present rate it will last exactly thirty years."

This is the first mention of trouble in connection with M. de Ring. The quarrel between him and his Controller-General became acute, and was only terminated by M. de Ring's recall in March 1881. But before he left he had done a great deal of harm by entering into communication with the rebellious Colonels, who never afterwards abandoned the belief that they could count upon the secret support of the French Government.

Whether M. de Ring's action was inspired by secret communications from M. Gambetta, who at this period seems to have been a sort of uncrowned king in France, or whether it was his own idea that that way fortune lay, and that it was a good stroke of policy to be on the winning side, can never be known. It is certain that the French

Controller - General was entirely opposed to it, and that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, recalled him on account of it; but why, if his chief disapproved, he should have been allowed to pursue it so long remains a mystery. M. de Freycinet, in his book, *La question d'Egypte*, is silent on the point.

By this time I had been rather more than a year in Egypt. My time had been fully occupied, but as yet I had rarely encountered any necessity for interference in administrative matters apart from the big general questions of reform in which all the Powers were interested though not in an equal degree.

“CAIRO, *January 10th*, 1881.

“I have been on two or three occasions lately obliged to test the amount of my influence here, and the result has been satisfactory.

“When I first came I had to complain of a sentence of Court Martial and received a simple reply that the sentence having been approved could in no way be interfered with. A few days ago I learnt that a sentence of a Court Martial had condemned a man to three months' imprisonment

in what I considered a most unjust manner, and, on making a complaint, instead of receiving a *non possumus* reply, I obtained the release of the man at once with a full pardon from the Khedive.

“The other day I asked Riaz Pacha, the Prime Minister, to make Count Sala a general, which gives him the rank of Pacha, in consideration of his services in suppressing the Slave Trade. The Minister made difficulties on account of the jealousies of the officers. I repeated my request yesterday to the Khedive. He told me he would think it over and, an hour after I had left him, he sent his A.D.C. to me to say that he would sign a Decree to-day raising Count Sala to the rank I had requested for him.

“The post of Inspector-General on the Sanitary Board was vacant. My French colleague, M. de Ring, was extremely anxious to get it for a Frenchman, but he knew that he was powerless to obtain it and he asked me for my good offices; I consented, and Riaz Pacha, though much put out, said he could refuse me nothing and appointed the man.

“Lastly de Ring himself has come round, professes the warmest friendship for me and a desire always to act in common. So that for the moment

I have every reason to be satisfied with my position."

"CAIRO, *January 12th*, 1881.

"Yesterday all day at the International Commission. To-day mail-day and as usual more work than I know how to get through. My whole morning taken up with presenting the Duke of Buckingham to the Khedive. However, come what may, I must send a line to you.

"It seems too good to be true, but I think almost that I have nearly arrived at steps for the abolition of slavery in Egypt. I have been working to obtain this ever since I have been here, and I have got so far that the Khedive and the Government have both declared that they will not oppose it. But I fear that both are afraid of the responsibility. It remains to be seen whether I can nerve them up to the sticking point. Meantime a seditious Arabic paper has appeared with a caricature in it of the Khedive, Riaz and me. Riaz dancing before his master and saying, 'I liberate your black slaves to please the English, but I give you white ones, and the exchange is to your advantage.'"

It must not be supposed that the fight on the slavery question was an easy one. The whole

interest of the governing classes was against us. The following extract of a letter from the British Consul at Suez gives an example of the difficulties attending our anti-slavery campaign.

*Mr. Consul West to Mr. Malet.*

“SUEZ, *January 11th*, 1881. ”

“My recent illness must plead my excuse for not having written to you sooner to thank you for the very kind assistance you afforded Mr. Medawas in obtaining the release from prison of the man Mohammed Eid, who is now here and remains so far unmolested; I fear, however, that if I were to leave the place, the vindictive feelings of the brothers Menshawi, who appear to be very influential, might again lead them to bring him to trouble. The effect of obtaining his release was very marked here, and it is evident that the hand of the whole Moslem community is raised against the man who in any way assists the Consulate in tracking out a fugitive slave. The whole proceedings show what very little progress has been made even in the mind of the highest and most influential people in the country towards countenancing the abolition of slavery in Egypt.”



Another matter was the question of who should be appointed Sanitary Inspector of Alexandria. It was a post for which there was a keen rivalry between candidates of different nations, and, with a dogged belief in the superior sanitary twist of the British mind, I left no stone unturned to obtain the place for the British candidate, Dr. Lowe.

*Dr. Lowe to Mr. Malet.*

“THEBES, *January 16th*, 1881.

“I have got the news of my appointment to the post of Sanitary Inspector of Alexandria, and for this piece of unexpected good fortune I have to thank you. From what you said when I last saw you I must confess my hopes of the place were not very high, but all my friends who knew best said that you would do more than you promised, and so it turned out; and though I am not very apt at expressing my sentiments, I am very grateful indeed for the good will with which you assisted me.

“I will always do my best in my new position so as to bring no discredit on my kind patron.”

There is a diverting passage in Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt* recounting the strange variety of

the services he was called upon to render while he was in Egypt, and I here add a letter from him showing how he himself contributed to the variety of mine while I occupied the post which he afterwards filled as my successor.

“CALCUTTA, *January 26th*, 1881.

“My dear Malet,—Could you procure for me *two young hippopotami*? I know it does not come quite within the range of your ordinary diplomatic duties to traffic in these interesting animals. Still, I hope you will not be averse to help the Calcutta Zoological Gardens, a very rising institution, on whose behalf I have been urged to make this request. Perhaps my old friend Riaz would not mind writing to Khartoum and seeing what could be done.<sup>1</sup> It is added that in case you should not be able to get the hippopotami, any other African animals, especially antelopes, zebras, or ostriches, would be also highly acceptable.

“Of course all expenses will be paid.

“Ever yours,

“EVELYN BARING.”

<sup>1</sup> Political complications interfered with the execution of this commission, and Lord Cromer states with regret that the “interesting animals” never came.

My excuse for introducing the hippopotami is that I require a little gaiety at this moment to cheer me,

For it may be  
That while I speak of it a little while,  
My heart shall wander from its deeper woe,

caused by the now imminent intrusion on the stage of the three redoubtable Colonels, Arabi, Abdel-Al and Ali Bey Fehmi, as political marplots.

When I made the acquaintance of Arabi, which was in the spring of 1881, he was forty years of age, a presentable-looking officer of the peasant type, thick-set, burly, good-natured-looking rather than not, but clumsy in his gait. It was easy to see that in the elasticity of youth he had probably been good-looking and, possibly, smart. He had been noticed by Saïd Pacha, who at that time ruled over Egypt, and who appointed Arabi to be one of his Aide-de-camps; he became a captain at eighteen, a major at nineteen and a Lieutenant-Colonel at twenty, which shows that at that time promotion went by favour. Saïd Pacha's death (1863) was a great misfortune to him, for Ismail Pacha, his successor,

showed none of that regard for the Fellaheen which had distinguished Saïd. So Arabi, who came of Fellaheen parentage, went on serving as Caimakam (Lieutenant-Colonel) for twelve years without much incident till the war with Abyssinia took place. He did not go to the front in that war, but was employed on the lines of communication.

While I was writing a letter of the 26th January, 1881, of which I am about to give an extract, events were preparing of which I had had no warning. Arabi and the other two Colonels whom I have named had made up their minds to endeavour to get rid of the Minister of War, Osman Rifki Pacha, whom they accused of having entirely reverted to the old system of advancing the officers of Circassian origin in preference to those of native Egyptian race. They foresaw, no doubt, that if they did not help themselves nobody would help them, and that by degrees they would be wiped off the Egyptian slate, and I do not say they were wrong in their forecast, for, apart from the racial question, there is no doubt that the Circassians were smarter officers and maintained discipline more efficiently.

So the three Colonels went straight to the Prime Minister and petitioned for the removal of the War Minister. It was an act of insubordination, but the Colonels had the power on their side, for they commanded their regiments. Unfortunately, the War Minister, when he heard of what had happened, resorted to a stupid plot to arrest them. There was shortly to be celebrated the marriage of the Princess Djemilla belonging to the Khedivial family, and a certain amount of military ceremonial was to take place. The War Minister summoned the Colonels to the barracks of Kasr-el-Nil on the pretext of settling the ceremonial and arrested them on their arrival.

I prefer to believe that he took this course without consulting either Riaz Pacha or the Khedive. However that may be, some one had previously got wind of what was intended, and when the plot, for it was nothing else, was carried out, the regiments came to the rescue of their Colonels and, after maltreating the Minister of War, marched with them to Abdin and demanded the dismissal of the obnoxious Minister. The Khedive yielded because, as he

informed my French colleague and me, he had no power of resistance; and from that moment his position as absolute ruler of the country ceased, never to be regained.

“CAIRO, *January 26th*, 1881.

“Henry<sup>1</sup> went off the day before yesterday and I am again alone. Fortunately my work is just now very heavy, and I have hardly time to think of or attend to anything else. There is lawn tennis every afternoon in the garden, but I very rarely receive my guests. The ground is open to them and they go and amuse themselves. The Egyptian Government here has now taken to consult me constantly, and I have the satisfaction of feeling that my influence is as firmly established as I could possibly expect or desire. Confidence is a plant of slow growth, and I look with satisfaction at having gained it within a year from my first arrival in the country. You must not think that there is nothing more for me to do here; I can be useful in many ways, and I hope in ways which may, by degrees, be clear to the public at large, though one of the misfortunes of diplomacy is that it must work rather like a mole.”

<sup>1</sup> My brother, Colonel H. C. E. Malet.

“CAIRO, *February 2nd*, 1881.

“We have had a military riot here which has been very unpleasant, and may hereafter be a disagreeable precedent. The soldiers, led by their officers, demanded the dismissal of the Minister of War, and the Khedive had to yield because he had not a single regiment on which he could count. De Ring and I went to the Palace while the revolt was going on, and certainly His Highness' position was most unenviable. He was, in fact, compelled to give way to force. To-day the matter is one in which foreigners are not concerned. But to-morrow? Suppose the troops next ask for the dismissal of the whole Ministry or of the European control?”

“The matter makes one anxious for the future. It is as yet so recent that I cannot form a good opinion as to all that has happened and the causes of it. And I have been besieged all the morning by people coming for news.”

“CAIRO, *February 7th*, 1881.

“We are in the full swing of agitation caused by the revolt of the regiments on the 1st, and we cannot see what may be the end of it, though I hope matters may go on quietly. It was a most un-

expected event resulting primarily from Palace intrigues. The Colonel of the regiment of guards had been a great favourite of the Khedive and he was a native Arab officer. The dominant class here are Turks and Circassians. Seeing the influence of the Colonel, a Circassian A.D.C. of the Khedive began to undermine him, and succeeded so well that all but official intercourse ceased between the Colonel and His Highness. The Colonel began to tremble for his position and sought to show that he could not be treated in this matter with impunity. He made a petition directed against favouritism to Turks, and it was resolved to arrest and try him. The Khedive felt sure of the regiment, but he was grievously out of his reckoning, for directly the Colonel was arrested he was forcibly released by his soldiers, who carried him in triumph to the Palace and demanded the retirement of the Minister of War. The Khedive was absolutely powerless, another regiment was marching to the assistance of the insurgents and His Highness had no force at all to oppose to them, so he dismissed his Minister and his obnoxious A.D.C. But the result is, of course, most disquieting. The Government is afraid to do anything for fear of a fresh outbreak, and the insurgent Colonels are at the head



of their regiments. I do not really see what is to be the upshot of the matter. It is hardly likely that a powerless Government can last. At the same time, if it falls we are more than ever under the dictatorship of the Colonels, who are ignorant men, and no one can foresee what they may want next.

“CAIRO, *February 9th*, 1881.

“I am sorry to say that the military revolt has done away for the present with all chance of my obtaining the abolition of slavery. I shall not indeed urge it again until I see that the Khedive is once more firm in his saddle. So many slips are there 'twixt the cup and the lip. One thing, however, has been done which gives me great satisfaction, that is the suppression of the ceremony of the Dosah, the riding over prostrate bodies by a Sheikh on horseback. It takes place once a year and to-morrow is the day for it. But an edict has been issued by the Sheikh-el-Bekri, head of the sects of Dervishes, doing away with it and many other fanatical practices. We are all quiet again at Cairo, though the Khedive and the Ministers cannot hold their heads very high for some time to come.”

## CHAPTER VII

### M. DE RING AND THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT

THE full gravity of the position created by the events of the 1st of February cannot be realised unless we go into the question of the action, in connection with the Colonels, of M. de Ring, the French Agent and Consul-General.

He and I had been appointed about the same time ; we had known each other previously, and we were on good terms with each other. It was our duty to make the Condominium a sound working policy. To do so involved the necessity of never taking any purely political step without mutual consultation, and I scrupulously observed this indispensable condition. Nor was I at all aware till after the 1st of February, on which day the Khedive was compelled by a mutinous soldiery to dismiss his Minister of War, that there was any *rapprochement*, as the French would term it, between the discontented officers and the French Agency.

What I did know was that the relations between M. de Ring and the Egyptian Government had not been good from the beginning. A small incident had occurred at the outset which was unlucky.

It was the custom when a new Agent and Consul-General presented his letters of credence for the Khedive to present him with a horse handsomely caparisoned, which was led back to the Agent's residence by a Khedivial groom behind the State carriage in which the Agent was conveyed to and from the Palace. It might be a good horse or it might be a bad horse ; if it was a good horse the Agent was pleased ; if it was a bad horse he was not. The Khedive, of course, knew nothing about the qualifications of the horse. It had, no doubt, figured as a fixed item in the ceremonial Budget for years. I arrived in Cairo some weeks before M. de Ring, and, unluckily, I got a good horse, so that it fell to M. de Ring's turn to get an indifferent one, for the balance apparently had to be always adjusted. "So bad begins and worse remains behind," for M. de Ring gave practical expression to his annoyance by selling the horse ; and by this

time, everybody being in the wrong, everybody was angry, and the seeds of discord were sown.

Then M. de Ring did not get on with the French Controller-General, M. de Blighnières, a very able man, but a man who considered that he was entitled to work out the duties of his office in his own way and not according to orders from the Agency.

I do not know what it was that originated the ill-feeling between Riaz Pacha and M. de Ring, but there is no doubt that in treating with Orientals French officials are often somewhat unceremonious, and I suspect that a want of attention to the small amenities which occupy so large a share of Moslem official etiquette rubbed Riaz's hair the wrong way. They complained of each other to me, and I always did my best to smooth matters down and to keep the peace between them.

After the 1st of February M. de Ring's tactics were shrouded in mystery, and it will be seen from the following letter written on the 14th that, up to that date, I did not know that he was not equally anxious with me to keep the Government of Riaz Pacha on its legs after the rude blow which it had

received, through the dismissal of the Minister of War at the dictation of the Colonels.

“CAIRO, *February 14th*, 1881.

“I have been having a hard time of it, since I last wrote, in the full swing of ministerial crisis, consequent on the revolt of the 1st of February. I held it to be essential for the possibility of government at all in Egypt that the Ministry should not resign under the pressure of military revolt, and I find, since, that public opinion entirely sides with me, but on Thursday, the 10th, the Ministry nearly slipt through my fingers and it was only by hard work next day, interviewing the military and the Khedive and de Ring and Riaz Pacha, that I managed to keep it on its legs. The deplorable result of it all is that I am supposed to have maintained the Ministry at all hazards, while my French colleague was labouring to pull it down. Victory is given to me and defeat to him. We neither of us deserve what is attributed to us, for, in fact, we worked together, but that does not suit the public. So they will have it that we were divided. I do not yet see what will be the upshot of it all, but I know that it is particularly tiresome while it lasts.”

When Riaz Pacha at length complained to me about communications which were passing between M. de Ring and the Colonels I thought that the matter had been exaggerated. I at once, however, spoke to my colleague about it, and he also glossed the matter over. But I saw that neither the Khedive nor Riaz Pacha was satisfied. The situation boded ill for the Condominium, and, with almost needless forbearance, I suggested to Lord Granville that perhaps it would be well if both M. de Ring and I were requested to come home to consult on the situation.

“CAIRO, *February 21st*, 1881.

“We are coming to a crisis here, as the stay or departure of my French colleague, who has rendered himself very obnoxious to the Egyptian Government, must soon be decided. I thought it would be better, in order to save the *amour propre* of the French Government, for our respective Governments to summon us both home for a while, but my Government does not take this view at present, so for the moment we must rub on, though I do not think that he, M. de Ring, will last long,

as the *République Française*, which is Gambetta's organ, has begun writing against him."

I was correct in my surmise, but a thing had happened in one of my discussions with the Khedive and Riaz Pacha which I did not commit to paper in writing home.

They seemed to think that it was my duty to complain of my French colleague and that I ought to telegraph to Lord Granville to inform him of all the wickednesses which they alleged against him and obtain his recall. I refused to see that this was my duty. I said that I had spoken to M. de Ring and that he had given me assurances that nothing had passed between him and the Colonels to which any objection could be raised. He said they had, it was true, been to see him, but in the advice he had given them he had acted only as peace-maker.

My reply caused greater chagrin than I could at the time account for, and Riaz pressed the matter most earnestly. There were long pauses in the conversation as though much hung on what was being said. We were all three at last somewhat

moved. It seemed as though the future was in pawn while we spoke.

Riaz continued to insist that the action of M. de Ring was putting not only the position of the Ministry but also the position of the Khedive himself in jeopardy—could I not at least give them advice? and we sat in gloomy silence.

At last I said—

“All I can think of is the letter post.”

They both waited! My thought had not helped them.

“His Highness might write,” I said at length, “to President Grévy.”

On this followed a good deal more silence and very few words.

I left without urging them to adopt the course I had suggested, but making them understand that I refused to complain of my colleague. The Condominium was never absent from my mind, and I knew that if I consented to take up the cause of the Khedive and Riaz against the French Agent, the French Government would justly be able to attribute its breakdown to me.



It must be remembered that at the time of which I am writing the name of Arabi was not a power in the land. To me it had been almost unknown.

Therefore the contact of M. de Ring and Arabi did not present to my mind the importance which it would have assumed if it had occurred a year later. I had indeed no ill will towards the Colonels. I believed in their grievances and I thought they had most just cause of complaint in the trap which had been laid for them in order to arrest them. I was not, of course, really fully aware of what M. de Ring had done, but, accepting what he had said to me when I spoke to him on the subject, I did not feel that he was particularly to blame. Later on I knew more and changed my opinion.

Meantime the Khedive acted on my remark about the existence of a letter post and wrote to M. Grévy, the President of the French Republic.

*Translation of Letter from the Khedive to the President  
of the French Republic.*

“CAIRO, *February 14th*, 1881.

“Since the return to Egypt of M. le Baron de Ring I have had occasion to remark, in his communications with my Government, a certain change of attitude, which manifested itself by the creation of difficulties without serious reason and to which, for the matter of that, I did not attach importance.

“Recent facts of a certain gravity place me now under the obligation of addressing myself to your Excellency.

“You are not ignorant, M. le Président, that on the 1st of February I was obliged, in the higher interest of public tranquillity, to perform an act of clemency, after which all had become calm again.

“Five days later new alarmist reports were put in circulation announcing a change of Ministry. Nothing was further from my thoughts. I caused a contradiction to be given to these reports, which had had time to cause a general unrest, especially at Cairo and Alexandria. But I was painfully

impressed on learning afterwards by public hearsay that on the preceding day M. le Baron de Ring had received the leaders of the disturbance and had listened to their political plan.

“ I do not know, M. le Président, whether an Agent accredited to me can properly receive visits from insubordinate officers and discuss questions of purely internal administration with them. I think at all events that his duty would be to come without loss of time to inform me of a step of this nature, especially if it should, as in the present instance, be made more serious by alarming commentaries which threw the public mind into a state of perturbation.

“ M. le Baron de Ring did nothing of the kind. He received, on the contrary, after an interval of three days, a fresh visit from the same officers, encouraged probably by the reception he had accorded to their first visit and by the rumours which had spread that the French Agent was favourable to their designs.

“ M. de Ring came, it is true, to inform me of this second visit; but it was twenty-four hours after the event, and he refused to give me the names of the officers, saying that he had given his word not to denounce them.

“ I expressed to him my regret to see and hear said that the good reception he had extended to the officers on the occasion of their first visit had had the effect not only of keeping them in the crooked path on which they had entered, but also of encouraging them to pay him a second visit and spread in the public mind the idea that the Agent of France was favourable to their projects.

“ Instead of desisting, M. le Baron de Ring pushed his singular conduct further. In the midst of the general agitation which these events caused, he betook himself to my cousin, Osman Pacha, eldest son of the late Mustapha Fazyl Pacha, and asked him whether, in case there should be a ministerial change, he would accept a post as Minister without Portfolio. He knew, nevertheless, that a perfect accord existed between me and my Ministry, which continues to enjoy my complete confidence.

“ Prince Osman came at once to inform me of this strange enquiry of the French Agent.

“ It would be painful for me, M. le Président, to qualify the conduct of M. de Ring, conduct so much the more inexplicable for me because France has not ceased to give both to me and to my Government and to prove on all occasions its benevolent concurrence in the work of regeneration which I have

undertaken to accomplish with the help of my Ministers.

“I give the facts in their eloquent simplicity to the appreciation and the wisdom of Your Excellency, and I beg you to believe in my sentiments of high consideration and esteem.”

This letter appears to establish that there was no foundation for the surmise that the Khedive's jealousy of Riaz was mainly responsible for what happened. I never perceived any signs of such a jealousy, and I probably saw more of both the Khedive and of Riaz than did Arabi and those who were in contact with him, not forgetting Ali Bey Fehmi, the Aide-de-camp of the Khedive, who acted as spy in the Palace, and sided with the Colonels against their Prince.

I am aware that it was said at the time that the Khedive would have taken the opportunity to dismiss Riaz if I had not so strongly supported the Ministers, but it was not true, and that is why I insert the Khedive's letter. It proves that there was no foundation for the rumour that he desired to rid himself of his Ministry and hazarded this

tortuous way of doing it. There is no passage in the letter more straight than that in which the Khedive says of M. de Ring, "He knew, nevertheless, that a complete accord existed between me and my Ministry."

But there were many persons in Egypt who did wish to get rid of the Riaz Ministry. Among them were all the followers of M. de Ring, that is, the majority of the French colony, who maintained that Riaz was unduly favouring British interests. It was known that M. de Ring had been obliged to ask me to interfere to obtain appointments for Frenchmen. It was an unhappy, but I suppose an inevitable, state of affairs that public opinion continued, as of old, to regard British and French influence as counter-weights at the opposite ends of a beam, and that one end could not go up without the other going down. It was what made the Condominium so difficult for the two Agents, even with the best of wills to maintain it, and fully justified Lord Granville's misgivings.

I worked, heart and soul, to maintain it in the letter and the spirit, but the very pains which I

took to avoid arousing the jealousy of the French operated in favour of the increase of my influence.

To enable the reader to understand what I mean, I will quote a forgotten work by Baron de Malortie, entitled *Egypt*, published in 1882.

“It is not the practice of Her Majesty’s Agents to identify themselves with the private interests of British subjects beyond the usual protection. French Agents, on the contrary, like patronising their countrymen, and are always asking for something.

“Both Cherif Pacha and Riaz Pacha assured the author that they did not remember Sir Edward Malet ever having asked for either an appointment or a concession for English subjects or having backed applications of that kind. . . . Les Agents Anglais ne se mêlent jamais de choses personnelles et ne sont pas mesquins.”

But this abstention on my part, which was largely due to my desire to avoid the jealousy of my French colleague, fostered for me the confidence of the Khedive and his Prime Minister.

Then, again, the position of M. de Ring was made more difficult by the contention for power

between him and the French Controller-General. It appears to be almost impossible for members of a strictly organised bureaucracy to drop their rivalry for the sake of the common weal, and later on, when the British occupation had taken place, nothing appeared to be more difficult for foreign dwellers in Egypt to comprehend than the good understanding, which never for an instant ceased to reign between the British civilian, naval and military chiefs. They seemed to think it quite impossible that Lord Wolseley, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and I should not strive, one against the other, to obtain a predominance of influence.

In the case of M. de Ring he went "to the wall" just as much through the inherent weakness of the methods imposed on him by tradition and circumstances as from any individual fault of his own. If his countrymen could have been content with his confining his actions to political influence instead of expecting him to be constantly demonstrating his power by obtaining places and concessions for them, and if he and his Controller-General could have worked in harmony, he might have had just as much



influence as I had, and all four of us, working harmoniously together, might have been sufficiently powerful to avert the dangers which beset the Khedive; but it was not to be.

“ALEXANDRIA, *February 28th*, 1881.

“My action throughout our late difficulties has been strongly approved by Lord Granville, and my French colleague has gone completely to the wall without my being in any way compromised in his fall. He leaves by the French steamer to-morrow morning.

“I have been very glad to get three days' change to Alexandria, as a constant tension as to what is to be the next move becomes tiresome in the long run—a game of chess on a big scale. De Ring publicly lays the blame of his recall on his own Controller-General, M. de Blignières, but he will learn, when he gets to Paris, that it comes about as the natural result of his singularly incautious conduct after the 1st of February. I do not know who we shall have in his place, but I hope I may not have to go on struggling for ever with an Agent who so imperfectly understands the nature of the *entente cordiale*.”

A somewhat anxious interval followed the departure of M. de Ring. He had been requested by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, to come home to consult on the situation, and he had given out, naturally, that he should soon return with an endorsement of all he had done from his Government.

Meanwhile a certain effervescence showed itself in the public mind. There was unrest at Alexandria, and disquieting rumours, such as arise in the East like sudden atmospheric disturbances, made people uneasy. I brought the matter to the notice of Riaz Pacha, and I find among my papers a letter from him, of which the following is a translation :—

“CAIRO, *March 23rd*, 1881.

“My dear Malet,—Although in consequence of the energetic measures (adopted) by the Governor of Alexandria in accordance with instructions (already) given it is not necessary, yet as an extra precaution, a *bataillon de renfort* has been ordered to start immediately by special train for Alexandria.

“*Tout à vous,*

“RIAZ.”

I insert this letter because it explains the serious view which the Khedive and his Ministers entertained of the action of M. de Ring as causing perturbation in the public mind, and because it demonstrates the active part which had been forced upon me by circumstances beyond my control. Without in any way desiring it, I found myself obliged to interfere in matters which lay quite outside the natural sphere of an Agent and Consul-General. Yet it will be seen from the tone of the letter from the Minister that my interference was in no way resented ; it was, in fact, by imperceptible degrees growing to be courted and welcomed.

At last, on the 26th of March, the suspense regarding the action of the French Government was ended. I received on that day the letter from Riaz Pacha of which the following is a translation :—

“ My dear Malet,—Monge<sup>1</sup> has just received a telegraphic despatch from his Government instruct-

<sup>1</sup> M. Monge was the French Consul at Alexandria, who was acting Agent and Consul-General at Cairo during M. de Ring's absence.

ing him to say to the Khedive that M. de Ring has been *mis en disponibilité*.<sup>1</sup> Monge, after having acquitted himself of his message to the Khedive, has just been here to announce the news to me."

I at once went to see Riaz Pacha, and he very literally embraced me.

But the President of the French Republic never replied to the Khedive's letter.

"CAIRO, *March 28th*, 1881.

"At last we have finally heard that de Ring is *mis en disponibilité*, and I can assure you that it is a considerable relief to me and the Ministry here.

"His return would have been disastrous. From many things that have been told me since his departure, I see that I was too good and long-suffering; but, as it happens, all has turned out for the best, as my position with his successor would be all the more difficult if it had been supposed that I had been instrumental in de Ring's fall. This, however, is not even rumoured.

"On the other hand, Riaz has told me that he

<sup>1</sup> *Mis en disponibilité* has no English equivalent. It means that a person has been withdrawn from a post, but can be employed at another. It does not imply blame.

---

owes everything to following my advice implicitly, and that he will show his gratitude not in words but in deeds. I told him that he owed just as much to de Ring, who had capsized himself, and that my only task had been to prevent Riaz from making a false move, which he would have done if I had not kept him cool."

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE MILITARY REVOLT OF SEPTEMBER, 1881 RETURN TO EGYPT VIA CONSTANTINOPLE

WE now entered upon a comparatively tranquil period, and had time, as it were, to take stock. My own position changed. The disappearance from the scene of M. de Ring left me sole representative of the Condominium, for Monsieur Monge, though a man of sound judgment and great experience, was mostly at Alexandria, and did not endeavour to do more than carry on the current affairs of the Agency.

Rumour always exaggerates, so it came about that I was credited with having worked the oracle with greater effect than was in reality the case. As an example, I translate a passage from a letter which I received from Rustem Pacha, at that time Governor of the Lebanon, who was well known later in London as Turkish Ambassador.

“I hear on all sides that the state of affairs in Egypt is very satisfactory, and that, with regard to yourself especially, you have in a short space of time acquired a very great position and authority which will not surprise those who know you, and which, of course, your antecedents and the memories which you left everywhere caused to be foreseen.”

The process of taking stock gave anything but agreeable results.

Item ; a Khedive, who was well meaning but very powerless, or, if any power remained to him, it was only such as could be brought into play by devious means. He could not make a decided move in any direction without encountering the opposition of a Consul-General or a foreign official in the Egyptian Administration. He was just as much hampered in doing good as in doing harm. It was, however, greatly in his favour that he was infinitely more intelligent than the people of his own country by whom he was surrounded. He was, indeed, the best man in his country, and it is satisfactory to observe that the historians of the

period, Milner,<sup>1</sup> Colvin<sup>2</sup> and Cromer,<sup>3</sup> have all given an equally favourable account of him. The character sketch of him given by Sir Auckland Colvin is the most life-like of the three, while that of Lord Milner is the most analytical.

Item; Riaz Pacha, President of the Council, enjoying the full confidence of the Khedive, so that I had not the additional difficulty of feeling that there were two authorities instead of one with whom I should have to negotiate. Riaz Pacha was a patriot if ever there was one, thinking of nothing and striving for nothing but the welfare of his country, but he had an overweening confidence in his own power to put everything to rights. Still it was a pleasure to work with a man whose aims were entirely unselfish, who was reasonable in argument and who never lacked courage, though he often lacked receptivity for modern ideas.

Item; my colleagues of the Diplomatic Corps. I had to take into account that I must expect little

<sup>1</sup> *England in Egypt*, p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> *The Making of Modern Egypt*, p. 54.

<sup>3</sup> *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 327.



or no help from them. The assumption by Great Britain and France of a preponderating right to manage the affairs of Egypt gave umbrage to Italy and Greece and encountered a cold aloofness from Germany and Austria. I knew that their assistance was indispensable in obtaining alleviation of any of the cruel wrongs which the Capitulations had rendered possible and which afflicted Egypt at the moment of which I speak as sorely as the plagues of old. But I also knew that not one of the Powers would raise a little finger to enable Egypt to be rid of these wrongs as long as Great Britain and France did not concede a working equality in Egyptian affairs.

Item ; an army which was docile and not badly disciplined, but a corps of officers which turned it into an element of danger instead of security. The grievances of these officers were very real. Hundreds of them had been retired, and their retired pay was often not forthcoming and, in addition to this grievance which afflicted all alike, a trouble had sprung up which I can only designate as a sort of cancerous growth, the desire of men of

one race to oust those of another race when both gain their living from the same source. We are hearing of it all over the world now, but this little ebullition of it in the Egyptian Army from 1880 onwards was the earliest sample that springs to my memory. Racial antagonism is destined to be one of the most difficult questions of the world. In the present case it was one of the most difficult questions in our little spot of earth.

For years the army had been officered by Circassians. Then Saïd Pacha, the predecessor of Ismail Pacha, began to favour officers of native Egyptian birth. Little by little the fellah officers, if I may call them by that convenient term, began to feel that they were a power in themselves and the Circassian officers also began to be aware of it; by degrees it became a question whether the Circassians were to be allowed to continue their supremacy. That was the question which led to the demonstrations of the 1st of February, 1881; that was the question, and no other, which led to the more formidable demonstration of the 9th of the following September, when the Khedive was

compelled by the fellah Colonels to dismiss the Riaz Ministry.

That was the question which in thus taking stock seemed to me to be the most pressing. The dismissal of the Minister of War, Osman Pacha Rifki, was the result of a purely military riot, and although Arabi Pacha states in his "autobiography" that in his previous petition, besides asking for the dismissal of the Minister of War he had also demanded the raising of the army to 18,000 men and the decreeing of the Constitution, it is quite certain that he did nothing of the kind.

In this respect the Grand Mufti flatly contradicts Arabi:—

"The petition talked of by Arabi as having been drawn up in January by him and taken to Riaz, certainly contained no reference to a Constitution or to the increase of the Army to 18,000 men."

The word "Constitution" leads me to the last item in my stock-taking—the Chamber of Notables.

This institution seems to have found a beginning so long ago as the days of Mehemet Ali, who gathered together a sort of Privy Council of

deserving men capable of giving him advice on matters of State. During the reign of Abbas Pacha nothing was heard of it, but Ismail Pacha again called it into being.

“In 1866 the Khedive revived the defunct assembly of delegates, one of the inchoate reforms projected by Mehemet Ali. . . . This germ of an Egyptian Parliament consists of Village Sheikhs and other provincial notables.”<sup>1</sup>

It is probable that Ismail Pacha only countenanced the Chamber in order to throw dust in the eyes of the Western Powers; but it is certain that Cherif Pacha, who was the principal Minister towards the close of Ismail's reign, attached a very real value to it, that it formed the keystone of the Constitution which he framed in 1879, and that he resigned because the convocation of the Chamber was refused. Then came the Ministry of Riaz Pacha under the new Khedive Tewfik, and neither the Khedive, nor his Minister, nor, I conclude, the Western Governments deemed it wise for the new

<sup>1</sup> *Egypt as it is*, by J. C. McCoan, p. 117.

reign to begin with a Parliamentary system for which the country was untrained.

I made no illusions to myself about the precarious nature of the situation. We were entirely at the mercy of the Colonels. The authority of the Khedive was gone. But it did not appear either that the Colonels were as yet aware of their power, or that, if they were aware of it, they desired to use it for nefarious purposes. On the contrary, for the moment we appeared to be drifting into a sort of political backwater. It was as though everybody concerned was somewhat alarmed at what he had done or allowed to be done and only desired to be quiet and not to be talked about. So, after the turmoil, consequent on the events of the 1st of February, had subsided, which was not until it was finally known that M. de Ring was not to return, I had time to ponder over things, and I came to the conclusion that the course which presented the best chance of tranquillity for the future lay in the gradual establishment of a constitutional system, and that my efforts must tend in this direction.

But knowing the jealousy which is unavoidably aroused in regard to any system which gets the reputation of being the cherished scheme of a foreign nation, I felt that if it were recognised that the resuscitation of the Chamber of Notables came from me, which, of course, was the same as if it had come from Her Majesty's Government, the prospect of its being entertained would be reduced to the vanishing point. For it must always be borne in mind that I had not even the semblance of a bayonet in the background to support me. "Remember," said Lord Salisbury, when it was settled that I was to go to Egypt, "that you will never have anything but moral support to help you," and this admonition was doubly enforced by the Liberal Government of Mr. Gladstone. On the other hand, I felt that the desire to see Liberal institutions everywhere and an exaggerated belief in their adaptability to the people of every nationality, were cardinal points of the Liberal creed, and that I should certainly be approved if I worked quietly towards their growth in Egypt.

*“ April 4th, 1881.*

“To-day I have applied for leave of absence, saying that if granted I propose to leave on the 3rd of May.

“I shall be very glad to have some complete rest, for I have been going through two months of constant anxiety as to what would happen next, and being obliged to decide on each successive day as to how to turn the helm, for, by a sequence of circumstances, it fell into my hands. However, I steered the Khedive and his Government through their difficulties, and I must say that they have expressed themselves to me with great gratitude; only I feel as if I should be thankful for a week of rest and solitude.”

*“ April 10th, 1881.*

“Here all is going quietly for the present, though there are signs of a development of crude ideas among the Arabs as to government which give cause for some anxiety in the future. Meantime the country is most prosperous. The taxes are collected without difficulty, the surplus on the revenue applied to the sinking fund, and the Government surplus besides will reach something like £700,000. Prosperity such as this ought to keep people quiet.”

*“April 25th, 1881.*

“I have got my leave and there is nothing that I foresee to prevent me from starting by the mail which leaves next week. I shall be glad of the rest.

“Here I think I may leave things without anxiety, quiet and prosperous. But I fear all the struggle will begin again next winter, and that is not a pleasant look-out.”

So in May I went on leave, not happy in my mind as to the future, but feeling that nothing could be done for the moment to make the outlook less dark.

In June disquieting rumours came from Alexandria as to further unrest among the officers. Nothing definite. I feared that the Khedive and Riaz Pacha might take some step which would increase the friction, and I wrote to Riaz. In due time I received a reply of which the following is a translation :—

*“CAIRO, July 4th, 1881.*

“My dear Malet,—In your letter of the 18th of June which I received by the last mail, you



speak of paragraphs in the newspapers relative to the military question.

“I can tell you, my dear friend, that they are pure exaggerations, the result of gossip on the part of evil-disposed persons, who never cease, as yet, for one single minute to fabricate and circulate false news.

“In regard to the nomination of officers, it has been decided in the military Commission that in future it is to be exclusively in the domain of the Minister of War.

“I would rather, my dear Malet, be accused of weakness than risk making the situation more complicated than it is by any precipitate acts at a moment, moreover, when this question has lost its importance.

“It is easy for people who are not in it (*hors de cause*) to gossip and to criticise; but those who have got their fingers in the fire are obliged to reflect more than once before acting lightly. There, my friend, is my way of seeing the matter.

“*Votre tout dévoué,*

“RIAZ.”

This was not reassuring, and an idea occurred to me which eventually led to my taking Constantinople

on my way back to my post, a journey which gave the quidnuncs food for much speculation.

There was by this time in Egypt a general feeling that its future depended principally on the policy in regard to it which would be adopted by Great Britain, and an unfortunate impression was gaining ground that we were going to act towards Egypt in the same way as France was at that moment acting towards Tunis.

The aggressive policy of France towards that country began in April, and it was pretty clear from the manner in which the whole campaign was handled that the ultimate issue could only be the subjection of the country ; which, indeed, was completed by the 10th of the following October when Tunis was occupied by French troops.

It is not to be wondered at that Egyptians were alarmed, and that many believed that the understanding between Great Britain and France included the permission to us to do what we liked in Egypt.

It was a rumour which it was difficult to deal with because it was obviously impossible for us to

make an official statement to say that it had no foundation.

But the Sultan had protested against the action of France, and it seemed to me that if it were made clear that, in regard to Egypt, Great Britain and Turkey were fully agreed, it would be recognised in Egypt that no understanding in regard to that country could exist between Great Britain and France which could enable us to act towards Egypt as France was acting towards Tunis.

Such an agreement could not for a moment be countenanced by the Sultan, and if I were to go to Constantinople and see the Sultan, the mere fact of the interview would dispel suspicions.

I also hoped that such a visit would have another effect. The fact that Egypt was still a province of the Turkish Empire, and that the Sultan had not abandoned his hold on it, or engaged to refrain from interference in its internal affairs if they called for it, was generally accepted by Egyptians. They still looked to the Sultan as their ultimate protector from Western aggression.

I believed that if the officers of the army were

convinced that I was working in harmony with the views of the Sultan and the Porte they would refrain from mutinous action for fear of consequences. These were the advantages which I hoped to gain from a visit to Constantinople. It will be observed that they were to be impressionist results.

To the matter-of-fact Western mind the calculation may seem to have been extravagant, but by those who have travelled and lived in the East, and who are therefore accustomed to modes of thought different from ours, I believe my plan will be regarded as reasonable and likely to effect what I expected of it if other matters had not intervened.

I was also very anxious to find out for myself how the land lay at Constantinople with regard to a Constitution for Egypt; whether such a project would be assisted, or countenanced, or meet with unbending hostility.

The journey by Constantinople would involve a delay in my return to Cairo, and I wrote to Riaz to inform him of the delay, but I did not mention my intention of going to Constantinople. Riaz

Pacha, whose letters were always rather quaint in wording, replied as follows:—

“CAIRO, 18th July, 1881.

*Translation.*

“My dear Malet,—It is not without interest or without great pleasure that I have just received your amiable letter of the 8th instant, for which I thank you sincerely.

“With regard to the prolongation of your leave, I know that it will do no harm to any one, but you must well know that it is of great interest and of great importance to me, be it personally or administratively, that you should be present here. The length of your leave, although it has now become tolerably short, is always to me very long.

“*Tout à vous,*

“RIAZ.”

I found no difficulty in obtaining Lord Granville's sanction to my taking Constantinople on my way in returning to Egypt. It was merely one way back instead of another. There was no question of giving me any instructions, for I was to have no mission in connection with the journey. I explained, of course, the object of my request, and

all that Lord Granville could say was that he hoped it might have the result I anticipated.

I left England on the 18th of August and reached Constantinople on the 2nd of September. Lord Dufferin had arrived during the summer as Ambassador on the termination of Lord Goschen's special mission. He was at the summer residence of the Embassy at Therapia, and I went to Petala's Hotel in the little bay of the village.

I at once acquainted His Excellency with the object of my visit, and asked him to inform the Sultan of my arrival in case His Majesty should desire to see me. I then waited and enjoyed myself.

It was indeed a joy to bask in the sun on the Bosphorus in that pleasant month of September and to see Lord Dufferin surrounded by his family in their beautiful home at Therapia. They were organising theatricals and I was quickly requisitioned for scene-painting.

At first all seemed to be going on in Egypt according to my anticipations, for the newspapers published the following telegram :—

“CAIRO, 2nd September.

“The eventuality of a military movement has become improbable in consequence of the menace of a Turkish occupation.

“The rumours of a change of Ministry are denied.”

Lord Dufferin sent me the telegram, on which he congratulated me and said that he had been much struck with it, that its arrival so soon after what I had told him was “quite dramatic.”

But, alas, there came a sudden change of scene! On the 9th of September the Colonels again mutinied, this time on a bigger scale.

It was more than a mutiny. It was a revolution. The Colonels brought their regiments to the open square in front of the Palace of Abdin, and when the Khedive appeared, accompanied by Mr. Colvin, who had been summoned by His Highness, Arabi Pacha demanded the dismissal of the Ministry, the convocation of a National Parliament and the increase of the army to 18,000 men.

By the judicious intervention of Mr. Cookson, the British Consul at Alexandria, who was acting as

Agent and Consul-General in my absence, the last two demands were ultimately reserved. The Khedive consented to dismiss Riaz Pacha and to appoint Cherif Pacha to be President of the Council in his stead with power to nominate a new Ministry.

The news reached us on Saturday the 10th. On the 11th I received a telegram from Lord Granville desiring me to return at once to my post, and on the afternoon of Tuesday the 13th I embarked on board the Russian steamer *Chichakoff* for Alexandria; but on the morning of that day I had an audience of the Sultan.

The account of what passed on that occasion was printed in a blue-book, and I need only quote the following paragraph:—

“ On my asking His Majesty whether he proposed to take any steps in answer to the application for assistance which was reported to have been made by the Khedive, he replied that he was not, as yet, in possession of sufficient details with regard to the origin and nature of the movement to be able to determine what ought to be done. He observed that the military put forward three demands: (1) the dismissal of the Ministry; (2) a Constitution;



and (3) an increase of the Army. With regard to the first point, His Majesty remarked that the fall of Ministers before the popular expression of the feeling of the country was not an unusual event ; that in this case that popular feeling had apparently found its mouthpiece in the army ; that although it was to be regretted, he did not consider the first point as one to be withstood.

“ But the second point, His Majesty said, was one which he could not concede ; it was not possible for him to allow a Constitution in one province of his dominions and to withhold it from the others.

“ On the third point he observed that the strength of an army depended upon the necessities of a country ; that he was not sufficiently informed about Egypt to be able to say off-hand that the present strength of its army was adequate, though his impression was in that direction.”<sup>1</sup>

I was thus enabled to return to my post with a knowledge of the Sultan's views at that moment in regard to Egypt.

I arrived at Cairo on the evening of Sunday, the 18th of September.

<sup>1</sup> Egypt, No. 3, 1882, p. 24.

The accounts of the events of the 9th of September are fully set forth in the blue-book (Egypt, No. 3, 1882) by Mr. Cookson, the Acting Agent and Consul-General in my absence, and Mr. Auckland Colvin, the British Controller-General, who were both present.

Arabi wrote two letters, one to the Minister of War and one to the Consuls, to explain his action:—

*Translation from the Arabic.*

“Colonel Arabi Bey to the Minister of War.<sup>1</sup>

“15 *Shawal*, 1298 (*September 9, 1881*).

“I, together with the officers and men, have ascertained that an order has been issued by Your Excellency to the 3rd Regiment of Infantry to proceed to Alexandria. And inasmuch as such an order is intended to disperse the military power with a view of revenge upon us, and as we cannot deliver up ourselves to death, we hereby give notice to Your Excellency that all the regiments will assemble to-day at 9 o'clock, Arabic time [about 3.30 p.m.] in the Abdin Square, for deciding this question. We shall ourselves write to all the

<sup>1</sup> Egypt, No. 3, 1882, p. 14.

Foreign Agents what is necessary. We further inform Your Excellency that no regiment will march in obedience to the orders given by Your Excellency until ample security be given for the lives and interests of ourselves and our relatives.

“I therefore address you the present for your information, and in order to confirm the verbal remonstrances I made to Your Excellency on your appointment to office against the intended tearing asunder of the military power. It is therefore hoped that the order given to the regiment to march may be rescinded.”

*Translation.*

“Colonel Ahmed Arabi to Mr. Cookson.<sup>1</sup>

“*Shawal*, 1298 (*September 9, 1881*).

“Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that, ever since the 1st February, intrigues have been on foot, inaugurated by Osman Pacha Rifki. More than seven months have elapsed, and during that period the military have endured oppression and intrigue, and have been threatened with destruction. In support of what I advance, I may mention the intrigue worked out by Youssouf Pacha Kamal, the Khedive's Agent; the incident of Farag Bey el

<sup>1</sup> Egypt, No. 3, 1882, p. 4.

Soudani; and the manœuvres of the nineteen officers who, at the instigation of Ibrahim Aga, the Khedive's *Toutoundjee* [Pipe-bearer], had been sowing discord and intrigue. And yet all our efforts have been directed to check intrigue, and by wise suggestions to bring about a better state of affairs, in order to ensure constant tranquillity, to prevent bloodshed, and to protect the interests of all subjects of friendly nations. But since the Khedive's return to Cairo, intrigues have been on the increase, while we have been threatened both openly and secretly; and they have culminated in an attempt to create disunion among the military, in order to facilitate the object in view, namely, to destroy and avenge themselves upon us.

“In this state of things, we consider it our duty to protect our lives and interests, pending the issue of an order from the Sublime Porte for the protection of our country and of the persons residing therein.

“I therefore address you the present to assure you that we continue to protect the interests of all the subjects of friendly Powers.

“Accept, etc.,

“COLONEL AHMED ARABI,

“*Representing the Egyptian Army.*”

Mr. Cookson, who was present and who had been in charge of the Agency all the time I was away, wrote :—

“It is beyond doubt that, though I believe without good reason, they (the Colonels) have always suspected that the Khedive and Riaz Pacha were only waiting for an opportunity to take vengeance on them.”

Arabi's two letters breathe fear. We need not go behind them and endeavour to find other motives.

I made it my first business on returning to find out what had led to the situation, and I committed the result to a despatch which will be found in the Appendix. The upshot of it is that the motive of the Colonels was the necessity of securing their own safety, and on reading over my report and considering the matter by the light of subsequent events I see no reason to modify anything that I said in it.

But there is a point which I can now amplify with the assistance of the information given in recent publications.

Arabi and his fellow-mutineers acted from fear, but they did more than the immediate necessity of providing for their safety required. They asked for a Constitution.

Arabi was an illiterate and ignorant man, and the other Colonels were more illiterate and more ignorant than he, who, at least, was versed in the Koran and had a smattering of what was taught at the University of El Azhar, but it may be safely asserted that if, on the day succeeding their *coup d'état*, the Colonels had been taken into a room by themselves and asked what was the nature of a Constitution, they would not have been able to give a sensible answer.

How came it about that on that famous 9th of September "a Constitution" found its place as one of their demands?

As the story develops it will be seen that the leading civilian on the revolutionary side was a Pacha named Mahmud Sami e Barodi. According to one's taste one may call him a leading conspirator or a leading patriot. He was an inconspicuous member of the Ministry when I went to Egypt, and

my attention was directed to him for the first time, when he was made Minister of War as successor to Osman Pacha Rifki, after the 1st of February, 1880.

Strange to say, he belonged to the ruling Turkish or Circassian class, not to the pure Egyptian or Fellaheen.

He knew no Western language, but he was a well-educated and a superior man judged by the Egyptian standard.

To me he was, I confess, very antipathetic. I did not like looking at him. He had small shifty eyes set in pink and white eyelids. Some people become thoroughly uncomfortable if there is a cat in the room. I fancy that the feeling they experience is much the same as what I felt when Sami Pacha was about. But I have always endeavoured to subdue my prejudices, and happily the necessity for interviewing him did not come till long afterwards, by which time I had become familiarised with his appearance and first impressions had subsided.

Still, if I had foreseen that he was a man to beware of, I should have been correct in my judgment.

In his remarks on Arabi's autobiography, the Sheikh Mohammed Abdu, Grand Mufti of Egypt, says:—

“Mahmud Sami was one of the original Constitutionalists dating from the time of Ismail. He was a friend of Cherif's, and belonged to the same school of ideas. It is most probable that he gave warning to Arabi of his intended arrest, as he was one of the council of Ministers and must have known. After the affair of Kasr-el-Nil he was altogether with Arabi and the Colonels. That was why Riaz got rid of him from the Ministry, and appointed Daoud Pacha in his stead.”<sup>1</sup>

We need go no further to ascertain why Arabi on the 9th of September put a Constitution into his programme. It was no doubt at the prompting of Mahmud Pacha Sami. Nor is there any fault to be found with it. It is indeed the best thing in the programme, but it is interesting to know why it was there, because Arabi unaided would certainly never have thought of it then, any more than he did on the 1st of February.

<sup>1</sup> *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*, W. S. Blunt, p. 492.



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But Mahmud Sami's own programme really went much farther than this. What he had always intended from the beginning of the movement was an Egyptian Republic on the model of Switzerland. In fact, from the first in Mahmud Sami we had to deal with a clever and unscrupulous man, who was traitor to his Prince and bent on overthrowing him; and Arabi, by degrees, became his tool.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII

Mr. Malet to Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *September 23rd*, 1881.

“My Lord,—For a better understanding of recent events in Egypt, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a short review of what has taken place in connection with the military movement, coupled with an attempt to show the causes which led to the action of the army on the 9th instant.

“It is merely necessary to allude to the military movement of April 1879, which caused the fall of the Ministry of which Sir Charles R. Wilson and M. de Balignières were members, as being the unfortunate occasion which first showed the officers their power. The motives which led to their action at that time were totally distinct from the movement which has culminated in the present crisis, and which first began to show itself at the close of the year 1880.

“Time has confirmed the accuracy of the account of the causes of the discontent of the officers which I had the honour to give your Lordship in my despatch of the 2nd February. It sprang from the comparative, or rather total, neglect of necessary reforms in the army, while other branches of the Administration and the country generally were being cared for. The representations then made,

instead of receiving due consideration, merely aroused the suspicions of the Government, and the officers who presented the petition were ultimately dealt with in the way best calculated to destroy all confidence in the Khedive and the Government, though it was in harmony with the traditions of Oriental statesmanship. They were instructed to come to the Ministry of War on the morning of the 1st February, to join in settling the arrangements for the military procession which was to accompany one of the Princesses on the occasion of her marriage. It had been decided at a meeting of the Council, at which the Controllers were not present, that on presenting themselves at the Ministry of War the three petitioning Colonels were to be arrested.

“The Colonels, however, had wind of the design, and, before proceeding to the Ministry, left orders with their officers to come with their men and release them if they did not return within two hours.

“The result will be fresh in your Lordship's memory. The Colonels were arrested, and released by force. The Minister of War had to escape through the window, and a few hours later was dismissed from office by the Khedive under compulsion of a riotous soldiery.

“Riaz Pacha was to blame for consenting to the arrest, but he had been strongly against the course pursued, and had only yielded when his own loyalty began to be questioned. The Colonels appeared to be perfectly aware of the several parts which the advisers of the Khedive had taken in the matter and in a short time, Riaz Pacha, if

not able to recover their confidence, had at all events, by yielding to the more pressing measures of reform which were demanded, and by promising the remainder at a future period, rendered himself acceptable for the time being.

“ It has frequently been said of late that if the insubordination of the officers had then been rigorously dealt with and the army disbanded, we should have been saved from the late crisis ; but, in fact, the power of dealing rigorously with any single officer, or of disbanding the troops, has never been in the hands of the Khedive or the Ministry from that time to this.

“ I felt from the first that the only chance for the future was the re-establishment of confidence between the Khedive and the officers, and to this end I dedicated my best efforts in speaking to the Khedive, Riaz Pacha, and the officers themselves. A Military Commission was established, and had apparently brought about a good understanding, which found its expression in a speech of unexceptionable character made by Arabi Bey at a banquet at the Ministry of War at the end of April. When I went on leave, at the beginning of May, I had reason to believe that confidence was being restored ; that the officers had, in fact, nothing to fear from intrigue ; that they were gradually relaxing measures for their own protection, and beginning to feel that the Khedive and the Ministers no longer aimed at their lives.

“ I should convey a wrong impression were I to be thought to have believed, for an instant, that the Khedive

had at any time designs upon the lives of these men. I feel certain that from first to last His Highness has never contemplated anything beyond the restoration of discipline by legitimate punishment, but I do know for certain that the officers were quite convinced that their lives were aimed at. The traditions of the days of Ismail Pacha stalked like spectres across their path, and the Colonels have never been able to understand that, through the participation of the English and French Governments in the administration of the country, the possibility of the repetition of the crimes of those days has vanished.

“Matters do, indeed, seem to have progressed favourably to the month of July, when two incidents occurred. An artilleryman was run over and killed in the streets of Alexandria. His comrades bore the dead body to the Palace, and forced an entrance in defiance of the orders of their officers. They were tried, and the ringleaders were condemned to severe sentences. Nineteen officers had brought charges against the Colonel of their regiment, named Abdel-Al; the charges were inquired into and declared to be unfounded, whereupon the nineteen officers were dismissed from the active list of the army, but were restored subsequently by order of the Khedive. This action of His Highness gave great umbrage to the Colonels, who believed that the order was given with a view to encourage the insubordination of the officers towards them, and a letter was written by the Colonels either to the Khedive or the Minister of War, contrasting the leniency towards the nineteen officers with the severity

towards the artillerymen. This letter was ultimately withdrawn, but by that time the Khedive appears to have been completely dissatisfied with his Minister of War, Mahmud Pacha Barodi, and alarmed at the bearing of the Colonels. He had become tired of hearing Riaz Pacha say 'Wait, and all will be well'; he saw no signs of returning authority, he made up his mind that his Ministry would make him wait for ever, he determined to see whether energetic measures would not be successful, and he appointed his brother-in-law, Daoud Pacha, to be Minister of War in the place of Mahmud Pacha Barodi.

"The measure was viewed with great dissatisfaction by the Colonels, and Arabi Bey presented a petition to the new Minister containing impossible demands. The petition was returned to him with an order that, in future, such documents must go through his military superior, and not be presented by him directly to the Minister of War. A decision was at the same time taken by the Ministry to order the Regiment of Tourah, commanded by Abdel-Al, to leave Cairo. On hearing of these events Mr. Cookson represented to the Khedive that it was very advisable to take no measures which might lead to a crisis until my return, as I should, no doubt, arrive with instructions as to the advice, if any, which Her Majesty's Government desired to give to the Khedive. His Highness replied that he had no wish at present to do more than oppose a firm front to all further demands for concession.

"Had His Highness followed the advice thus given the

crisis might, at all events, have been staved off; but, unfortunately, the energetic attitude displayed by the new Minister of War met apparently with unlooked-for success. The Khedive resolved to come to Cairo, and a step was taken which, as far as I can judge, finally led to the crisis. The Prefect of Police at Cairo was changed, and a person named Abdel Kader Pacha, noted for his despotic and determined character, was appointed to the post. This official immediately began to display an indiscreet zeal in sending out spies to watch the movements of the Colonels. These spies appear, indeed, to have reported that there was nothing to fear. It is a singular feature of the history of the movement that the Government was always in the dark as to the intentions of the Colonels, and that the Colonels appear to have been thoroughly informed of every move of the Government.

“At no period since the 1st February had the confidence of the Khedive and the Government been so complete as immediately before the outbreak of the 9th. On the very eve, and on the morning itself of that day, Riaz Pasha assured those with whom he conversed that the Government were masters of the situation, and that the danger of a military movement had passed away. But, in fact, all the terrors of the Colonels for their personal safety had been again aroused. A story had got abroad that the Khedive had obtained a secret ‘Fetwah,’ or Decree, from the Sheikh-ul-Islam, condemning them to death for high treason. There was absolutely no foundation for this story, but it is still currently believed, and at

this moment the position of the Sheikh-ul-Islam is precarious in consequence of it. Spies were continually hovering about the residences of the Colonels, and on the night of the 8th instant a man presented himself at the house of Arabi Bey, was refused admittance, and was afterwards followed and seen to return to the Prefecture of Police. It was no doubt in the mind of Arabi Bey that he was to be murdered; he left his house, and went to that of one of the other Colonels, to whom a similar incident had just occurred. It is my belief that then only measures were taken for immediate action, that it was concerted and planned that night, as it was executed the following day.

“Your Lordship will observe that in endeavouring to trace the history of events I have made no allusion to intrigue from abroad. The first idea which has occurred to all is that the ex-Khedive, Prince Halim, and the Porte itself are behind the scenes. It is impossible to prove that they are not. I have been able to trace no evidence that they are, and I can only advance my belief, with some hesitation, that the motives which I have given above are sufficient to account for the action of the Colonels without seeking further.

A Mussulman gentleman, to whom I was speaking yesterday, told me that he had had long and frequent conversations with Arabi Bey since the 9th, and had pointed out to him the great danger which his action had caused to Egypt of foreign intervention, either on the part of England and France, or of Turkey. He asked



Arabi Bey if he had not foreseen this danger, and, if he had, how he could reconcile his proceedings with the patriotism which he professed. Arabi Bey replied that he had foreseen such consequences, but that he and his friends were between two fires—on the one side from the Government, and on the other from their own comrades, who were gradually being gained over by the Government; in fact, that action had become absolutely necessary in self-defence.

“I trust that the view which I have ventured to submit to your Lordship is the correct one, because, if it is, there appears to be hope for the future. It is obvious that if the movement is prepared from abroad, if Arabi Bey and his fellow-agitators are merely the puppets of persons who, from motives of ambition or revenge, desire to see anarchy in Egypt, no concessions, no reforms, will be of the slightest avail, whereas if fear is the motive there is a hope that it may be dispelled, and that with the restoration of confidence the tranquil progress of the country may be resumed.

“I have, etc.,

“EDWARD B. MALET.”

## CHAPTER IX

EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE MILITARY REVOLT—  
LORD GRANVILLE'S DESPATCH OF  
NOVEMBER 4TH, 1881

THE new President of the Council, Cherif Pacha, was of Turkish descent, but imbued with Liberal ideas, which, in his case, were not in any way confounded with revolutionary ideas. From first to last he was loyal to the Khedive. He was the author of a Constitution in the time of Ismail which never came into force, and he was now destined to encounter the same species of adversity. He was apparently about fifty years of age and very prepossessing in manners and appearance, the exact antipodes of Mahmud Sami Pacha.

Cherif Pacha had hesitated for some time before consenting to take office. The Colonels had been perfectly intractable and it was the Notables, who had come to Cairo at the call of Arabi, who made the golden bridge for a solution of the difficulty. In

a body of 150 they implored Cherif to take office and gave their own guarantee that the Colonels should obey any orders that might be given by the Government. The military, however, held out for the appointment of Mahmud Pacha Sami to be Minister of War, to which Cherif Pacha unwillingly consented, and on the 15th of September the formation of the new Ministry was officially announced. Mustapha Pacha Fehmi, who has since gained honourable distinction by his Presidency of the Council for many years during the British occupation, was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I arrived at Cairo on the 18th of September and found the new Government already installed. I at once called on Cherif Pacha, whom I had not previously known, and was delighted to find in the new President of the Council a man of such an attractive personality.

The principal condition of Cherif's accepting office was that the mutinous regiments should leave Cairo and the black regiment under Abdel-Al was the first to go. There was a slight hitch because

the band of the regiment was not included in the order for departure, and the men refused to start without it, so this also was accorded.

On the 25th of September I wrote to Lord Granville :—

“ Two more regiments will be ordered away after the convocation of the Chamber of Notables ; but it is not yet clear to my mind that Arabi will consent to go himself. I am rather alarmed at the Pan-Islamic spirit which he appears to be endeavouring to spread in the country and I sincerely hope that Cherif Pacha will stop it. We owe that to the French in Tunis. I find a deep-rooted feeling here that we intend to play the same game with Egypt. Nothing that I can say will disabuse the popular mind of it, either native or foreign. I do, however, sincerely trust that some agreement may be come to with the Porte as to the future. Might it not be an opportunity for us to place Cyprus under a Government similar to that of the Lebanon, which has given such complete satisfaction to its inhabitants, in exchange for special guarantees with regard to Egypt ?

“ I can hardly hope that we are at the end of our troubles here ; Arabi Bey is an illiterate fanatic.

It is not to be expected that after his recent success he will give no further trouble. His influence in the country is undoubtedly great. I cannot believe in his using it wisely.

“The Chamber of Notables also, although it is the best measure which can be at present devised to break the power of the military, is a dangerous experiment.

“There is no saying how long it may remain under the control of the Government. Under Ismail they were sheep, but they will snap their fingers at the present Khedive.

“If they choose to discuss matters foreign to their *Règlement* and the Army supports them, he will be powerless to dissolve the Chamber. In short, there is urgency for preparation, on our part, for an unpleasant turn of events.”

I have been accused of not keeping Her Majesty's Government properly informed of the real state of affairs in Egypt; but the forecasts in this letter were both accurate and complete. I used the expression Pan-Islamic because, at that time, the word “National” had not come into fashion.

In the autumn Sir W. Lake, a civil K.C.B., had died and Lord Granville at once recommended me for the vacancy, it being the first which had occurred since he wrote to me, "Will you have a K.C.M.G. in the hand or a K.C.B. in a very thick bush?"

The announcement that the Knighthood of the Bath was to be conferred on me was now made, and it was certainly a rather unfortunate moment. It is not the custom of the Government to name the services for which honours are given, but it is generally supposed that there is some connection between the bestowal of the honour and the recent action of the person on whom it is conferred. It was impossible to get any one to understand that I was made a K.C.B. in October 1881 for work done in the spring of 1880, and it was naturally somewhat surprising that I should receive it just at a moment that things had ceased to go well in Egypt. It engendered the idea that I had some occult and powerful influence at home which would be exerted in my favour irrespective of what I did. To this extent the honour was, at the time, not an

advantage to me. Yet nothing could be further from the truth that I had anything more to lean on at home for favour than my own exertions. I had no powerful connections and I was little known.

Before the end of September an incident occurred which illustrates the variety of the events which required my intervention.

A young Englishman whom I will call Mr. A., engaged in a chemical laboratory, called on Saturday the 24th of September and asked to see me on business. I had met him before and knew him to be intelligent and trustworthy.

He unfolded a story which set my imagination to work, but also rendered it advisable to mix with it a little scepticism and a large amount of caution.

The reader may remember that when Arabi was accused by the Viceroy Ismail of being one of the leaders in the riot against Nubar Pacha in April 1879, he was brought before a council on which, among others, were Stone Pacha and Osman Rifki Pacha, the Minister of War, who was driven from office by Arabi on February 1st. Stone Pacha was

an American officer who kept himself very much to himself, and although at the time of which I am writing (September 1881), he occupied the high position of Chief of the Staff of the Egyptian Army, I had never met him and did not know him.

Mr. A. told me that he desired to ask me, as British Agent and Consul-General, to advise him how to act in a difficult position in which he found himself.

He said that on the previous day General Stone had sent for him and asked him whether he would undertake the manufacture of dynamite bombs. The General said that he should want a sufficient quantity to blow up a building of the size of the New Hotel, a building about as large as the Charing Cross Hotel in London. The General also asked him to provide a number of hand grenades filled with dynamite or nitro-glycerine. He had asked Mr. A. a number of questions as to the manufacture of such articles, and requested him to send him any treatises on the subject which he might possess. Mr. A. had replied that he



would give an answer next day as to whether he could undertake the work.

He had, however, on reflection, thought that the matter was very serious, and he had come to me for advice as to whether he ought to engage in it.

I told him that he had better have nothing to do with it, but that as he would have to see General Stone again he had better temporise with him and let me know what passed, and, above all, speak to no one on the subject.

I saw Mr. A. again on Monday, when he told me that General Stone had rather put him off and that he thought that the General had found an American to undertake the task instead.

I now talked the matter over with Colvin. It appeared to me to be very serious, for if the General were to persist in his plan, or by any mischance the rumour of such a thing got wind, the Colonels would naturally at once refuse to leave Cairo, and there was no saying what consequences might ensue. Colvin and I decided that Cherif Pacha must be told. I drove to the house of the President of the Council, and as I did my tale

unfold he looked as grave as I no doubt did myself while listening to Mr. A. He at once recognised the gravity of the matter, and that it was even dangerous to cause an inquiry into it to be made, as the one thing to avoid was that the story should get abroad. At the same time it could not be left alone. Cherif Pacha decided to send for General Stone, and I authorised him to tell the General the source of my information.

The result was that General Stone partially acknowledged the truth of Mr. A.'s statement, and defended his action by saying that it was absolutely necessary to be prepared against the recurrence of the troubles of the 9th of September, but he now undertook to pursue the matter no further.

On the following day I received a letter from General Stone to the following effect. I do not vouch for the textual accuracy.

“Sir,—The manner in which you have elicited the substance of my private conversations may be regarded as permissible in certain circles, but it is assuredly not so considered among gentlemen.

“I am, etc.”

This was a little rough on me considering what had taken place, so I asked Colvin, who knew the General, to go to him and explain the circumstances under which I had acted, by which it would be made clear to him that I had "elicited" nothing and that I had merely received the information in my official capacity. He was then to request the General to withdraw the letter.

The matter ended better than seemed likely. General Stone told Sir Auckland Colvin that the letter had been written under a false impression, that Mr. A. had said that I seemed to be aware of what was passing in the General's house, that I had sent for Mr. A. and asked him whether it was true that the General had proposed to him to manufacture dynamite shells; that as there appeared to be a misunderstanding he, General Stone, frankly withdrew the letter and authorised Sir Auckland to express to me his regret at having written it, and to make to me his *amende honorable*.

That is the end of the story. General Stone called on me a day or two afterwards and I returned his visit, and we neither of us alluded to

the incident; and fortunately the affair never got wind.

I have often asked myself where the truth lay, and what would have happened if Mr. A. had not come to me. For those who like to exercise their ingenuity in that direction there is as much material for speculation as in the story of "The Lady and the Tiger," with the advantage of a more immediate historical interest.

Two Envoys from the Sultan came to Cairo at the beginning of October, Ali Pacha Nizami and Ahmed Pacha Ratib.<sup>1</sup> On October 10th I wrote to Lord Granville:—

"The Turkish Envoys, as far as I can tell, confine themselves to the simple mission stated by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Lord Dufferin.

"If they do no more than this, they will go away and leave very little trace behind them. They might render us essential service if we were willing and able to make use of them. The alternative is trusting to the continued power of Cherif Pacha and

<sup>1</sup> Egypt, No. 3, 1882. No. 85, p. 52.

giving a helping hand to the development of Egypt under it.

“The programme of Arabi is now pretty clear and consists in the liberation of Egypt from European control, and a Constitution. Whether he has the perseverance and the intelligence to carry on this propaganda until he forces our armed interference, time only can show. I have no doubt, however, that if we did threaten armed interference he would show fight, at all events till troops appeared.

[This passage was intended to warn Lord Granville against threatening intervention unless he were prepared to act. Since the success of Dulcigno he had been favourably inclined to “demonstrations.”]

“The Suez Canal would be immediately blocked, and telegraphic communication with India by this route would be cut off.

“However, these are eventualities which the actual aspect of affairs does not warrant us in supposing near.

“Only if, at any time, intervention of this nature should be contemplated, the Canal and the telegraph should be thought of first.

“Cherif is sanguine as to the future ; he declares

that, now that the grievances of the army are redressed, he apprehends nothing from them, and I trust that this view is the correct one."

On October 17th I wrote: ---

"I really do not venture yet to say much about the future, for the relative strength of the Ministry and the Army has not shown itself yet.

"There is a general aspiration throughout the country for something, but I do not believe that any single individual would be able to say what he wants. It tends vaguely to liberation from foreign control and a Constitution, but there is also a general acknowledgment that the assistance of foreigners is still absolutely indispensable, and the visit of the Turkish Envoys has let them know that if ever they do arrive at a Constitution it can only be done by our assistance against the Porte.

"I myself count a great deal on the inauguration of justice for the natives, which will, I hope, take place by the end of the year.

"I am anxious with regard to the question of the increase of the Army. One of the most sensible of the Ministers said to me the other day: 'We shall resist it as much as we can, but if the Army insists we must give way.'

“If the Colonels know this the increase is inevitable. Cherif is, however, sanguine that the Colonels will be reasonable and listen to him.”

My general line had now shaped itself into a definite support of constitutional progress without hostility to any branch of the reformers, were it the party which was now beginning to be termed “Nationalist,” or the Government, or the Colonels, as long as they kept faith.

A very disagreeable incident occurred towards the end of October, which showed the dangerous ground on which we were all treading.

During the time of his supremacy Riaz Pacha had established a French newspaper entitled the *Egypte* in which to ventilate his views and, I think, to conciliate the French colony, and the unhappy expression “a false Prophet,” applied to Mahomet, was discovered in a back number and aroused a fanatical eruption, sudden, violent, and unexpected.

Happily the Government of Cherif Pacha had severed all connection with the paper, and therefore were not included in the storm of rage which

was evoked. The editor of the paper, a M. Laffon, was threatened with death, and Cherif Pacha found himself so powerless before the whirlwind of fanaticism that, instead of at once according the editor the protection to which he was entitled, he actually advised the French Agent and Consul-General that M. Laffon had better leave the country as quickly and as quietly as he could for fear of consequences.

I wrote to Lord Granville :—<sup>1</sup>

“It is difficult to arrive at the truth. . . . M. Laffon appears to have believed that a sentence of death had been recorded against him, and that two individuals had arrived at Alexandria to execute it.

“Cherif Pacha, although he acknowledges that M. Laffon was menaced, denies the remainder of the rumours.”

The French Consul at Alexandria wrote on the 1st of November to M. Laffon :—

“In accordance with instructions from the French Agent and Consul-General I have to request you to leave Egypt. . . .

<sup>1</sup> Egypt, No. 5, 1882. No. 8, p. 11.



“I hope you will be able to embark to-morrow on board the Messageries Maritimes steamer sailing for Marseilles.”

And M. Laffon did so. The whole incident was humiliating to France and disquieting to all foreigners and Christians in Egypt. I suspect that it had much weight in deciding M. Gambetta to adopt his forward policy if ever he should get the chance.

I had written to Lord Granville on the 31st of October :—

“M. Sienkiewicz [the new French Agent and Consul-General] is fortunately singularly moderate, and is doing his best to induce M. Laffon to leave the country. I confess that had the thing occurred to an Englishman I should have been inclined to compel Cherif to measure his strength with Arabi.”

But all this time the mistrust of English policy was growing instead of diminishing, and I felt that Her Majesty's Government ought to take some step to allay it. I therefore drew up the draft of

a despatch, which I thought would have a calming effect on the public nerves, at the same time that it would be a true exposition of the intentions of the British Government. I should have been glad to insert a distinct promise to assist the establishment of a constitutional system, but after the decided refusal of the Sultan to authorise a Constitution this was not possible. So by carefully adjusted phrases I attempted to indicate as nearly as possible the liberal proclivities of Her Majesty's Government without using the obnoxious word "constitution."

To my great satisfaction Lord Granville accepted my proposal, and sent to me, almost by return of post, the oft-quoted despatch of the 4th of November, 1881, which was the only State document in regard to our intentions in Egypt which gained general approval.

In writing about it himself he says under date of the 18th of November, 1881 :—

"The despatch based on your draft with some few alterations seems to be successful both in England and in Egypt."

The letter in which I forwarded my draft of the proposed despatch ran as follows :—

“CAIRO, *October 24th*, 1881.

“Dear Lord Granville,—One of the principal features of the present feeling in Egypt is distrust of England arising from articles in the English Press, and from the efforts of newspapers of all nationalities except our own in this country to propagate it. Mr. Gladstone’s remarks at Leeds came just at the right time, and, thinking that your Lordship might not be unwilling to further reassure the Egyptians, I have ventured to put down in an imaginary draft, which I enclose, the points which it would be very advisable that they should clearly understand.

“Such a despatch, were you to entertain the idea of writing anything of the sort, is not the least necessary for the Ministry, who do not share the general mistrust, but I should ask to have it printed in the *Moniteur* and in the Arabic papers. The people generally have great need to be enlightened as to the ‘rôle’ which we are playing.

“I hope now that nothing will happen until the meeting of the Chamber on the 15th of December. Opinions as to its action are extremely divided.

Some think that it will attempt to govern the country and destroy Cherif's power; others that it will be moderate and of great service. It seems to me that somehow or other it must be a break-water between the Khedive and a further display of military force to wring concessions from him."

The draft which I enclosed in my letter will be found in the appendix to this chapter, together with the despatch founded on it. It will be seen that the despatch is substantially a reproduction of the draft with certain alterations of style and words to suit the atmosphere of Downing Street, together with a final paragraph inserted as a civility to the French. Lord Granville also added an emphatic approval of my attitude in regard to the Riaz Ministry.

In *Modern Egypt* Lord Cromer quotes some of the passages in Lord Granville's despatch and says in regard to the paragraph about the maintenance of the independence of Egypt as established by the Firmans:—

"These are wise words. They indicated that Turkish intervention was undesirable, but that if

material force had to be employed a Turkish was to be preferred to an Anglo-French occupation."

That was exactly my view. I looked with absolute dread upon the prospect of Anglo-French armed intervention. The recollection of the ultimate result to Austria of the Schleswig-Holstein War was fresh in my memory, and I believed most sincerely that a joint English and French armed descent upon Egypt would lead to war between Great Britain and France just as surely as the war of Prussia and Austria to wrest the Schleswig-Holstein Duchies of Denmark led to war between the two Powers that made it.

It is curious to note that my views at this time were apparently shared by Prince Bismarck, as will be seen from the singularly apposite account of his attitude given by Lord Fitzmaurice in his *Life of Lord Granville*.<sup>1</sup> The time to which the remarks refer may be a few months later, but the date is not clear. In any case the similar situation in October 1881, no doubt caused the same criticism in Prince

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Lord Granville*, p. 260.

Bismarck's mind. Lord Ampthill was our Ambassador at Berlin, and Lord Fitzmaurice is apparently quoting him.

“ It was always to be remembered in dealing with Prince Bismarck that his sympathies were in favour of strong action. He understood and appreciated the interests of Great Britain in Egypt, and had always done justice to them, but he regretted that Great Britain had recently thought it necessary to share her interests too exclusively with France, and was convinced that France must, in that case, quarrel with Great Britain. Such a quarrel might affect all Europe. He called Egypt the Schleswig-Holstein of the two Western Powers, and thought that a joint intervention would be like the action of Austria and Prussia in the Elbe Duchies and other joint interventions of which the history had ended in war. He believed that France had ambitious views on Egypt. These he proposed to neutralise by giving his moral support to the Sultan's suzerainty over Egypt in the event of a foreign occupation becoming necessary.”

Meantime Lord Granville wrote to me in a letter dated the 7th of October :—

“I quite agree with you about the evils of a French-English or joint occupation. I see the evils of a Turkish occupation more strongly than you do.”

Undoubtedly Lord Granville saw the difficulties of such an occupation, if not the evils, more distinctly than I did, because he was in daily communication with the Quai d'Orsay, and knew, which I did not, that a cardinal point of French policy at that time was the prevention of the slightest encroachment of Turkey in Egyptian affairs.

M. de Freycinet, writing about the situation at this date, says that the French Agent and Consul-General, in giving an account of the events of the 9th of September and of the formation of Cherif Pacha's Ministry, observed that the Europeans were uneasy because there was a rumour that there was to be a Turkish intervention to re-establish order.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *La question d'Égypte*, p. 199.

“Was much moved at this prospect in a conversation he had with the British Representative at Paris: he pointed out to him that, in his opinion, any intervention of the Ottoman Porte, under whatever form and whatever pretext it might assume, under the actual circumstances would be disastrous to Egypt. The Minister was right. The Porte, intervening *sponte sua* exclusive of the European Powers, at a moment when the public mind was so profoundly moved, would have appeared among the Egyptians as the only legitimate authority, and would have seriously compromised the situation created by the Firmans of 1841. M. Barthélémy de St. Hilaire asked Lord Granville to be so good as to enjoin Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople to unite his efforts with ours to hinder the Sultan from taking such an initiative.”

M. de Freycinet goes on to say that the Turkish intervention did not take place, but that the Sultan “to affirm his sovereignty” sent two Commissioners to Cairo, which decided the despatch to Alexandria of a French and an English man-of-war as a set-off against the mission, and that the mission and the men-of-war left together.



“After these agitations the two Governments thought it would be useful to announce their views to the Egyptians in order to reassure them as to whither their policy was tending. Perhaps they would have done better to concert before speaking, as, then, they would not have furnished the evil-intentioned with an opportunity of dwelling on divergencies of expression which it was easy to make much of. Moreover, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire would not have allowed his colleague in London to have gained the advantage over him by the assistance of cleverness of language which, to the Egyptians and indeed to Europe, secured the best part (*le beau rôle*) to England.”

He then cites the despatch of the French Foreign Minister to the French Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, dated October 17th, 1881. There is really no harm in it, but it makes rather too much of the bondholders for a document intended to conciliate the Egyptians. M. de Freycinet then exclaims :—<sup>1</sup>

“How much cleverer and how much more disinterested, so far as appearances go, is the policy

<sup>1</sup> *La question d’Égypte*, p. 202.

indicated by Lord Granville. In his despatch to Sir Edward Malet of the 4th of November he is at pains to attribute to his country a humanitarian rôle."

He then quotes passages from the despatch, and says:—

"Lord Granville ends with a brief allusion to the financial question. He does not even pronounce the words 'foreign creditors.' . . . The Khedive received the programme of Lord Granville with satisfaction, and took care to have it inserted in the official journal.

"At this moment, the 14th November, 1881, M. Gambetta succeeded M. Jules Ferry as President of the Council and took the post of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire at the Quai d'Orsay."

That is, he became Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At the time of his advent to power the position was improved in Egypt itself. A more tranquil spirit reigned. The mutinous Colonels had left Cairo with their regiments. It is true that Arabi had not gone far, but still he was away, and that was a great point gained. Cherif Pacha was very

much pleased with Lord Granville's despatch of the 4th of November, and had it translated into Arabic and disseminated.

Lord Granville's policy was to work with France, and he was aware that to do this he must renounce all idea of bringing the Porte into play in Egypt, but he was miles from contemplating a combination with France which should lead to joint military intervention. He was, I fear, still basing his hopes for the future on the power of pacific demonstrations, and in a general way on things not being so bad as they seemed. He was always inclined to the sanguine view that things would right themselves if time was given to them.

As to France I feel that I have no authority to speak regarding what M. Gambetta really intended, but now that all is for ever shrouded, I may fairly say what I dreaded without pretending that I was correct in my judgment. I feared that M. Gambetta dreamt of a North African Empire stretching from Morocco to Egypt, that he would entangle us to the point of armed intervention and then adopt the simple expedient of telling us that we were a Naval

Power while France was a Military Power, and that we need only send our fleet and furnish transports and France would supply the army.

All that I could do at Cairo was to redouble my efforts to move quietly along on the path of reform, trying to remedy abuses and building hopes for the future on the Chamber of Notables, which was, after all, Cherif Pacha's child. He himself professed the utmost faith in his power to guide it, and the Khedive announced himself as ready to assist and encourage the new departure.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX

DRAFT OF DESPATCH FORWARDED IN  
SIR E. MALET'S PRIVATE LETTER TO LORD  
GRANVILLE OF OCTOBER 24, 1881

“Sir,—I have learnt from your despatches that much misapprehension exists in the minds of the people of Egypt with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and I desire by a clear exposition of this policy to obviate the misunderstandings and dangers to which such misapprehension of our views may give rise.

“Our policy towards Egypt has no other object than the prosperity of the country and its full exercise of that liberty which it has obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan, concluding with the Firman of 1879.

“We believe that the prosperity of Egypt mainly depends upon the prosperity of the people. We have, therefore, on all occasions pressed upon the Government of H.H. the Khedive such measures as we deemed likely to raise the people from a state of subjection and oppression to one of ease and comparative independence. The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the regularisation of the land tax, the diminution of forced labour, have been procured by our direct intervention through the Controllers-General. One measure of reform among them remains to be accomplished which we consider to be more necessary than those above enumerated;

the reform of Justice as it is administered to the Natives. In this matter we have restricted ourselves to instructing you not to relax your endeavours to prevail upon the Government of H.H. to give this reform. Because we have felt that the Ministry of H.H. is alone competent to reconcile Western and Mahommedan law in a manner which can be acceptable to a Mahommedan people. It is for this reason that we have strenuously opposed the extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to Natives. We intend to abstain from imposing laws upon Mahommedans which may in any degree conflict with those laws which they inherit from their Fathers. But the proper administration of justice is the keystone of the well-being of all Nations, and it has been impossible for us to regard its absence in Egypt with indifference. We are, on the contrary, convinced that until it is established no Ministry will enjoy the confidence of the country or be regarded as fitting guardians of the State. It is therefore with sincere satisfaction that we have learnt that Cherif Pacha, immediately on his accession to office, instructed the Minister of Justice to proceed with the organisation of Native Law Courts, and we look forward to the accomplishment of his task with impatience.

“ You inform me that it was generally supposed that Riaz Pacha was specially supported by England and that the Khedive retained H.E. in office to avoid offending H.M.G.

“ It cannot be sufficiently well understood that England

seeks no partisan Ministry in Egypt. We hold that partisan Ministries alienate the population from their true allegiance to their Sovereign, and give rise to counter intrigues which are detrimental to the interests of the State. You gave that loyal support to Riaz Pacha which it was your duty to give to the Minister selected by the Khedive, but had you gone beyond this you would have exceeded the instructions given to you by H.M.G. Your reports show me that you acted within them.

“ It would seem hardly necessary to touch upon our desire to maintain the independence of Egypt as it is established by the Firmans. Such liberty as Egypt possesses is the result of the struggle of years dating from the time of Mohammed Ali. It has been gained on the battle-field and by the expenditure of vast sums of money. The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of National history were it to entertain a desire to diminish those liberties or to tamper with the independence to which they have given birth. A Government which has restored Corfu to the Greeks, the Transvaal to the Boers, and Afghanistan to the Afghans, should be safe from the suspicion which, you inform me, exists in Egypt with regard to our intentions towards it. But the tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is a safeguard from foreign intervention. Were it to be broken Egypt would soon fall a prey to the rival ambitions of the Greater Powers. It is therefore our aim to maintain this tie as it exists, and to allow it to be neither strengthened nor weakened.

“The only circumstance which could force us to depart from the policy which I have indicated would be anarchy in Egypt. We look to the Khedive and to Cherif Pacha and to the wisdom and moderation of the Egyptian people to prevent such a catastrophe from falling upon the country, and I have written this Despatch, of which you will give a copy to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order that all doubt may be dispelled as to the intentions of H.M.G. so long as Egypt continues in the path of tranquil and legitimate progress, to which we have done our best to contribute in the past, and which, if maintained, will lead Egypt to an honourable position among the Nations of the World.

“I have, etc.”

TEXT OF DESPATCH AS ACTUALLY SENT BY  
LORD GRANVILLE

*(The passages added by Lord Granville to the Draft are printed in italics. There are other minor verbal alterations)*

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4th*, 1881.

“Sir,—I gather from the despatches which I have received from you since your return to Egypt that much misapprehension exists in the minds of the great mass of the population with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egyptian affairs; and I desire, by a clear exposition of our views and objects, to obviate the misunderstandings and dangers to which this misapprehension is not unlikely to give rise.



“The policy of Her Majesty’s Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan, concluding with the Firman of 1879.

“In our belief, the prosperity of Egypt, like that of every country, depends upon the progress and well-being of the people.

“We have therefore, on all occasions, pressed upon the Government of the Khedive the adoption of such measures as we deemed likely to raise the people from a state of subjection and oppression to one of ease and security. The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers-General.

“One measure of reform among others remains to be accomplished, which we consider to be even more necessary than those above enumerated—the reform of justice as it is administered to the natives. But in this matter Her Majesty’s Government have restricted themselves to instructing you not to relax your endeavours to prevail upon the Government of the Khedive to make the necessary reforms. We have felt that the Ministry of His Highness is alone competent to reconcile Western and Mahommedan law in a manner which would command the confidence and satisfy the requirements of the

native population; and for this reason we have consistently opposed the extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to causes between natives. We should greatly deprecate any attempt to impose upon the Egyptian people a system of jurisprudence which would conflict with that which they have inherited from their fathers.

“ At the same time, the proper administration of justice is the keystone of the well-being of all natives, and it has been impossible for us to regard its absence in Egypt with indifference. We are convinced that until it is established no Ministry will enjoy the full confidence of the country, or can be regarded as fitting guardians of the State. It is therefore with sincere satisfaction that we have learned that Chérif Pasha, immediately on assuming office, instructed the Minister of Justice to proceed with the organisation of native Law Courts, and look forward with interest and impatience to the accomplishment of a task of such paramount importance.

“ You inform me that there was a general impression that Riaz Pasha received the special support of England, and that the Khedive retained him in office in order to avoid giving offence to Her Majesty's Government. It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no partizan Ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a partizan Ministry, founded on the support of a foreign Power, or upon the personal influence of a foreign Diplomatic Agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that

in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained. It can only tend to alienate the population from their true allegiance to their Sovereign, and to give rise to counter-intrigues which are detrimental to the welfare of the State.

*"I am glad to be able to bear record to the manner in which you have understood and fulfilled your duty in this respect. You gave to Riaz Pasha that loyal support which it was your duty to afford to the Minister selected by the Khedive. Had you gone beyond this limit you would have exceeded the instructions given to you by Her Majesty's Government. The whole tenour of your Reports, no less than the course of events, proves that you have kept carefully within them.*

"It would seem hardly necessary to enlarge upon our desire to maintain Egypt in the enjoyment of the measure of administrative independence which has been secured to her by the Sultan's Firmans. The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of national history were it to entertain a desire to diminish that liberty or to tamper with the institutions to which it has given birth. It would not be difficult, if it were necessary, to show by reference to recent events that this Government should be safe from the suspicions which, as you inform me, exist in Egypt with regard to our intentions on this head. On the other hand, the tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is, in our conviction, a valuable safeguard against foreign intervention. Were it to be broken, Egypt might at no very distant future find herself

exposed to danger from rival ambitions. It is therefore our aim to maintain this tie as it at present exists.

“The only circumstance which could force us to depart from the course of conduct which I have above indicated would be the occurrence in Egypt of a state of anarchy. We look to the Khedive, and to Chérif Pasha, and to the good sense of the Egyptian people, to prevent such a catastrophe, and they on their part may rest assured that, so long as Egypt continues in the path of tranquil and legitimate progress, it will be the earnest desire of Her Majesty’s Government to contribute to so happy a result.

*“You are authorized to deliver a copy of this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that it has been written with the object of dispelling any doubts that may exist as to the intentions of Her Majesty’s Government. We have every reason to believe that the Government of France will continue as heretofore to be animated by similar views. It has been easy for the two countries, acting in concert and with identical objects of no selfish character, to assist materially in improving the financial and political condition of Egypt, and so long as the good of that country is alone the object in view, there should be no difficulty in prosecuting it with the same success. Any self-aggrandizing designs on the part of either Government must, from its very nature, destroy this useful co-operation. The Khedive and his Ministers may feel secure that Her Majesty’s Government contemplate no such deviation from the path which they have traced for themselves.*

“I am, etc.,

“GRANVILLE.”

PART II

CONTINUATION

ARRANGED BY LORD SANDERSON



PART II  
CONTINUATION

INTRODUCTORY

THE consecutive narrative of events goes no farther, and an attempt to continue it on the same lines without the assistance of Sir Edward Malet's personal recollections and comments would necessarily be meagre and unsatisfactory. The story in its main features has been told with admirable lucidity by Lord Cromer in *Modern Egypt*, Vol. I, Chapters XII–XVIII. But Sir Edward left a note of the points which he wished to establish to the satisfaction of unprejudiced readers if he were able to complete the work, and it seemed desirable to add a compilation of the documentary evidence which is available for the purpose he had in view. This has been found to involve giving extracts from Sir Edward Malet's correspondence

on all the principal events in which he took part. Those events were of so dramatic a character that the extracts will not be found lacking in interest.

The main portions of his note are as follows :—

*“April 22nd, 1908.*

“In case I am prevented by illness from finishing this book, I note down what I hope to be able to prove in it to the satisfaction of unprejudiced readers :—

“That I kept Her Majesty's Government accurately informed as to what was passing in Egypt ;

“That I was anxious to promote the growth of constitutional methods as being the best safeguard against the resumption by a Khedive of arbitrary rule ;

[This of course refers to the pre-intervention period.]

“That the Despatch of November 4th, 1881, the only State document which gained Her Majesty's Government any credit, was written by me ;

“That on the presentation of the Dual Note of January 7th, 1882, I desired to resign because



it upset all I had hoped to effect, but that I was dissuaded by Lord Lyons on grounds which I fully accepted ;

“That I was not hostile to Arabi until the arrest of the forty Circassian officers at the beginning of April 1882, which showed that he and those acting with him were cruel and unscrupulous ;

“That if I had relaxed my personal support of the Khedive in the spring of 1882 he would have been made away with ;

“That I had arranged with the Khedive that whatever might be the sentence of the Court Martial on Arabi, the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the execution of the sentence were to be paramount ;

“That, therefore, the defence by English Barristers, in so far as the lives of the accused were concerned, was superfluous ;

“That I myself asked Lord Granville to send Lord Dufferin as Commissioner to Egypt when I found that the Egyptian question, through the agitation set on foot and the Parliamentary action of Lord Randolph Churchill, had become a mere partisan Parliamentary matter, and therefore was outside the question of right or wrong.”

Finally, Sir Edward wished to show that after passing through fire, sword, and pestilence, Egypt was left by him in a good state of preparation for the work of his successor, Sir E. Baring.

The narrative ends with Lord Granville's Despatch of November 4th, 1881. The next stage in the course of events was the joint Anglo-French Note of January 1882.

## CHAPTER X

THE DUAL NOTE OF JANUARY 7TH, 1882

THE history of the Dual Note is given in Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, Chapters XIII and XIV. The documents set forth below tend to confirm in every important point his conclusions as to the motives which led the British Government to consent to its presentation. But they also throw some unexpected light on the views which Sir E. Malet held on the subject.

On September 25th, 1881, immediately after the military revolt of that month, Sir Edward Malet had given his views to Lord Granville on the situation in a private letter, from which an extract is given in Chapter IX of this book (page 162).

On October 4th the Khedive issued a Decree convoking the Chamber of Notables, to be elected under a law of 1866, and to meet on December 23rd following. Shortly afterwards the Minister of

War, under pressure of the military party, brought forward proposals for an increase of the Army to 18,000 men, with a corresponding addition of £280,000 to the Army Budget. It was clear that on financial grounds the English and French Controllers would be compelled to resist this proposal. Sir E. Malet reported the approaching consideration of the question on October 17th, and Lord Granville replied in a long and reasoned Despatch of November 2nd, stating the objections entertained by Her Majesty's Government to any such increase, and directing him to communicate them to Cherif Pacha and the Khedive.

Sir Edward Malet's letter to Lord Granville of October 17th is quoted by him in Chapter IX (page 172).

In the following month he wrote :—

“CAIRO, *November 7th*, 1881.

“We have had rather an uneasy week owing to the Bairam Fêtes having brought together a number of people who had better have remained apart. Cherif Pacha is looking anxious and worn. He is a man who likes his ease and fair-weather

government, and the exertion of dealing with so delicate a state of affairs as that through which we are passing is painful to him. I fancy that he and the Khedive do not get on very well together. He is of a liberal turn of mind, and consequently does not view the movement which is in progress with aversion in its general aim. Whereas at the bottom of the Khedive's heart the only desire is a return to the iron rule of his father, and, not being a clever man, he allows this to be known, though of course he is, and always will be, utterly unable to revert to it.

“It is impossible to tell what may be the next incident, and I do not pretend to foretell the turn which events may take.”

“CAIRO, *November 21st*, 1881.

“The consideration of the question of the increase of the army has begun. The Controllers-General had a long conference on the subject this morning with Cherif Pacha and the Minister of War. The Controllers of course merely take up the financial side of the question, and they show that there is no money. Colvin thinks that it will come to a compromise which need give no uneasiness. We have always got to deal with the inconvenient legacy

of 1200 officers out of employment; 400 of these will be retired under the recently issued military regulations, about 500 would be absorbed into the skeleton reserves and second reserves ('Redifs' and 'Ihtiah'), leaving about 300 for whom places could be found by degrees in the civil service.

"The Khedive told me yesterday that Arabi Bey complains of the ants at the Wady and wants to come to the Barrages, an encampment about ten miles from Cairo, his object being to be close to the capital while the Chamber is sitting. I have said nothing yet to Cherif Pacha on the subject, but if I find that Arabi Bey is likely to have his way, I shall represent that it will become a question whether his coming here against what must be the desire of the Government is not the nearest possible approach to anarchy.

"The Khedive's spirits, strange to say, appear to rise whenever the future looks more than usually dark. The reason, I fancy, is that he would prefer another blow-up and whatever might be the consequences, rather than his present subjection to a liberal Ministry in league, as he considers, with the army.

"If we can keep Arabi Bey out of Cairo, I think his influence will decrease. His fame is a fire

which requires constant fuel to keep it alight. There are already signs that the country is getting weary of the agitation which he causes, and I think that the knowledge of this makes him wish to come to Cairo."

*"November 28th, 1881.*

"Cherif Pacha seems to have set his face against Arabi Bey's coming to the neighbourhood of Cairo. He has sent down some medical men to inquire into the sanitary state of the regiment, and if the report is unfavourable he proposes moving the men to Rosetta. It remains to be seen whether he [Arabi] will go. Cherif is, however, too wide awake to give the order unless he first assures himself that it will be obeyed. It is impossible to speak with confidence about the future until something arises to show on which side power lies, and yet for the present we must endeavour to prevent any too violent test of this nature, lest it should prove itself to be with Arabi."

In a despatch of the same date (November 28th), Sir E. Malet reports :—

"The Khedive continues to take a gloomy view of the general situation, as he still considers the country to be in the hands of Arabi

Bey, and has little confidence in the Chamber of Notables showing either wisdom or moderation.

“Cherif Pacha, on the other hand, is well satisfied with the result of the elections, and appears to look forward very hopefully to the future.”

In his next private letters he reports conversations of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and Sir William Gregory with Arabi:—

“CAIRO, *December 5th*, 1881.

“There is happily nothing of special interest to record this week. Wilfrid Blunt, who is here and who goes about a good deal amongst the natives, tells me he sees no trace of the fanaticism which he had heard had sprung up amongst them of late. He had this morning a long conversation with one of the principal Ulemas and found him very reasonable. He said they still distrusted England because the English newspapers had shown them that Egypt was necessary to England, but that if they could be certain that we had no designs upon them they would look upon us as their best friends, and he declared that there was no desire to get rid of



the Control—that, on the contrary, they considered it a safeguard.

“I am trying to induce Cherif Pacha to name foreign judges in his native Courts of Appeal, and I hope to succeed. I am sure that it is the only way of securing the independence of these Tribunals.”

“CAIRO, *December 12th*, 1881.

“A few days ago Sir W. Gregory ‘interviewed’ Arabi Bey and came away with a high opinion of him. The only thing that he said that I had not heard from him before was that he had no intention of interfering in politics, that he left them to the Government and the Chamber. On the whole, our horizon seems to be brightening, and I am less anxious about it at present than I have been for some time past. I think an onslaught will be made in the Chamber on the official salaries of foreigners, and I confess that they afford reasonable ground for attack. I see that the members of the administrative Council to be established at Constantinople are to have £1200 a year each. Here similar officials receive £3000. I feel sure that proper persons could be found to fill the posts at £2000. The ‘Caisse’ is especially open to such criticism, four

members doing work which could be done by two, each member receiving £3000 a year.

“CAIRO, *December 19th*, 1881.

“We are in difficulties about the War Budget, and cannot at present tell how it will end. The Minister of War seems to be so anxious to get his figures passed, that I doubt his being in any plot to upset the Ministry, and I cannot suppose that the Colonels would again resort to arms at present. Wilfrid Blunt has struck up a friendship with Arabi Bey, and I am now going to make use of him to try and induce Arabi to consent to the Controllers' figures. The Khedive said to me the day before yesterday, speaking of the political look-out: ‘Nous sommes dans un joli pétrin.’<sup>1</sup> He takes the most gloomy view of the future.

“We are obliged to stand out on this question of the Budget. The Control would lose all consideration were it to yield further. We must face the consequences whatever they may be.”

On the 15th December M. Gambetta, who in the previous month had succeeded M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire as French Minister for Foreign Affairs,

<sup>1</sup> We are in a nice scrape.

had spoken to Lord Lyons, proposing that the French and English Governments should "consult with each other on the course to be taken by them in common, in the face of certain not impossible events in Egypt," observing that the "first and most important thing was that the two Governments should not only be perfectly united, but should make their union unmistakably apparent, both to their friends and their adversaries in Egypt."

Lord Granville replied on the 19th, agreeing in the expediency of such a consultation between the two Cabinets, and added: "Her Majesty's Government also think that it is desirable that some evidence should be given of their cordial understanding, but that it requires careful consideration what steps should be taken in case of disorder again reappearing."

On the 24th December Lord Lyons telegraphed that M. Gambetta thought that "as a first and immediate step the two representatives at Cairo might be instructed to take occasion from the Session of the Council of Notables to convey collectively to

Tewfik Pacha assurances of the sympathy and support of France and England, and to encourage His Highness to maintain and assert his proper authority."

This proposal was telegraphed by Lord Granville to Sir Edward Malet on the 26th December with an inquiry whether he saw any objection to it.

Sir Edward replied on the 27th December :—

"I see no objection to M. Gambetta's proposal. The support that the Khedive is most likely to require is towards the maintenance of the independence of the Chamber against the jealousies and suspicions of the Porte."

Lord Granville thereupon informed Lord Lyons that His Majesty's Government agreed to M. Gambetta's proposal, and M. Gambetta promised to prepare a draft of an instruction to the British and French Agents <sup>at</sup> Cairo to be submitted for Lord Granville's concurrence.

In the meanwhile, Sir Edward had reported by telegraph on the 21st December that the question of the War Budget had been practically settled that day in accordance with the proposals of the

Controllers, and that the Budget Estimates had been finally passed. The increase of expenditure for the Army was reduced from £268,000 to £154,000.

On the 26th December the Chamber of Notables was opened by the Khedive.

On the 26th December Sir Edward Malet wrote privately to Lord Granville on the subject of a difficulty which had arisen with Mr. Blunt, but which had been arranged:—

“CAIRO, *December 26th*, 1881.

“My despatch of to-day<sup>1</sup> gives an account of another difficulty with which I have to contend in the too ardent espousal of the national cause by

<sup>1</sup> Sir E. Malet's reports of his communications with Mr. Blunt were laid before Parliament in a Blue-book, Egypt, N. 13 (1882). In his despatch of December 26th, alluded to above, Sir E. Malet states:—

“I have always been friendly towards the aspirations of the National party. I should be glad to see the principles advocated by it carried out, because they are in accordance with the object which we have always had in view of placing the institutions of Egypt on such a permanent basis as will secure it from the return of arbitrary rule, which, wielded by the late Khedive, so nearly brought the country to ruin. It is also, to a certain extent, to our interest that the movement should develop itself with our assistance, and there is no doubt that at the present moment the National party looks exclusively to England for

Mr. Wilfrid S. Blunt. He has been in close communication with Arabi Bey and the heads of the movement, and has drawn up for them a programme of their wants to be communicated to the *Times*. As at first phrased it made a bound towards Constitutional Government, which was, I thought, impolitic and based on error of statement. He has just been to me to say that after again consulting his friends a change has been made by which the existing Chamber only is spoken of, so that the most objectionable point has been removed. I am only able to try and moderate him, he goes his own way, but this shows that he will to some degree listen to me. I do not object to the movement, but I fear that precipitation will lead to its collapse before greater complications.

“In the meantime the Chamber is open, and here all is quiet, and I have good hopes for the future if the Sultan does not intervene, but having allowed

help. Under these circumstances there is the good and the bad in Mr. Blunt's interference. As the movement is one which, as far as I can judge, has taken too much consistency to be stopped, it is useful that it should be in some sense guided by a person of education and knowledge of the institutions of the world. But, on the other hand, if the movement goes too fast, and it receives nothing from England but moral support, when the time of difficulty comes we shall be regarded as false friends, and have to take the consequences of such a feeling towards us.”

the movement to go so far, this ought to be provided against."

On the 30th December, Sir Edward addressed to Lord Granville the following telegram with regard to the proposed Anglo-French Declaration:—<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This warning telegram of Sir E. Malet was probably suggested to him by a perusal of Lord Lyons' Despatch giving a full report of M. Gambetta's language to him during the interview of December 15th. M. Gambetta showed great distrust of the Chamber of Notables. To quote Lord Lyons' words:—

"He observed that the approach of the meeting of the Chamber of Notables at Cairo made him uneasy. It was, he said, impossible to foresee what line they would take. They might be moderate, support the Khedive's authority, and assist the Government in carrying into effect useful and practical measures. It was, on the other hand, quite as probable that they might make common cause with the Colonels, and insist upon the adoption of the reactionary and anti-European schemes of the so-called National party. It might be taken for granted that they would be beset by intrigues proceeding from Constantinople, as well as from Egypt itself. They might weaken or even upset altogether the authority of Tewfik Pacha. They might admit or even invite the active interposition of the Porte. In short, their meeting might put an end to the present apparent tranquillity, and be the signal for a fresh and more serious crisis than that which had been recently tided over. . . .

"As regarded the actual posture of affairs in Egypt, M. Gambetta considered it to be extremely important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pacha. On the one hand, every endeavour should be made to inspire Tewfik himself with confidence in the support of France and England, and to infuse into him firmness and energy. . . ."—Egypt, No. 5 (1882), p. 21.

“ I am anxious that before deciding the terms of a communication, your Lordship should read my Despatch of the 26th instant, which should reach on Monday.

“ It would be undesirable that the Khedive should be encouraged to hope that we would support him in maintaining an attitude of reserve towards the Chamber. It has been convoked with the full approval of Cherif Pacha, who looks to it for success and support. To discountenance it would be to play into the hands of the Porte, increase the influence of the military, and diminish that which we are now obtaining as befriending moderate reform.

“ The reply of the Chamber to the Khedive is stated to be extremely moderate.”

The despatch referred to in this message was dated December 26th, and began as follows :—

“ My Lord,—I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a Memorandum by Sir Auckland Colvin on the probable development of the National movement in Egypt, and on the manner in which it may affect the Control maintained by England and France.



“Sir Auckland Colvin starts on the supposition that the movement will, sooner or later, take the form of making the Ministers responsible to the Chamber and of giving the Chamber the right to discuss and sanction the Budget. If this takes place the position of the Control will be materially altered, and he is of opinion that the two Governments should now, when the movement is in its infancy, state authoritatively that while leaving full liberty to the Egyptians to frame what measures they please for their internal government so far as they are not inconsistent with the *status* acquired by the Powers, they in no way renounce the material interest and the guarantees which they possess, and that it is their intention to maintain them.”

Sir A. Colvin's Memorandum enclosed in the despatch has been quoted at considerable length by Lord Cromer (*Modern Egypt*, Vol. I, pp. 218 *et seq.*).

Only two passages need here be given :—

“The liberal movement now going on should, I think, in no wise be discouraged. It has many enemies, no less among Europeans than among Turks. But I believe it is essentially the growth

of the popular spirit, and is directed for the good of the country, and that it would be most impolitic to thwart it. But, precisely because I wish it to succeed, it seems to me essential that it should learn from the first within what limits it must confine itself. Otherwise expectations may be formed and hopes raised, the failure of which may lead to its entire discomfiture. . . .

“The line, it will be thus seen, that I would advocate, is the open and firm recognition by the Powers, through their Diplomatic Agents, at this critical juncture when Egypt is remoulding her internal organisation, of the material interest they possess and intend to maintain in the Administration, leaving full liberty to the Egyptians to frame what measures they please for their internal government, so far as they are not inconsistent with the *status* acquired by the Powers.”

The despatch and memorandum reached the Foreign Office on the 2nd January, 1882. Simultaneously a despatch was received from Lord Lyons enclosing the draft which M. Gambetta had prepared of an identic instruction to be addressed to the British and French Representatives at Cairo.

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This instruction was to be communicated to the Khedive on the occasion of the opening of the Chamber of Notables.

The English text of the draft was as follows :—

“Sir,—You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his Government of the determination of France and England to afford them support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with the course of public affairs in Egypt.

“The two Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them the opportunity for a further exchange of views.

“I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to Tewfik Pacha, after having come to an arrangement with M. Sienkiewics, who is instructed to make an identic and simultaneous communication, that the English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognised by the two Governments as alone able to guarantee, for the present and future, the good order and the development of

general prosperity in Egypt in which France and England are equally interested.

“The two Governments, being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complications, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find France and England united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and its people.”

It is clear that this draft, while sufficiently explicit as to the intention of the two Powers to maintain their material interests in Egypt, did not indicate that full liberty would be left to the Egyptians to frame what measures they pleased for their internal government so far as these were not inconsistent with the *status* required by the Powers.

On the other hand, it contained nothing diametrically opposed to the policy set forth in Lord

Granville's despatch of the previous November, which had been published in the *Egyptian Gazette*, and it was not unnatural that Lord Granville should have assumed that it would be read as supplementing that despatch, instead of being interpreted as announcing an entirely new departure. It was, unfortunately, susceptible of the latter interpretation, but any attempt to alter its terms in the sense desired by Sir A. Colvin would have occasioned delay and dissensions between the two Governments which it was desirable, if possible, to avoid.

The draft was accepted by the British Government on the 6th January,<sup>1</sup> with the reservation that they must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action if action should be found necessary, and was forthwith telegraphed to Sir E. Malet.

In the meanwhile affairs were moving rather more smoothly at Cairo. In a despatch and a

<sup>1</sup> Lord Fitzmaurice observes (*Life of Lord Granville*, Vol. II, p. 255), that a Cabinet was held on that day which lasted four hours.

private letter, dated January 2nd, Sir E. Malet reports :—

“ In an interview which I had with the Khedive on the 31st ultimo, I found His Highness, for the first time since my return in September, cheerful in mood and taking a hopeful view of the situation. He spoke with much satisfaction of the apparently moderate tendencies of the Delegates, and he expressed the belief that the country would now progress.

“ The change was very noticeable, because His Highness had, up to the time of the opening of the Chamber, been full of misgiving, and I feared that this feeling was prompted by a mistrust of what the Delegates might do.

“ His Highness appears, however, to have frankly accepted the situation.”

*Private Letter.*

“ I am sure you will not ascribe it to neglect if I do not predict anything with regard to the probable action of the Chamber. It is hazardous to do so in any country, and here we have no data of the past to go upon in calculations for the future. The country seems generally relieved by the meeting

of the Chamber, and the Khedive and the Ministry are hopeful. The only thing that I may foretell is that we are passing into a constitutional system, and that in doing so Egypt may have to look to us for protection against the Sultan. This, in case of any desire on his part for active intervention, would, I am sure, not be withheld."

These reports were not received at the Foreign Office till the 9th January, when the favourable aspect depicted in them had been seriously modified by the presentation of the Dual Note.

Sir Edward had commenced the draft of a despatch bearing date of January 7th, the completion of which was rendered superfluous by the events of the following days, but which is interesting as showing the view which he took of the progress of the Nationalist movement. The fragment is, therefore, given so far as it goes:—

“CAIRO, *January 7th*, 1882.

“My Lord,—In my Despatch of the 23rd of September I had the honour to explain what I believed to be the causes which led to the revolt of the Military on the 9th of September, and on

now reverting to that Despatch I may state that, although it was and is still believed by many persons that the revolt was a move of a National party with organised political aims, I am still of opinion that it was merely an act of self-preservation, and that it would not have taken place if the Colonels had not supposed that it was the intention of the Government to arrest them.

“ But the result has been that a National party has undoubtedly sprung into the foreground, and has displayed a vitality which shows that the spirit animating it existed previously, and merely required some such galvanising event as occurred on the 9th of September to make it instinct with life and vigour.

“ It was, perhaps, not unnatural that a movement commenced by an act of rebellion should have been regarded with suspicion, and that the most gloomy forecasts as to the future of Egypt should have been made. It was considered that in order to avert greater disaster the new Ministry must show itself master of the situation by some striking act of vigour, and, as time progressed without any such demonstration taking place, it was held that the revolution, regarded as dangerous, progressed. As a matter of fact the revolution did progress, but its



leadership was assumed by Cherif Pacha, who recognised that the time had come to establish liberal institutions to which he had always been attached. Instead, therefore, of endeavouring to stifle the movement with a high hand, he made use of it to assist him in the object which he had in view. The result has been that the gloomy forebodings of the advocates of repression have not ceased, and those who have looked forward to the restoration of stable government have been regarded either as purposely misleading the public from private motives, or as wanting in judgment. The task of Cherif Pacha, though beset with difficulties, was facilitated by the cordial co-operation which he received from the Controllers-General in pursuance of the instructions received from the Governments of England and France to give him efficacious support. The establishment of a regular system of government based on the national will as opposed to the old system of arbitrary rule, can but be regarded with favour by the Powers. The difficulty was, and continues to be, the attainment of the end without injury to the various interests engaged, without too suddenly relinquishing necessary guarantees, without needlessly offending the susceptibilities of the Sultan.

“Keeping these points in view, it has been extremely difficult to harmonise the changes made with the full aspirations of the party of progress, and unless a spirit of moderation and conciliation is cultivated by the Khedive, the Government, the Control, and the Chamber, the future of Egypt may again be placed in jeopardy by the failure of the present attempt.

“Whatever happens, it is well that the Egyptian people should understand that the Governments of England and France have not only been animated by unselfish and friendly feelings towards Egypt, but that they have rescued the country from oppression and misrule, and that without their countenance and assistance Egypt could not have obtained the guarantees which the people at present possess that they will not hereafter be subjected to the arbitrary form of government from which it has emerged.”

The joint communication was made to the Khedive by the British and French Agents on the 8th January, and the reports circulated as to its tenour produced a most unfortunate change in the situation.

Sir Edward Malet thus describes its effect in telegrams to Lord Granville :—

“CAIRO, *January 9th*, 1882.

“Cherif Pacha has been to my French colleague and to me to say that the impression created by our joint communication yesterday has been most unfavourable ; that it is regarded (1) as encouraging the Khedive to place himself in antagonism to reform ; (2) that the wording, which as it were connected the events of September with the opening of the Chamber, shows a spirit unfavourable to the latter ; (3) that it indicates a desire to loose ties to the Porte ; (4) that it contains a menace of intervention which nothing in the state of the country at present justifies. His Excellency expressed the hope that our respective Governments will make, as soon as possible, a further communication destroying such an impression, which he feels sure was not intended to be conveyed.”

“CAIRO, *January 9th*, 1882.

“The communication has, at all events temporarily, alienated from us all confidence. Everything was progressing capitally, and England was looked to as the sincere well-wisher and protector of the country. Now it is considered that England has definitely thrown in her lot with France, and that France, from motives in connection with her

Tunisian campaign, is determined ultimately to intervene here.

“It is desirable that any further communication which may be made should be of a pacifying nature, and that it should contain an assurance that the Powers regard the reforms in progress and the existence of the Chamber as the best guarantees for the future that Egypt can possess.”

In a despatch and private letter he gave some further details :—

“CAIRO, *January 10th*, 1882.

“Cherif Pacha’s account of the impression created by the joint communication made by M. Sienkiewicz and me to the Khedive is correct as far as the general public is concerned, though no doubt part of the irritation manifested is in some degree accounted for by the text not having as yet become generally known.

“Certain that the communication would give rise to comments of all sorts, I asked Cherif Pacha to have it published without delay, and he excused himself yesterday for not having done so by alleging the difficulty of translating it into Arabic which should render it exactly.

“I believe, however, that other causes have delayed it, whether in the nature of a telegram from the Porte or of representations made by the Minister of War I cannot say, but I hear that both these causes have been at work. The communication was, however, published in an Arabic paper yesterday at Alexandria, and I am in hopes that when its wording is carefully examined it may be acknowledged not to contain the import which is attributed to it.

“The person chiefly blamed is the Khedive, who, it is alleged, requested me to obtain a declaration from my Government of the nature contained in the message. The report is absolutely without foundation. His Highness has never even hinted at a desire for special support from abroad, and when I saw him after the convocation of the Chamber, he was, as I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch of the 2nd instant, sanguine about the future of his country and apprehensive of no danger of any sort.

“It is too soon to judge at present of the ultimate result of what has taken place ; but for the moment it has had for effect to cause a more complete union of the National party, the military, and the Chamber, to unite these three in a common bond of opposi-

tion to England and France, and to make them feel more forcibly than they did before that the tie which unites Egypt to the Ottoman Empire is a guarantee to which they must strongly adhere to save them from aggression. The military, who had fallen into the background on the convocation of the Chamber, are again in everybody's mouth, and Arabi Bey is said to be foremost in protesting against what he is represented to consider as unjustified interference.

"Yet as the situation appeared particularly hopeful and tranquil three days ago, I trust that, as time allows more just and moderate opinions to be formed, the country may resume the even course upon which it seemed to enter on the opening of the Chamber."

*Private Letter.*

"I hardly know what to write to you privately today. The whole situation has been so changed within the last three days that I do not look forward with much confidence. A general calm had come over the country on the opening of the Chamber, and all seemed to promise to go smoothly when the collective note was presented. Since then, the idea having spread that we intend intervention,

nothing has been heard of but Arabi Bey and his redoubtable Colonels. It is the more unfortunate as Arabi Bey had previously sided with Cherif Pacha on the Budget question, and had said that the deputies ought not to have the right to vote the Budget. But since the note he has gone round. As for me, I am considered an arch-traitor who lured them into believing that England was favourable to reforms only to obtain an excuse for intervention, and that I want to play here the part which Roustan played in Tunis. I confess, on the other hand, to be so anxious to prevent intervention at all hazards, that I should even prefer that the Egyptians should try to manage their own country without the Control."

Lord Granville was not indisposed to offer the explanations desired by Cherif Pacha, and proposed to the French Government to send an explanatory telegram to the effect that the character of the dual communication had been misunderstood, partly in consequence of the comments of the European Press; that Her Majesty's Government in no way departed from the policy laid down in Lord Granville's despatch of November; that they dis-

liked intervention either by themselves or by others as much as ever, looked upon the experiment of the Chamber with favourable eyes, and wished to maintain the connection of the Porte with Egypt as far as was compatible with the liberties which had been accorded to the latter country. Finally, that the object of the note was to strengthen the Egyptian Government and maintain the existing state of things.

M. Gambetta was, however, strenuously opposed to offering any explanations beyond the publication of the actual text of the Note.

In the course of ten days the excitement slowly subsided, but it left behind it the seeds of much future trouble.

Sir Edward's feelings of disappointment were expressed freely in his letters to his parents:—

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *January 10th*, 1882.

“I write in worry and vexation of spirit. I have had to present a joint communication here which I warned them at home would have ill effects. In fact, it has swept away all the good I had been



laboriously building up since I arrived in September. It is very sad, and I have no heart to write further about it.

“I have been worried all day with visits and telegraphing and threats of revolt and Heaven knows what. I dare say things will quiet down in a day or two, but meantime it is troublesome.”

“CAIRO, *January 11th*, 1882.

“The situation has not much changed since Tuesday. For some reason or another it is said that I desire to play here the part which M. Roustan played in Tunis, and that I am endeavouring to bring about intervention. Nothing can be more absolutely without foundation, for far from wishing to create myself more embarrassments, I only desire the country to go on tranquilly so that I may be in peace, and I had full hope that the Chamber would have brought about general confidence and repose. It would have done so, perhaps, had it not been for that unhappy dual communication which has put everything in a turmoil. However, time may bring about improvement, though for the moment matters are gloomy enough.”

To Lord Lyons he wrote asking whether it would not be better that he should tender his resignation :—

“CAIRO, *January 11th*, 1882.

“Dear Lord Lyons,—I feel very much discouraged at affairs here. I wonder what could induce Gambetta to propose and Lord Granville to accept such a firebrand document as the dual Note! What I foretold in my telegrams as likely to be the result of such a communication has more than come to pass, but no heed was paid to my warnings. It is important to acknowledge that the power of the Khedive is gone, and that it is useless to urge him to show courage, for if he had any, which I doubt,<sup>1</sup> it would be no use.

“We have got into the constitutional path. We may be wrecked at the outset, but up to the moment of the communication we were going smoothly and hopefully; now all our influence is gone, and we have massed opposition to face. But I only trouble you with my griefs to ask your opinion on a particular point, which I can trust your constant kindness to me to give me.

“When one finds that one's advice from the

<sup>1</sup> Later on Sir E. Malet had reason to change his opinion on this point.

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country of one's post is unheeded, as in the beginning of the crisis here in September, and now at a critical moment, ought one not to offer to retire, or would it be putting one's personality too much forward?

"In September my view was that the only way to keep Egypt in hand was through a limited Turkish intervention. This policy was not accepted. Then I turned about and made up my mind that the alternative was to give a helping hand to reform and to let the Egyptians work out their own destinies, obtaining such influence as friendly support would give.

"Just at the critical moment, shortly after the opening of the Chamber, their belief in the sincerity of this support is shattered, and I come to be looked upon as an arch-traitor who has lured them on to obtain an excuse for intervention. It seems to me that my power of being useful here after this is, to use an Americanism, pretty well played out, and that I had better retire, but I do not wish to do what might be regarded as stupid or conceited, and so I venture to ask for your advice. Perhaps, before I can receive it, events may have become much more complicated than they are even now."

Lord Lyons at once replied :—

“ PARIS, *January 19th*, 1882.

“ My dear Malet,—I have just received your letter of the 11th, and I have luckily a messenger to London this evening.

“ Your scruples are natural, and are creditable to you, but I do not think they are well founded. They are certainly contrary to my notion of what is correct for a Diplomatist, and to the principle on which I have always acted myself.

“ Of course, in my long career it has happened that my opinions have not been concurred in, and that my suggestions have been overruled by the Government at home. I suppose that I have generally continued to think *de facto* that my views are the correct ones, but I have always remembered that *de jure* the Government must be held to be right, and have set to work with good heart to carry out their views. I have, I must confess, sometimes been convinced in the end that the Government were right *de facto* also, there being considerations of general policy and of public opinion in England, of which a man at a distance cannot be so good a judge as they are.

“ I have also always felt that to resign in the

middle of an affair was hardly fair to the Government, as it made a sort of public scandal of the divergence of views between them and their Agent.

“I most fully enter into the discomfort and mortification you are feeling just now, and it is the more irksome to you to be in your present position, because your career has continually been prosperous and gratifying. But I think your real duty is to make the best of things, and to do all you can to put or keep things straight, given the circumstances.

“As regards yourself personally, your retirement would good-naturedly be attributed to pique, and you would spoil the best career that has been made in diplomacy by any man of your standing.

“The key-note of the policy of our Government in Egypt is united action with France, and it is, of course, essential to their views that at this moment your attitude and language and those of Sienkiewicz should be identical.

“This is written at the fag-end of a long and fatiguing day’s work, but I hope it is intelligible. I am obliged to write this evening in order that my letter may get to the F.O. in time for their bag to you of to-morrow evening.”

This excellent advice was accepted wholeheartedly

by Sir Edward Malet, and it is noteworthy that in all his correspondence, official and private, with his Chief he never allowed any complaint of disregarded suggestions or warnings, or any remarks of the "I-told-you-so" class, to interrupt his patient attempts to set forth clearly the various phases of the situation and the measures which they seemed to call for.

## CHAPTER XI

### CLAIM OF THE CHAMBER OF NOTABLES TO VOTE THE BUDGET—CHANGE OF EGYPTIAN MINISTRY

THE first business of the Chamber of Notables was to discuss the draft of a new Organic Law, which had been laid before it by the Government, and a question at once arose as to the powers which were to be conferred on the Chamber by this measure.

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *January 11th*, 1882.

“The 31st Article of the new Organic Law of the Chamber of Delegates proposed by the Government authorises the Chamber to express opinions on the Budget, but it gives no power of sanctioning or rejecting any part of it.

“The Budget is divided into two sections, one disposing of revenues assigned to the service of the National Debt, the other of those revenues which are free.

“ The Delegates of the Chamber, it appears, are unanimous in insisting upon the right in future years of voting this second part, which they contend will in no way interfere with international engagements.

“ At first they asked to examine and vote this part of the Budget for 1882, but the proposal was subsequently withdrawn.

“ Cherif Pacha and the Controllers-General are of opinion that if the Chamber is to have the right of voting the Budget, the Council of Ministers, and therefore the Control, lose all hold over the finances.

“ Under these circumstances, Sir Auckland Colvin has asked me to inquire the views and wishes of your Lordship on the subject.

“ It is possible that the Chamber, if it possessed the right, might use it with moderation and good sense, but it would be a leap in the dark to confide the power to it before it has, in other matters, proved its political capacity.

“ On the other hand, the Chamber exists and will continue to do so unless it is forcibly suppressed, which can only be done by intervention, and this is a last resource which the possible eventuality of the infraction of the Law of Liquidation would in no way justify.



“ It is not impossible that the breach which has thus been created between Cherif Pacha and the Chamber may, if not avoided, ultimately cause his Excellency’s resignation, in which case the present Minister of War<sup>1</sup> would be the popular candidate of the National party for the Presidency of the Council. But supposing the Khedive names a Minister who comes into office on a point on which he at once finds himself at variance with the Controllers, the situation becomes extremely difficult. I confess that, rather than that this situation should supervene, I should prefer to give the Chamber the right, and to wait till this right is abused before interfering.

“ It must be borne in mind that the Egyptians have distinctly, for good or for evil, entered on a constitutional path ; that the Organic Law of the Chamber is their Charter of liberties.

“ It has occurred to me that, as a compromise, the right might be given, and form part of the Organic Law, on the conditions that the Delegates voluntarily abrogate the use of it for three years.”

Lord Granville’s first instruction (January 11th)

<sup>1</sup> Mahmud Pacha Sami (see *ante*, pp. 149, 161).

was to the effect that Her Majesty's Government did not desire to commit themselves to a total or permanent exclusion of the Chamber from handling the Budget, but that caution would be required in dealing with it, having regard to the pecuniary interests on behalf of which the Government had been acting.

Subsequently (January 16th) the British Government came to the conclusion that the proposed clause of the Law could not be agreed to, at all events in its actual state, and Sir E. Malet was instructed to join his French colleague in supporting Cherif Pacha in his opposition to the demand of the Chamber.

The opposition of the French Government was even more decided, and included an instruction to their Agent not to listen for a moment to the proposal that effect should be given to the demands of the Chamber at some fixed future date.

Those demands were, moreover, found to go further than had at first been reported, and included not only control of the Budget, but complete Ministerial responsibility to the Chamber in administrative and other matters.

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *January 16th*, 1882.

“We are at present very close to the crisis which was to be foreseen of the conflict between the Chamber and the Ministry, though I did not anticipate that it would come so immediately. In one way it is fortunate, for Cherif will be on firm ground legally in remaining in office without regard to the wishes of the Chamber, as the Chamber will be still under the old *règlement* which contemplates no Ministerial responsibility.

“It is difficult to believe that the military will again resort to violent measures. They must by this time know that it would insure intervention. They are said to have threatened to hew the Khedive in pieces if the dual Note were not returned to the Powers, and for a few days Cherif Pacha was very uneasy and the British colony much frightened. The usual difficulty about a ship at Alexandria has arisen. There is none there, and were one to come suddenly now the distrust of the Egyptians would be increased and the danger of an outbreak would become greater.

“I cannot but hope that the Chamber will come to reason, but it has shown no sign of doing so as yet.”

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *January 16th*, 1882.

“We have had a lively week of it, and are by no means at the end of our troubles. If the Egyptians go on in this way they will force intervention, which I have done my utmost to prevent the necessity of. The Chamber wants to get into its hands the whole power of government, which is not possible to grant them. I had a long talk with the President of the Chamber yesterday, and did my best to point out the error of their ways, which he himself sees, but he appears to have no control over his deputies. However, we stand to our guns, and fortunately Cherif Pacha is quite resolved not to give way. The British colony has been in some alarm all the week owing to terrifying rumours of what the military intended to do, but are quieter now.”

Lord Granville wrote privately :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 20th*, 1882.

“The compromise as to time which was proposed is objectionable, and we agree with the French in objecting to it. But I shall instruct Lyons to propose to the French Government that we should

agree as to certain things on which it would be useful to consult the Notables.

“Gambetta's shaky position at home complicates matters. It is more than ever desirable that the crisis may be postponed. It is important that you should know what I think, but pray keep it for your private information. I am dead against intervention, single or double. I dislike exceedingly the Turkish intervention, although under certain conditions and guarantees it would be a lesser evil.

“I am not certain that I shall not propose to the French Government that we should spontaneously admit Europe to a Commission which, leaving the financial control, and giving us (France and England) each two votes, would settle some of the points which are left unsettled in the Egyptian administration.

“The Turk would object, even if he were to be a member of the Commission, and the French would dislike it much ; but it would be difficult for them to refuse, and it would relieve them as well as us from great difficulties. But please do not give a hint of this.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Circumstances never admitted of the proposal being put forward.

“R. Wilson<sup>1</sup> asked whether it might not be arranged *if* there be another crisis that a Coalition Ministry should be formed of Nubar, Cherif, and Arabi. This, I presume, would be an absorption of Cherif.”

Before the receipt of this letter Sir Edward again wrote :—

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *January 23rd*, 1882.

“We have had another agitating week, and are by no means out of the wood. The Chamber is obstinate, and so are we, and no one can foresee the end. I shall be very sorry if it comes to war when I think how easily it might have been avoided, but we are walking in a dangerous road and may not be able to turn back in time with honour. Cherif Pacha is highly incensed with his Chamber. The Chamber is furious with England and France. Cherif and the Khedive are not on good terms, so that altogether I have too much on my hands.”

<sup>1</sup> Sir Rivers Wilson had been Egyptian Minister of Finance in Nubar Pacha's Administration of 1878-9.

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *January 23rd*, 1882.

“We have had an agitated week, with much alarm among Europeans. There are to-day slight signs that the unanimity and obstinacy of the Chamber are breaking, but they may be delusive. Cherif Pacha, in speaking to me yesterday, sighed and said that the solution would be so easy if England and France would consent to a Turkish Commissioner coming and putting the whole matter straight, but I said that this was quite impossible.<sup>1</sup> I trust that if intervention becomes necessary it may be in overwhelming force, in which case there would probably be no fighting at all.

“I trust there may be a way out of the difficulty, for I own to having a repugnance to a war engaged on behalf of bondholders, and which would have for effect to repress the first attempt of a Mussulman country at Parliamentary Government. It seems unnatural for England to do this.

“I do not see any means of providing for the safety of the European population here and in the towns, with the exception of Alexandria, where I fancy there would be no danger.

<sup>1</sup> In consequence of the determined opposition of France. It was the course which Sir E. Malet himself constantly advocated.

“Mr. Sienkiewicz and I have worked very cordially together, and the union between the two countries has had the appearance of being complete.”

In his next letter to his mother he alluded with much pleasure to Lord Granville's explanation of his views:—

“CAIRO, *January 30th*, 1882.

“I was consoled for my various annoyances by getting a letter from Lord Granville last week which was particularly satisfactory to me, and so I work on with better heart than I did after the presentation of the dual Note. The future, however, gets no clearer, and I doubt our getting out of our difficulties without armed intervention. Poor Cherif Pacha is utterly tired out with his numerous worries and is looking ill and fagged. He is not the energetic man that Riaz was.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *January 30th*, 1882.

“I received on the 26th the letter which Y.L. was so kind as to write to me on the 20th.

“I cannot really say that matters are looking better here. The Chamber insists as obstinately as



ever on the right to vote the Budget. The proposal of the Committee to associate itself with the Ministry is hardly more acceptable than the Chamber itself voting it. Cherif Pacha is so worried that he may break down any day or throw up in disgust. My French colleague, Mr. Sienkiewicz, and I, although willing to gain time, have in no way encouraged the idea that our Governments would listen to the proposals of the Chamber, and we insist that they be made in writing before we transmit them, to guard against its being asserted that we have proposed the change.

“The country is suffering from administrative paralysis—the want of confidence is destructive to trade. No confidence is felt in the future if even the Chamber gets its own way. My German colleague was saying yesterday that the changes which the Chamber proposed were a matter which concerned Germany, that she had been quite content to leave the interests of German bondholders in the hands of England and France, but that if the authority of these two countries was neutralised she would have to reconsider the situation.

“I trust that the change of Ministry in France may be of use, for I do not believe that the two

countries alone can now settle our difficulties here satisfactorily.

“P.S.—Nubar Pacha has no following in Egypt. The Khedive would not voluntarily call him to power, and could not impose him as Minister as long as the army remains in power.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *January 23rd*, 1882.

“On the 20th instant, at the request of Cherif Pacha, Mr. Sienkiewicz and I called, separately, upon Sultan Pacha, the President of the Chamber, to inform him that our Governments could not consent to the Budget being voted by the Chamber, as it would be an infringement of the international engagements contracted in the establishment of the Control.

“Sultan Pacha said that the Chamber did not regard it in that light, and that it was resolved not to give way. He finally, however, made the suggestion as coming entirely from himself, that the Chamber should send certain of its Members to be present at the Council of Ministers when the Budget was discussed. Being unwilling to shut the door to all negotiations, I replied that the idea was one

which was open to consideration, and it appears that my French colleague gave Sultan Pacha the same reply from the same motives.

“ In speaking generally of the counter-project of Organic Law drawn up by the Chamber, I said to Sultan Pacha that it was without parallel in any country ; that it took away all power from the Ministry and transformed the Chamber into the Government with the Ministers as its Executive officers.

“ Sultan Pacha said that such was not the intention of the Chamber, that the Constitutions of many countries had been examined, and that there was no provision in the counter-project which did not exist elsewhere. I answered that the Chamber must, in that case, have selected all the precedents which could give it power, and omitted all those which counterbalanced that power and guaranteed the necessary Government authority to the Ministry. The only precedent, as far as I knew, for such a Constitution as that proposed by the Chamber, was the French National Convention of 1792, the consequence of which was that the country was inundated with the blood of its citizens, and that finally a despotism grew out of it, the most arbitrary ever known, which had been brought to an end by an

European coalition against it ; and I asked Sultan Pacha whether it was not better, rather than to risk consequences such as these, to accept the liberal Organic Law proposed by Cherif Pacha. He replied that Cherif Pacha's law was like a drum—that it made a great sound but was hollow inside.

“On the following day Sultan Pacha made to Cherif Pacha the proposal regarding the Budget which he had made to me and Mr. Sienkiewicz ; but he formulated it as follows :—The Chamber should send Delegates of a number equal to the number of Ministers to assist in passing the Budget ; that each Delegate and each Minister should have a vote, and that the President of the Council should have an additional vote.

“This proposal is tantamount to the Chamber voting the Budget, as if there is a defection of two Ministers, the Delegates obtain the majority. The only possible advantage would be that the Controllers would be present and could exercise a certain amount of influence.

“My French colleague and I considered that we could not take upon ourselves, individually, the responsibility of refusing to listen to the overture made, and that the consideration of it would be useful as giving time for wiser counsels to prevail, and

to enable our Governments to decide upon the course to be pursued, in case no agreement could be come to. I therefore telegraphed on the 22nd instant to ask whether your Lordship was disposed to authorise me to recommend the Ministry to consider proposals which had been made unofficially by the President of the Chamber with a view to an arrangement which would have for effect to accord to Delegates of the Chamber the right to co-operate with the Ministers in the examination and vote of the Budget.

“Since then we have considered that it would be better that the other questions pending between Cherif Pacha and the Chamber should be decided prior to any attempt to come to an arrangement regarding the Budget, and this view is, I learn, shared both by Cherif Pacha and the Chamber.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *January 27th*, 1882.

“I enclose herewith a copy of a Memorandum, dated to-day, which M. Sienkiewicz and I have given to Cherif Pacha. It sets forth the grounds on which the contention is based, that the Chamber cannot vote the Budget without infringing the Decrees establishing the Control, and it goes on to

say that an innovation of the nature proposed by the Chamber cannot be introduced without the assent of the English and French Governments.

“In order not to close the door to a possible understanding, we added that if the Government of the Khedive deemed fit to open negotiations on the subject, we were prepared to transmit its proposals to our respective Governments, but that we considered that such a negotiation would be on the understanding that the Government and the Chamber were agreed with regard to the rest of the proposed Organic Law.”

*Memorandum.*

“The Decree of the 18th November, 1876, regulates the mode of procedure with regard to the Budget, and lays down what authorities are to prepare and vote it.

“By the terms of the 10th Article of that Decree the Budget is prepared by the Finance Minister and the two Controllers-General. The Council of Ministers, after having discussed it in concert with the Controllers, submits it to the approval of the Khedive. No mention is made of the Chamber of Notables, which, however, already existed.

“The Control was suppressed when the Mixed

Ministry was constituted, but, by an official note addressed to the Agents of England and France on the 31st March, 1879, the Egyptian Government undertook, if it should make any change in the organisation of the Ministries of Finance and Public Works, to re-establish the Control under the conditions of the Decree of the 18th November, 1876.

“By the Decree of the 4th September, 1879, the Control was re-established. Thereafter, the Government, desiring to modify the functions of the Controllers itself, acknowledged what, moreover, was self-evident, that it could not do so except with the assent of the English and French Governments. The assent was given, and is mentioned in the Decree of the 15th November, 1879. At that time the two Governments, moreover, reserved to themselves the right to withdraw the consent which they gave, and they expressly stipulated for ‘the possibility of an eventual return to the provisions contained in the Decree of the 18th November, 1876, relative to the functions of the Controllers-General.’ (Note of the Agents of France and Great Britain, dated the 15th November, 1879.)

“The Chamber of Delegates now makes a demand to co-operate in a certain measure in the examination and voting of the Budget.

“So grave an innovation cannot be introduced without the assent of the English and French Governments.

“In the event of the Khedive’s Government considering it right to open negotiations with a view of obtaining some modification in the existing régime, the Agents of France and Great Britain would be disposed to transmit its proposals to their respective Governments. They consider, however, that a negotiation of that nature would be on the hypothesis of a complete understanding between the Ministry and the Chamber on all the other points of the Organic Statute of the Chamber.”

On the 1st and 2nd February came a crisis reported in the following telegrams to Lord Granville:—

“CAIRO, *February 1st*, 1882.

“Cherif Pacha has requested the Chamber, in a letter explaining the situation, to formulate a basis of negotiation with the Powers.

“The Chamber insists on the issue of a Decree sanctioning the Organic Law, with the vote of the Budget vested in the Chamber.

“Cherif Pacha expects a deputation from the Chamber to-day, to demand his compliance or



resignation; and he says that he shall have to resign in order to avoid danger to the Khedive."

"CAIRO, *February 1st*, 1882.

"One of the Ministers tells me that the only issue from the situation now is the immediate despatch to Egypt of a Commission from the Porte, to be followed as soon as possible by a Turkish force.

"He says that armed intervention on our part could neither be threatened nor effected without the most serious danger to the European population, and a resistance which would lead to prolonged bloodshed.

"He thinks that by acting with tact, and accepting any Ministry the Chamber asks for, we can tide over the moment without public disturbance; but he is of opinion that as the army has again exercised dictatorship, there is no hope for the future, unless it be rendered powerless by force.

"The matter is urgent, and demands immediate attention."

"CAIRO, *February 2nd*, 1882.

"The Khedive summoned my French colleague and me this afternoon. Cherif Pacha was at the Palace.

“The Khedive said that a deputation of the Chamber had been to him, and requested a change of Ministry. His Highness asked on what Law of the Chamber they founded their right to make the request. This they could not answer, but insisted on the change. They also presented a copy of the draft Organic Law of the Chamber, with the Budget Articles as drafted by the Chamber, and requested His Highness to sign, saying that the right to vote the Budget was not one for discussion with foreign Powers. His Highness dismissed them, saying that he would consider their requests.

“The Khedive will convoke them this evening, and, stating that he yields because he has no force to resist, will ask them to name the persons whom they desire as Ministers, at all events, the President; and His Highness will appoint those mentioned. He will refuse to sign the Law, leaving the question over for the future Ministry.”

Lord Granville replied :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 2nd*, 1882.

“I am in communication with the French Government on the subject of your telegram of yesterday.

“It is desirable that, under present circumstances, you do nothing to precipitate matters, but abstain from any encouragement that Her Majesty’s Government will agree to abandonment of the Sultan’s Firmans and international engagements.”

In a private letter Lord Granville added :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 3rd*, 1882.

“So the crack has more or less arrived. You will see by the despatch which we have written to Lyons the views we have taken, and the first observation of Freycinet in reply.<sup>1</sup>

“It is satisfactory that Freycinet is strongly against English and French single or joint occupation. It was to be expected that he would dislike

<sup>1</sup> On the 31st January, M. Gambetta had resigned office in consequence of an adverse vote of the Chamber on the Electoral Law. He was succeeded by M. de Freycinet. A summary of Lord Granville’s despatch to Lord Lyons of January 30th is given in Lord Cromer’s *Modern Egypt*, Vol. I, p. 245. It set forth the strong objections entertained by Her Majesty’s Government to a British, a French, or an Anglo-French occupation, and expressed a preference for a Turkish occupation in case of necessity, though agreeing that it would be a great evil. M. de Freycinet’s views, reported by Lord Lyons on February 3rd, were against any armed intervention in Egypt, whether by France and England together or by either separately. He was also strongly opposed to any intervention of the Porte.

Turkish intervention, for which we are certainly not keen.

“It is awkward that Parliament should be meeting at this moment, when we want time to look around us. There seems at present no danger of anarchy or disorder at Cairo.

“I am glad to hear you work so well with the French representative.”

On the 5th February, Sir E. Malet telegraphed a list of the new Ministry, which included Mahmud Pacha Sami, President of the Council and Minister of the Interior; Arabi Bey, Minister of War; Moustapha Pacha Fehmi, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On the following day he telegraphed:—

“In the programme of the new Ministry, which has been published, and which contains the usual promises to respect international engagements, the following passage occurs: ‘The first act of the new Cabinet will be to cause to be sanctioned an Organic Law of the Chamber of Delegates. This Law will respect all rights and all obligations of a private or international character, as well as all engagements relative to the Public Debt and to the

charges which the latter impose on the Budget of the State.’”

He wrote privately on the same day :—

“ I have been very careful in the last week to act up to Your Lordship’s instructions to do nothing to precipitate matters. It would have been easy, by a word to the Khedive advising him to retain Cherif Pacha and to dissolve the Chamber, to bring about a dangerous crisis which would have necessitated immediate action, but, cordially seconded by my French colleague, I have been only intent on gaining time. Colvin has shown me the letter which he has written to you by the present mail, and I agree with him that the position of the Controllers must be very embarrassing.<sup>1</sup> They have done their utmost to prevent the passing of the Organic Law, and if it is passed their power will be well-nigh entirely clipt. In such a case I am not sure that, if the new state of things is acquiesced in, it would not be better to change the Controllers, as new ones only could work freely in the fresh groove. I am not, indeed, certain that it would not also be as

<sup>1</sup> From subsequent correspondence it appears that Sir A. Colvin’s letter contained an offer to resign his post. The offer was not accepted. The French Controller-General, M. de Blignières, did resign shortly afterwards, and was succeeded by M. de Brédif in May.

well to recall me, as having failed to maintain the *status quo* of the Control in which we were so deeply interested. I own that I do not think that we have been to blame, but new blood works better after a crisis of the sort through which we have passed. I hope you do not attach any credit to the assertions in the *Journal des Débats*, that the effect of the Dual Note was destroyed by my saying that it was drawn up by M. Gambetta, and that Your Lordship was opposed to it. Of course, I have never said anything of the sort, and Mr. Sienkiewicz and I have worked together without a hitch, of which I feel sure that he will bear testimony to his Government.

“I think we shall go on quietly though not satisfactorily, provided there is no interference on the part of the Porte. The question to be considered is whether it is most detrimental to our interests to lose influence gradually and see Customs, Posts, Telegraphs, etc., revert by degrees to native hands, or to favour a violent solution based on the *status quo*; both are bad enough. I confess to being rather tired out by the anxieties of the week.”

On the 8th February Sir E. Malet forwarded by telegraph the translation of a long note addressed to the British and French Agents by the Egyptian

Minister for Foreign Affairs, which asserted the claim of the Chamber to discuss the Budget, and explained the provisions of the amended Organic Law providing for such discussion.

On February 6th, 1882, Lord Granville addressed to Lord Lyons a despatch of which the following is an extract :—

“The reports at present received from Egypt are not of a nature to excite apprehensions of early disorder or anarchy. But matters seem to have reached a crisis, when the order of things established by the Firmans of the Sultan, and by the international engagements of Egypt, whether with England and France alone, or with all the Powers, is exposed to a risk of encroachment.

“Her Majesty’s Government would propose that France and England should communicate with the other Powers, and should ascertain whether they would be willing to enter upon an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the affairs of Egypt on the basis of the maintenance of the rights of the Sovereign, of the liberties of the Egyptian people as secured by the Firmans of the Sultan, and the strict observance of the international engagements of Egypt.

“Her Majesty’s Government do not consider that a case for intervention has at present arisen, since on the part of the Notables and the new Government the intention is avowed to maintain international engagements. But should the necessity arise, it would be their wish that such intervention should represent the united action and authority of Europe.

“In that event it would also, in their opinion, be right that the Sultan should be a party to any proceedings or discussions that might ensue.”

The French Government having concurred in this proposal, instructions were addressed on the 11th February to the British and French Representatives at Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburg to make a communication in the terms thus agreed upon to the Governments to which they were accredited.

The replies to this overture were favourable, but they left it to the British and French Governments to take the initiative in putting the plan into execution.



From Lord Granville.

*Extract.*

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 10th*, 1882.

“You will be glad that all question of immediate occupation by us and the French is at an end. I hope it will not be necessary to have the Turks in. It is the lesser evil but a great one.

“You see the French have agreed to some communication with the Powers—if these behave well, which of course is a question, will Arabi venture to stand up against such a phalanx?

“What we are desirous of knowing is exactly what can be given to the Notables. Do our Controllers exaggerate that which ought to belong to them?”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *February 13th*, 1882.

“I received on the 9th your letter of the 3rd.

“The country is perfectly quiet, and I hope that nothing may happen to prevent the visit of the Princes.<sup>1</sup> There is no danger from within unless an intervention is threatened, but I dare say you

<sup>1</sup> The late Duke of Clarence and the Duke of York (now Prince of Wales) were about to visit Egypt and take a trip up the Nile.

will be of opinion that the prospect of the present Government mismanaging matters to such an extent as to necessitate intervention is not sufficiently certain to render the immediate application of intervention justifiable. There is, I think, very little doubt that the ultimate aim of the National party is to get by degrees possession of the places held by Europeans; at all events, that is the general supposition here, and amid the general chorus I am afraid of becoming prejudiced against the Nationalists. It is much easier to judge from a distance whether the interests of private persons, including bondholders, justify interference. The Europeans here say that the Government is quite incapable of governing, and that it is our duty to save the country while there is yet time. The Controllers look on the matter solely from the point of view of the Control, and they are right in asserting that their position is changed. I myself should be inclined to change the Controllers, bring in fresh blood and see how matters go on. But I am afraid that I stand alone here in thinking that this would be the best course."

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *February 20th*, 1882.

“I beg to acknowledge the receipt of Y.L.’s letter of the 10th inst.

“I fear that it would be useless now even for united Europe to give advice, if it were unaccompanied by immediate active measures to force its acceptance, and I should myself much prefer to see the active measures taken first and the views of the Powers inflicted afterwards. For the course to be pursued I would venture to refer to my private letter of the 25th of September.<sup>1</sup>

“The alternative is to do nothing and to allow the pot to simmer. I do not think it will be long before it again boils over.

“I take it for granted that matters will be allowed to sleep until the Princes’ visit is over, for as I have explained by telegraph, I believe that it would be dangerous for them to come here if intervention of any kind were threatened.

“I do not think that our Controllers exaggerate that which ought to belong to them if they are to be responsible for the financial situation. And it is at present clear that the provisions of the Decree of

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, page 162.

1879 re-establishing the Control may be strictly observed by the Government, and yet that the Control may be powerless. It is so at this moment, yet no article of the Decree is infringed.

“Wilfrid Blunt continues in his optimism and declares that if Egypt is only left alone all will come right. But of course he considers that ‘right’ means among other things the exclusion as far as possible of European public servants. He has arrived at the conviction that the pure Egyptians are quite capable of governing and administering the country. I do not share this view, and fear that we are gradually going from bad to worse, though I do not at all say that the system should not be given a fair trial.

“But as soon as it is demonstrated to the meanest comprehension that the Control is powerless, I think that it ought to be withdrawn. I fancy that in a very short time the public will understand that the Control is only one in name. The fact of £290,000 having been added to the Army expenditure since the 1st of February last sufficiently proves it.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *February 27th*, 1882.

“I am extremely grateful to you for authorising me to make the Nile trip with the Princes. I have need of a little rest from constant anxiety, and it will be the pleasantest form of rest that I could devise.

“There is nothing new in the situation here except that each week we seem to go a little further down the fatal incline.”

From the beginning of March to the 25th Sir Edward Malet was absent from Cairo, having been authorised to accompany Their Royal Highnesses Prince Edward and Prince George of Wales on a trip up the Nile as far as Assouan. He left in charge of the Agency Mr. Cookson, H.M. Consul at Alexandria, who had been summoned from his post for the purpose.

On his return Sir Edward received with other papers the following private letter from Lord Granville :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 17th*, 1882.

“I suppose this note will arrive about the same

time as you do at Cairo. You will not have found things improved during your absence.

“ I send you a despatch which we have agreed with the French Government to send to the Powers. I suppose it will be generally acceptable, all the more from its not dealing with the crucial question, how our wishes are to be enforced.

“ Will Arabi Bey and his supporters feel that it is a risky game to put themselves in opposition to all Europe, backed up as it may be by Turkey?

“ I have begged Lyons to explain to Freycinet that we must know on what foot we are dancing, but my own belief is that the object which he has at heart, and which we also desire, viz. not to be obliged to occupy, can best be reached by a good understanding between the two countries, supported by Europe, and not opposed by Turkey.

“ Pray tell me exactly your views as to Colvin's present position.”

The despatch which accompanied this letter was a circular addressed to the British Representatives at Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburg for communication to the Governments to which they were accredited. It discussed at length the note presented on the 8th February to the British and

French Agents, set forth the objections to the proposed provisions of the Organic Law with regard to the Budget, and concluded with the following passage :—

“ On the whole, therefore, Her Majesty’s Government are of opinion that the functions of the Chamber should, at present, be confined to certain definite matters, including even finance so far as possible, in respect of which they may undoubtedly render useful service, gradually developing their capacity for self-government, without risking a breach of the international obligations resulting from the Law of Liquidation and other Conventions.”

Sir Edward Malet wrote privately to Lord Granville in reply :—

“ CAIRO, *March 28th*, 1882.

“ I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship’s letter of the 17th instant. I have not found matters much improved since I left at the beginning of the month, but on the other hand they have not become so rapidly worse as was expected. Arabi is the leading spirit of the Cabinet and Mahmud Pacha Sami, who at first attempted to dispute in-

fluence with him, has accepted the secondary position, and there is no breach between them. The Government seeing that it receives no support from abroad is leaning more upon the Khedive, and if His Highness was sharp he might by degrees regain a good deal of his position.

“The general impression among my colleagues is that Arabi and his friends will not hold out against the demand of the Powers to alter the Organic Law; but there will be trouble about it. It cannot be done without the consent of the Chamber, and the Government will probably attempt to postpone a decision until its next meeting in November, but I think that we ought to insist upon the Chamber being specially convoked. The French, I gather from the tone of Sienkiewicz, will find everything pardonable in order to prevent the necessity of intervention.

“Colvin is naturally dissatisfied with the position of the Control, as it has lost its power, but I see no reason why it should not maintain great influence. He is too sensible to make difficulties, personally, and in Council he does not *bouder* as de Blighières did. He speaks his mind on all matters and is treated with great deference, and it is of immense advantage that his knowledge of Arabic



should enable him to understand all that passes, and that the Ministers should know that he understands what they say to each other. I hope that I also may by degrees regain influence. Colvin and I are both of opinion now, after our first annoyance has worn off, that we are much better off with the Control under the present disadvantageous conditions than we should be if it were withdrawn. I have been very glad of the rest which the trip with the Princes has given me. I have come back quieted and clearer in mind and ready, I hope, to grapple with the difficulties before us."

The proposal made to the other Powers in the Circular of March 17th was favourably received, and matters seemed ripe for the commencement of negotiations, though what the result might be was not clearly to be foreseen.

Sir Edward wrote again to Lord Granville:—

“CAIRO, *April 4th*, 1882.

“It has become generally known here that the Powers are agreed to demand a change of the Organic Law, but there is great difference of opinion as

to the way in which the demand will be met. On the one hand it is said that it will be impossible for the Ministry to treat on the subject because it came in on the platform of not negotiating with the Powers on the right of the Chamber to vote the Budget. It is supposed, therefore, that Mahmud Pacha Sami will retire and that we shall have a purely military Government with Arabi Pacha at the head, who will be proclaimed Khedive if the Powers push the matter further.

“On the other hand it is said that the Government will willingly accept an arrangement which gives them all they want, that it recognises the remainder of the Organic Law and only abstracts from discussion by the Chamber certain revenues which by implication the law has already treated in this way. Colvin adheres to his opinion that if the Budget is made by the Ministry emanating from the Chamber and responsible to it, the special reservations will be a useless guarantee to the creditors, because their only real guarantee is that the lien has hitherto been on all revenues and that therefore the Control, to be efficient, should be on all revenue and expenditure.

“Where I fear there will be a difficulty will be in the matter of coercion should it become neces-

sary. The Porte will be hardly willing to interfere on the lines laid down because they practically grant the constitution which is peculiarly distasteful to the Sultan.

“ Militarism is increasing in every direction, and the country will soon be governed by nothing but officers, who now show themselves everywhere.

“ I am told that Krupp guns have been ordered from Germany.

“ My French colleague has taken to see everything *couleur de rose*, and does not apprehend cause for intervention of any kind.”

To Lady Malet he wrote on the same day in reply to a letter received from her :—

“ As to taxes there is nothing to be done on our part. We have said over and again that we consent to equal taxation with Egyptians, and the Egyptians are perfectly aware of this. The difficulty is that other Powers will not consent. All must do it together or it cannot be done. I have had now several talks with Arabi Bey, or Pacha, as he is now, and he may be a well-meaning man, but he is not intelligent and Sir W. Gregory’s adoration of him is simply ridiculous.”

The Session of the Chamber of Notables was closed on the 26th March.

Events were impending which indefinitely postponed the proposed negotiations for a modification of the Organic Law passed by the Chamber.

## CHAPTER XII

### ARREST AND TRIAL OF CIRCASSIAN OFFICERS CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY TO MURDER ARABI PACHA—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KHEDIVE AND THE EGYPTIAN MINISTRY

ON the 11th April Sir Edward Malet reported that the Government were making wholesale promotions in the Army :—

“With reference to Mr. Cookson’s despatch of the 16th ultimo regarding the promotions of several Colonels in the army, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, since then, numerous further promotions have been made. I am informed that up to the present time 520 officers have been advanced in rank.

“The Controllers-General are unacquainted with the manner in which the increase of pay of these officers is provided for, but it is supposed that the augmentation of the army has been more or less left aside, and that the money intended for this service is being used to pay the officers.”

On the following day he telegraphed :—

“ Sixteen arrests have been made among officers and soldiers in consequence of an alleged conspiracy to murder Arabi Pacha.

“ Over 500 officers have recently been promoted, causing much discontent amongst those not promoted, principally Circassians.

“ Arabi Pacha is said to be much alarmed, and no longer goes home at night, but lives entirely at the barracks.”

In a subsequent telegram, dated April 14th, he added :—

“ There is some anxiety as to the result of the imprisonment of the Circassians. It is doubted whether the Government is strong enough to remain master of the situation. It is said that the Bedouins are much discontented and may move on slender provocation.

“ A little time, to see the turn which events may take, would be useful before opening any negotiations between the Powers and the Government.”

Again on April 17th he wrote :—

“ I saw the Khedive on the 16th instant, when he informed me that up to that date thirty arrests had

been made consequent on the alleged conspiracy against Arabi Pacha. His Highness said that he could not but be anxious about the situation, that several Pachas were supposed to be implicated, and that a general uneasiness, such as he had never known before, reigned at Cairo. He feared that the atmosphere would not clear without a storm, and he said that the danger to himself was that if the Circassians and Turks continued their opposition he would be accused by the party in power of fomenting and assisting it."

On the 18th he wrote privately :—

"It looks rather as though troublous times were again in store for us. The conspiracy against Arabi does not really appear to amount to more than outspoken threats to murder him on the part of unpromoted Circassian officers, but the wholesale arrests made have spread alarm which will probably render the life of Arabi really in danger. I have never seen the Khedive so anxious as he was on Saturday. He complained of having no party on which he could rely. It was impossible, he said, to make use of the Bedouins, because they were not under the control of their Chiefs, and once in Cairo they would probably take to pillage and massacre.

“Arabi Pacha has lost caste in a variety of ways. On hearing of the conspiracy he fled from his house in his dressing-gown to the barracks, and not to the barracks at the Ministry of War, which would be the more natural refuge, but to the barracks at the Palace of Abdeen, because he is supposed to count more on the fidelity of the troops quartered there. He is reproached with enriching himself and with living in a house belonging to a well-known bankrupt named Enani Bey, whose claim for £30,000 against the Government he strongly advocates before the Council of Ministers. His capacity for administration does not seem to go beyond the promotion of officers of his party.

“In the Provinces the power of the Governors is rapidly declining, and business at the Ministries is very nearly at a standstill.

“My French colleague has had to complain sharply of the treatment of French subjects in the streets by the police and soldiery, and I have just heard of a case of arrest of three Englishmen at Suez which I must take up energetically.”

To Lord Granville. “CAIRO, *April 18th*, 1882.

“On the 16th instant the Khedive received a telegram from the Porte saying that it was ad-



visible that the matter of the alleged conspiracy against Arabi Pacha should be terminated as quickly as possible, as it was causing uneasiness and exaggerated rumours.

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that, in consequence, the sentence of the Court-martial occupied in trying the prisoners would probably be pronounced to-day—that there was good proof against twelve out of the thirty prisoners, three of them being more guilty than the rest ; that the names of several influential Pachas had been mentioned as instigating the prisoners to murder Arabi Pacha ; but that they would not be proceeded against without clear evidence.

“Another element of general disquiet is the attitude assumed by the Bedouins towards the Government, of which they speak with open contempt, and have repeatedly said that, on a word from the Khedive, they will sweep it away. Although not well armed, their numbers are so large that little resistance could be made if they were to descend upon Cairo. I am informed that the frontier tribes number about 220,000 men. It is alleged that a short time since Arabi Pacha endeavoured to enter into a compact with them to join in resisting intervention, and that they agreed,

in case of intervention on the part of a Christian Power, but stated that if the Sultan intervened the Bedouins would side with him to a man.

“The anxiety of the Khedive with regard to himself being suspected, as mentioned in my telegram of yesterday, is not unreasonable. During the month of March an attempt was made to poison Abdel-Al Bey, one of the three revolutionary Colonels, by his stepson, a youth of sixteen, and a friend. These young men were both cadets at the military school supported by the Khedive, and it was alleged that they had been prompted to the crime by Ali Pacha, Agent of the Khedive’s estates. The rumour acquired so much consistency that the Khedive was obliged to defend himself to his Ministers, and the inquiry is, it is said, still pending. There can be no shadow of doubt that the Khedive is innocent, but it is not impossible that over-zealous courtiers may, by their intrigues, arouse suspicion against him.”

Lord Granville wrote on the 14th April asking for Sir Edward’s opinion as to the retention of Sir A. Colvin as Controller-General, and again on the 21st on the general situation.

From Lord Granville.

“WALMER CASTLE, *April 14th*, 1882.

“In a letter written by you about the time that Colvin offered his resignation you expressed a doubt whether under the circumstances it would not be better to accept it. I am inclined to adhere to my former opinion, but should like to know what you think. Colvin is evidently a strong man. He knows the position, and a change would probably be interpreted as weakness. Blunt, who acts here almost as an agent for Arabi Bey, is strong against Colvin; says that he is so strong a partisan, has declared so openly his determination to get rid of the present Government, that he has lost all influence in matters about which they desired nothing better than to be guided by European intelligence.

“Blunt also says that Colvin does not understand what is going on in the Council from ignorance of the language used. But I see you praise him for his knowledge of Arabic.

“Freycinet is sincerely anxious to avoid any intervention, and is dead against the Turks.

“I believe he would not object to the Italians, but at present this idea does not smile to me. I

am rather a believer in diplomatic pressure when it is unanimous."

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 21st*, 1882.

"We have followed your telegraphic advice, and delayed opening negotiations with the Egyptian Government till we hear more from you as to the chances of Arabi's Government. The French in the meanwhile are getting alarmed at the prospect of disorder. They have pressed us hard to agree to a change of Khedives, and the substitution of Halim for Tewfik. We have put down our foot and objected entirely. I believe they will give it up. However, they say they are ready to adopt anything we will suggest, privately sending a message that they would not object to a naval demonstration and a mission of English troops from India.

"We press them to try Turkish *moral* influence, joined to us, for the maintenance of Tewfik with the necessary changes in the new Constitution.

"How far do you believe forcible intervention can be avoided? I detest the very thought of it."

Sir Edward Malet replied :—

“CAIRO, *April 25th*, 1882.

“I did think when Colvin first offered his resignation that it might be advisable to accept it, because he appeared to be so exceedingly unwilling to continue, but I have quite come round from that opinion now. A change would certainly be interpreted as weakness, and a new man could not possibly render the service which Colvin is still rendering. At the same time it is right that I should let Your Lordship know that he continues to tell me that if matters are ultimately settled in accordance with the proposals made to the Powers for the change of Art. 34 of the Organic Law, he should be unwilling to remain, because he thinks that he would be undertaking a duty (responsibility for the financial situation) which he could not fulfil. Blunt's estimate of Colvin is on a par with his estimate of other affairs and other people in this country, shallow and prejudiced. Colvin speaks Arabic sufficiently to hold a long conversation, and he understands the substance of what passes in Council, though when the Ministers speak rapidly he may not understand every word. Blunt himself is always obliged to use an interpreter.

“I am very sorry for the continued objection of the French to Turkish intervention and continue to be sure that European intervention would be a very serious affair, and that Turkish intervention could be effected without bloodshed of any sort, even at the present moment, by Commissioners, with the knowledge on the part of the Egyptians that a Turkish force consented to by Europe was behind them. The terms should include the acceptance of the Organic Law as originally drafted by Cherif Pacha and the return to power of Cherif or Riaz. Arabi's reputation has so much declined that he might be provided with a comfortable civil sinecure and no more thought of. The danger is at present that, seeing his popularity forsaking him, he may venture on another *coup* to restore it.

“I do not think that any more dependence can be placed on Halim than on the ex-Khedive.

“The general opinion about the conspiracy Court-martial is that the prisoners are tortured into saying whatever suits the Government, and very little credit is attached to the official theory that there was a genuine conspiracy to bring back Ismail Pacha.

“To revert to what Blunt said of Colvin, I feel quite sure that Colvin has never declared openly or

otherwise his determination to get rid of the present Government. It would be foreign to his whole system to have such an intention. He has always kept himself steadily aloof from political action, and I feel convinced that he can have said nothing of the kind. He may have expressed an opinion that the present Government would not last, but I doubt even that."

To Lady Malet he wrote :—

"CAIRO, *April 25th*, 1882.

"The court-martial on the prisoners accused of conspiracy drags on without coming to a conclusion. There are now fifty prisoners, and report says that they are cruelly treated, though the Government strenuously denies it. The Government has issued orders which, if carried out, will effect the suppression of slavery and the slave trade in the Soudan, and I sincerely hope that good may come of it. I could forgive the Government all it has done if it would really abolish slavery, but Blunt's boast that he will obtain a fetwah from the Sheikh-ul-Islam is, I fear, an empty one."

On the 22nd April Sir E. Malet wrote a remarkable despatch defending the Khedive against

the imputations of weakness and incapacity made against him by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and pointing out in forcible language the difficulties of His Highness's position. A considerable portion of this despatch was published in the papers laid before Parliament, but it is of sufficient importance to be set out here at length :—

To Lord Granville. "CAIRO, *April 22nd*, 1882.

"I observe from Lord Lyons' despatch marked 'Very Confidential,' of the 3rd inst., that M. de Freycinet attributes the main cause of the present state of affairs in Egypt to the incapacity of the present Khedive, and suggests the substitution of Prince Halim as a remedy for the evil.

"I cannot agree in this estimate of the Khedive's character and its results, or in the efficacy of the remedy suggested.

"Since the 2nd February, 1881, the Khedive has been in a peculiarly trying position, and taking a general view of the events of the present situation, it would appear to be more just to consider that he has behaved with both tact and intelligence. I take the keynote of his line of conduct to have been to act faithfully in accordance with the Rescript of



the 28th August, 1878, by which the Khedive, Ismail Pacha, undertook to relinquish despotic rule and to govern in conjunction with his Ministry. It should be remembered that up to the moment of the first military disturbance in February, 1881, he was regarded as a model Prince, endowed with moderation and intelligence, and that this was in great measure due to his cordial co-operation with Riaz Pacha and the Controllers-General.

“It is now made a matter of reproach that he did not after the 1st February treat the ringleaders of the revolt with a high hand, but on the day of the revolt he had pardoned them, and if he had adopted the course which he is now reproached with having neglected he would have betrayed his word.

“Subsequently, when the want of discipline became more apparent, he repeatedly pointed out the danger to his Ministry, and becoming convinced of the connivance of his Minister of War, now President of the Council, he dismissed him from the Ministry. Then, acting always with his Government, he endeavoured to resume the reins over the army which were falling from his hands. The 9th September was the result. On that occasion again he is reproached with having lost his opportunity by want of energy, if not of courage. There are

probably few natures which would have been suddenly ready to lose all or gain all at that critical moment. Negotiation was the natural expedient of a man not of the strongest personal character. 'How easy it is for those in power and prosperity to preach heroism to the vanquished. How little can they understand that life itself may rise in value when nought but life remains.'

"Since that day the Khedive may be said to have had not even a powerful friend upon whom he could rely. During the brief Ministry of Cherif Pacha he constantly foresaw the difficulties in store, and he was so buffeted backwards and forwards by the rival contentions of England and France on the one hand and the Sultan on the other, that his only chance of safety lay in their support. When the moment which he had foreseen did come he was completely abandoned, both by the Powers and the Sultan, and left to struggle through the surf as he could. The men who had stript him of his power, and were the authors of his humiliation, became his Ministers, and the last shred of support vanished. He has frequently spoken to me about the advice which the Porte and my colleagues have given him to show more energy, and has asked in what direction he should display it. He was urged to place

himself frankly at the head of the national movement. Could he do so when he saw that its object was to rid Egypt of Christian officials who were the works which made the clock go? He was urged to form a party of his own. Was this party to support him individually against his own Ministry? If so, of what elements which had a chance of power or stability was it to be composed, and what time would be given to him by his Ministers to weld it into form? He was urged to accept the offer of the Bedouins, who recognised no master but himself, and at a signal from him would sweep away the present Ministry and the Chamber; but what fate would he himself merit if he invited pillage and massacre in his capital? He said that his life was wellnigh unendurable, that he lived from day to day not knowing what the morrow would bring forth; that his family could not sleep, but wept; that his only policy was to rigidly abstain from all intrigue himself, to treat his Ministry with frankness, to endeavour by reasoning to restrain them when they made a more rapid leap than usual in the dark; but that, notwithstanding all his circumspection, he was accused of complicity in the attempted poisoning of Abdel-Al Pacha, and that from hour to hour he expected to be accused of

connivance in the present alleged conspiracy to murder Arabi Pacha. He would be grateful to me if I could tell him in what direction he could move, in what direction he could usefully show the energy, to the absence of which his present position was frequently ascribed.

“ I was not able to answer His Highness' appeal. I could not say, ‘ Resist your Ministry and military dictation, and leave the consequences to us.’ I could not hold out to him any hope of immediate and successful support to himself personally if the consequences of such a course placed him, as they certainly would, in danger ; I could merely concur in his temporising policy. And when I hear him abused for lack of energy and capacity, I doubt whether there be many men in the world who would have been able to extricate themselves from the difficulties in which he has been involved through the want of foresight of all who co-operated in the settlement of the internal affairs of Egypt on the accession of the present Khedive, in neglecting the signs of danger shown in the military revolt of April, 1879. Nor do I believe that any real progress will be made towards the settlement of the Egyptian question until that military ascendancy is subdued.

“ With regard to the remedy suggested by M. de Freycinet of replacing the Khedive by Prince Halim, I see no signs that such a change would be welcome to any party in Egypt, where, to the present generation, he is comparatively unknown.”

In the meanwhile, by the 22nd April, the arrests of officers had increased to forty-eight. Among the number was Osman Pacha Rifki, who in February had been Minister of War.

The inclusion of this officer among the prisoners on trial roused the susceptibilities of the Sultan, from whom the General held his military rank. On the 30th April Lord Dufferin telegraphed from Constantinople that the Sultan had asked the Representatives of Germany, Austria, and Italy to induce their Governments to intervene against Arabi, and that the three Ambassadors had transmitted the message to their Governments. Their reply was to the following effect :—

First, that they had not sufficient information to warrant their interfering in favour of Osman Rifki and the other officers under arrest.

Secondly, advising the Sultan, if he took steps in

their behalf, not to interfere with the government of Egypt.

Thirdly, to be careful not to do anything before he had ascertained that he was not acting in opposition to the Western Powers.

On the 2nd May Sir Edward Malet reported by telegraph :—

“Forty officers, among whom is Osman Rifki, ex-Minister of War, have been condemned to exile for life to the furthest limits of the Soudan. The proceedings of the court-martial were secret. The prisoners were undefended by counsel.”

A despatch of the same date gave the details of the sentence<sup>1</sup> as communicated to the Telegraphic Agency of Havas by the Government for publication :—

“It begins by stating that it is the sentence on the Circassians compromised in the recent plot against Arabi Pacha. Forty officers, among whom is Osman Pacha Rifki, ex-Minister of War, are condemned to be degraded and to exile for life to the furthest extremity of the Soudan.

<sup>1</sup> The full text is given at the end of this chapter.

“General Ratib Pacha, at present in Italy, who is stated to have organised the plot at the instigation of Ismail Pacha, is degraded, and will incur the same punishment if he returns to Egypt.

“As the ex-Khedive is the promoter of the plot, and has made use, for this purpose, of the annual allowance granted to him by Egypt, the Council of Ministers is to consider whether the allowance shall be stopped. Finally, the proper authority is to prevent all communication between him and any one in Egypt.”

To Lord Granville.

*(Telegraphic.)*

“CAIRO, *May 2nd*, 1882.

“I have been asked by the Khedive for my advice as to whether he should refuse to sanction the sentence of the court-martial. I replied that, in my personal opinion, he ought to refuse on the ground of the secret nature of the proceedings, the fact that the accused had been undefended, and because the sentence dealt in the latter part with matters beyond the competence of the court-martial. But I advised His Highness to convoke the Representatives of the Great Powers, and be guided by their counsel. He is inclined to do so, but will wait over the discussion with his Ministers to-day.

“ The situation is critical, and I should be glad to know if your Lordship approves my reply to His Highness. It appears to me to be a moment when the Khedive must show that he can act.”

Lord Granville at once replied entirely approving his language to the Khedive.

On the 3rd May, Sir Edward telegraphed that the Government had ordered of Krupp's agent fifteen batteries of guns (ninety in all).

In a further message he reported :—

“ My French colleague saw the Khedive after me yesterday. He recommended His Highness not to countersign the sentence at present, and he rather urged a middle course, such as confirming and pardoning or commuting.”

Sir Edward's despatches and private letters, written on the 2nd May, give more detailed accounts of what had passed :—

To Lord Granville.

“ CAIRO, *May 2nd*, 1882.

“ I received a message from the Khedive this morning asking me to come to the Palace at 10



o'clock. On my arriving His Highness said that he desired to consult me as to the course he should pursue with reference to the sentence of the Court-martial on the prisoners accused of conspiring against Arabi Pacha, which sentence I had no doubt seen, as it had been published by the Havas Telegraphic Agency.

“ His Highness said that he had not yet countersigned it, as he had insisted on all the evidence, which was very voluminous, being communicated to him. He had also said to his Minister of War, Arabi Pacha, that the Council of Ministers ought to be consulted on the subject, but Arabi Pacha had replied that he saw no need for this, and that at all events it was superfluous, as the Ministers all agreed with him.

“ I replied to His Highness that, in my personal opinion, he ought to refuse to countersign the sentence, on the ground that the proceedings had been secret, that the prisoners, accused of a crime rendering them liable to the punishment of death, had not been permitted to have counsel for defence, and also because that part of the sentence which related to Ismail Pacha went into matters which were not within the competence of the Court.

“ His Highness said that, as far as the evidence

which he had perused went, it showed that the prisoners had the intention of presenting four petitions : one to the Sultan, one to himself, one to the Ministry, and one to the Consuls-General, praying that a Commission should be appointed in which Delegates from the Porte and the Powers should take part, to inquire into their grievances ; and there was vague evidence that there had been threats of resort to extreme measures if their prayers were not listened to. His Highness himself could not consider that crimes were brought home to the prisoners deserving a sentence nearly equivalent to death.

“ It is, in fact, notorious that prisoners rarely return from the White Nile, the place indicated for the exile of the accused by the term ‘ the most distant part of the Soudan.’

“ ‘ But,’ His Highness asked, ‘ if I refuse to sign, what then ?’

“ I replied that there were moments when one must face the unknown, and that I thought that if His Highness desired to maintain his reputation as a civilised Prince, he should on this occasion refuse to sanction a sentence which, by his own showing, and in general opinion, was contrary to the principles of humanity and justice. I said, however, that I did

not desire His Highness to be guided by my advice alone, and that I recommended him to convoke the Representatives of the Great Powers, and to lay the matter before them. His Highness agreed to this course, and said that he would request us to come to the Palace this afternoon. I learn, however, from M. Sienkiewicz, my French colleague, who has seen him since, that he inclines to defer convoking us until he has spoken to his Ministers, who are to meet at the Palace to-day. M. Sienkiewicz informed me that he had strongly urged the Khedive not to sanction the sentence, but had suggested that he should insist on its being revised, on account of its dealing with matters beyond the competence of the Court.

“I observed that, if this were done, the sentence on the accused would still remain, but M. Sienkiewicz replied that then the Khedive might employ the prerogative of pardon. My colleague is no doubt influenced by a strong desire to avoid a rupture between the Khedive and the Government, which might in its turn lead to the necessity of intervention. I have spoken to my German and Austrian colleagues on the subject of the Khedive's intention to consult us. Baron Saurma, although he entirely agreed that the Khedive ought not to

sanction the sentence, said that he was not ready to give such advice officially, as his general instructions were to leave politics alone. M. de Martino said he was quite prepared to advise the Khedive to refuse."

To Lady Malet.

"CAIRO, *May 2nd*, 1882.

"We have dropped into troublous moments again, but I have an idea that it is the beginning of a final solution. I have strongly urged the Khedive to refuse to sanction the sentence of the Court Martial on the persons accused of conspiracy against Arabi Bey. I am convinced that it is the moment for him to put his foot down, and I hope to keep him up to the mark. I was for quick and rapid action and chancing the consequences, but my French colleague has given him dilatory advice, being anxious not to do anything which might lead to intervention."

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *May 2nd*, 1882.

"In reply to the question in your letter of the 21st ulto. as to how far I believe forcible intervention can be avoided, I think that the arrival of

Commissioners from the Sultan would put matters straight, and it being known that their demands would be insisted on, if necessary, by force, that the Government here would collapse. But they should come with a definite programme which I think should be the maintenance of the *status quo* as fixed at the beginning of Tewfik's reign with the addition of the Chamber regulated by the Organic Law proposed by Cherif Pacha, and the command of regiments should be given exclusively to Turkish officers. I believe that if these three points were insisted upon by the Porte with the formal consent of the Powers, that little moral resistance would be made here, and certainly no armed resistance if the worst came to the worst and a Turkish force were actually landed. The country is tired of its military dictators, and they would not only stand alone but be divided. If France is willing to allow the Sultan to depose the Khedive and send a new one, surely she might agree to the lesser move of Commissioners. It is certain that Halim could not stand without Turkish troops.

"I cannot but think that Arabi's conspiracy court-martial is the beginning of an end of some sort, and that it is firm ground for the Khedive to resist upon. A naval demonstration at the same

time as the arrival of the Sultan's Commissioners would, I think, make the acceptance of the points demanded certain."

A despatch written on the same day encloses letters from the provinces of Behera and Charkieh, which are thus described :—

"The first of these [letters] reports growing insecurity, due to the small respect paid to the civil authorities by the natives. This is attributed to the action of the military, who treat their civil colleagues with none of the consideration necessary to carry on provincial administration.

"Corruption among the employés is attaining its former prevalence, and is favoured by the frequent changes among the higher functionaries, which virtually throw the working of the administration into the hands of subordinates, who alone are versed in the current business, and who are not slow to seize the opportunities for peculation thus offered to them.

"The second letter dwells upon the straits to which the fellaheen are now reduced in order to obtain money. The banks will no longer lend any large sums, and the petty usurers ask interest as

high as thirty-six per cent per six months for small loans.

“The landed proprietors attribute this tightness of capital, and their present distress, to the feeling of distrust which reigns under the present Government, and they boldly declare that the Ministry is responsible if they are unable to pay the land-tax, this being, in reality, almost the only side of politics at which the Egyptian agriculturist will look.

“Land is everywhere losing its value, and sales at heavy loss are constantly being made, one example being cited of property purchased a few months back at £60 per feddan having been lately sold at £28.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 3rd*, 1882.

“Moustapha Pacha Fehmi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, came to me yesterday afternoon and stated that the sentence of the court-martial had been published by mistake as the Khedive had not yet confirmed it, and that the version given was incorrect, that the real version contained no mention of the plot as being against Arabi Pacha, and that the last part recommended the conduct of the ex-Khedive to the consideration of His Highness, but

made no allusion to the question of suppressing his allowance.

“ I replied to His Excellency that the sentence published had been communicated to the Agent of Havas by the Government Bureau of the Press ; that I knew for certain that it was correct, and that his present statement could only mean that the Government, seeing the mistake which had been made in alluding to Arabi Pacha, and the allowance of the Khedive, had altered the paragraphs as it suited them.

“ His Excellency did not press the point beyond insisting that the official version was as he stated it to be. He proceeded to endeavour to disclaim responsibility on his part, and that of the Government, with regard to the sentence. I replied that at the present moment the whole of the evidence was being read to the Khedive daily in the presence of all the Ministers, and that if they did not deter His Highness from counter-signing the sentence, they would clearly be held responsible. Moreover, that it was notorious that Arabi Pacha, though not a member of the Court, was present at the trial. And His Excellency then affirmed that the trial was public. On this point, also, I was obliged to differ ; many persons might have gone



in and out of the Court who were not directly concerned in the proceedings, such as officers, and possibly officials, but no strangers were admitted. His Excellency said that the procedure of the Court was that which had been always followed on previous occasions, and that no protests had previously been made. I remarked that when single individuals lost their lives it attracted little attention, but that when a catastrophe occurred involving many lives, public opinion took up the matter and inquired into the cause. I would, I said, not refrain from telling His Excellency that, in the present instance, public opinion held that he and his colleagues were engaged in an act which would take rank amongst the crimes of the century.

“It is to be remembered that the sentence of exile to the extreme limits of the Soudan is equivalent to death, as few prisoners ever return from the White Nile. The Khedive has told me that the evidence of the prisoners does not clearly prove more than their intention to petition, and that the design to assassinate is not, in his opinion, proved.

“I continue, therefore, to think that the Khedive should refuse to confirm the sentence, and should insist upon a new trial, granting ordinary safeguards to the prisoners.”

Lord Granville telegraphed May 4th :—

“In your telegram of yesterday you express the opinion that the Khedive should simply refuse to confirm the sentence of the court-martial and insist on a new trial of the accused, to whom the ordinary safeguards should be granted.

“I have to instruct you, in giving expression to these views, which have the approval of Her Majesty’s Government, to act as far as possible in concert with the French Consul-General.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 4th*, 1882.

“The Khedive summoned the Representatives of Austria, Italy, Russia and Germany to-day, to ask them their advice as to sanctioning the sentence of the court-martial. The German Representative being away for the day was not present. The others, with the exception of the Italian, who recommended His Highness to refuse, declined to give advice without special instructions from their Governments. The Khedive asked them to obtain instructions, and requested the support of their Governments.

“I happened to be present by accident at the close of the interview, having gone to the Palace to

inform His Highness that the language which I had held to him on the 2nd instant had been approved by Her Majesty's Government.

"His Highness told me that he had received a telegram from the Porte, desiring him to delay taking any decision.

"Many rumours are afloat as to the course which will be adopted should His Highness refuse to sanction the sentence, and threats of violence are used, but it is certain that if he does [sanction it] his position as Khedive will become precarious, because he will have incurred the distrust of his own people and of the Powers, and the ill-will of the Porte. He will, however, require strong support to keep him firm, and I trust that it will be given."

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *May 4th*, 1882.

"The sentence of the court-martial, notwithstanding the assertions of Moustapha Pacha Fehmi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my despatch of the 3rd instant, was in the terms of the document published by Havas' Telegraphic Agency and inclosed in my despatch of the 1st instant. It contained, in addition, a list of over 250 persons

mentioned as 'suspect,' and to be kept under surveillance. The list included Ali Pacha Moubarek and Ismail Pacha Eyoub, Ministers of Public Works respectively, in the Riaz and Cherif Ministries, and other influential Pachas.

"These names were, however, subsequently erased, and the Pachas acquitted of suspicion.<sup>1</sup>

"The Court was composed of fifteen officers, presided over by Rachid Pacha Husni, a Circassian General. Among the officers were Toulba Pacha, Ali Pacha Fehmi, and Abdel-Al Pacha. They are the three military Pachas who have risen into notoriety with Arabi Pacha, and the prisoners are accused of including them among the persons to be assassinated. They ought, consequently, not to have sat as judges.

"No officer on the Court held rank equal to that of Osman Pacha Rifki, ex-Minister of War, one of the condemned.

"An English gentleman has to-day informed me that two natives of condition, living close to the barracks where the prisoners are confined, have told him separately (they live in different houses) that they have heard the cries of the prisoners at night, and my informant, who is perfectly trust-

<sup>1</sup> For text of sentence see appendix to this chapter.

worthy, says that he had no doubt that the persons who told him of it were speaking the truth. It appears from the depositions that the prisoners were asked the same question day after day till they answered in the affirmative. The supposition is, that they did so when they could support their ill-treatment no longer.

“The general opinion is that they were tortured, though the fact is strenuously denied by the Government.”

The reports of the ill-treatment of the prisoners were subsequently confirmed by statements made by one of them to Mr. Aranghy, the Interpreter to the British Agency. The prisoner requested that his name might not be divulged, and the statement was not published at the time lest the informant should be traced and should suffer.

Mr. Aranghy's report, dated May 16th, is as follows :—

“I have the honour to report to you that on this day I proceeded to the Abdeen Barracks, where the Circassians accused of a conspiracy against Arabi Pacha, Minister of War, are imprisoned.

“On arriving at the gate I demanded to see ——. I was then searched by the sentry on duty, and no arms having been found on my person I was conducted by a soldier to my friend’s room, where I found him alone. The soldier then retired, and I was left alone with ——.

“After a few complimentary words on his safety, I asked him as to the treatment he had received while in confinement. He then informed me, in the strictest confidence, that at the time of his arrest he was on a mission in Upper Egypt, when one night a band of soldiers, with their bayonets pointed towards him, broke into his room, and ordered him to follow them to the station. There he was put in a carriage under guard and conveyed to Cairo. ‘On arriving there I was led to the Abdeen Barracks, and thrust into an underground cell without windows or any furniture whatever. The next day I was brought up before a court-martial and informed by the President that twelve witnesses had deposed that I was conspiring against Arabi Pacha. I replied that it was absolutely false; that I had always been a faithful servant of the Government, against which I had no complaints to bring; and that I refused to be tried by a Court amongst whose members were to be found the generals

against whom I was accused of conspiring. No notice was taken of my protest, and I sealed my above answer. For fifteen days I was brought before the Court, and each time I gave the same reply. During my confinement I was subjected to numberless tortures. I was never allowed to lie down; an officer in my cell, by continual brutality, prevented me from sleeping for a moment. I was closely ironed on the arms and legs and repeatedly beaten. The food sent from my house was eaten by the soldiers on guard, and a piece of dry bread only was given to me for my daily meals. One night, at about midnight, six soldiers entered my cell and pinioned my arms. They were followed by a man in a mask, who carried a candle and a written document. Without being able to resist, my seal was taken from my pocket, and the masked man applied it to the document, of the contents of which I am entirely ignorant.'

"I may add that — bore very evident traces of the sufferings he had undergone. The marks of the irons remained on his limbs, and he looked many years older than when I saw him last, about two or three months ago."

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 6th*, 1882.

“The Khedive requested me to come to the Palace this morning, and on my arriving His Highness said to me that he had received an official message from the Porte, stating that it had learnt by a public telegram that several Ottoman subjects had been condemned to degradation of rank and exile to the extreme limits of the Soudan, and that among them was Osman Pacha Rifki, bearing the rank of ‘Ferik’ or General, which was conferred by the Sultan, and could only be taken away by His Majesty; that this being contrary to the Firmans, the matter required minute examination, and that the Porte desired that the matter might be referred to it.

“His Highness said that he had replied to the effect that the sentence as published was exact; that as soon as he had finished the examination of the trial himself, he would submit the matter to the Porte, whose privileges he would uphold, and that he was ready in this as in all cases to listen to instructions from it.

“His Highness proceeded to inform me that he had communicated these two telegrams to his Ministry in the morning, and that they had shown



much annoyance at the reply which he had made, and had asked him to withdraw or modify it, on the ground that he was surrendering privileges acquired by the country. His Highness said that he had denied this, and had refused to change his answer in any way, on which they had left."

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *May 7th*, 1882.

"The Ministers last night presented a written petition to the Khedive, asking His Highness to commute the sentence pronounced against the prisoners accused of plotting against the State to simple banishment beyond Egyptian territory, and proposing that they should neither be degraded in rank nor be deprived of their order, but merely that their names should be erased from the roll of the army.

"On receiving this petition His Highness replied that the matter was now in the hands of the Porte, and that he could do nothing further until a reply came.

"In acquainting me with the circumstance this morning, the Khedive asked me my opinion as to whether he should receive the petition of the Ministers favourably, or await the reply of the Porte.

“I replied that I was not prepared to give an immediate answer, and I subsequently conferred on the subject with my French colleague.

“My French colleague and I deemed that the question exceeded our competence, and that we should refer it to our respective Governments.

“We might, perhaps, suggest to the Khedive some course which would dispense him from sanctioning the sentence. He might, for instance, simply exercise his prerogative, and decree a commutation of the sentences pronounced, or the action of the Powers might be brought to bear upon the Porte to induce it to send the Khedive instructions in this sense. The latter course would decide, in favour of the Porte, the principle that it has the right to oppose the degradation of high Egyptian functionaries on whom it has conferred rank, a question which can only be decided by the interpretation of the Firmans.

“It is at all events now clear that the sentence against the Circassians will not be executed, and that therefore the rights of humanity will be preserved.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 7th*, 1882.

“With reference to my immediately preceding despatch of this day’s date, I venture to observe that in considering the form in which the sentence of the court-martial should be dealt with by the Khedive, the bearing of the general situation should be taken into account. It should be remembered that the present Ministry is distinctly hitherto bent upon diminishing the Anglo-French protection, and that, as a matter of fact, our influence is daily decreasing. It will not be possible for us to regain our ascendancy until the military supremacy which at present weighs upon the country is broken.

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning, unofficially, that the Government would resist the arrival of Turkish Commissioners by force, and he begged me to use my influence to prevent this complication.

“I believe, however, that some complication of an acute nature must supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question can be attained, and that it would be wiser to hasten it than to endeavour to retard it, because the longer

misgovernment lasts the more difficult it is to remedy the evils which it has caused."

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 8th*, 1882.

“Mahmud Pacha Sami, President of the Council, came to me this morning to say that if the Porte should send an order to cancel the sentence of the court-martial on the Circassian prisoners the order would not be obeyed, and that if the Porte sent Commissioners they would not be allowed to land, but would be repulsed by force if necessary. His Excellency observed to me that this would be an act of open revolt against the Sultan, and that he hoped that I would use my good offices towards avoiding such a necessity.

“I gave His Excellency no assurances of any kind.

“His Excellency protested that he and his Government were animated by the strongest desire to be on friendly terms with foreign Powers, and denied that they had any anti-European tendencies. He deplored the apparent isolation of the Government, and declared that it must be due to falsehoods and unfounded reports concerning them.

“I recalled to His Excellency's recollection briefly

that the present Government had come into power on the platform of not negotiating with foreign Powers regarding the voting of the Budget, which was a breach of international engagements, and His Excellency said that the Government was at present ready to enter into such negotiations, that the public feeling was so much strained at the time of Cherif Pacha's fall that it was not possible to negotiate, but that time enough had now elapsed for people to view the matter more calmly.

“With regard to the court-martial, he declared that the procedure had been strictly in accordance with the law, and that it was not possible for him to cause a new trial to be held, as there was no appeal from the sentence of a court-martial.”

Lord Granville's instructions were as follows :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 8th*, 1882.

“I have repeated to you Lord Lyons' telegram of to-day stating that the French Government are of opinion that the Khedive should, by his own prerogative, grant a pardon to the officers sentenced by the court-martial.

“Her Majesty's Government agree in this opinion, and I have accordingly to instruct you to

concert with the French Agent with a view to advising the Khedive in the above sense."

Sir Edward Malet made the following report of the action thereupon taken by him :—

“CAIRO, *May 9th*, 1882.

“We had been summoned to the Palace for 10 o'clock, and, on arriving, found with the Khedive the Representatives of Germany, Austria, Italy and Russia. The Khedive informed us that, having telegraphed to the Porte that his Ministers recommended him to commute the sentence, he had received a reply desiring him to send all the papers connected with the trial to Constantinople, and His Highness asked our advice, remarking that the process of sending the papers and of waiting for their examination would take a long time, and that, for the sake of the prisoners, he should prefer to finish the matter at once. As none of my colleagues made any reply, I stated, after a pause, that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that His Highness should make use of his own prerogative in the matter ; and my French colleague said that his Government was of the same opinion. His Highness replied that this opinion coincided

with his ; he had even debated whether he should not pardon the prisoners absolutely ; but that he had decided that this would be unsafe for the prisoners themselves, as he should not be able to protect them when free. The meeting broke up ; but my French colleague and I remained behind.

“ It was decided that the Khedive should reduce the sentence to nothing but sending the condemned officers out of Egypt without loss of rank and honours, and that the rest of the sentence should be cancelled.

“ I suggested that, to prevent the supposition that His Highness was acting under pressure from his Government, we should remain with His Highness until the Decree was signed, so that no Minister might approach His Highness until the matter was absolutely settled.

“ The Decree was accordingly drawn up in Arabic, and sealed by His Highness in our presence. It was then sent to the President of the Council. I have not, up to the moment of closing this despatch, heard how it has been received by the Ministry.”

In a private letter to Lord Granville Sir Edward writes :—

“CAIRO, *May 9th*, 1882.

“I have been the whole morning at the Palace, and am so short of time in consequence that I must be brief. The Khedive has shown plenty of pluck in the affair of the court-martial, and has regained a great deal of his lost prestige. The Government has, of course, lost in an equal degree.”

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *May 9th*, 1882.

“I have had a hard week of it, but have succeeded in what I wanted to do, which was to save the miserable Circassians, who had been condemned to what was equivalent to death, viz. the White Nile. I do not know whether they were guilty or not, but I am certain that they did not have a fair trial, so I went at it energetically and told the Khedive from the first that if he confirmed the sentence he would lose his reputation as a civilised Prince. Fortunately my advice was approved by H.M. Government, and so I have managed to keep the Khedive to the sticking point till to-day. He has issued a Decree commuting the punishment to simply leaving Egypt.

“Here is another summons to the Palace, and I must be off.”



To Lord Granville.      “CAIRO, *May 10th*, 1882.

“At six o'clock yesterday evening the Khedive again summoned the Representatives of the Great Powers, and informed them that the President of the Council had insisted that the Decree should be changed to condemning the prisoners to be struck off the rolls.

“His Highness stated that upon his refusing the President had threatened him, had spoken slightly of any assistance he could receive from the foreign Representatives, and had remarked that if he persisted in his refusal there would be a general massacre of foreigners.

“M. Sienkiewicz and I, at the request of our colleagues, then visited the President of the Council.

“We told him that on the previous day he had begged for our influence to avert a Turkish intervention in the question of the court-martial; that we had that morning rendered His Excellency the service which he had asked for by advising the Khedive to issue the Decree; and that we were surprised to hear that in return for our good offices he had menaced our fellow countrymen, had spoken insultingly of our power to protect the Khedive, and had threatened him.

“Therefore, we had now come to ask him officially, in our own names and those of our colleagues, if any danger was to be expected in the event of the Khedive’s refusing to change the Decree, so that we might inform our respective Governments.

“The President denied that he had threatened the Khedive, or had made use of the language attributed to him. He declared that the alteration of the Decree was a request which it was open to the Khedive to accept or to reject.

“On our asking what the consequences would be of a rejection, His Excellency replied that it was impossible for him to say, beyond that the question would be submitted to the Council.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 10th*, 1882.

“In company with the Representatives of France, Austria, and Germany, I to-day asked the President of the Council to describe to us the present situation.

“His Excellency answered that since the Khedive and his Ministers could not agree, and it was not possible for the Ministry to resign, it had convoked the Chamber of Notables to meet immediately in

order to lay the case before it; that the Ministry meanwhile guaranteed the personal safety of the Khedive and public security.

“The Chamber is convoked by the Ministry alone, without the authority of the Khedive having been even requested.

“The complaint against His Highness is that he has acted in a way to diminish the autonomy of Egypt, and, on many occasions, without consulting his Ministers.

“My colleagues and I feel assured that it is intended to depose the Khedive if the Chamber will lend itself to the step.

“The President said that in three days the Chamber might be assembled, and that he did not intend to hold any further communication with His Highness until the difference between them had been decided by the Chamber.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 10th*, 1882.

“The situation has become most serious since the relations have been broken off between the Khedive and his Ministers.

“The guarantee given by the Ministers of the safety of the Khedive and of Europeans can hardly be relied upon as a solid one.”

Lord Granville at once telegraphed to Lord Lyons, May 11th:—

“Inform the French Government that Her Majesty’s Government are willing to send two ironclads to Alexandria to protect Europeans, informing other Powers in case they are disposed to do likewise.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 11th*, 1882.

“The Khedive has officially told my French colleague and me this morning that the Ministry has convoked the Chamber in defiance of his authority and of the 9th Article of the Organic Law.

“His Highness’s Decree with regard to the court-martial has been returned to him, but this may be on the ground of informality, since the President of the Council declares that it ought to have been written on the sentence of the Court itself, and forwarded to the Minister of War, whereas it had been written on separate paper and sent to the Minister of the Interior. The Khedive has done this to-day without in any way altering the wording of the Decree. I beg your Lordship to be so good as to instruct me as to what attitude I should observe towards the Ministry.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 11th*, 1882.

“The President of the Council said yesterday, in speaking of the safety of the Europeans, that it was also guaranteed in the event of an intervention by the Porte alone.

“The Delegates are coming in, and they at once proceed to the house of Arabi Pacha. It is reported that the Chamber will meet on Saturday, and will immediately pronounce the deposition of the Khedive, and sentence the whole family of Mohamed Ali to exile, appointing the President of the Council Governor-General of Egypt by the National will.

“It is superfluous to remark that the Chamber, acting under terror of the military, which is at present extreme, is no exponent of the real National will.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 13th*, 1882.

“The President of the Chamber and the Deputies ostensibly take the part of the Khedive, but they have requested His Highness to pardon and to be reconciled with his Ministers. The Khedive has refused.

“His Highness remains firm, and will not be reconciled to a Ministry which has defied him

openly, threatened himself and his family, and by the convocation of the Chamber without his sanction has violated the law.

“At Cairo there is considerable uneasiness, and many persons are leaving.”

From Lord Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 14th*, 1882.

“I have to instruct you, if you think such a course judicious, to arrange with the French Agent to send for Arabi Bey, and inform him that if there is a disturbance of order he will find Europe and Turkey, as well as England and France, against him, and will be held personally responsible. If, on the other hand, he remains loyal to the Khedive, his acts and person will be favourably regarded.

“I have requested Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Paris to communicate with the French Government with a view to obtain their concurrence in this instruction.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 14th*, 1882.

“This morning the President of the Chamber begged the Khedive to accept the retirement of the Prime Minister. My French colleague and I, in

consideration of the coming action of the Powers, and the importance of nothing happening in the meanwhile to the Khedive, have advised His Highness to accept this proposition, which can, nevertheless, be merely a temporary solution. Moustapha Pacha Fehmi, at present Minister for Foreign Affairs and Justice, will probably be appointed President of the Council. We agree to the nomination of any one except Arabi Pacha.

“The President of the Chamber also said to His Highness that the Chamber ought to be convoked if the fleets arrived ; that it would then pass a vote of censure on the Ministry for having necessitated foreign interference, and would insist that the military leaders should retire from the country.”

As regards the proposed naval demonstration Sir Edward Malet telegraphed :—

“CAIRO, *May 14th*, 1882.

“My French colleague and I think that the political advantage of the arrival of the combined squadron at Alexandria is so great as to override in consideration the danger which it might possibly cause to Europeans in Cairo.

“Its arrival in support of the Khedive, who now

seems to have with him all but the military party, diminishes the danger."

But he added in a subsequent message of the same date :—

"Knowing the feeling here, I fear that if the Sultan's implied co-operation is not secured and made known, if he does not give his countenance at the beginning to the action of the Powers, there is a risk that the Chamber and the Army may again coalesce, and offer resistance which would otherwise, I think, be impossible."

Subsequent events showed the wisdom of this warning. Unfortunately the French Government, though willing to contemplate Turkish intervention in the last resort, had the strongest objection to any public admission of such a possibility.

On the 15th May Lord Granville telegraphed :—

"An Anglo-French squadron is assembling at Suda, and will soon enter Alexandria. We reserve to ourselves to employ such other means as we may deem necessary to make order respected, and to maintain the authority of the Khedive. You will concert with your French colleague in order to



make such use of this telegram as circumstances may appear to you to call for."

The following telegram was sent at the same time to the British Representatives at Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburg :—

"In consequence of the last events in Egypt, the French and English Governments have thought it right to agree to send to Alexandria a squadron which is at this moment assembling at Suda. The object of this demonstration is to strengthen the authority of the Khedive, and to safeguard the legal state of things in Egypt which has been recognised by Europe, and in the maintenance of which Europe is interested. In order not to complicate the situation, the two Governments have thought it right to instruct their Ambassadors at Constantinople to recommend the Porte to abstain from all intervention and all interference in Egypt, reserving to themselves, however, to make later further propositions to the Porte in case of need. We should be glad that the Government to which you are accredited should send instructions in the same sense to its Ambassador at Constantinople."

Lord Dufferin\* was instructed to make a commu-

nication to the Porte in the sense indicated in concert with his French colleague. Lord Granville added :—

“ It would be desirable that you should be able to let the Sultan understand, in very moderate terms, that it would not be improbable that further proposals might be made to the Porte later.”

Sir Edward reported on the 15th May :—

“ CAIRO, *May 15th*, 1882.

“ The Presidency of the Council of Ministers having been offered to Moustapha Pacha Fehmi, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Justice, his Excellency absolutely declined to accept it.

“ The Ministers declare that they will only resign if the Chamber of Notables desire it.

“ The President of the Chamber, however, declares that it will be impossible to change the Ministry as long as the military power continues to be invested in Arabi Pacha.

“ Public telegrams have announced the departure of the Anglo-French squadron for Alexandria.

“ Under these circumstances, my French colleague and I proceeded to the Palace and stated to the Khedive that an Anglo-French squadron was

assembling at Suda Bay and would soon enter Alexandria ; and that the Governments of England and France reserved to themselves the right to employ such other means as they might deem necessary to make order respected, and to maintain the authority of the Khedive. We further said to His Highness that it was essential that there should be a Government with which we could negotiate ; and that the Khedive being unable to form a new Ministry, we requested him to re-enter into relations with the present one, informing it that, in consequence of the serious news which we had imparted to him, personal questions must be set aside, and that the Ministers must enter into negotiations with us in order to avoid the danger which menaces the country."

In another telegram of the same date he stated:—

" This morning M. Sienkiewicz and I stated to Arabi Pacha, the Minister of War, that if order is disturbed he will find the Powers, without exception, against him, and that he will be held personally responsible, but that if he remains loyal to the Khedive his acts and person will be favourably regarded.

" His Excellency replied that he would guarantee

public order and the safety of H.H. the Khedive as long as he remained Minister, but that in the event of an Anglo-French squadron arriving, he could not guarantee public safety.

“His Excellency gave us a formal denial that either he or any of the Ministers had harboured a design for the deposition of the Khedive. Notwithstanding his assurances, we repeated that if public order is disturbed the responsibility would rest with him.

“Since the despatch of the Anglo-French fleet has become known, the President of the Council has assured M. Monge, the French Consul here, that public tranquillity will be maintained.”

The following circular was addressed by Sir E. Malet to the various British Consular Officers in Egypt :—

“Inform the authorities that the object of the Anglo-French naval expedition to Alexandria is of a friendly nature, and that no danger is to be apprehended provided public security is maintained and the negotiations which ensue result in a satisfactory settlement of the questions pending between the Egyptian Government and the Powers.

“ Send above instructions to Consular authorities under you.”

On the 16th May Sir E. Malet was able to report an improvement in the situation :—

“ Last night the Ministers proceeded to the Palace of Ismailiah, and made a complete submission to the Khedive. During their interview His Highness made no allusion to the recent differences.

“ Perfect tranquillity reigns in Cairo.”

Later in the day he telegraphed :—

“ The President of the Council and the Minister of War have visited me separately this morning, and have both given me assurances of the maintenance of public tranquillity on the arrival of the combined squadrons.”

In private letters Sir Edward wrote :—

To Lord Granville.      “ CAIRO, *May 16th*, 1882.

“ I am very sorry that things should have come to their present pass, but it must have happened sooner or later, and an excellent ground has been chosen for the quarrel. We come in support of the Khedive, who in his turn is supported by the

Chamber and the general voice of the people. Therefore there is no question of crushing honest aspirations for self-government. We have merely to liberate Egypt from military despotism. I do not think that the necessity for Turkish troops will arise, but the chance of it would be greatly diminished, if it were known that they were coming when wanted. I sincerely hope that the negotiations may begin by breaking the military supremacy, until that is effectually done guarantees for other arrangements will be valueless.

“Arabi’s assertion that neither he nor the Ministers had thought of deposing the Khedive was an impudent fiction, but perhaps a convenient one. He said to me to-day that he was glad that the Fleet was coming, as the officers could come up to Cairo to see the sights, and also because a good deal of money would be spent in Alexandria.

“During the last busy week my French colleague and I have acted together without a hitch of any sort.”

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *May 16th*, 1882.

“I write overnight for the mail to-morrow, as in these piping times I do not get an hour in the day

to myself. We are in for the end now, and it is high time that it should come. The ground is fortunate, we interfere in favour of the Khedive, the Chamber and the liberties of the people against military despotism. Unluckily the negotiation must be arduous as we have to ask the Government to commit suicide. I have had a really hard week of it. From nine in the morning to night I never get a moment to myself; in fact, the only moment of repose which is left to me is at seven, when I get an early game of lawn tennis with Graham. He was going away last week and the boat settled (back to Lord Dufferin), but seeing the troublous times in store he had, I think, a *mouvement de cœur*, and said he should stay. Nearly all ladies have left Cairo, but that is merely because they are in the way, I apprehend no danger. This morning I went to Arabi and held him responsible for any disorder which might occur. The Khedive has been very firm, and has acted entirely under the advice which I and my French colleague have given him. We shall pull him through, though I do not feel sure that we may not have a rough time first."

As regards the fate of the condemned officers,

whose sentence had been the first cause of the crisis, Sir Edward reported on the 20th May :—

“ Having learnt from a trustworthy source that it was the intention of the Ministry to send the prisoners convicted by the court-martial out of the country in an Egyptian steamer, I conferred with M. Sienkiewicz, my French colleague, on the subject, as I feared that the lives of the prisoners would be in jeopardy if they were thus disposed of.

“ Being agreed as to the course which we should adopt, I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who came to me on the 18th instant, with regard to the matter. I observed to him that the Khedive's Decree commuted the sentence to simple exile, and that therefore the Government had no right to send the prisoners to any particular place against their will. I warned His Excellency that if the prisoners were conveyed away in an Egyptian ship, and any accident occurred involving the lives of any of them, the Government would not only be held responsible, but would certainly be believed by public opinion to have compassed their death intentionally, and I was sure that His Excellency would feel that this was not a moment when the



Government should expose itself to any further accusations of cruelty. I therefore begged His Excellency to use his influence to cause the prisoners to be embarked on foreign ships, to go whither they pleased.

“I am glad to learn by a telegram received this morning from Mr. Calvert that the first lot of prisoners, sent to Alexandria on the night before last, have been treated in accordance with the request preferred by M. Sienkiewicz and me.

“They were embarked yesterday morning on board the Russian mail-steamer for Constantinople, and Osman Pacha Rifki, ex-Minister of War, who was, as your Lordship will remember, also one of the condemned, left, accompanied by two or three of his suite, on the Austrian steamer for Syria.

“Though it has not been possible to save these men entirely from the consequences of what I believe to be an unjust accusation, the firmness of the Khedive has reduced their sentence to a minimum, and will enable His Highness, if he becomes again a free agent, with a Ministry imbued with the sentiments of justice, to restore them to their families and their homes.”

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII

SENTENCE OF THE COURT-MARTIAL ON THE  
CIRCASSIAN OFFICERS

Sir E. Malet to Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 11th*, 1882.

“My Lord,—I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a translation of the original sentence of the court-martial on the Circassians accused of plotting against the State.

“I have, etc.,

“EDWARD B. MALET.”

## ENCLOSURE

## SENTENCE OF COURT-MARTIAL

*Traduction.*

“Comme il a été reconnu que ces complots, conspirations, révoltes, et perturbations n'avaient d'autre but que la ruine du pays et du Gouvernement, ainsi que l'assassinat des âmes nobles, au moyen d'une entente faite à ce sujet entre les susdits individus pour perpétrer ce crime et provoquer une révolte ; de manière que le grand d'entre eux

excitait le petit et l'instiguait à pousser les autres et les encourageait à semer les troubles et les intrigues pour atteindre leur but funeste, en faisant allusion à Son Altesse le Khedive et à quelques-uns des hauts fonctionnaires pour réaliser leurs mauvaises intentions : d'autant plus que le haut fonctionnaire qui a eu la hardiesse de procéder à de pareils actes, de ne faire aucun cas du Gouvernement qui lui a accordé de hauts grades et l'a comblé de ses bienfaits, et d'intriguer auprès les subalternes pour suivre son exemple ;—tout cela constitue de grands crimes et prouve qu'ils n'ont ni honneur, ni qualités, ni confiance : par conséquent, le Conseil a jugé convenable, pour leur faire subir une peine exemplaire, que les quarante officiers, dont les noms sont mentionnés plus haut, soient tous dégradés et dépossédés des privilèges militaires, ainsi que des décorations dont ils sont honorés.

D'ailleurs, Omar Rahmi et Ibrahim Khalil, employés civils, seront privés de leurs droits civils, et ces derniers, avec les quarante officiers susmentionnés, seront déportés perpétuellement à l'extrémité lointaine du Soudan, et pour ne pas trouver l'occasion de se réunir dans un même endroit, afin qu'ils ne puissent faire d'autres révoltes, il a été décidé, en outre, qu'ils soient dispersés dans les localités séparées, à condition que les localités où ils habiteraient ne seraient situées ni dans les centres du Gouvernorat, ni dans les chefs-lieux des Moudiriehs, ni sur les côtes.

“ Pour ce qui concerne Mohammed Ratib Pacha, qui est le promoteur principal de cette intrigue, et ayant su que le Gouvernement a découvert son projet et va pro-

céder à son arrestation, il a pris la fuite pour se rendre en Europe.

“ Le Conseil de Guerre a jugé convenable de rayer son nom du cadre de l'armée en le dégradant de ses honneurs, grades, décorations dont il est porteur, et de lui défendre l'entrée en Égypte. Et s'il y rentre, il sera arrêté et exilé à perpétuité au Soudan, et sera traité sur le même pied que ses complices, &c., et cela conformément à l'Article 359 de la Loi Intérieure et à l'Article 155 de la Loi relative à la citadelle et à la caserne.

“ Attendu que l'origine de cette révolte n'était qu'Ismail Pacha, l'ex-Khédive, au moyen de ses correspondances dans l'espoir de retourner en Égypte ou de la rendre à un état plus pire que celui de son règne, d'autant plus qu'il est assisté dans ses projets par l'abondance de sa liste civile, qui lui est allouée par le Gouvernement ; que l'esprit de justice ne permet pas qu'un Gouvernement se charge de lui payer de numéraires au moyen desquels il fait des démarches pour le ruiner ; et comme l'examen de la question relative à la suppression de sa liste civile qui le favorise à atteindre son but, qui est préjudiciable au Gouvernement, dépend exclusivement du Conseil des Ministres et de Son Altesse le Khédive, nous leur laissons donc le soin de prendre des mesures à ce sujet ;

“ Comme la perturbation et les intrigues provenaient des communications et correspondances échangées entre l'Égypte et l'ex-Khédive, et que de pareils faits ne seraient pas tolérables, il appartient donc à qui de droit de faire cesser cet état de choses. Quant aux individus civils, ils

seront renvoyés par devant les Tribunaux locaux, attendu qu'ils ont déclaré qu'il y avait dans la maison de son Excellence Kosrew Pacha un Grand Conseil composé d'Européens et autres pour délibérer sur la question des partis, et qu'un d'eux nommé Hadji Fanti se serait engagé de faire venir des Grecs pour les faire introduire dans ce complot ;

“Quant à leurs Excellences Ali Pacha Chérif, Ibrahim Pacha Sonari, Daoud Pacha Falthei, Sami Pacha, Youssuf Pacha Kamal, Youssuf Pacha Chouhir, Ahmed Pacha Rafaat, Osman Pacha Nedjib, Chesmé Pacha, Ismail Pacha Eyoub, Ali Pacha Moubarek, Mahmoud Bey Taher, Mohamed Bey Nezib, Mohamed Bey Sharki, et Hussein Bey Karchoulti Zadeh, dont les noms sont mentionnés dans l'enquête, ils ont été justifiés par les déclarations contradictoires des individus qui ont cité ces noms, tout en jetant l'un sur l'autre, d'autant plus qu'ils n'ont pu produire aucune preuve pour avoir vu l'un de ces hauts fonctionnaires dans une de ces réunions ou dans un de ces partis, ni avoir entendu directement n'importe quelle chose de leur part ;

“ Il a été constaté de ce qui vient d'être dit que le but principal des perturbateurs d'avoir cité les noms susmentionnés n'est que pour semer les intrigues et jeter les troubles afin de satisfaire aux désirs des malveillants pour agrandir et fortifier les partis en citant les noms de ces Pachas ;

“ Pour cette raison le Conseil a cru devoir justifier ces hauts fonctionnaires dans cette affaire, de ne pas les

rendre responsables et de ne pas les interroger à ce sujet, vu la non-participation. Et comme il a été reconnu des vérifications faites et des déclarations données que les partis ne se sont pas bornés seulement aux individus qui ont été l'objet des condamnations précitées, mais encore à d'autres dont le nombre s'élève à 300 individus, et qu'il est nécessaire de connaître tous les noms des autres complices et d'arrêter au fur et à mesure tout ce qui sera connu pour subir le jugement requis sur le crime dont il est coupable ; par conséquent le Conseil a jugé opportun de confier personnellement au Préfet de Police au Caire le soin de prendre toutes les mesures politiques et administratives, pour faire lui-même toutes les recherches nécessaires, ou de déléguer également un homme de confiance de sa part pour le reste des complices compris dans ces partis, le plus promptement possible.

“ Toute personne arrêtée de ces complices sera envoyée au Ministère de la Guerre pour procéder à son jugement, afin de prévenir toute perturbation et d'obstruer le chemin aux méchants.

“ Quant aux armes qui ont été saisies avec quelques-uns des auteurs du complot, ainsi que les munitions, elles seront envoyées aux dépôts militaires.

“(Suivent les noms des 13 membres du  
Conseil de Guerre.)”

## CHAPTER XIII

DEMAND OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH AGENTS  
FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARABI—HIS DISMISSAL  
FROM OFFICE AND REINSTATEMENT—REQUEST  
OF THE KHEDIVE TO THE SULTAN FOR A  
TURKISH COMMISSIONER

ON the 18th May Sir Edward Malet reported to Lord Granville :—

“CAIRO, *May 18th*, 1882.

“Although the Anglo-French squadron has not yet arrived off Alexandria, the effect of its appearance has been discounted, and tranquillity reigns in Cairo.

“The announcement, however, in a public telegram, that the Porte has protested against our despatching vessels has produced a bad effect.

“If it is known that, in the event of the Egyptian Government refusing to come to an arrangement, Turkish intervention must follow, negotiations will probably succeed ; but if it is thought that the Porte and the two Powers are not in accord, the consequences may be most serious. I venture, therefore,

to urge that it is desirable that, before commencing negotiations, an agreement should be come to with the Porte."

Sir Edward's apprehensions were justified by a telegram received from Lord Dufferin on the same day :—

"The French Ambassador and I conveyed verbally on Tuesday afternoon to Said Pacha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the identic communication we were instructed to make by your Lordship's telegram of the 15th instant. Last night Said Pacha informed me that the action of the Western Powers had caused the Sultan displeasure. He read me a circular he had addressed by telegram to the Turkish Representatives abroad. He then entreated me to represent to your Lordship that the Egyptian Ministers having made their submission to the Khedive, the crisis no longer existed, and the proposed naval demonstration was unnecessary. He has made a similar appeal to my French colleague."

On the 19th Sir E. Malet reported :—

"This morning the Khedive told M. Sienkiewicz and me that he had informed his Minister of War



that all military preparations were in contravention of His Highness's orders.

“Arabi Pacha professed his obedience, but continues actively to push on his preparations.

“In order to arrive at a settlement, the first step must necessarily be the resignation of the Ministry now in power and the surrender of the military leaders, which could probably be compassed if their persons, rank and property are guaranteed, but they should be obliged to quit Egypt for a year at least.

“If this were obtained and a Ministry were formed under Cherif Pacha there would be little difficulty with the remaining questions, but if the Porte shows itself hostile to the action of the two Powers, resistance will be shown here. According to the compact between England and France, Turkish troops are to suppress such resistance, but the fact of its not being generally known here that the Sultan will intervene may probably make that very intervention necessary which both of the two Powers are anxious to avert.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 20th*, 1882.

“Mr. Main, British Vice-Consul at Damietta, informs me that on the 17th instant an emissary of

Arabi Pacha arrived there, and after a fruitless attempt to excite the masses against the Khedive and Anglo-French intervention, presented to them four petitions for their adhesion, purporting to convey their entire satisfaction with the present Ministry and their opposition to any change.

“The Ulema and Notables positively refused to sign, but a considerable number of signatures was obtained from the lower classes.

“Mr. Main further reports that he has been assured that a special representative of the Ulema, Notables and merchants leaves for Cairo to instruct the Member for Damietta in the Chamber of Notables to take steps to assure His Highness of the loyalty and devotion of the inhabitants of Damietta to his person.”

The British and French squadrons arrived at Alexandria at daylight on the 20th May.

As the result of communications with the French Government, Lord Granville telegraphed as follows:—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 20th*, 1882.

“Consider the following instructions which have been proposed by M. de Freycinet as addressed to

you by Her Majesty's Government, with the proviso added to my instructions telegraphed to you yesterday,<sup>1</sup> in which the French Government have concurred :—

“ You should abstain, for the present, from entering into the details of combinations. Avoid making allusion to any particular measure, especially as regards the army, the opposition of which would be excited by anything which had the appearance of being directed against it. Your action, for the moment, ought to be limited, in accord with your French colleague, to the three following points :—

“ 1. To declaring that the two Governments of France and England intervene to maintain the *status quo*, and, consequently, to restore to the Khedive the authority which belongs to him, and without which the *status quo* is incessantly threatened.

“ 2. To advising the Khedive to take advantage of the favourable moment, on the arrival of the ships or afterwards, to call for the resignation of his Ministers, and to form a new Ministry, at the

<sup>1</sup> The proviso was that he should say nothing which would prevent Arabi and his friends being ordered to leave the country if desired by the incoming Ministry.

head of which should be placed Cherif Pacha, or another personage offering equivalent guarantees.

“3. To letting it be understood that, if everything passes off well and tranquilly, indulgence will be shown, no prosecution will be made, the persons, the property and the rank of Arabi and his friends will be respected, and, in a word, the change of Ministry will not have any character of vengeance or reprisals.

“When once this change of Ministry has been effected, we will occupy ourselves with detailed measures to secure our interests for the future.

“If, for some reason which I cannot foresee, this plan should be deemed impracticable, you will, after conferring with your French colleague, report to me your practical proposals.”

Sir E. Malet telegraphed on the same day that he and his French colleague had consulted regarding the instructions sent to them with the following result :—

“Until the supremacy of the Military Party is broken the Khedive is powerless to form a new Ministry. No one will accept the task until this is effected.

“We intend, therefore, to propose the following terms to the President of the Council and to Arabi Pacha: That they should quit Egypt together with the three other military Pachas, Toulba, Abdul Al and Ali Fehmi, and that they should not return without the Khedive's sanction, in return for which we should guarantee them their property, rank and pay.

“M. Monge, the French Consul, who thoroughly knows Arabic, will act as intermediary in these negotiations.”

A second telegram of May 21st reported that owing to M. Monge's unwillingness to undertake the negotiation, the endeavour to come to an agreement with the President of the Council and Arabi Pacha regarding their resignation had been abandoned.

To this Lord Granville replied at once:—

“Her Majesty's Government see no objection to such negotiations being carried on by you and your French colleague personally, failing any other mode of proceeding, and provided such a course offered some prospect of success, and that you had no reason to consider it as open to objection.”

To Lord Granville. "CAIRO, *May 22nd*, 1882.

"The President of the Chamber has entered into negotiations, in the name of the Deputies, to induce the present Ministry to resign and the Minister of War to leave Egypt. He also demands the retirement of the other military ringleaders to the provinces.

"His Excellency has particularly questioned me as to whether there is any infringement of the Porte's sovereign rights in the action of England and France. I have answered that the intention of the two Governments is now, as hitherto, to respect these rights, and in no way to infringe them. I added that if His Excellency succeeded in overthrowing the military supremacy, the aim of England and France, which was to restore the Khedive's authority and to maintain the *status quo*, would be fulfilled. He proposed Cherif Pacha as future President of the Council, and added that if his proposals were repulsed by the Ministry, he should request the Khedive to convoke the Chamber, and should, by an immediate vote, bring about the fall of the Ministry."

The difficulty with the Porte now began to manifest itself.

Sir E. Malet telegraphed on the 22nd May :—

“ The Khedive received last night the following official telegram from the Porte :—

“ ‘ The two Powers, as well as the four Powers, have repeatedly assured His Majesty that they will respect his sovereign rights.

“ ‘ The despatch of ships to Alexandria is merely a visit such as occurs yearly. Neither we nor the four Powers were informed by the two Powers of their departure. Consequently the arrival of these ships at Alexandria does not disquiet us, since they will leave in a few days.

“ ‘ In the eventuality of propositions being made, the Powers should make them directly to the Porte. In that case, the Porte will assuredly maintain its rights, and, as we have full confidence in your devotion and loyalty, we are sure that you will respect the Firmans.’

“ The Khedive said to my French colleague and me that if the Porte does not take means of letting it be known that it acquiesces in the action of the two Powers, the Chamber will forsake His Highness and unite with the army. He again, therefore, prays that the Porte may be induced to declare itself. His Highness also told us that Arabi had

declared that he would not resign except by decision of the Chamber.

“I can but repeat what I have ventured to foreshadow from the outset, that unless the Porte is known to support the negotiation its armed intervention will become a necessity.”

In a telegram dated the following day Sir E. Malet made the further suggestions that a general amnesty should be proclaimed by the Khedive, and that the Consuls-General might preface their demands by the declaration forming the first point in their instructions.

In a private letter to Lord Granville he wrote:—

“CAIRO, *May 22nd*, 1882.

“This morning the Khedive was very low at the message which he had received from the Porte saying that the Powers must refer their proposals to it, and insisted that unless the Powers obtained the co-operation of the Porte nothing could be done here. I must, however, do him the justice to say that he professed, notwithstanding this view, his willingness to do whatever we advised.

“The action of the President of the Chamber in demanding the retirement of the Ministry, etc.,



will I hope save us from interfering at all, which, of course, would be to the advantage of all parties concerned. I encouraged Sultan Pacha by all means in my power, especially by telling him that, having once taken the matter up, we were determined to go through with it, and that therefore the safety of the country depended upon the success of his negotiations.

“I have hope now that we shall after all succeed without armed intervention, which, of course, is the object of all my endeavours.”

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *May 22nd*, 1882.

“I am sorry to say that we have not got on as I could wish with our negotiations. I am, however, this afternoon more hopeful, as the President of the Chamber has taken the matter in hand, and has requested the Ministry to resign and Arabi Pacha to leave the country. If we succeed in obtaining a peaceful solution of our difficulties we shall have *bien mérité de la patrie*. I have been very sorry for the Khedive through it all, as he has been, and is, in hourly fear of his life, and his wife and female relations are constantly in tears, so that he, poor man, has a hard time of it; but

he keeps up his pluck, and I hope that he may come out of it all safe and sound. Meantime my work has, as you may suppose, been considerable—telegrams without end all day and all night. The Admiral will pay me a visit here as soon as matters are smoothed, and when we get a new Ministry my prospect of getting home will be very considerably brighter. In fact, the silver lining has appeared in the cloud.”

The French Government and French public opinion continued to be obstinately opposed to any direct intervention on the part of the Sultan. Lord Granville telegraphed on the 22nd May :—

“The French Government are nervous lest the conditional consent they have given to Turkish intervention may be publicly announced at Cairo or Constantinople, and produce an explosion of public feeling at Paris.

“This would complicate matters.

“A satisfactory settlement without Turkish intervention would be the great success.

“We are glad to see that you and your French colleague are promoting it.”

Lord Granville had telegraphed on the 20th May that a report had reached the French Government of the possible departure of the Khedive from Cairo to Alexandria, that the two Governments were agreed that such a step would have the worst effect on the Khedive's position and prestige, and should be strongly opposed.

Sir E. Malet replied :—

“I should be glad if a certain liberty of action could be allowed to me with regard to advising the Khedive not to leave Cairo. It is a very heavy responsibility for us to take, if, in the case of danger to his person being imminent, we prevent him from leaving.

“I have never been able to agree entirely with my French colleague on this subject, and, though I would not separate myself from him on the point, I am anxious that we should not both be bound by a hard and fast instruction.”

Lord Granville was unconvinced, but gave to his instruction a less active shape. He enjoined Sir E. Malet to do nothing to countenance the Khedive in taking the fatal step of leaving Cairo.

On the 23rd May Lord Lyons telegraphed that M. de Freycinet was sending the following instructions to the French Agent at Cairo :—

“We authorise you to do all that you may think necessary to obtain without delay the two following results :—

“1. The temporary removal from Egypt of Arabi and of other personages the removal of whom may also appear to you advantageous.

“2. The appointment of Cherif Pacha as President of the Council. You need not refer to us with regard to the measures to be taken, provided that you be in accord with your English colleague.”

Lord Lyons added :—

“M. de Freycinet directs the French Agent to act upon this instruction if his English colleague shall receive the like instruction, and he earnestly hopes that your Lordship may think it right to send Sir E. Malet an instruction in the same terms.”

Sir E. Malet on the same day reported a change for the worse in the state of affairs on the spot. He stated :—

“The President of the Council has replied to the

proposal of the President of the Chamber that the Ministry should retire, that it will not do so as long as the squadrons are kept at Alexandria.

“Yesterday my French colleague received the visit of Arabi Pacha, and explained to him the necessity of the Ministry resigning and of himself leaving Egypt. After two hours’ conversation the Minister of War said that in the evening he would give his answer.

“The French Consul went to receive it, and Arabi Pacha told him that he must refuse either to retire from his position or from the country. A native colonel present said aloud before M. Monge that the officers would hew Arabi in pieces if he deserted them.

“It has been to-day decided in a Cabinet Council that the Government will reply to any official demands from us that they do not admit the right of the English and French Governments to interfere in such a question, and that they recognise no ultimate authority but that of the Sultan.

“The President of the Chamber informed my French colleague to-day that he can no longer rely upon the Deputies, on account of the feeling against the intervention of the two Powers which is now gaining ground.

“Mr. Sienkiewicz and I hesitate, therefore, to make an official demand to the Ministers, which we know beforehand will be met with a refusal, until we are in a position to declare what would be the consequences of such a refusal, and I accordingly venture to beg your Lordship to favour me with further instructions.

“The present situation has been brought about by the Ministers and the people persisting in a belief that the two Powers will not despatch troops, and that the opposition of France renders a Turkish intervention impossible.

“In the meanwhile military preparations are being carried on, and fanatical feeling against foreigners is sedulously fostered.

“I am still of opinion that if the Sultan declares himself at once, and if it be known that troops are ready to be despatched, we may succeed without the necessity for landing them.”

Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Lyons :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 24th*, 1882.

“Tell M. de Freycinet that the news from Cairo is disquieting. Time is all-important. Propose to him that the two Governments should telegraph a Circular to the Powers, requesting them to join in

asking the Sultan to have troops ready to send to Egypt under strict conditions.”<sup>1</sup>

To Sir Edward Malet he sent the following instruction :—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 24th*, 1882.

“ If circumstances still admit possibility of executing such instructions as those sent to French Agent, as recorded in Lord Lyons’ telegram of yesterday, repeated to you, you may consider yourself as similarly instructed.”

On the 25th Sir Edward reported :—

“ My French colleague and I, for reasons given in my other telegram of to-day, have this afternoon given the following note to the President of the Council :—

“ ‘ The undersigned, Agents and Consuls-General of England and France, considering that His Excellency Sultan Pacha, President of the Chamber of Delegates, actuated by a sentiment of patriotism, and desirous of assuring the peace and prosperity of Egypt, has proposed to Mahmoud Pacha Sami,

<sup>1</sup> M. de Freycinet made no reply to this communication until three days later, when he represented that the improved condition of affairs rendered unnecessary any appeal for Turkish troops

President of the Council, as the only means of putting an end to the disturbed state of the country, the following conditions:—

“ 1. The temporary retirement from Egypt of His Excellency Arabi Pacha, with the maintenance of his rank and pay ;

“ 2. The retirement into the interior of Egypt of Ali Fehmi Pacha and Abdoullah Pacha, who will also retain their rank and pay ;

“ 3. The resignation of the present Ministry.

“ Considering that these conditions, by reason of the spirit of moderation which dictated them, may prevent the misfortunes which threaten Egypt, acting in the name and with the authorisation of their respective Governments, the Undersigned recommend these conditions to the most serious attention of the President of the Council and his colleagues, and, if necessary, will insist on their fulfilment. The Governments of England and France, in intervening in the affairs of Egypt, have no other object than to maintain the *status quo*, and consequently to restore to the Khedive the authority which belongs to him, and without which the *status quo* is continually in danger.

“ The intervention of the two Powers being



divested of all character of vengeance or reprisal, they will use their good offices to obtain from the Khedive a general amnesty, and will watch over its strict observance.’”

The second telegram referred to in this message was to the following effect :—

“ I learnt to-day that the military leaders were circulating amongst the soldiers and officers of the army a document which pretended to set forth the conditions insisted upon by England and France, which were stated to be as follows :—

“ 1. All the Ministers to be exiled.

“ 2. All the officers in the army list to leave Egypt.

“ 3. Disbandment of the entire army.

“ 4. Occupation of Egypt by foreign troops.

“ 5. Dissolution of the Chamber.

“ The French Representative and I, persuaded that the situation would become still further complicated, and even dangerous to the lives of foreigners, if these conditions were believed to be the true ones determined upon the official step from which we had hitherto shrunk, and presented to the Ministry the note repeated in my other telegram of to-day.

“After asking the President of the Council to return us an answer in the shortest time possible we withdrew, and proceeded to communicate the note to the Khedive and to the President of the Chamber, who promised to forward a copy of it to all the principal towns of the provinces.”

Lord Granville at once approved the terms of the note.

To Lord Granville. “CAIRO, *May 26th*, 1882.

“Last evening the President of the Council waited upon the Khedive and asked His Highness’s advice on the course to be taken with regard to the joint note presented to His Excellency by Mr. Sienkiewicz and me.

“The Khedive answered that he would consider the matter.

“His Highness telegraphed the text of the note last night to all the telegraphic stations in the country.

“The general opinion seems to be that the conditions will be rejected by the Ministry, whose isolation will then be complete, since the note only demands the execution of the will of the Chamber of Deputies, expressed by Sultan Pacha, its President.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 26th*, 1882.

“The President of the Council, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, waited this afternoon upon the Khedive again to ask his opinion on the answer they should make to the joint note of England and France.

“His Highness distinctly told them that he accepted its conditions.

“They urged a reference to the Porte, to which the Khedive replied that it was an internal question, and that it was strange that they, who had complained that he had failed to uphold the privileges of Egypt, should suggest such a course.

“On receiving this answer the Ministers withdrew, in order to deliberate further on the course which they should take.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 27th*, 1882.

“Last night the Ministry sent in a letter to the Khedive announcing their resignation, and stating that His Highness, in accepting the conditions proposed by England and France, had acquiesced in foreign interference in contradiction to the terms of the Firmans. The Khedive proposes to reply, stating that he accepts the resignation of the

Ministry, since it is the wish of the nation, and that, as regards the rest of the letter, the question is one between himself and the Sultan, whose sovereign rights he will always maintain."

To Lord Granville. "CAIRO, *May 27th*, 1882.

"When the Ministers visited the Khedive yesterday they carried with them the answer to the joint note, the text of which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my telegram of to-day;<sup>1</sup> but they appear to have been so surprised at the distinct manner in which the Khedive declared his acceptance of the conditions laid down by us, that they withdrew without communicating their reply to him.

"On a further consideration, they perceived that were they to reject the conditions which the Khedive accepted they would be in overt instead of covert rebellion, a position from which they shrank. The retirement of the Ministry is therefore due to the decisive and firm attitude assumed by His Highness.

<sup>1</sup> This intended answer was published by the Ministers. It was a refusal to discuss the demands of the British and French Agents as being an encroachment on the Firmans and other international engagements fixing the status of Egypt.

“There is a report that a military parade is intended to-day.

“The Khedive has instructed the Under-Secretaries of State to carry on the business of the Ministries.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 27th*, 1882.

“The Khedive having summoned Cherif Pacha to accept the Presidency of the Council and to form a new Ministry, His Excellency refused, on the ground that no Government is possible as long as the military chiefs remain in the country. The Khedive will now endeavour to form another Ministry, although he has faint hope of being able to get an efficient one, if he can form one at all.

“It is most desirable that the Sultan should send an order with reference to the documents telegraphed to Your Lordship in my telegram of this day’s date.

“It should support the authority of the Khedive, reject the accusations formulated against His Highness by the outgoing Ministry, and should order the immediate departure to Constantinople of the three military chiefs, and possibly of the President of the Council also, to give an account of their conduct.

“Such an order might be brought by an officer of the Sultan, who, however, should be despatched to Egypt with as little delay as possible, and his departure should be announced as soon as this step is decided upon.”

To Lord Granville.

*(Telegraphic.)*

“CAIRO, *May 27th*, 1882.

“The Khedive has sent a circular to all the Governors in Upper and Lower Egypt in the following sense :—

“ ‘Now that the Ministry has sent in its resignation, you are to watch over the maintenance of public order; and since we inform you that the ships of war at Alexandria have come with a friendly object, you are not to collect the reserves lately called in by the Ministry of War, but to dismiss to their houses any that may have already come in. You are to instruct the village Sheikhs to suspend recruiting, and to give their attention to agriculture, until the formation of a new Ministry. You will refer to my private Cabinet any important business which would ordinarily come before the Ministry of the Interior.’ ”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 27th*, 1882.

“The Khedive has just received a telegram from the officers of the regiments and the police force stationed at Alexandria declaring that they [*sic*] will not accept the resignation of Arabi Pacha, and that they allow twelve hours to His Highness to answer, after which delay they will no longer be responsible for public tranquillity. I have telegraphed this information to Admiral Seymour.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 27th*, 1882.

“The Khedive this afternoon summoned to him the chief personages of the State, of the Chamber, and of the merchants, and the fifteen superior officers of the Cairo garrison, to lay the situation before them.

“General Toulba Pacha interrupted His Highness in his speech, and stated that the army absolutely rejected the joint note, and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only authority they recognised, after which they withdrew, without waiting for any further remark from His Highness.

“In consequence of the open defiance of the army, the Khedive is powerless to form any Ministry whatsoever.

“His Highness is extremely anxious, but he is of opinion that a Turkish Commissioner could make himself heard and restore tranquillity.

“There is, however, certainly no chance of the Khedive's authority being restored so long as the Minister of War and his associates are allowed to remain in Egypt.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 28th*, 1882.

“In the afternoon of yesterday Arabi Pacha, at the head of about one hundred officers, met the chief persons of Cairo and the Deputies at the house of Sultan Pacha, and demanded the deposition of the Khedive, threatening death to the recalcitrant.

“Nevertheless, almost all present except the officers persisted in supporting His Highness. Arabi Pacha and the officers stated that they demanded of the Khedive a decree reinstating Arabi Pacha as Minister of War, and that they allowed till this morning for its promulgation.

“In the evening the Khedive summoned M. Sienkiewicz and me, but we could not advise His Highness to comply with the officers' demand. I recommended His Highness to answer that the whole



question was under the consideration of the Porte, which must decide, and I believe that he acted upon this advice.

“The greatest anxiety is felt for the safety of the Khedive, and possibly also of Europeans. The Representatives of Russia, Austria, Italy and Germany are presently going to Arabi Pacha to demand guarantees for public security from him. The only possible means of restoring order which I can suggest is the prompt intervention of the Porte.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *May 28th*, 1882.

“The Khedive has received a telegram from the Grand Vizier, saying that a Turkish Commissioner will be sent if His Highness will officially ask for one. He has questioned M. Sienkiewicz and me as to whether he should make the request.

“On our arrival at the Palace we found with His Highness a few Deputies and Sultan Pacha, who had told him that unless he agreed to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War his life was not safe; nevertheless, His Highness refused.

“With regard to asking for a Turkish Commissioner I stated that, if His Highness's life were

in danger, I could not give any advice against a step he proposed if it appeared to be the only chance of safety. M. Sienkiewicz limited himself to saying that he would request instructions from the French Government, and we left without giving any further answer, although the Khedive urged the necessity of immediately making some reply to the Grand Vizier. I am unable to say what course His Highness will follow.

“He is in an extremely painful position. Menaced with death, prevented by England and France, while yet there was time, from leaving for Alexandria, and not permitted to appeal for assistance to the only quarter from which it can effectually come, His Highness must bitterly feel the present apparent result of following our counsel and relying on our support.”

Lord Granville telegraphed the following instruction to the British Ambassador at Constantinople :—

“*May 28th, 1882.*”

“Although circumstances in Egypt have been changed by the offer on the part of the Ministers to resign, and the acceptance of their resignation by the Khedive, the reports which reach Her

Majesty's Government of the insubordinate attitude of the officers lead them to believe that there is still danger of a military revolt.

"It is most desirable that the Sultan should not delay acting in the present crisis, and I have to request your Excellency to impress upon His Majesty the necessity of sending an order to support the Khedive, to reject the accusation brought against His Highness by the fallen Ministry, that his action constitutes an attack upon the rights of the suzerain Power, and to summon the three military chiefs, and perhaps, also, the ex-President of the Council, to Constantinople, to explain their conduct.

"I have telegraphed in this sense to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at the four Courts, and requested them to obtain the concurrence in this advice of the Governments to which they are accredited."

To Sir E. Malet Lord Granville replied :—

"I have received your telegram of this day, giving an account of an interview which, in company with your French colleague, you had with the Khedive. Her Majesty's Government approve your having told His Highness that you could not advise him not to ask for the despatch of an Im-

perial Commissioner from Constantinople if His Highness's life was in danger as represented, and that was the only chance of safety.

“If your French colleague will join with you in giving such advice to the Khedive, Her Majesty's Government desire that you will recommend His Highness to make the application for an Imperial Commissioner.”

In the evening of the 28th May Sir Edward sent the following further messages:—

“This afternoon the Chiefs of Religion, including the Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi, all the Deputies, Ulemas and others, waited on the Khedive, and asked him to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War. He refused; but they besought him saying that, though he might be ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain his consent.<sup>1</sup> The Colonel of the Khedive's Guard stated that the guard of the Palace had been doubled, that orders had been given to them to prevent his leaving the Palace for his usual drive, and to fire if he attempted to force his way.

<sup>1</sup> See note at end of this chapter, page 378.

“Under these circumstances, the Khedive yielded, not to save himself, but to preserve the town from bloodshed.

“I venture to offer an opinion that if the Sultan sends Commissioners it is desirable that they should be instructed not to proceed at once to Cairo, but to commence negotiations at Alexandria, and that the Khedive should meet them there.

“I cannot feel sure that His Highness would be permitted to leave Cairo, but he is not in safety here, and it is evident that the negotiations could not be entered upon here with the requisite calm.”

On the following day Lord Dufferin telegraphed :—

“CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 29th*, 1882.

“I am informed that the Khedive, having previously telegraphed to the Porte to ascertain how the request would be received, has to-day made a formal demand to the Sultan that an Imperial Commissioner may be sent to Egypt.”

Sir Edward Malet again reported the Khedive's desire to go to Alexandria :—

“CAIRO, *May 29th*, 1882.

“The Khedive has sent me a message to say

that he is now again anxious to go to Alexandria on account of his family, which will not leave without him, and because he may at any moment be subjected, for some particular purpose, to the same pressure as was exercised upon him yesterday. He says, however, that he will do nothing without consulting my French colleague and me.

“Should I continue to dissuade him from going to Alexandria under present circumstances?”

After consulting the French Government Lord Granville informed Sir Edward that he need not press the Khedive to remain at Cairo.

In private letters to Lord Granville and his parents Sir Edward Malet gave his impressions of the situation :—

To Lord Granville.      “CAIRO, *May 30th*, 1882.

“My French colleague and I were rather taken aback by the Khedive giving way and reinstating Arabi. His Highness had told us in the morning that he would rather die. The Cairenes are the most timid people, and were really afraid of being butchered by the military if they failed in their

mission to the Khedive, so that the scene in the Palace was such as must have prevailed with almost any one. They wept, embraced his feet, begged him to think of their families, urged that his was one life but theirs many, and refused to be comforted with anything but consent. Sultan Pacha, who has behaved extremely well throughout, was not present. A petition for the deposition of the Khedive has been circulated for the last two days and signatures are exacted by threats. It is said that a great number have been obtained. I wonder that the poor Khedive has not broken down under the worry of the last few days, but I imagine that fatalism does much to sustain him. I must ask your Lordship's indulgence if I have done too much or too little ; the time has been a trying one for me also."

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *May 29th*, 1882.

“Another stormy week, full of anything but pleasant incidents, and especially the end, which is that the Khedive has taken Arabi back as his Minister of War. I am sick at heart at seeing the mess that we have got into through no one at home listening to what I have told them over and over

again, that unless an agreement was come to with the Porte previous to ourselves acting there would be difficulties. Of course I know that the Porte is to come in now, and that this was settled previously, but we began with the wrong end of the stick. I almost doubt whether it will be possible to pull the Khedive through his troubles. He has behaved exceedingly well, and I am very sorry for him. My French colleague and I have pulled well together all through."

To Sir Alexander Malet.

"CAIRO, *May 31st*, 1882.

"Our crisis makes slow progress, as do all matters when once the Porte is brought into the game. This was so clearly to be foreseen that it is a pity she was not asked to intervene before. I think people are more frightened at Alexandria than here, but the Cairenes themselves are in a great state of trepidation.

"The Khedive bears up well. Yesterday he took a drive through the town, and was very well received."

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *May 31st*, 1882.

"There is no change in the situation here. The



officers are obtaining by threats signatures to a petition praying for the Khedive's deposition.

“In order to save the Representatives from being compelled to sign this document, the President of the Chamber has requested them to go to their homes.

“Some of the officers show signs of being ready to fall away from Arabi Pacha, if they had a rallying point.

“I venture to offer an opinion that if it were known that the Turkish Commission was supported even by a small force, the victory would have already been half won.”

The state of the country was, however, very disquieting. In a despatch of May 30th Sir E. Malet states :—

“One of the Inspectors of the Control, writing from the provinces, states that the reinstatement of the Minister of War is looked upon by the natives as a sign that the Christians are going to be expelled from Egypt, that they are to recover the land bought by Europeans or mortgaged to them, and that the National Debt will be cancelled.

“Great numbers of Christians are leaving the interior in fear.

“ It may be possible for Arabi Pacha to maintain order in places where troops are at his command, but in stirring up religious fanaticism he has set on foot a movement which at any moment may pass beyond his control.”

In a telegram of the 31st May Sir Edward had stated :—

“ It is worthy to be remembered that, although at the present moment the Under-Secretaries of State are entrusted with the business of their several departments, work is actually at a standstill, excepting at the War Ministry. The whole country is labouring under a panic, and a collision might occur at any moment between the Moslems and the Christians.”

From the British Admiral at Alexandria a telegram was received :—

“ *May 29th, 1882.*

“ Alexandria is apparently controlled this morning by the military party.

“ Earthworks are being built rapidly abreast of H.M.S. *Invincible*.

“ I think an increase of force desirable.

“ There is much panic at Cairo, and some here.”

On the receipt of this intelligence orders were given to reinforce the British squadron. The French Government at first objected to this step, but eventually sent similar orders. The Turkish Government was invited to send a ship-of-war, carrying the declarations already requested of the Sultan, but they went no farther than preparing vessels for sea.

From the French Government came the proposal for a Conference. Lord Lyons reported :—

“PARIS, *May 30th*, 1882.

“I learn from M. de Freycinet that he sends to-day by telegraph to M. Tissot, the French Ambassador in London, instructions to suggest to your Lordship that France and England shall propose immediately to the other Powers and to the Porte to assemble as soon as possible a Conference on Egyptian affairs. The Ambassadors will be directed to suggest that the Conference shall sit neither in Paris nor in London, but either at Constantinople or in one of the other capitals, and that it shall be composed of the resident Ambassadors.”

AS TO USE OF THREATS TO OBTAIN PETITIONS FOR  
ARABI'S REINSTATEMENT

*Note to line 15, page 370.*

The use of threats was afterwards denied, but the following statements seem absolutely conclusive :—

Sir E. Malet to Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *June 5th*, 1882.

“My Lord,—With reference to my telegram of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose herewith a translation of an insertion in the native official newspaper relating to the controversy as to whether threats were used by the military to induce the chiefs of the Corporations to go to the Khedive on the 28th ultimo, and to beg him to re-appoint Arabi Pacha Minister of War.

“The notice states that the Ulemas, Notables and Representatives have delegated three persons to make a statement, which follows, to the Under-Secretary of State for the Interior. The statement itself denies that any threats were used ; the persons who make the statement are notorious partisans of the military.

“I have spoken to Sultan Pacha, President of the Chamber of Representatives, on the subject, and he has told me that it is idle to deny that the Corporations acted under fear, for that the officers on this occasion went beyond their usual system of taking people separately and threatening them with death ; they openly went about the streets in bands, and drove the Notables before them. Their violence was such that the heads of the Corporations veritably believed, as they stated to the Khedive, that their lives, and the city itself, was in danger, unless His Highness yielded.

“I have, etc.,

“EDWARD B. MALET.”

Sultan Pacha gave the following evidence in December, 1882, as to the part taken by Mahmoud Pacha Sami and Arabi Pacha in these proceedings. The evidence was published in the *Egyptian Gazette*.

“1. Mahmoud Sami summoned the Deputies by telegrams, which he forwarded direct to the Mudirichs without an order of H.H. the Khedive.

"I was at Minieh when I received this telegram. On reaching Cairo I went to him. He told me that the Deputies had been summoned because it was intended to assemble the Chamber for the purpose of laying before it certain acts imputed to H.H. the Khedive, with a view to obtaining a decision pronouncing his deposition, a decision that would be in accordance with his (Mahmoud Sami's) wishes and those of Arabi. I pointed out to him that the Constitutional Law of the Chamber did not permit of its being summoned except by order of H.H. the Khedive, and that the Deputies would not assemble except by a Decree of H.H. the Khedive, as was prescribed by the aforesaid Law.

"2. While the Deputies were at Cairo, summoned in the way I have just related, the note of the two Powers was presented, and caused the resignation of the Sami Cabinet, of which Arabi was a member. On that same Saturday H.H. the Khedive had assembled some Ulemas, Notables, and the chiefs of the Military Party, among whom were Yacoub Sami, who was Under-Secretary of State for War. H.H. the Khedive told them that the Ministry had been changed, that he intended to take charge of the Ministry of War until he found a person for that post, and that every one would be responsible, within the limit of his attributions, along with those under his orders, for any act that might disturb public security. Toulba and Yacoub Sami then suddenly withdrew alone, without having been dismissed, in order to accentuate their refusal to submit to the Khedive, and said that they would neither accept the joint note of the two Powers nor the revocation of Arabi.

"The Ulemas and Notables then asked me to find some means to preserve the town from disturbance, and with that object I requested Toulba, Yacoub Sami, the other Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels, as well as a few Notables, to meet me at my house. When they arrived, I pointed out to them how disrespectful and insulting their conduct was towards H.H. the Khedive. I warned them of all the dangers that would be engendered by following the path that they were then on, and I advised them to submit to the orders of H.H. the Khedive. They replied that they would postpone their answer until the arrival of Ahmed Arabi, who would provide for order and security, because they were all under his orders, and acted in accordance with

his wishes. I answered that there was no need to send for him as he had been dismissed.

"They refused, however, to submit unless it was by agreement with Arabi, and I was obliged to send for him. He arrived, accompanied by several officers and soldiers, and a few minutes afterwards 500 soldiers and officers surrounded my house inside and out. Arabi then rose and delivered a speech full of insults to previous Viceroys of the country and to the present Viceroy; he threatened the Deputies and Notables present, and carried his audacity to the length of proclaiming the Khedive's deposition. At this word the officers and soldiers posted inside and out shouted 'The Khedive is deposed.' Then Arabi, addressing the Deputies and others who were present, said: 'Those who are with us, rise!' Upon this, Mohammed Ebeb drew his sabre and swore 'by the divorce' to cut off the head of any one who did not rise. The threats did not intimidate the Deputies, who remained seated with the exception of those belonging to the Military Party, such as Emin-el-Chamsi, Mohanna Abou Omar, Mourad-el-Sonoudi, Abou Abdellah, of Charkich, and Mohammed Gilal, of Minieh. Arabi demanded the signature of the Deputies to the minutes of the proceedings (*procès-verbaux*), which he had with him.

"I told him that it was impossible, and the Deputies also energetically refused. Seeing that the Deputies remained impassive in the face of his threats, he sat down. Then Yacoub Sami and Toulba requested me, the Deputies and others who were present to beg H.H. the Khedive to reinstate Arabi in his functions, so that public tranquillity might not be disturbed. I went to His Highness and laid before him an account of what had occurred, but he refused to reinstate Arabi. The following day the merchants and Ulemas came to me; I refused to see them under pretence that I was ill. Arabi came and suggested to them that they should go to H.H. the Khedive and solicit his recall. They went there, in fact, and His Highness ceded to their prayer in the interest of public order.

"The President of the Chamber of Notables,

(Seal) "MAHMOUD SULTAN.

"24 *Zilk'edé*, 1299."

## CHAPTER XIV

### ARRIVAL OF TURKISH COMMISSIONER—RIOT AT ALEXANDRIA—SIR E. MALET'S ILLNESS

THE first three weeks of June were spent by the Porte in efforts to avoid the meeting of a Conference on Egyptian affairs, while the course of events in Egypt showed the increasing and urgent necessity of intervention for the protection of European interests.

On the 31st of May Lord Dufferin had reported :—

“It seems to be the general impression here that the Sultan will now be unwilling to send troops to Egypt. He appears to dread the idea of coming into collision with the Mussulman population, by whom he seeks to be regarded as their chief defender against European aggression.

Sir Edward Malet telegraphed on June 1st :—

“The Khedive sent for M. Sienkiewicz and me this morning, and informed us that it had come to

his knowledge that the military intended this afternoon to depose him and to proclaim Halim Pacha as Khedive of Egypt. He had at the same time been warned that if he presented himself at the demonstration he would be insulted and turned away, together with any Consuls-General who might be with him at the time. The Khedive said that he hardly believed the truth of this information, but he begged us to advise our Governments of the very dangerous position in which he found himself, and to urge that the Turkish Commission should receive orders to start immediately for Egypt.

“As all the Great Powers are now acting in concert at Constantinople, M. Sienkiewicz and I recommended His Highness to make a communication, similar to that which he had made to us, to the Representatives of Austria, Germany, Italy and Russia.”

Later in the day he reported that the demonstration had not taken place. It was alleged that it had been postponed till the following Saturday, but he doubted whether it was ever more than a repetition of the threats by which the military party had hitherto obtained their objects.



On the 2nd of June the following notice, signed by Arabi Pacha, was communicated to all foreign Representatives in Egypt :—

“ In conformity with the verbal order which I have received from His Highness the Khedive, and with that which was addressed to him by our august Sovereign the Prince of the Faithful, holding the army which is under my orders responsible for public security, I declare to all that I guarantee tranquillity and public security, that I will take care of all the inhabitants of Egypt, without distinction of religion or nationality, natives and Europeans, guaranteeing them from everything which could touch their civil rights.

“ In consequence of the above I address this notice to you, begging you will communicate it to the Agents and Consuls-General of all the Powers, in order that they may know that there is no danger whatever to Europeans, and that they may be assured of the security of their persons, of their honour, and of their property, and in order to demonstrate the good intentions of the Egyptians towards those who treat them well.

“ ARABI PACHA.”

On the 1st of June there came from the Admiral in command of the British squadron at Alexandria further symptoms of the trouble which eventually necessitated the use of force :—

Vice-Admiral Sir B. Seymour to Admiralty.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 1st*, 1882.

“Egyptians have now thrown up four earthworks in addition to the forts, giving as reason previous order to fortify.

“When the earthworks are armed the present position of the wooden unarmoured ships would be untenable, if fired upon without warning.”

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir B. Seymour.

“ADMIRALTY, *June 1st*, 1882.

“With reference to your telegram of to-day, arrange with French Admiral to dispose ironclads so as to silence batteries if they open fire.”

Vice-Admiral Sir B. Seymour to Admiralty.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 2nd*, 1882.

“In reply to your telegram of yesterday, arrangement made with French Admiral to have steam

ready in ten minutes. We shall probably have that warning.

“*Monarch* has arrived. Will move unarmoured ships on the arrival of French ironclad ordered here.

“No change in the situation.

“Earthworks will be armed in three days.”

The British and French Governments now made a formal proposal for a Conference on the affairs of Egypt in the following terms:—

Lord Granville to Her Majesty's Representatives  
at Berlin, Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburg, and  
Constantinople.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 2nd*, 1882.

“It does not seem as if the hope of a pacific solution of the Egyptian difficulty by means only of the moral influence of our squadrons and good offices of our Agents at Cairo can any longer be reasonably entertained. The moment appears, therefore, to have arrived, as contemplated in our identic telegram of the 23rd May, for us to concert with the Powers and with Turkey to decide in common on the measures fitted to put an end to the

crisis. The Cabinets of London and Paris believe that the most practical and rapid method of realising this concert would be to assemble at Constantinople a Conference formed of the Great Powers and of the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

“ This Conference will be charged with determining the measures to be taken in order to secure a settlement of the affairs of Egypt on the following bases, laid down in the identic telegram addressed to the four Powers on the 11th February :—

“ ‘ 1. The maintenance of the rights of the Sultan and of the Khedive, of international engagements and the arrangements existing under them, whether with England and France alone, or with those two nations and the other Powers ;

“ ‘ 2. The preservation of the liberties secured by the Firmans of the Sultan ; and

“ ‘ 3. The prudent development of Egyptian institutions.’

“ Concert with your French colleague for immediate communication accordingly to the Government to which you are accredited, giving copy if desired.”

Lord Granville wrote privately to Sir E. Malet :—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 2nd*, 1882.

“ I write more to express my sympathy with you in the great strain you are undergoing than to give you information. It is difficult to do the latter by writing in these times of telegraphing.

“ If I had been previously consulted I should have toned down a little the wording of what is called your ultimatum to Arabi Bey, but the matter was pressing, and I had not a moment's hesitation as to approving what you had done.

“ At times you seem provoked at our not having been more speedy in affording the Khedive material assistance, but the thing was impossible.

“ We were determined not to agree to send French and English troops, and if we had, it has always appeared to be the most likely way of getting you all ill-treated. Freycinet's fatal indecision has nearly ruined us, but I have some hope that the Sultan is sufficiently intelligent to see that the wisest course is for him to try to settle the matter before the Conference sits.

“ I gather that you think he might do so, if it is known that his Agent would be followed by troops.

“Everybody seems united now as to the wish to get the thing settled and the mode of doing it.

“I keep sending messages to your father and mother of a reassuring kind. I hope and trust they will in no way be falsified.”

On the 3rd June Lord Dufferin reported the departure of the Turkish Commissioner for Egypt :—

“Dervish Pacha, who has lately returned to Constantinople from Albania, and Lebib Effendi, Second President of the Criminal Appeal Court, will start in a few hours for Egypt as Imperial Commissioners.

“The Sultan has given me to understand, through a private source, that he expects that the foregoing action upon his part, coupled with the repulsion he has expressed towards the idea of a Conference, will induce Her Majesty’s Government at all events to postpone pressing such an arrangement upon him until it shall be seen whether the steps he is about to take for getting rid of the Egyptian difficulty succeed or not.

“I said in reply that I would acquaint your Lordship with this communication, but that I must decline to pronounce any personal opinion upon the view suggested; and that both the French Am-

bassador and I had already in our hands an instruction from our respective Governments to propose a Conference at once to the Porte."

A fresh telegram was received from the British Admiral as to the construction of batteries at Alexandria :—

"ALEXANDRIA, *June 3rd*, 1882.

"Batteries, apparently for mortars, going up fast. Matters becoming serious."

Lord Granville wrote to Lord Dufferin on the subject :—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 3rd*, 1882.

"I told the Turkish Ambassador to-day of the reports which had been received by Her Majesty's Government of the construction of batteries at Alexandria in proximity to the anchorage of the English and French squadrons. I requested His Excellency to call the attention of the Porte to this proceeding, and to point out that, if persisted in, it was calculated to lead to a collision.

"I observed that we were endeavouring to arrange that if any measures of force became necessary for the restoration of order in Egypt, recourse should be had to the Sultan for their

execution, but that if such a collision as I had referred to should occur, we should be compelled, as a point of national honour, to take the matter entirely into our hands.

“Musurus Pacha promised to telegraph at once to his Government on the subject.”

This despatch was followed by a telegram to Lord Dufferin :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 3rd*, 1882.

“Batteries being raised at Alexandria. If not stopped, may produce collision.”

Sir Edward Malet wrote on the same subject :—

“CAIRO, *June 4th*, 1882.

“At 9 a.m. this day I received a telegram from Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, informing me that, notwithstanding our friendly observations, earthworks were being erected facing the port, where no previous fortifications existed, and requesting me to represent the matter to the competent authorities.

“After consultation with my French colleague, I replied that there was no authority to whom representations could be usefully made, that Arabi Pacha



had already, on application, refused to discontinue what he calls the repairs of the earthwork, and that, notwithstanding the Khedive's injunction to discontinue all warlike preparations, His Highness's orders have been entirely disregarded.

“At noon of the same day the Admiral again telegraphed to me that he had received a message from the Admiralty asking whether, if instructed to prevent the armament of the earthwork, he would be in a position to enforce the threat, and if so, what the risk would be, military and political, and requesting me to give him my opinion on the subject.

“I replied that it would be inopportune at present to provoke a collision, which would possibly be the result of preventing the armament of the earthwork ; that, as the Turkish Commissioner was expected to arrive in Egypt on Tuesday, it was to be hoped that the present military dictatorship will be put an end to, as a first and absolutely essential step for the restoration of the *status quo*.”

In a letter to his father Sir Edward described the situation as follows :—

“CAIRO, *June 5th*, 1882.

“The telegraph tells you so much more quickly than a letter what is going on here, that it is hardly

worth while for me to write to you on politics. We are, I hope, on the eve of emerging from our difficulties, but the Porte has been so mismanaged that one cannot be surprised if she puts a spoke in our wheel. We expect Dervish Pacha to-morrow, but the wind has been blowing like anything for the last three days and he may have been delayed. He is nothing but a soldier; that, however, is what we want here. As far as words go Arabi and his fellow mutineers show no signs of giving in, but I fancy that the Porte has been intriguing with them, and that they hold out thinking that the verdict will be in their favour.

“Our weather is perfect, really quite cool and comfortable, and high pressure of the political crisis has calmed down. I am no longer called three times a day to the Palace.

“The upshot of matters, as far as we have got as yet, is that the Khedive owes everything to H.M.G. The only question is whether, with so many intrigues, we shall be able to keep him on his legs. In any case we have played the honest game and deserve to win, and I think we shall.”

Sir B. Seymour reported June 5th that the erection of earthworks had been suspended. In his

reply to the Khedive's orders Arabi defended the works as "merely the ordinary repairs which are indispensable at all times," and concluded by stating that orders had been sent to stop them, with a request that the British squadron might be withdrawn in order to avoid the consequences which might result from the excitement of the public mind.

On June 7th Dervish Pacha arrived at Alexandria with a large following. Besides his son, his suite included Lebib Effendi, Cadri Bey, Sheikh Almed Essad,<sup>1</sup> four aides-de-camp, a private secretary, a telegraphist and twenty servants.

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *June 5th*, 1882.

"The Khedive received a telegram from the Sultan last night, requesting His Highness to insist that the warlike preparations carried on at Alexandria be stopped, as one shot fired might lose Egypt.

"His Highness communicated the Sultan's message to Arabi Pacha, and reiterated his official

<sup>1</sup> On the subject of the contradictory instructions given to Dervish Pacha and Sheikh Ahmed Essad respectively, see Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, Vol. I, p. 285.

order to him to desist from making further armament.

“In consequence of this, Arabi Pacha has sent orders to Alexandria to discontinue warlike preparations.

“It is evident that the Sultan is not aware that Arabi Pacha is in possession of absolute power over the army, and that he openly defies the authority of the Khedive.

“The officers continue to boast that they will resist by force, if necessary, all orders of the Sultan tending to the departure of their chiefs and the subjugation of the army.

“Measures short of this, however, will, in the end, lose Egypt to the Sultan, for if the rebels gain a partial success now, they will not rest until they have established an independent Arab State.”

Sir Edward Malet telegraphed June 7th :—

“Dervish Pacha, the Imperial Turkish Commissioner, arrived in Alexandria to-day, and is expected in Cairo this evening. No trustworthy information can be obtained as to the intentions of the Military Party; the balance, however, of public opinion inclines to the belief that it will resist. The military preparations continue at

Damietta, soldiers appear in increasing numbers along the Suez Canal, and the reserves continue to arrive here.

“It is advisable that Dervish Pacha should receive instructions from the Porte to provide above all things for the personal safety of the Khedive before the negotiations arrive at such a point as to show that resistance is inevitable, because, when that point is attained, the military will very probably seize the Khedive as a hostage, and even resort to extreme measures against His Highness.”

In the meanwhile the prevailing disquiet was producing serious financial inconvenience.

Sir E. Malet telegraphed :—

“One-fourth of the year’s land revenue in the Province of Assiout in Upper Egypt is due in June. Owing to the flight of the European grain-dealers from the interior, there were no adequate means open to the proprietors of disposing of their produce, and therewith paying the revenue. The Khedive, with the concurrence of the Control, has suspended one-half of the instalment due in June for the moment. It will be recovered as soon as

the European grain-dealers recommence operations in Upper Egypt on the restoration of order."

On the 8th of June Sir Edward reported the arrival of the Turkish Commissioner at Cairo. He added :—

"Dervish Pacha has begun badly, so far as outward appearances enable a judgment to be formed. Arabi Pacha, the Minister of War, had delegated Yakoub Pacha, the Under-Secretary of State for War, to proceed to Alexandria to meet the Turkish Commissioner. The Khedive had sent Zoulfikar Pacha, His Highness's Grand Master of Ceremonies, and had instructed him not to present Yakoub Pacha, or to allow him to travel in the special train from Alexandria to Cairo. It appears, however, that, since the arrival of the Imperial Commissioner, Yakoub Pacha has been constantly with him, and, on their arrival to-day in Cairo, actually drove with Dervish Pacha in the Khedive's carriage to the Ghezirah Palace, where the Imperial Commission is to reside during its stay in Cairo.

"The Khedive has, in consequence, begged me to represent that if the Imperial Commissioner is at the outset to parade friendly communication with the Military Party, who are in open rebellion to His

Highness's authority, His Highness's cause must immediately and sensibly be weakened."

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *June 9th*, 1882.

"At the first interview yesterday between the Khedive and Dervish Pacha, His Highness was not quite satisfied with the tone of the Imperial Commissioner. The Khedive returned the visit immediately, and spoke very plainly what was on his mind. His Highness said that he was much displeased at the conduct of Dervish Pacha in taking with him Yakoub Pacha, Arabi Pacha's Delegate, in the special train, and in His Highness's carriage from the train to the Palace of Ghezirah, which has been assigned to the Commissioner as his residence during his stay at Cairo. His Highness said that he wished therefore to know if the Commissioner was prepared to act in accordance with the assurances of support to His Highness given by His Majesty the Sultan, that otherwise His Highness must adopt his own line and refuse to see Dervish Pacha any more. Upon this Dervish Pacha rose and declared to His Highness, with great emphasis, that he would faithfully execute the Sultan's instructions; that he had come to restore

the authority of the Khedive ; that he was determined to do it, and that, if necessary, he would place himself at the head of His Highness's troops to subdue the rebels. Dervish Pacha further observed that he was sure that the troops would obey, as he spoke in the name of the Sultan, and that he did not think he would require the assistance of a single Turkish soldier to help him.

“The result of this second interview with Dervish Pacha has considerably reassured the Khedive.”

Lord Granville wrote a private letter commenting on these reports :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 9th*, 1882.

“I got your two telegrams to-day : the first alarming, the second reassuring. The first did not frighten me as much as it would otherwise have done, because from all that I have heard of Dervish Pacha, he was almost certain to be civil to those whom he meant to spiflicate. I cannot help being sanguine, although the basis of my argument is a fallacious one, by the line which in their own interest the Turks ought to take.

“It would be a great diplomatic coup for the



Sultan to settle off his own hook the matter in the sense which will be approved by the Powers, and to avoid the Conference which, above everything, alarms him.

“I have seen Goldsmid,<sup>1</sup> Rowsell and our friend Baron Malortie.<sup>2</sup> The latter looks as if he had eaten nothing since I last saw him, but, to do him justice, though taking a very gloomy view, he spoke well of you. The General, as he ought to be, was the least alarmed.

“What I most dread short of anything happening to you or to the Khedive, which I do not expect, is Dervish patching up such an arrangement as it will be difficult to accept or to reject.”

Lord Dufferin telegraphed on June 9th that he had informed Said Pacha of the apprehensions entertained by Sir Edward Malet respecting the safety of the Khedive.

His Excellency replied that he had once at-

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid, K.C.B., and Mr. Rowsell were respectively the British members of the Commissions managing the estates of the Daira Sanich and of the Khedivial Domains, which were pledged as security for Egyptian loans.

<sup>2</sup> Baron de Malortie, who had passed some time in Egypt, shortly afterwards published a book on the subject.

tended to this representation; but he added that the Porte's news from Cairo did not lead them to think that the Khedive was in any danger.

Sir E. Malet telegraphed:—

“CAIRO, *June 9th*, 1882.

“This afternoon M. Sienkiewicz and I paid a visit to Dervish Pacha. I impressed upon His Excellency the urgent necessity of providing for the personal safety of the Khedive. Dervish Pacha replied that, since his arrival, the Khedive was no longer in danger. I begged His Excellency not to place confidence in the assurances of the Military Party in this respect, but to effectually secure His Highness against the danger of any surprise.

“During our interview Dervish Pacha remarked that there were two *corps d'armée* ready to come to Egypt on His Excellency's giving the signal.

“His Excellency spoke with confidence of succeeding in the mission on which he had been despatched to Egypt by the Sultan.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *June 10th*, 1882.

“The Ulemas, about sixty in number, visited the Imperial Commissioner this morning. One of them,

well known as a follower of Arabi, proceeded to deliver a speech, extolling the course pursued by the army as having preserved the country from falling into the hands of the Infidel. Upon this the Commissioner rose from his seat, and, in forcible language, reminded those present that he had come to issue orders and not to listen to preaching; the offending Ulema was thereupon seized and forced to retire by an attendant of colossal stature, who appears to be always at hand."

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *June 11th*, 1882.

"Up to the present the Imperial Commissioner appears to be using his efforts to persuade Arabi Pacha and his associates to listen to reason. No orders have been issued nor any proclamation made. It is said that the Military Party will refuse submission. There is no doubt that they will keep up the threat of resistance to the last whether they ultimately yield or not."

On the night of the 11th June news was received of a serious outbreak at Alexandria, accompanied by loss of life.

Vice-Consul Calvert to Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 11th*, 1882.

“Serious riot this afternoon between Arabs and Europeans ; many persons wounded. Mr. Cookson badly wounded in head, also three of our Consular constables. Police did not interfere to protect Europeans. Engineer of *Superb* killed. Cannot yet ascertain who else killed or wounded. Troops have come to restore order. Governor and Consuls have been concerting measures. Governor promises public security, but is, I think, quite powerless to maintain order.”

A second telegram reported :—

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 11th*, 1882.

“Delegates from Khedive, Dervish and Arabi Pachas, are now on way from Cairo to Alexandria by express train. Egyptian troops are patrolling town. Many European houses and shops plundered by Arab mob. Greek Consul-General wounded.”

The telegrams received on the following day were somewhat more reassuring. Sir E. Malet telegraphed :—

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“CAIRO, *June 11th*, 1882.

“Particulars of the disorders at Alexandria are not yet known here, but Dervish Pacha has ordered Arabi to send stringent order for the protection of Europeans. The Khedive has sent an aide-de-camp to Alexandria.”

“I have no news from the Consulate, but the latest news from Alexandria, dated 11 p.m., states that order has been established by the troops.”

Following telegram from Dr. Mackie, dated midnight :—

“CAIRO, *June 12th*, 1882.

“Cookson seriously wounded ; head severely cut several places ; lost deal blood ; one finger broken ; both hands much injured ; body full of bruises. Is in bed, and kept quiet.”

The British Vice-Consul telegraphed .—

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 12th*, 1882.

“1 a.m.

“Town quiet, excepting in lowest quarter of town, where fighting still continues. Cavalry sent to suppress rioting. Several English ladies and

children sought refuge in Consulate, and some have returned home. Arrangements have been made to embark them if necessity arises. Governor guarantees their security."

" 10.25 a.m.

"Women and children who sought refuge in the Consulate have been escorted aboard ship under the protection of the soldiery. The military still maintain order. Mr. Cookson is convalescent, but confined to bed; injuries not serious. Only danger now apparently would be from further hostilities between Arabs and Europeans, in which the Europeans might prove the strongest, and military might come to aid their compatriots."

" 1.58 p.m.

"Medical inspection held at hospitals shows that in yesterday's riot about fifty Europeans were killed and only three Arabs; but it is inferred that other Arabs have been killed, and are kept out of sight not to create alarm or excitement.

"Nearly all the Europeans killed or wounded have been clubbed. Some have received stabs.

"Town at present very quiet. Every one in streets is searched and disarmed.

"Vessels in port are crowded with European fugitives."

Sir E. Malet telegraphed again :—

“CAIRO, *June 12th*, 1882.

“In consequence of the riot which took place yesterday at Alexandria, the Khedive says that if men are landed from the ships, or if the Egyptian garrison apprehends any hostile action on the part of the Europeans, there is a danger of a general conflagration throughout the country. I have accordingly telegraphed in this sense to Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, adding that the Representatives of the Powers will endeavour to obtain from Dervish Pacha some temporary arrangement by which the safety of the Christian population in Egypt may be secured.”

“The Representatives of the Great Powers have together visited the Imperial Commissioner. We demanded of Dervish Pacha guarantees for the safety of foreigners throughout Egypt. In reply His Excellency stated that neither he nor the Khedive had the power in their hands, and that since he was without forces to rely upon for support, he must decline responsibility.

“He said, however, that he would immediately call upon the Khedive, and concert with His Highness as to the measures which could be taken to

meet our demands on behalf of our subjects, and he promised to inform us of the result. Meanwhile, he begged us to abstain from sending alarming telegrams to our Governments, as immediate calamities might be produced by aggressive action."

"A meeting has taken place at the Palace; present: The Khedive, Dervish Pacha and suite (consisting of Lebib Effendi, Kadri Bey and Sheikh Essad); also Cherif Pacha, Arabi Pacha and Representatives of Germany, Austria, Italy, Russia, France, and myself. The object of our meeting was to receive an answer to the demand which we had made to Dervish Pacha in the morning that measures which should be satisfactory to us should at once be adopted to ensure the safety of Europeans in Egypt. The following guarantees were given to us, and accepted:—

"Arabi undertook to obey implicitly all orders given to him by the Khedive, and stated that he would stop all inflammatory preaching, meetings and newspaper articles, and guaranteed the maintenance of public order by the troops. The Khedive undertook to issue orders immediately with the object of restoring public tranquillity. Dervish Pacha said that, under the urgent circum-



stances of the case, he would assume joint responsibility with Arabi Pacha for the execution of the orders of the Khedive."

"At the meeting held to-day at the Palace the Representatives of the Powers stated that, for the moment, the danger which threatened Europeans in Egypt must take precedence of every other question. The political situation in no way entered into the discussion. At the conclusion, I requested the Khedive to repeat this to Dervish Pacha, and distinctly to state to His Excellency that the discussion which had just terminated, and the conclusion at which we had arrived, had nothing to do with the mission on which His Excellency had come to Egypt, the object of which still remained to be attained."

Sir Edward wrote in private letters :—

To Lord Granville. "CAIRO, *June 12th*, 1882.

"Things have not mended. It looks as if Dervish Pacha could not overcome the military resistance. He said as much this morning when he declined all responsibility, because he had no force to back him. It is generally believed here

that the troubles at Alexandria yesterday were got up by the military. They have certainly played into their hands for the moment. My terror is always lest the Khedive should be murdered. It would be such a shocking ending to our promises of support. I would give a great deal to see him safe at Alexandria, but I give him no advice on the subject beyond letting him know indirectly that if he wants to go I shall not dissuade him. The hatred of the military towards him is of the most bitter kind, and I fear that it will ultimately find its vent in acts."

To Lady Malet.

"CAIRO, *June 12th*, 1882.

"I fear that you will again have been very anxious about me. This, indeed, is my chief worry here, thinking of you, because I know that anxiety at a distance is difficult to bear. Here, however, all is quiet, and there is no reason for us to be anxious about ourselves. It is a harassing time to go through, but all things must come to an end at last. Dervish Pacha is a small man with a face like a bird of prey. He has not, however, as yet shown that he can pull us through our difficulties. Alexandria, the refuge, has been the first place to suffer."

To Sir Alexander Malet.

“CAIRO, *June 12th*, 1882.

“One anxious day succeeds another. I hope we have got over the prospect of another such tumult as occurred yesterday at Alexandria, and that at last the Government will seriously understand that military force alone can help us; the ships are merely a danger as they frighten and apparently cannot help.

“I am perfectly well. I think nothing keeps one going like work.”

A reassuring telegram was received from the British Admiral :—

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 12th*, 1882.

“City now quiet; troops maintaining order; large number of women and children embarked in merchant steamers; 600 refugees on board *Monarch* and *Invincible* will be sent to a line of steamers.”

On the 13th June Sir E. Malet telegraphed :—

“The Khedive has sent me a message to say that he starts for Alexandria at 10 o'clock this morning with Dervish Pacha, the Imperial Commissioner.

“I intend to consult my colleagues on the course we should follow in consequence.”

Lord Granville replied :—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 13th*, 1882.

“ It appears to Her Majesty’s Government that you should follow His Highness to Alexandria, unless you consider that there are strong objections to your doing so.”

Sir E. Malet rejoined :—

“ CAIRO, *June 13th*, 1882.

“ In consequence of the departure of the Khedive to Alexandria, my German and Austrian colleagues will go there by to-morrow’s morning train. M. Sienkiewicz informs me that he will not be able to leave for two or three days. I fear that, were I to leave immediately, my departure would produce a panic here among Europeans, and I therefore propose to defer it for two days. The news received to-day from Alexandria reports all to be quiet there, and that shops are re-opening.”

In a further telegram he reported :—

“ At the meeting held at the Palace yesterday Dervish Pacha made a statement to the effect that, if the Egyptian troops required assistance in maintaining order and protecting the European

population, a Turkish force would be summoned for the purpose. I hear that it is His Excellency's intention to follow out the idea of assigning this reason for the arrival of Turkish troops, in order to prevent any resistance on the part of the Egyptian army ; and I look upon this form of proceeding as the only means by which a pacific solution may still be attained.

“ Dervish Pacha's mission seems to have altogether failed in its object.

“ The garrison of Alexandria has been strengthened, and now amounts to about 10,000 men. This has been done upon the advice of Dervish Pacha, whose view is that the town and garrison can at any time be reduced to submission, and that, consequently, it is better to concentrate the resistance at this point, so as to save the country by one decisive blow.”

Lord Granville maintained his view that Sir E. Malet should go to Alexandria. He telegraphed:—

“ Her Majesty's Government remain of the opinion that your proper place is where the Khedive may be. I have so informed the French Ambassador.”

The British and French Governments now made the following communication to the other Powers:—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 13th*, 1882.

“ The time has now arrived when the progress of disorder in Egypt threatens to call for some more decided action, and I have to instruct you to propose, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, to the Government to which you are accredited, that the Sultan, as sovereign, shall, in case of necessity, be jointly invited by the Powers united in Conference to be prepared to lend to the Khedive a sufficient force to enable His Highness to maintain his authority ; the Sultan to be requested to give a positive assurance that these troops should only be used for the maintenance of the *status quo* and that there should be no interference with the liberties of Egypt secured by the previous Firmans of the Sultan, or with existing European agreements ; the troops not to remain in Egypt for a longer period than a month, except at the request of the Khedive and with the consent of the Great Powers, or of the Western Powers as representing Europe ; the reasonable expenses of the expedition to be borne by the Egyptian Government.”

Sir Edward telegraphed on June 14th that he was leaving for Alexandria, that the British Admiral had offered to take him on board H.M.S. *Helicon*, but that the Consuls of other countries had objected to this on the ground that it might be regarded as a sign that hostilities were contemplated, and that the safety of the European community might thus be compromised. He had, therefore, taken rooms at the Hôtel d'Europe.

The following exchange of telegrams then took place :—

From Lord Granville.

“June 14th, 1882.

“Is the Hôtel d'Europe well situated for communication with the ships in case of danger?”

To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, June 15th, 1882.

“The Hôtel d'Europe is in the square in the centre of the town. There is a telephone from the Consulate to the *Helicon*. But there would be no means of getting to the ships, because the streets leading to the quay are in the worst quarter.”

From Lord Granville.

*“June 15th, 1882.*

“Are there no apartments which you could occupy within easy access of the fleet?”

“Is the Palace, where the Khedive resides, available?”

To Lord Granville.

*“ALEXANDRIA, June 16th, 1882.*

“There are no apartments within easy access of ships.

“But in any case I am compelled to stop where I am. A move on my part indicating apprehension might have disastrous results.

“Pray do not be anxious about me. I shall pull through.”

Mr. Cookson reported from Alexandria on June 14th:—

“All quiet here since last telegram. Town patrolled day and night. All troops apparently doing their duty.

“Khedive and Dervish Pacha arrived yesterday afternoon; both assure Consuls of confidence in the maintenance of public safety.



“Khedive admits to Sir A. Colvin that mission of Dervish Pacha had failed, and says nothing but arrival of Turkish troops would terminate crisis.

“Great panic since yesterday, in consequence of rumour of landing from British and French fleet. I have contradicted it as publicly as possible.

“A large number of Bedouins reported outside Alexandria, intention unknown; probably for plunder. Present garrison of Alexandria estimated about 7000 in all.

“General flight of Europeans continues. Ships' accommodation quite inadequate, and am begging authorities, if absolutely necessary, to charter vessels for conveyance of British subjects. All shops closed, and business suspended.

“My own health progresses favourably. Injuries to hand prevent my writing.”

Sir Edward arrived in Alexandria on the afternoon of June 14th. His first care was to provide for the refugees who were flocking on board ship. He telegraphed:—

“Three hundred British subjects have taken refuge on board an Egyptian steamer, and 400 on board an English merchant ship in this harbour. I

therefore venture to ask whether the Maltese may be sent to Malta. It is urgent that vessels should be sent for the purpose of receiving the refugees. It is to be feared that if the panic continues the men-of-war will be rendered useless by the number of refugees flocking on board. Immediate steps should be taken, as the matter is very urgent."

He reported June 15th :—

"The Representatives of Germany and Austria have suggested to the chiefs of the Military Party here that they should formulate their demands precisely, and have offered to get them submitted to the Conference.

"My German and Austrian colleagues have explained to me that their object in doing this is to avert, for the sake of their own subjects, the danger of an immediate catastrophe ; and they have assured me that they do not wish, by their present action, to influence the eventual decisions of their Governments in regard to the political question.

"I have thought it right to keep entirely aloof from these overtures ; but, on the other hand, there is such a pressing necessity for measures that may tend to restore tranquillity that I have not raised any objection."

His own suggestion was as follows :—

“The situation here is so strained that it is absolutely necessary that something should be done. There appears to be no immediate prospect of Turkish troops being despatched to Alexandria. The French Government will do all in their power to prevent it, and the views of my German and Austrian colleagues will have great weight in deterring their Governments from giving their consent.

“In this state of things I have ventured to suggest to the Khedive this morning that His Highness should convoke the Chamber of Notables, and ask for an expression of the wishes of the country, with the view of laying them before the Conference. The Chamber would probably, in that case, submit a draft Constitution to the Khedive, and I think that the prospect of attaining a Constitution would bring about a union between the Notables and the Military Party, and at the same time lead to an apparent reconciliation with the Khedive. While the Constitution is being considered by the Conference, all would be quiet ; and, considering the extreme complexity of the situation, some such rallying point as a Constitution would be of great service.

“The watchwords of the military chiefs are ‘Patriotism’ and ‘Law,’ and although they do not seem to understand the real meaning of these words, I believe that they might be induced to retire if a Constitution were granted by the Khedive.

“His Highness was not unfavourable to the idea, but it could not be carried out until the Conference has been formally convened.”

On the general situation he states :—

“A panic has arisen in Cairo, and large numbers of European employés are leaving. I cannot discover any valid cause for the existence of this alarm beyond the general feeling of insecurity which prevails amongst all classes of Europeans; but the consequence to the different services, including railways, posts and telegraphs, will be serious, and I fear that they will be completely disorganised.

“M. Brédif, the French Controller-General, arrived at Alexandria this morning.”

In a letter to Lady Malet he wrote :—

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 16th*, 1882.

“Here I am comfortably housed at Alexandria in a good apartment in the hotel. The town is looking quieter after the late disagreeable incidents.

I am worked off my legs, but am perfectly well. You must not be in the least anxious about me. I cannot say what may happen from one hour to another, but I am sure that I shall pull through. My colleagues are sadly scared. A panic is a very catching thing, and here it has become an epidemic. I see the Admiral daily."

To Lord Granville.

"ALEXANDRIA, *June 16th*, 1882.

"The present state of things still causes the greatest anxiety to my German and Austrian colleagues. They believe that the formation of a Ministry approved by the Military Party would restore confidence; they implore me to recommend this step to the Khedive, and not to risk the lives of 30,000 Europeans by abstaining from doing so; and they say that Dervish Pacha is fully aware of the existing danger, and will advise the Khedive to make terms with the officers.

"In reply, I informed my colleagues that I had strongly urged the Khedive this morning to put confidence in Dervish Pacha, and that I was prepared to support the Imperial Commissioner in any arrangement His Excellency might propose."

To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 16th*, 1882.

“The manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company came to me this morning saying that his clerks were in fear of their lives and wished to take refuge on board ship. I have done all I can to calm their apprehensions.

“About 4000 persons came down from Cairo yesterday, but I have received a letter from Mr. Beaman, who remains there in charge of the archives, stating that the strictest orders have been issued by the officers, and that there is no danger to the lives of Europeans.

“I have strongly advised the Khedive to give orders for the removal of the Government offices from Cairo to Alexandria.

“We are in danger of suffering from want of water owing to the European workmen leaving the waterworks at Atfeh, by which the town is supplied.”

From Lord Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 16th*, 1882.

“In your telegrams of yesterday and to-day you state that you have suggested to the Khedive

that he should obtain an expression of the wishes of the country by summoning the Chamber of Notables, and that the German and Austrian Consuls-General having persuaded Dervish Pacha to favour the formation of a Ministry in accordance with the desires of the Military Party, you have strongly urged His Highness to have confidence in the Sultan's Envoy, whose proposals you were ready to support.

“I have expressed to you by telegraph my approval of this advice as regards Dervish Pacha, provided that you do not commit yourself to any particular plan, but I have instructed you to abstain from recommending the convocation of the Chamber in the present conjuncture.”

To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 16th*, 1882.

“Acting under pressure from my Austrian and German colleagues, the Khedive has summoned Ragheb Pacha and Rashid to Alexandria, with a view to entrust to them the formation of a Ministry.

“I gather from the news received privately from Cairo that the Military Party, having lost confidence in the benevolent intentions of Dervish Pacha

towards them, has decided to resist the disembarkation of any Turkish troops that might be sent.

“In the interview which I had with Dervish Pacha to-day, His Excellency merely told me that he has applied to Constantinople for ampler instructions than those with which he has been furnished.”

To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 17th*, 1882.

“About 20,000 Christian refugees have embarked, of whom upwards of 14,000 have left the port, and the rest are now awaiting transports to take them.

“The panic in Cairo continues, and about 8000 persons have left. The banks have closed. I have urged the Khedive to bring the Government offices to Alexandria in order to enable the European employés to come away.”

To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 17th*, 1882.

“The Khedive has nominated Ragheb Pacha to be President of the Council, and has entrusted him with the formation of a Ministry. Arabi Pacha will be Minister of War.”



To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 17th*, 1882.

“M. Sienkiewicz and I have abstained from any participation in recommending the Khedive to form a Ministry under the Presidency of Ragheb Pacha. We have confined ourselves to advising His Highness to be guided by the advice given to him by Dervish Pacha.

“In charging Ragheb Pacha to form a Ministry, the Khedive acted under the urgent advice, almost under the compulsion, of my Austrian and German colleagues, who gave His Highness twenty-four hours to comply with their request. My Italian colleague has been instructed by his Government to join the Austrian and German Agents in the course which they are pursuing.

“These latter have explained to me that their object in urging the formation of a Ministry is to gain time and prevent a massacre while the political question is being decided by the Conference.”

To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 17th*, 1882.

“One of my colleagues made to me yesterday what I consider an outrageous proposal, viz. that

I should insist on the Khedive going on board one of Her Majesty's ships and leaving the country. My colleagues would all be glad to get rid of the Khedive to calm the danger to their countrymen.

"The Khedive is himself, no doubt, still in danger, and would be in a most precarious situation if Turkish intervention were known to be decided upon.

"For his sake I venture to submit following plan :—

"He and Arabi to be both summoned to Constantinople. Arabi would probably refuse to go, and the Turkish intervention would then become a matter of necessity.

"I am afraid of the Sultan allowing the Khedive to be murdered as the easiest solution of the difficulty. If he could be got away by the above plan we, at all events, have saved his life, in the preservation of which we are very deeply concerned."

To this message Lord Granville replied :—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 17th*, 1882.

"I am afraid that new proposals to the Sultan will only confuse matters, and enable him to delay giving a decisive answer on what is most pressing."

At this moment Sir Edward received a message of sympathy and support from Lord Dufferin, which gave him much satisfaction. In a letter to Lady Malet, dated June 19th and written in a shaky scrawl very unlike his usual bold, clear handwriting, he complains that he has caught a chill, and adds:—

“I got a telegram from Lord Dufferin this morning as follows:—

““You seem to be the only man in Egypt who has not lost his head. I have watched all you have done with the greatest admiration.””

This was his last effort for some time to come.

He was prostrated by a sudden attack of illness which the doctors pronounced to be malarial fever, and was for some days in a very critical state. On the 22nd he was sufficiently recovered to be removed on board H.M.S. *Helicon*, and on the 27th he started by the advice of the doctors on a sea-trip to Venice. Mr. W. C. Cartwright, who was attached to the Agency with the rank of Second Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, was placed in charge during his absence with instructions to

take the advice of Sir Auckland Colvin in all matters of importance.

Sir Edward wrote to his mother and to Lord Granville before leaving :—

To Lady Malet.

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 27th*, 1882.

“I received your letters safely by last mail. One of my chief anxieties through all troubles here has been about you, knowing that you would worry more about me than there was need for. It is always the way with those at a distance. It magnifies the danger.

“If you like to write one more letter to Lord Granville to tell him that you are very grateful to him for all his kind solicitude for me about which I have written to you, he might be pleased. I cannot tell you how good he has been—*anxious at my going to the hotel, wanting me to move nearer the ships, till I was obliged to telegraph to him not to be anxious about me, that I could pull through very well. Then when I fell ill—at once telegraphing only to think of my health, and now letting me go off to Venice; in fact, from first to last always thinking, it seemed to me, in the first place about my personal welfare and politics afterwards.*

“I can tell you a little about my illness now.<sup>1</sup> I was perfectly well when I came to Alexandria on the 14th. On the 16th I had a slight diarrhœa. On the 18th I overslept myself, which is an unknown thing to me, and had to be roused to be in time to see Dervish Pacha at nine. I received his visit and felt queer and stupid, and fell asleep again as soon as he left, but in the meantime a doctor had been suggested, to which I agreed indolently, merely feeling tired and sleepy. Dr. Mackie, an excellent doctor, came and found I was regularly caught hold of by malarious fever. My temperature was 105. I was sent to bed and allowed to see no one, and slept nearly all day. Next morning the fever had disappeared, and I have had none since, so that since the first day I have had nothing to do but to get over the effects of the short violent attack. The doctor was much frightened at first, and feared some very bad form of fever; it was only my being in excellent bodily health at the time of attack that saved me. Of course, people would have it that I had succumbed to anxiety and overwork. There was not a vestige of truth in this. I was physically quite equal to any work which could possibly devolve upon me, and as to the

<sup>1</sup> For another account see *Shifting Scenes*, p. 78.

situation in general I was taking it perfectly calmly and merely anxious to instil some of my own calm into the panic-stricken people around me. I own now to being exceedingly vexed at being obliged to go away just when the climax must be approaching."

To Lord Granville.

"P. & O. s.s. *Mongolia*,

"ALEXANDRIA, *June 27th*, 1882.

"I am off to Venice in this ship to-morrow, very sorry indeed to be obliged to relinquish my post at such a moment. I wanted to see the affair all through. It is very hard to have to give up running when so near the goal. I was quite well up to the time that I was knocked down by this sudden attack of malarious fever. It was not in any way the result of anxiety or overwork. I was not overworked, and I am sure that your Lordship will have seen by my telegrams that while not under-rating the gravity of the situation I was neither over-anxious nor nervous. It is a most unlucky accident which has happened to me, like a horse running away or a chimney pot falling on my head. It has absolutely nothing to do with politics.

“ But I desire to thank you very sincerely, dear Lord Granville, for the great kindness which you have shown me both before the illness came on and since. I was, I assure you, deeply touched at your anxiety about my being at the hotel in an unfavourable position for escape. I could not be elsewhere without increasing the panic which was already bad enough.

“ I am mending steadily though rather slowly, but I expect that the sea breeze will have quite set me up by the time I reach Venice, where I shall put up at the Grand Hotel and await your orders.”

The following letter was written by Lord Granville's directions to Lady Malet, who was anxious that her son should receive permission to come to England :—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 27th*, 1882.

“ Lord Granville had meant to write to you himself yesterday, but was interrupted. He telegraphed to your son privately on the 23rd to do whatever the doctors advised him for the restoration of his health. The doctors wish him to go for a cruise at least as far as Venice, and Lord Granville has approved this.

“If the doctors advise anything more as necessary for Sir Edward’s complete recovery, you need be under no apprehension as to Lord Granville’s objecting. But it would not be fair to your son to order him home or to send him a permission which would look like the intimation of a wish on the part of the Government.

“The last telegram yesterday evening is much better, I think. It speaks of him as being less depressed and much stronger.”

From Brindisi Sir Edward wrote to Lord Lyons an account of his illness, adding :—

“By the time I reach Venice I have no doubt that I shall be ready to go back at once, but could anything be more unlucky for me? I feel like a general leaving the field in the middle of battle, and am very low about it.”

On his arrival at Venice, however, it was found that he required a further spell of rest and change. He came on to England, and after an interview with Lord Granville, who received him with great kindness, went to Whitby, where he remained till the 26th July.



## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIV

NOTE ON THE RIOT AT ALEXANDRIA OF  
JUNE 11, 1882Lord Cromer observes in *Modern Egypt*:—<sup>1</sup>

“Both the Khedive and Arabi have at times been accused of having instigated the Alexandria massacres. So calm and impartial an observer as Sir Edward Malet, however, held that both accusations were devoid of foundations, and that the massacres were the natural outcome of the political effervescence of the time. There can be little doubt that this view of the question is correct. A considerable moral responsibility, however, rested on Arabi and his colleagues for the blood which was shed. For a long time past they had done their best to arouse the race hatred and fanaticism of the cowardly mob at Alexandria. The natural result ensued.”

The following letter written by Sir E. Malet a year afterwards gives his reasons for the conclusion he had come to:—

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *July 2nd*, 1883.

“To all those who were on the spot the accusation that the Khedive had anything to do with the massacres seems so absurd as hardly to require argument. In the

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 287.

first place the whole character of the man belies it. He is of a mild and gentle disposition and lacks harshness to a degree, which prevents any one being afraid of him. It is a defect. Secondly, he had no power to bring about the massacre, had he even desired it. The troops, of whom the Moustahfazin or gendarmerie at Alexandria formed part, were in complete rebellion under Arabi, and took no orders from the Khedive. As to Dervish having had anything to do with them, I now hear of it for the first time, and can give no sort of credence to it. We know that his mission was a farce, that the Sultan intended him to do nothing, and had rendered him absolutely powerless by associating with him the Sheikh Essad with opposite instructions.

“ There is this to be said, that in the trial of Khandeil,<sup>1</sup> as prepared by the Court of Instruction, no evidence has been adduced proving that the massacres were prepared. There is no doubt that while they were going on the authorities were utterly wanting in their duty, but that is all. If your Lordship will look at the despatch which I send home to-day anent Sir William Gregory's letter, you will see that for a fortnight or three weeks before I looked upon a massacre occurring as nearly inevitable. When it did come I saw no reason to infer that any further preparation had been necessary for it than the preaching in the mosques of fanatical doctrines, setting the Mussulmans against the Christians. It was clear that any spark would light an already laid train. In this way Arabi and

<sup>1</sup> Said Pacha Khandeil had been at the time Prefect of Police.

his party prepared the massacre. In order to condemn them it is not necessary to prove that special orders were given on any special occasion."

The reports of Mr. Cookson, the Consul at Alexandria, written at the time, sufficiently show the temper of the soldiery and native population :—

*Extract.*

"ALEXANDRIA, *June 2nd*, 1882.

"An incident occurred yesterday at nine a.m. which had no importance in itself, but which shows the temper of the soldiery. A small detachment of soldiers were coming from Ramleh (by the English line); the Arab ticket-collector asked one of them for his ticket; the soldier refusing to produce it, the collector attempted very gently to detain him. Thereupon all the soldiers joined in a violent attack on the collector, who was struck over the head with the butt-end of their rifles, so violently as to cause a considerable amount of blood to flow from the wound. Some of the other soldiers pointed their muskets at the guard of the train and at the railway officials. Mr. Gailly, the manager of the railway, tried to interfere to prevent further disturbance, but they drove him, at the point of their bayonets, to the nearest police station, where he was very speedily released.

"I took occasion of a visit which I wished to pay to the Governor immediately to report this occurrence to His Excellency, and I heard subsequently that the soldiers who had made the attack had been imprisoned."

*Extract.*

“ALEXANDRIA, *June 8th*, 1882.

“This morning, as Mr. Croghan, my Chief Constable, was passing through the crowd which had collected in consequence of the passage of Dervish Pacha to the railway station, he and other Europeans were hustled and spat upon repeatedly by the Arab ‘roughs,’ men and boys, around him, and the police and soldiers made no effort to protect him. He kept his temper and took no notice of it. On his reporting the circumstance to me, I sent Mr. Zananiri, my dragoman, to the Prefect of Police to mention the fact, in order that measures might be taken to prevent conduct which was so likely to lead to a breach of the peace, and which at this moment might have very serious consequences. The sub-Prefect, in the absence of the Prefect, expressed his regret for what had occurred, and sent for the ringleader of the crowd, who appears to have been known, with the expressed intention of punishing him.

“I yesterday communicated confidentially to M. Kleczkowski, my French colleague, a detailed plan for self-defence by the European residents of Alexandria, in case of emergency, which had been prepared by Lieutenant Bradford, R.N., in concert with Lieutenant Marriott, R.M.A. This plan had been already generally approved by an officer of the Greek Navy, named by M. Rangabi, the Greek Agent and Consul-General, and by the Doyen of our Consular body here, M. Bodtker, the Swedish Consul-General. If approved by the French authorities, it will

be then shown in strict confidence to the other Consular Representatives, and the necessary arrangements entered into by which it can be put into execution at any moment, if, unfortunately, it should be necessary. Every possible precaution has been, and will be, taken to avoid this scheme becoming known so as to create a panic."

"ALEXANDRIA, *June 9th*, 1882.

"I do not wish to appear an 'alarmist,' but I think it well you should see this note from Morice Bey, describing the sentiments expressed to him by an officer of the Egyptian army here. And I am bound to add that they are perfectly in harmony with those which I hear from good authority to be prevailing among the officers and men of this garrison, as well as by a large portion of the Arab population.

"I know that there is a long interval between words and deeds, but there seems to be little doubt that if Arabi were driven to desperation it would be possible for him to cause a terrible catastrophe."

"ALEXANDRIA, *June 20th*, 1882.

"I am sorry I forgot to enclose Morice Bey's letter. I now do so. The feeling here is as strong as ever against Europeans, but I believe the presence of the Fleet at last has much frightened the soldiers. Still, there is no knowing what desperate men may do.

"The [Prefect of] Police here is entirely Arabist, but the Governor represents him as loyal to the Khedive, and I really believe he is too shrewd a man to be otherwise."

*Enclosure.*

“ June 6th, 1882.

“ It may be both interesting and useful if I place on record a long conversation I have just had with an officer in the army. At first this officer's remarks were cool and guarded, but as the argument warmed, he expressed his opinion that if the Khedive gained the day, certain death to those who had opposed him would follow, hence it was preferable to sacrifice the lives of the army (*en bloc*) fighting for their cause. This officer expressed a liking for me, and said it had been his intention, as well as that of others, to gather certain Christian families together and personally to protect them in the hour of danger. The army would not tolerate the interference of the European Powers, nor would they allow their Chief to come to Alexandria to meet Dervish Pacha, nor should Arabi put his foot on board any ship. It was not intended (in the event of the army gaining the day) to get rid of all Europeans, those who had done good would be allowed to remain. A fair scale for pensions would be drawn up for civilians. Under every circumstance the army would oppose interference. The object of European banks lending money to the fellaheen was to obtain possession of the land. The Khedive had the intention to destroy the lives of the three Colonels engaged in saving the country. The Khedive had further connived at the conspiracy against the life of Arabi, as plotted by the Circassians, so the Effendina must be got rid of.”

The British community were even more alarmed. On the 30th May Mr. Cookson had at their request telegraphed the following appeal, signed by all the principal British merchants :—

“ British residents in Alexandria call upon Her Majesty’s Government to provide efficient means for the protection of their lives. During twenty-four hours from the 26th to the 27th instant the town was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who, as we believe, actually had cartridges served out, in response to their demand, to be used against Europeans. The crisis is only suspended, but all elements of danger which existed yesterday remain to-day. There is every reason to fear the recurrence of perils which will come, as before, without warning, and against which Europeans are absolutely defenceless. They have not even the means of flight, as, in order to reach the ships in the harbour, they would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small squadron actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptian forts, and when these forts are disabled then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed three hundred men, although the squadron was sent here to safeguard European life and property. Every day’s delay increases the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline.”

## CHAPTER XV

### THE BRITISH INTERVENTION—TRIAL OF ARABI— LORD DUFFERIN'S MISSION

ON the 22nd July Sir Edward Malet, who had been regaining strength at Whitby, received the following message from Lord Granville :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 21st*, 1882.

“Lord Granville wishes me to ask you how you feel, and what are the prospects of your being fit to return at once or shortly to Egypt.

“He says you are *not* to reply according to your own wishes, but according to what your doctors tell you of your being up to the climate and the work.”

He replied that the doctors pronounced him sound and free from any trace of fever, and at once made preparations to come up to London and return to his post.

On the 10th August he reported his arrival at Alexandria, and the departure of Sir A. Colvin,



who since the commencement of his illness had been the guiding spirit of the British Agency.

During the seven weeks of Sir Edward's absence from Egypt the situation had entirely changed.

The persistence of the Egyptian army in constructing batteries menacing the British and French squadrons had led at last, after repeated warnings, to the bombardment of the forts by the British ships on the 11th July. The action lasted from 7 a.m. to 5.30 p.m., by which time the forts were silenced, and the Egyptian garrison abandoned the town after setting fire to it. After an unfortunate delay, during which much pillage took place, a British force was landed, and steps were taken for the restoration of order, and for the protection of the Khedive, who had been powerless and at times in considerable personal danger,<sup>1</sup> but who now dismissed Arabi from the post of Minister of War and issued orders forbidding all Egyptians to assist him.

A Conference had been sitting at Constantinople since the 23rd June, at first without, but subse-

<sup>1</sup> See *Shifting Scenes*, p. 70, for some of the Khedive's experiences.

quently with, the participation of Turkey, and had been endeavouring without any effectual result to settle the terms on which Turkey should intervene. The British Government after inviting the co-operation first of the French and then of the Italian Government, both of which had declined, was taking steps to send a force of 20,000 men under Sir G. Wolseley to restore the Khedive's authority, and Lord Dufferin was engaged in further negotiations with the Porte to settle the terms on which a Turkish contingent should be sent to join in the operations.

Lord Granville wrote to Sir E. Malet :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 11th*, 1882.

“I was delighted to hear of your safe arrival. I trust you and Cherif will conduct everything to a successful end, but diplomacy, I think, will have to yield to Admirals and Generals, over whom, however, we have succeeded in getting you an acknowledged precedence.

“I cannot believe that Arabi Bey can have such formidable armies posted in different parts of the country as he is now described to have, but I am

getting impatient for action. Delay will give so many opportunities for others to do mischief."

Sir Edward found the Agency in all the turmoil of preparations for the approaching disembarkation of the British force, and of measures to assist its future operations.

His first business was to provide the Khedive with an efficient Ministry.

To Lord Granville.

"ALEXANDRIA, *August 16th*, 1882.

"Finding on arrival that the Khedive was still encumbered by his very useless Ministry on account of the unwillingness of Cherif Pacha to assume the reins until the campaign had actually begun, I went to Cherif Pacha and expostulated with him on the delay, and said that it was necessary for us that a Ministry in which we could have confidence should now be formed. He at length consented, and I then went to the Khedive and told him that Cherif's hesitation was removed. I urged Cherif to join to himself in the Ministry those Egyptians of eminence whose names and capacity were known, such as Nubar Pacha and Riaz Pacha. With regard

to Nubar I made no way, but having urged both I obtained one and he telegraphed to Riaz,<sup>1</sup> who, without absolutely consenting in reply, is forthwith coming here and there is little doubt that he will accept. He is a man of far more energy and decision of character than Cherif, and at this moment these are the two qualities which we much need. I have spoken to Cherif generally about the future, saying that no plan has been settled, but that it was probable that changes would be made in a sense favourable to the Egyptians. He expressed the hope that no change would be made which would involve the removal of Sir A. Colvin, of whose advice and assistance he stood in the greatest need. He spoke in terms of the highest admiration of England for coming to the assistance of Egypt in the hour of her need. He said that without this timely aid the country would have been lost to civilisation for generations."

In a subsequent despatch, Sir Edward gives a very favourable account of the new Ministry :—

"The composition of the Ministry is not only as satisfactory as circumstances admit, but may be

<sup>1</sup> Riaz Pacha, who was at Geneva, was offered and eventually accepted the post of Minister of the Interior.

considered to form as strong a Cabinet as could be got together in the country, if it were in its normal state.

“The honourable antecedents of Cherif Pacha and Riaz Pacha are too well known to your Lordship for it to be necessary to make any remark with regard to them.

“Haidar Pacha, the Minister of Finance, held the same post in Cherif Pacha’s former Ministry, and Sir Auckland Colvin approves of his reappointment.

“Fakhri Pacha, Minister of Justice, occupied the same position in the Ministry of Riaz Pacha, and distinguished himself by the ability with which he discharged the duties that devolved upon him in the International Commission for the Reform of the Mixed Courts.

“Ali Pacha Moubarek held under Riaz Pacha the Ministry of Public Works, to which he has now been reappointed, and displayed in it much energy and knowledge, and, in general opinion, much ability.

“Omar Pacha Loutfi remains as Minister of War, being the only member of the Ragheb Ministry whose services are retained. His fidelity to the Khedive, shown during the recent troubles, entitles him to this distinction.

“Khairi Pacha has filled the office of Keeper of the Seals to the Khedive since the accession of His Highness. He is a man of high literary attainments, and is regarded with much respect and esteem.

“Finally, Zeki Pacha, Minister of Wakoufs (religious institutions), has been continuously in office during the reign of the present Khedive, successively as Native Administrator of the Daira Sanieh, Minister of Public Instruction under Cherif Pacha, native member of the Railway Board, and recently Governor of Alexandria, in all which positions he has been noted for a conscientious discharge of the duties entrusted to him.”

To Lord Granville.

“ALEXANDRIA, *August 22nd*, 1882.

“The change of Ministry has been effected very quietly, and one breathes freer air at the Palace now that Ragheb and his crew have given up the oars. A question which lies before us, though not immediately, is what to do about the Chamber. Cherif's plan is to dissolve it, that then the Khedive should issue a fresh Organic Law off his own bat, similar to the one first proposed by Cherif,

which does not give the Chamber power over the Budget and makes no mention of Ministerial responsibility. Cherif holds that the present Organic Law having been wrung from the Khedive by force has no legal vitality.

“Sultan Pacha opposes the dissolution of the Chamber, but suggests that the sixty Deputies who were loyal should decree the expulsion and trial of the twenty-five who sided with Arabi, and that their place should be filled by fresh elections.

“I like neither of these plans. The difficulties we have got into are in great measure created through not keeping within the law. I should prefer to keep the present Chamber, and to make it alter its own Organic Law in accordance with the wishes of Cherif.

“The Chamber does not meet till November, and there is time before us. Riaz, who comes to-morrow, will have a good deal to say on the subject, and I do not know what his views are.”

On the 21st August Sir G. Wolseley reported the commencement of his operations:—

“KANTARA, *August 21st*, 1882.

“Reached Port Said yesterday morning. Found,

in compliance with orders previously issued, that all commercial traffic was stopped, and Port Said, Kantara and Ismailia successfully occupied by navy at daybreak, and telegraph seized at Ismailia. Small skirmish had taken place and enemy bombarded in his camp at Nefiche. Hope that Serapeum may be occupied by troops from Suez to-day. Owing to block in Canal, have been delayed, or should have been at Ismailia last night." •

Plans had now to be made for the future. Lord Granville wrote privately :—

“WALMER CASTLE, *August 23rd*, 1882.

“You must feel rather up in your stirrups. The movement seems to have been admirably begun. But our Press is in rather too great a hurry to discount our ultimate success.

“I think there is every chance of our obtaining this, but speed in doing so will be of great importance.

“In the same way it is desirable that we should have our plans cut and dried as soon as diplomacy comes into play again.

“The two important points are the financial and the military.



“I shall be very glad to hear your views on both.

“I do not think Rowsell’s plan<sup>1</sup> would answer, although I am quite ready to hear comment on it. Would it be possible to get back to Goschen’s arrangement, or something like it?

“With regard to the army, or rather the armed police force to be substituted for it, how is it to be officered so as to secure the continued safety of the Khedive and to prevent the undue interference of any of our European friends?

“What do the intelligent Egyptians think on this subject?

“General Goldsmid<sup>2</sup> told me that he did not think the matter was very difficult to deal with. What would be his plan now?

“Prince Ibrahim came here to-day by way of thanking me for having asked whether his application<sup>3</sup> would be granted.

“He talks sensibly enough. He says that Egypt only requires troops on the Abyssinian frontier; that a good police force would be sufficient; that

<sup>1</sup> British Commissioner for the Khedivial Domains: see note p. 399.

<sup>2</sup> British Commissioner for the Daira Estates: see note p. 399

<sup>3</sup> For permission to return to Egypt.

with trained European officers there would be no danger of mutiny ; that the evil had arisen from the promotion of ill-educated men from the ranks."

A question now arose as to the disposal of prisoners captured by the British forces. Sir E. Malet telegraphed :—

“ ALEXANDRIA, *August 22nd*, 1882.

“General Wolseley telegraphs last night from Ismailia, that Abdul Razak Nazmi, of État-Major, has surrendered, with two other officers. They say they are loyal to Khedive, and wish to go to Alexandria. General proposes to send them here if Khedive approves. Khedive has approved.”

Lord Granville replied :—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 28th*, 1882.

“The proposal of General Sir Garnet Wolseley to hand over to the Khedive all prisoners of war taken in course of the present military operations in Egypt is approved by Her Majesty's Government.

“You will, however, obtain from His Highness a previous engagement that none of them shall be

put to death without the consent of the British authorities."

Sir E. Malet telegraphed on the following day that he had obtained this assurance.

"ALEXANDRIA, *August 28th*, 1882.

"On receipt of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date, I mentioned to the Khedive the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war who should be handed over to him by the British Military Authorities. His Highness has given me a verbal assurance that no prisoners of war made over to him shall be put to death without the consent of Her Majesty's Government."

He wrote privately to Lord Granville on the subject:—

"ALEXANDRIA, *August 29th*, 1882.

"The Ministry is a good one provided Cherif and Riaz will work together. I have obtained an engagement from the Khedive that no prisoners shall be put to death without the consent of Her Majesty's Government. I went straight to the Khedive on the subject, as I felt sure that the Ministers, although they would have ultimately to

yield, would begin by raising difficulties, and accordingly the Khedive has sent to me since I saw him this morning to say that the Ministers are rather put out about it, but that he adheres to his word. I explained to the Khedive that he had nothing to do but to accept, because if he made difficulties the prisoners would not be sent."

On the 6th September Lord Granville telegraphed on the subject of reports that prisoners were being tortured :—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 6th*, 1882.

"*Daily Telegraph* of the 4th states that Mahmoud Fehmi was given sea-water to drink by his custodians, and in issue of yesterday that torture had been and continued to be used by Egyptian courts-martial to extort evidence or confessions, and account is given of application of thumb-screw to old man at Governor's house.

"On 30th ultimo same paper gave account of keel-hauling of four men on board Egyptian ship. *Daily News* stated punishment to be ordered by court-martial for mutiny, and that sufferers died."

Sir E. Malet was instructed to inquire, and if the

reports were true to make strong representations to the Egyptian Government.

He replied :—

“ALEXANDRIA, *September 7th*, 1882.

“I have requested the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* to come to me in order that I may inquire into the cases which he mentions, but I have not yet seen him. Meantime the Khedive has sent me the following message :—

“His Highness has learnt, with regret, statements have appeared in certain London newspapers to the effect that certain prisoners of war had suffered ill-treatment and torture at the hands of the Egyptian authorities. His Highness hopes that you will inform Lord Granville that these statements are unfounded. All the prisoners of war are on board the frigate *Mehemed Ali*, in charge of Captain Privilegio Bey, a European, who has received strict orders to treat the prisoners humanely. Mahmoud Pacha Fehmi is at the Government House, in custody of the Chief of Police. His Highness admits that a case of thumb-screwing has come to his knowledge, inflicted on a spy who refused to give information.

On hearing of it, His Highness had at once given most stringent orders that no prisoners whatever should be put to any torture or suffer any ill-treatment in future.’”

“ALEXANDRIA, *September 8th*, 1882.

“There is no foundation for the statement that Mahmoud Fehmi was given sea-water to drink. The report owes its origin to a suggestion, made in an Arab paper, that as he endeavoured, by damming the Canal, to deprive Alexandrians of fresh water, he should be treated himself to the *régime* he had desired for them.

“The use of thumb-screws is proved. In former days Riaz Pacha, at my request, took all such instruments away from the police at Cairo, and he has now undertaken to do the same here.

“The Khedive has sent for the Prefect of Police, and has given the most positive orders that no torture of any kind is to be used for extracting statements from prisoners or other purposes. I am not yet able to report respecting keel-hauling, but, in any case, it will not take place again.”

“ALEXANDRIA, *September 8th*, 1882.

“The facts with regard to the case of keel-hauling are as follows: Three Arab porters returning

from a looting expedition fell out, and two of them endeavoured to murder the third. The two men were sentenced by the court-martial to be keel-hauled in accordance with Article 2 of the Egyptian Naval Code; both men are alive. The Khedive has given orders that no sentences to keel-hauling shall be passed for the future."

On the subject of future organisation Sir Edward Malet wrote privately :—

"ALEXANDRIA, *September 5th*, 1882.

"I enclose herewith two Memoranda on the subjects on which you asked for my opinion in your letter of the 23rd ult. I submit them to you with much diffidence, for the subject of the reconstruction after our military operations are complete is one which requires the most careful consideration and the most delicate handling. The dual system has had a great deal to do towards bringing us to our present pass.

"To my mind the really most important point in the reconstruction before us is the establishment of justice to the natives; till this is done there will be no security in Egypt of a durable and solid character. If they will not give it to themselves it should be forced upon them."

The battle of Tel-el-Kebir was fought on the 13th September, and the news was received in the course of the morning :—

“Tel-el-Kebir carried this morning in twenty minutes. Forty guns taken and large number of prisoners. Cavalry in pursuit. Arabi's force appears quite broken up.”

On the 15th came the further report that the British troops had occupied the Citadel at Cairo and had arrested Arabi and Toulba.

Lord Granville wrote :—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 15th*, 1882.

“I send you my warm congratulations. What a swell you must be!

“Many thanks for your suggestions. We shall sit upon them in small conclave on Tuesday.”

Sir Edward wrote his congratulations to Lord Granville almost simultaneously, but at greater length. He had begun already to preach clemency to the Egyptian Government.



“ALEXANDRIA, *September 18th*, 1882.

“I venture to begin my letter by congratulating you and Her Majesty’s Government on the complete success which has crowned your Egyptian policy. It has been a struggle between civilisation and barbarism. Had Her Majesty’s Government held back and allowed Arabi to gain the upper hand in Egypt, the country would have been thrown back 100 years, and the lives of Christians in all Mussulman States would have been in danger. You have fought the battle of all Christendom, and history will acknowledge it. May I also venture to say that it has given the Liberal party a new lease of popularity and power?”

“I am doing my utmost to moderate the clamour for vengeance, and I think we may be sure that the trials which must ensue will be conducted fairly.

“The conduct of our troops has on the whole been very good. They have won golden opinions here.”

A week later he announced the return of the Khedive to his capital :—

“CAIRO, *September 25th*, 1882.

“The Khedive made his solemn entry into Cairo at 3.30, and was received with great enthusiasm.

The Duke of Connaught, Sir G. Wolseley, and I drove with His Highness. The reception was a magnificent pageant. I congratulate Her Majesty's Government on the complete suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of the authority of the Khedive in his capital and throughout the country."

Difficulties now began to arise as to the trial of the prisoners, particularly those who had been the leaders of the rebellion.

The following communications had passed in pursuance of the conditions made by Lord Granville on the 28th August.

After obtaining from the Khedive a verbal promise that none of the prisoners of war handed over to the Egyptian authorities should be put to death without the consent of Her Majesty's Government, Sir E. Malet wrote a formal note to Cherif Pacha placing the engagement on record.

On August 30th he reported:—

"Cherif Pacha has spoken to me about the assurance given to me by the Khedive that no prisoners of war made over to him should be put

to death without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

“His Excellency said that the intention of His Highness' Government had been to leave the prisoners until order should be re-established, and then to try them before a properly constituted Court, in which an English officer of rank should take part.”

Five days later Cherif Pacha reopened the subject. Sir Edward Malet writes :—

“ALEXANDRIA, *September 5th*, 1882.

“Cherif Pacha spoke to me again yesterday regarding the condition exacted by Her Majesty's Government, that no prisoners of war should be put to death without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

“His Excellency asked me to represent that the condition infringed the sovereign rights of the Khedive, with whom rested the prerogative of mercy in all cases in which the sentence of death was pronounced.

“He ventured therefore to ask whether the object of Her Majesty's Government could not be attained by some means which would not involve

this apparent restriction placed upon the Khedive's authority. He repeated that the Government had intended to try all prisoners against whom serious charges existed by a carefully constituted Court at which he hoped that English officers of rank would be permitted by Her Majesty's Government to assist, that the proceedings would be public, and that the accused should be allowed counsel for their defence, and that he still hoped that the guarantees of justice this afforded would be deemed sufficient by Her Majesty's Government. He, however, added that of course, the Khedive's word having been given, his present observations were only designed to call your Lordship's attention to the point, in case it should be possible for your Lordship to modify the conditions, so as to save the rights of the Khedive and yet to preserve the necessary guarantee."

Lord Granville replied on the 14th September :—

" Her Majesty's Government agree to the proposals of the Egyptian Government in the matter, subject, however, retrospectively to any terms of surrender which may have already been granted to the rebels, and prospectively subject to any

terms which may be granted to them, in virtue of his full powers, by the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's forces."

On the 28th September Sir Edward telegraphed proposing that Colonel Sir Charles Wilson should assist at the court-martial to be instituted for the trial of the rebels, and that Mr. Beaman of the British Consular Service should act as his interpreter. Sir Edward added: "Sir Charles would not be a member of the Court, but would only watch its proceedings on behalf of Her Majesty's Government."

Lord Granville replied, approving the proposal, with the following observation:—

'Her Majesty's Government do not desire to take any step in regard to these trials which might have a tendency, real or apparent, to supersede the authority of the Khedive, nor would they wish that English officers should sit among the Judges, and so assume a share of the responsibility for the sentences of the Court. They desire to limit their action to assuring themselves that the prisoners

have a fair trial, and that no improper or unjust restrictions are placed on the defence. They reserve to themselves, however, the right of appealing to the Khedive's humanity of disposition to exercise his prerogative of mercy in any cases where the full execution of the sentence may appear to them to entail unnecessary severity."

In the meanwhile Arabi's friends and admirers in England had not been idle, and had succeeded in enlisting a considerable amount of public sympathy on his behalf.

On the 30th September Sir E. Malet telegraphed, requesting instructions with regard to a letter which he had received from Mr. Blunt for delivery to Arabi, and pointed out the dilemma in which he would probably be placed if Mr. Blunt put into execution the intentions announced by him.

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *September 30th*, 1882.

“I have received a letter from Mr. Wilfrid Blunt,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This letter had been forwarded in the despatch-bag from the Foreign Office, but the question how it should be dealt with had been left open.

dated the 22nd instant, enclosing an open letter for Arabi, which he requests me to forward. In it he states that he has resolved to come to Egypt, to help him with his evidence, and to bring an English advocate to conduct his defence. Am I to have this letter delivered?

“The Egyptian Government will not allow Mr. Blunt to land in Egypt. If prevented, he will appeal to me. Unless I receive instructions to the contrary from your Lordship, I shall not interfere in his behalf.

“If Mr. Blunt comes here secretly, and is discovered, he will be arrested. In that case, unless instructed by your Lordship to the contrary, I should not exact his release, but should insist upon his being sent out of the country.

“With regard to counsel for the defence, the pleadings will be in Arabic, and the Egyptian Government will not allow defence in any other language.”

In reply Lord Granville telegraphed:—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 3rd*, 1882.

“Return Mr. Blunt's letter to him.

“I agree to your other proposals as to your action with regard to him.”

On the 1st October Sir Edward Malet addressed the following note to Cherif Pacha :---

“ On the 30th ultimo I had the honour to inform your Excellency that prisoners of war would be delivered to the Khedive, His Highness having given an engagement that none should be executed without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

“ Your Excellency made certain representations to me with regard to this engagement of His Highness, and on the 16th instant I informed your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government agreed to the conditions proposed by your Excellency with regard to the trial of the prisoners, subject retrospectively to any terms of surrender already granted, and prospectively subject to any terms which might be granted by Sir Garnet Wolseley in virtue of his full powers as Commander-in-Chief.

“ In order that there should be no misunderstanding as to the nature of the conditions agreed to, I had the honour to place in your Excellency's hands a copy of my despatch to Lord Granville, reporting my conversation with your Excellency, which gave rise to these instructions from His Lordship.

“ One of the conditions on which the acceptance of Her Majesty's Government was based was the



presence at the court-martial of English officers to watch the proceedings.

“I have now learnt through the newspapers that the court-martial has been appointed, but I have received no official information on the subject from your Excellency.

“When I receive from your Excellency the necessary notice of the institution of the Court, and the request that, in accordance with the conditions accepted by the Government of His Highness, an English officer or officers may be appointed to attend on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, I shall be prepared to act in accordance with your Excellency’s request.

“But it is my duty to point out to your Excellency that any proceedings, being part of the court-martial, which may take place before this formality is fulfilled, and without the presence of the Delegate of Her Majesty’s Government, will be a violation of the conditions under which prisoners of war were delivered to the Khedive, and that the prisoners, although surrendered, may at any moment be withdrawn from the custody of the Egyptian authorities, unless the conditions under which they were surrendered by the British authorities are complied with.”

In reply to this note Cherif Pacha at once addressed to him a formal notification of the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry and a court-martial for the trial of persons implicated in the rebellion, and Sir E. Malet then informed His Excellency of the appointment of Sir Charles Wilson to watch the proceedings on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.

He wrote privately to Lord Granville :—

*“ October 8th, 1882.*

“ There are difficulties about the treatment of prisoners, but Riaz<sup>1</sup> listens with tolerably good grace to me, and my threat of withdrawing the prisoners if the forms of justice are not carefully observed has had a wholesome effect.”

On the 6th October Sir Edward reported the arrival of the Hon. Mark Napier, barrister, and Mr. Eve, solicitor, retained by Mr. Blunt to conduct Arabi's defence. Mr. Napier telegraphed to obtain the services of Mr. Broadley, a barrister practising in Tunis, who had a competent knowledge of Arabic.

<sup>1</sup> Riaz Pacha was Minister of the Interior.

A prolonged discussion thereupon arose as to whether Arabi should be allowed to employ foreign counsel for his defence before the court-martial.

Sir E. Malet to Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *October 10th*, 1882.

“The Egyptian Government have now to decide whether the defence of Arabi should be placed in the hands of foreign counsel.

“I am informed by the Government that in the ordinary course of things no counsel at all are allowed to prisoners by the Code under which the present court-martial is instituted; the trial, moreover, would be conducted in private, and the proceedings could not be watched by foreign officers. These conditions have, however, been made by Her Majesty's Government and accepted by the Government of the Khedive, but there are no precedents by which their execution can be guided.

“In the matter of allowing counsel to the accused, the Egyptian Government consider that the condition agreed upon with Her Majesty's Government is fulfilled by granting the permission to employ native counsel. But Mr. Mark Napier informs me that he has telegraphed to Tunis to retain the

services of Mr. Broadley, a barrister who knows Arabic.

“I should therefore be glad if your Lordship would instruct me as to whether it is the desire of Her Majesty’s Government that foreign counsel should be allowed, or whether the proposal of the Egyptian Government to admit only native counsel should be agreed to.

“It is understood that all the proceedings of the court-martial will be conducted in the Arabic language.”

From Lord Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 13th*, 1882.

“Her Majesty’s Government are of opinion that Arabi should be defended by counsel of his own choice, whether native or foreign, who should be allowed free access to him; that interpreters should be provided, and that the trial should be conducted in public.

“Every interference with the freedom of the accused, as to his defence, by the Egyptian Government must tend, in the eyes of all who have any jealousy for the fair and impartial administration of justice, in political as well as in

other cases, to make the result of the trial unsatisfactory.

“You will accordingly insist on these conditions, and, if necessary, on an adjournment of the trial in order that they may be secured. It is admitted that the procedure of the Egyptian Code is inapplicable in the present case.”

Sir E. Malet to Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *October 15th*, 1882.

“I acquainted Cherif Pacha with the terms of your Lordship’s telegram, and left with him a translation of it in French.

“His Excellency asked me if I could explain precisely the meaning of the last sentence in your Lordship’s telegram, to the effect that the Egyptian procedure was admittedly inapplicable to this case. I replied that I thought that this statement had reference only to the two points mentioned in the telegram, viz. those of foreign counsel being allowed for defence and publicity of the trial, but I added that I would submit the matter to your Lordship.

“The decision of Her Majesty’s Government is causing the greatest anxiety to the Egyptian Government, who fear that, in consequence, the trial

may last for months, and that during such protraction the political excitement would ferment and seriously increase in importance.

“Is it the wish of Her Majesty’s Government that all the political prisoners, who number about 120, should be allowed the right of employing foreign counsel if they wish it, or whether this privilege should be restricted to Arabi alone?”

“I am given to understand that the Hon. Mark Napier, who will act as Arabi’s counsel, intends to summon M. de Lesseps and other persons from Europe as witnesses for the defence.”

From Lord Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 16th*, 1882.

“The opinion of Her Majesty’s Government that the procedure of the Egyptian Code is inapplicable is based on the fact that it is inconsistent with the conditions of a fair trial, as laid down in my despatch of the 29th ultimo. Her Majesty’s Government consider that no distinction should be made between Arabi Pacha and the other prisoners awaiting trial as regards free choice of counsel, but the Court would have power to control the conduct of the defence and prevent the trial from being unreason-

ably protracted. Her Majesty's Government assume prisoners will be tried on definite charges, and if time should be requested to procure attendance of absent witnesses, counsel should state what facts they are expected to prove, and the request should be refused if the object be not to prove any fact material to the charges but to prove any political reasons or motives."

On the 17th October Sir Edward telegraphed the contents of a long note from Cherif Pacha explaining the objections entertained by the Egyptian Government to the employment of foreign counsel for the defence. The following extracts will show its purport :—

"The Government of His Highness the Khedive, in derogation of its rights and the conditions under which criminal trials are usually conducted in Egypt, had admitted in favour of the rebels, prisoners of the English army handed over to the Egyptian authorities, the assistance of counsel freely chosen. It had likewise admitted publicity for the sittings of the court-martial, and the presence in the Commission of Inquiry and Instruction of an English Delegate and of an interpreter, whose

mission was to ensure the observance of the essential principles of humanity in the conduct of the case.

“To-day Her Majesty’s Government require that Arabi should have the faculty to choose as counsel a foreign lawyer. Lawyers have already arrived from England, at the expense, it is said, of persons well known in Europe for their political propaganda in favour of the rebels. Other lawyers, belonging to the Bar of Paris, have offered their assistance. This intervention in a judicial question has had as an immediate consequence the adjournment of the opening of the proceedings before the court-martial. It will lead necessarily to other measures contrary to the usages and customs of the country.

“If the Government of His Highness admitted without difficulty that Arabi should be assisted in his defence by a lawyer of his choosing, having free access to him, it was because a native lawyer was intended, and that this advantage in no way infringed the fundamental principles of right and jurisdiction. This is not so if the lawyer is a foreigner.

. . . . .



“ But the Government beg Lord Granville above all to be so good as to consider that the prestige of the Khedive, and the authority of his Government, will be again compromised in the eyes of the population if the Egyptian authorities appear, in the face of a revolt without example, powerless and subordinate to an intervention which manifests itself in appearance as being to the advantage of the recognised chief of the rebels, guilty of crime towards the person of the Sovereign, responsible, even admitting the absence of all effective co-operation, for all the disasters and all the ills which, during the past year, have been heaped upon Egypt.

“ The usages and the free application of laws are suspended. The result in the public mind is a deplorable doubt which impedes public confidence from returning and moral order from re-establishing itself.

“ After a conscientious preliminary investigation, directed by honourable and known men, conducted in presence of British officers specially delegated, the Government of His Highness thinks that Arabi and his accomplices should be brought before the court-martial to hear the reading of their Act of Accusation and the documents of the trial, and present defence which they may deem useful either

themselves or through native lawyers freely chosen, and afterwards be sentenced.

“ In the interests of an exemplification of justice which the state of the country renders indispensable, the prisoners have been placed in the hands of the Egyptian Government. But in the event that, contrary to all expectation, Her Majesty's Government persist in the view expressed in the telegram of the 13th October, the Egyptian Government would consider as an impossibility the continuation of the criminal prosecutions begun against the rebel chiefs.”

Sir E. Malet sent at the same time two messages, the first reporting an interview with the Khedive, the second giving his own views :—

“ CAIRO, *October 16th*, 1882.

“ The Khedive this morning placed in my hands a note addressed to me by Cherif Pacha, copy of which I have had the honour to enclose in my despatch of to-day.

“ His Highness asked me to urge the prayer therein contained very earnestly on your Lordship, viz. that Her Majesty's Government would reconsider their determination to allow Arabi to be

defended by foreign counsel if he desires it, on the ground that, if Her Majesty's Government continued to insist, the authority of His Highness would receive a dangerous blow ; His Highness added that, after all that Her Majesty's Government had done to restore his authority and reinstate him on his throne, he could not believe that they wished to do anything so calculated to enfeeble his position, and to render his tenure of power precarious.

“ Referring to the last sentence of the note, His Highness requested me to state to your Lordship, that if Her Majesty's Government finally refused to accede to the request of the Egyptian Government, that Arabi be defended only by native counsel, he begged that a court-martial of British officers might be appointed by Her Majesty's Government, which would try the six leaders of the rebellion according to English law, the Egyptian Government appearing as accusers.

“ In reply, I said that I thought Her Majesty's Government would find some difficulty in acceding to this request, but I promised to submit it to your Lordship, as His Highness continued to urge me to do so, desiring, as he said, that it should be clearly understood that he and his Government, in raising these objections, were far from wishing to impede

or divert the course of justice, but that they foresaw, and earnestly wished to avoid, the political consequences of a trial which might be indefinitely protracted at will by the introduction of foreign counsel, and during the course of which important political questions might be dragged into the discussion, all reference to which, for the sake of the future tranquillity of the country, and of the authority of the Khedive, it would be most advisable to avoid."

"CAIRO, *October 16th*, 1882.

"With reference to my two immediately preceding despatches, there is, in my opinion, some reason to apprehend dangerous results from the admission of foreign counsel to defend Arabi and the other rebels.

"The court-martial may become a sort of political arena for attacks upon the whole policy of Her Majesty's Government, as well as the conduct of His Highness the Khedive.

"It appears likely that French barristers holding communistic views may be retained by some of the prisoners, and in that case the consequences may be very prejudicial to the interests of the country. It cannot be expected that the natives of whom the court-martial is formed should be able to manage these legal advisers, and it is to be feared that the

proceedings will attain an importance and extension which should, if possible, be avoided.

“ If, as I suppose, Her Majesty’s Government are unwilling to accept the Khedive’s proposal that the prisoners should be tried by English officers and by English law, I would venture to suggest that we should reply to the Egyptian Government that the present form of procedure was originally proposed by Cherif Pacha (as will be seen by reference to my despatch of the 5th September and your Lordship’s reply of the 14th), but we might state that, as there has been some misunderstanding upon the details of that arrangement, we are ready to revert to our original conditions, which were accepted by the Khedive prior to the surrender of the prisoners of war, namely, that none of the prisoners should be put to death without the formal consent of Her Majesty’s Government.

“ If it were deemed advisable, I should have no difficulty in arranging with the Egyptian Government that the trial should be a public one; and they would likewise willingly consent to the presence of Sir Charles Wilson to watch the proceedings.

“ But this possible solution of the difficulty has not yet been spoken of between me and the Khedive or his Government.”

To these messages Lord Granville replied :—

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 18th*, 1882.

“ Her Majesty’s Government are of opinion that all the objections of the Egyptian Government can be met as follows :—

“ 1. Prisoners should only be allowed foreign counsel if any are on the spot, and available within time reasonably fixed for trial.

“ 2. Names of such counsel should be submitted to and accepted by the Egyptian Government.

“ 3. Native counsel only should be allowed to address the Court. Foreign counsel should only advise.

“ 4. No arguments or evidence as to political motives or reasons in justification of the offences charged should be admitted, but only such as go to establish or disprove the truth of the charges made.

“ 5. No counsel should appear who does not subscribe to above conditions, which should be rigidly enforced by Court.

“ Her Majesty’s Government still advise the Khedive to allow foreign counsel on above conditions. Prisoners cannot be tried by court-martial of British officers.”

Sir E. Malet reported October 19th :—

“ In consequence of the arrangement proposed in your Lordship's telegrams of the 16th and 18th instant, which I have communicated to Cherif Pacha, the Egyptian Government will probably consent to the admission of foreign counsel to defend Arabi. They see the possibility of guarding against the evils which were chiefly to be apprehended, namely, the undue discussion of political questions and the protraction of the trial beyond its proper limits.

“ But in conversation with me Cherif Pacha showed some anxiety that there should be no retrospective interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government when once the sentence of the court-martial had been pronounced. His Excellency was not speaking of any appeal which might be made to the clemency of the Khedive, but merely of the proceedings of the Court ; and he hopes that no demand will be made by Her Majesty's Government for a review of those proceedings.

“ In reply I ventured to say that hitherto there had been no indication of such an intention in any instructions I had received ; but His Excellency was anxious that the question should be submitted

to your Lordship in order to avoid misunderstanding hereafter."

On the following day he telegraphed that the matter was practically settled in principle :—

"The Egyptian Government has decided to admit foreign counsel for the defence of Arabi. The rules of procedure are being drawn up by Mr. Broadley and by Borelli Bey, who is Legal Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.

"Mr. Broadley and Mr. Mark Napier came this morning to express their acknowledgment of the assistance they have received from me in the matter; they both absolutely repudiate the insinuation contained in Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's letter to Mr. Gladstone, published in the *Times*, that I do not wish a fair trial to be granted to Arabi."

He subsequently forwarded the following letter received from the English legal gentlemen employed for Arabi's defence (Messrs. Broadley, Napier and Eve) :—

"CAIRO, *October 22nd*, 1882.

"The arrangements for the trial of Arabi Pacha and his friends being now complete, we are desirous



of tendering our thanks to you for the constant and invaluable assistance you have given us, and to which assistance we mainly attribute the satisfactory result now arrived at. At the same time, we trust you will express, on our behalf, to Her Majesty's Government, our deep sense of gratitude for the generous support Lord Granville has been pleased to accord to us in securing for Ahmed Arabi and his associates a fair, regular, and open trial."

A complaint that Arabi, while in prison, had been treated with indignity by a member of the Khedive's household was investigated by Sir Charles Wilson, and on his report that the charge appeared to be substantiated, a strong remonstrance was addressed to the Egyptian Government, and the Khedive was urged to give strict orders for the prevention of such abuses.<sup>1</sup>

In the meanwhile other communications were passing, which, to Sir Edward Malet's mind, must

<sup>1</sup> Sir C. Wilson's and Colonel Stewart's reports on the condition of the prisons and the treatment of the prisoners were on the whole satisfactory. Concerning the cruel treatment of the prisoners arrested and confined in the Citadel at Cairo by Arabi and his associates during their reign of power, see Blue Book, Egypt, No. 1 (1883), p. 15.

have brought the conviction that the question whether foreign counsel should or should not be formally permitted to take part in the proceedings was not likely to have more than a very secondary influence on the ultimate issue.

In the previous portion of this book (page 84) Sir Edward Malet has quoted a letter from Sir A. Colvin, dated September 21st, in which he advised clemency to Arabi and the other leaders of the rebellion unless murder were brought home to them, suggesting that they might be deported to Burmah or the Andaman Islands and adding, "whatever is done, should, I think, be done *quickly*." Sir Edward's own opinions pointed in the same direction. Later on he will be found arguing, "I do not agree with those who consider that the death of the principal rebels is essential to the restoration of the Khedive's authority. On the contrary, I think it quite as likely that their death would canonise them, and that they would, if executed, be more than before objects of veneration and fanatical enthusiasm." But as he states after quoting Sir A. Colvin's recommendation, the opposite feeling on the spot

was very strong, and he was well aware that the matter would probably be decided in Downing Street rather than in Cairo.

A message received by him from Walmer Castle while the question of the employment of foreign counsel was in full discussion showed clearly in which direction the influence of Downing Street would be exercised.

In this message Lord Granville expressed his opinion that if there were no satisfactory proof of atrocious crimes, over and above that of armed rebellion, a sentence short of death, or if sentence of death were required by Egyptian law, then a commutation of the sentence would be wiser than capital punishment.

On the 17th October Sir C. Wilson reported that the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry had been conspicuous for the fairness and impartiality with which they had been conducted, adding that in his experience of the East he had never observed such application and attention to business as had been shown by the members of the Court.

On the 22nd Sir Edward Malet sent home the

following memorandum by Sir Charles Wilson on the charges against Arabi and the other principal prisoners :—

“ I have read through the *acte d'accusation* against Arabi Pacha, Mahmoud Sami Pacha, Toulba Pacha, Mahmoud Fehmi Pacha, Omar Rahmi and Said Kandeel, as well as a large portion of the depositions of the prisoners and of the evidence of the witnesses.

“ The evidence against the prisoners, and the explanations some of them have offered in their defence, are briefly summarised, and the following charges are then formulated, viz :—

“ 1. Arabi, Toulba, Mahmoud Sami, Mahmoud Fehmi and Omar Rahmi are charged with having abused the flag of truce on the 12th July by withdrawing the troops and pillaging, and by burning Alexandria whilst it was flying.

“ 2. All six prisoners are charged with having incited the Egyptians to arm against the Government of the Khedive.

“ This crime is stated to come under Article 55 of the Ottoman Penal Code, which lays down that every one who directly or indirectly incites subjects

of the Ottoman Empire to arm against the Imperial Government should suffer death.

“ 3. Arabi, Mahmoud Fehmi, Toulba and Mahmoud Sami are charged with having continued the war after they had heard that peace was concluded. The fact that Arabi had been dismissed from his post as War Minister is quoted as an aggravation of the offence.

“ This crime is said to come under Article III of the Ottoman Military Penal Code, viz. :—

“ ‘ Every commander who, without motive, continues hostilities after he has been officially informed of the conclusion of peace, or of an armistice, shall suffer death.’

“ 4. All six prisoners are charged with having incited the people to civil war, and with having committed acts of destruction, massacre and pillage on Egyptian territory.

“ These crimes are said to be punishable under Articles 56 and 57 of the Ottoman Penal Code.

“ I must express my belief that on the existing evidence no English court-martial would convict the prisoners, except perhaps Toulba and Said Kandeel, of any greater crime than that of taking part in a successful military revolt against the Khedive.”

This practically settled what was already almost a foregone conclusion, and Sir Edward Malet's principal care must have been that the trial, as trial there must be, should be got through as quickly as possible, that the Egyptian Government should be induced to acquiesce with as much complaisance as was possible in a solution which would be highly distasteful to the majority of their adherents, and that Arabi and his associates should be completely removed from the sphere of Egyptian politics in such a manner that their influence should not remain potent as a cause of unrest.

But his difficulties were not small. His mouth was closed to all except the Khedive and his Ministers by obvious considerations of prudence and discretion; Arabi's lawyers, on the other hand, as indeed was their duty, were doing their utmost to organise a defence which threatened to cause the most formidable delays. In the meanwhile the political effect of British intervention on behalf of the prisoners was in the highest degree embarrassing.

Sir Edward reported officially to Lord Granville :—

“CAIRO, *October 17th*, 1882.

“The suppression of the rebellion through the victory of Tel-el-Kebir was followed by complete tranquillity throughout the country, and it is only by degrees that the population is beginning to recover from the blow which made it senseless for a time. According to all tradition, the victors would have made use of the opportunity to ride roughshod in every direction and to stifle every voice that did not raise itself in their praise.

“The reports now coming in from the country seem to show that the people either do not believe in the capture of Arabi or are convinced that he and the British forces have come to an agreement to his advantage. They cannot understand that, though conquered, he is treated with consideration while awaiting sentence by a court-martial, because such treatment is unlike anything they have ever seen or heard of. Arabi contrived to inspire the people with the belief that he possessed Divine power to restore the supremacy of Islam, and the common saying among the people is that he cannot be put to death, and that he will yet prove himself

the 'Mahdi' or Saviour. The more ignorant have a story that he is at present making a forty days' journey through the heavens, and, in general, his hold on the sympathy of the lower classes has made rapid and dangerous strides since the time when he became the acknowledged leader of the people against armed Christian invasion.

"It is natural that the events of the past three months should have brought home to all parts of the country the fact that a great struggle was engaged, and the bare fact of Mussulmans being on the one side and Christians on the other is sufficient to account for the drift of public feeling with regard to it.

"Now that the end has come and that the mass of the population find no evil effects accruing to them, they account for it by the Divine powers of Arabi, on the ground that Divine power alone could save them under such circumstances. They are beginning to lift up their heads, and an uneasy feeling is again pervading the country. Requests are made to me from many places to send English troops, in order that the fact of the occupation may be brought home to the people; but the military authorities are averse to distributing detachments, on account of the sickness which has attacked those which have



already been stationed in the outlying districts. I am not apprehensive of danger, but there is no doubt that the hostility of the lower class of native to the Christian which has been aroused by recent events has not been allayed by our success, and that until the trial of the State prisoners is over the evil spirit will continue to ferment and increase."

In a private letter of the same date he wrote more freely :—

. "CAIRO, *October 17th*, 1882.

"I suspect I shall be eventually wrecked on the Arabi rock, for he is as great a difficulty as a prisoner as he was as a Minister. The support which we are giving to him in insisting upon his having a trial with foreign counsel to defend him is entirely misunderstood and misconstrued. I have frequently pointed out in my despatches that there is an absence of all knowledge of even the proper forms of justice in Egypt, and the present action of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Arabi is considered as a sign that we, in fact, befriend him and mistrust the Khedive. As long as sentence is not passed the old feeling which ascribed power to him will grow, and the authority of the

Khedive will decrease. I perfectly understand the motives which inspire the course directed to be pursued, but it is my duty to point out the result which it has on the spot. It must be remembered that Egypt has from all time been the country of superstition and the belief in supernatural agency. It exists still, and only the hard fact of the disappearance of Arabi from the scene will restore security. The action of Her Majesty's Government with regard to him should be very carefully considered in regard to its future effect in Egypt. It would be a sorry conclusion to the expenditure of millions and of much blood if the future is left in jeopardy. I have been very careful to express no opinion here as to the future in store for him, but I cannot but express my anxiety on the subject privately to your Lordship, and I would ask you to consult Sir Garnet Wolseley and other officers who have been here before deciding on the extent of the intervention to be exercised in his behalf."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The danger was that if simply exiled, and allowed to establish himself in England or some European country even nearer to Egypt, he might remain a permanent danger to the security of the new régime.

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A week later he again wrote to Lord Granville:—

“CAIRO, *October 24th*, 1882.

“I have had a great deal of trouble about the trial of Arabi through the timidity and slowness of the Egyptian Government, and only got the matter finished at last by telling Cherif that if it were not done at once I doubted the Khedive maintaining himself on the throne. I fear the trial will give a great deal of trouble before it is over. I have been trying to accustom the Khedive and the Ministers to the prospect of his escaping with his life. I would ask your Lordship to take into consideration what is to be done with him if he is not executed. It would not be possible to keep him in any part of Egypt if tranquillity is to be restored. The Egyptian Government will infallibly ask Her Majesty’s Government to take charge of him. I receive numerous requests from the provinces to send detachments of English troops, and perhaps the appearance of a regiment in Upper Egypt later on may be desirable. But I am anxious that Lower Egypt should become tranquil without their presence, and, unless the reported hostility of the natives towards Christians takes more active form, I shall not propose to General Alison to send

troops. I fear that through the inequality of ability in the defence and prosecution of Arabi the prisoner will appear to be an ill-treated lamb, and the Khedive a cruel and vacillating tyrant."

On the 24th October Sir E. Malet reported:—

"Mr. Broadley states that it will be necessary to collect evidence in Europe and at Constantinople, and that, consequently, the trial will probably not commence till about the 15th December. I hear that Dervish Pacha and Sheikh Ahmed Essad are amongst those whom he proposes to examine."

On the 27th a fresh question arose as to whether foreign advocates should be allowed to address the Court on Arabi's behalf. Lord Granville telegraphed the following comment on the rules drawn up for the conduct of the trial:—

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 27th*, 1882.

"It does not appear to be clearly stated that native advocates only will be allowed to address the Court. It should be understood that if the conditions laid down in my telegrams of the 16th and 18th instant are not strictly adhered to, the Egyptian Government must be responsible for any

delays or inconvenience which may result therefrom."

Sir E. Malet replied :—

"CAIRO, *October 28th*, 1882.

"M. Borelli, the advocate conducting the case on behalf of the Egyptian Government, tells me that he gave his consent to the stipulation that the counsel for the defence should have the right of addressing the Court, in return for a concession, which he considers important, on the part of Mr. Broadley, to the effect that evidence should be taken only before the Commission of Inquiry, whereby the proceedings before the court-martial will be reduced to simply reading over the evidence and the speeches of counsel for the prosecution and for the defence. M. Borelli said that he did not think that this concession would in any way add to the length of the proceedings."

In the meanwhile Sir Edward Malet was undergoing what is always an unpleasant, and to him was a novel, experience, that of being sharply attacked in the Press of his own country for motives which he did not in the least entertain, but which he had no

means of disclaiming. He, perhaps, rather over-rated the effect of such attacks, but he felt, and no doubt rightly, that the variety and complexity of the problems, on the solution of which the future of Egypt depended, called for the presence of some person of longer and wider experience than himself—one who was already well known to the British public and would command their confidence in a greater degree than a younger man whose life had been entirely passed in the junior ranks of the diplomatic service.

In the discussions which had taken place in the English Ministry on the future organisation of Egyptian institutions a suggestion had already been made that the matter might, with advantage, be placed in the hands of Lord Dufferin, whose mission to the Lebanon in 1860 had been attended with signal success, who had subsequently filled with credit the positions of Governor-General of Canada and Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and who, as Ambassador at Constantinople, had been taking part in all the recent phases of the Egyptian question.

Lord Granville had asked Sir E. Malet how such a step would affect his own position. Sir Edward consulted Lord Wolseley and Sir A. Colvin, and on their advice replied that the effect would be prejudicial. But his own view, which from the first was favourable to the proposal, was strongly confirmed by the increasing complications of the situation, and he addressed a telegram to Lord Granville, which, without mentioning any name, sufficiently showed that he advocated the immediate adoption of the proposal.

From Sir E. Malet to Lord Granville.

*(Telegraphic.)*

“CAIRO, *October 27th.*

“Mr. Broadley, who is connected with the *Times*, tells me that he telegraphed to the Editor a message in which he expressed his obligation to me for ensuring a fair trial for Arabi. The Editor replied that he inserted the notice with regard to me, but that he thought that I was too much for him (Mr. Broadley) or had got round him.

“It is very disadvantageous for H.M. Government to have a Representative here at the present

moment who has not succeeded in inspiring confidence in the public at home, and I would venture to suggest to your Lordship that it would be advisable to send out some one especially for the present crisis who, by his antecedents, would command this necessary confidence.

“I have gone through more than a year of anxiety and overwork, relieved only by a short illness, and I should be grateful for rest.”

From Lord Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 28th.*”

“I consider your telegram as personal for the present. Not aware of the want of confidence in you; but there might be advantage in the suggestion I made some days ago.”

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *October 29th.*”

“Your Lordship’s private telegram of yesterday about me. I think that many, including the Editor of the *Times*, have been induced to believe that I am interested in obtaining the condemnation of Arabi; that I am prejudiced and vindictive and therefore dangerous in this matter. Under these



circumstances I cannot but think that it would be better for H.M. Government and for me that I should retire from the scene until the fate of Arabi is decided. If Lord Dufferin's arrival would enable me to go up the Nile until then I think that the object would be attained, and that whatever is the result of the trial it will be felt that justice has been observed. I can easily understand that a man who, like me, has been mixed up in the matter from the beginning and has been the opponent of Arabi should not be considered a fair judge. I need hardly add that the statements with regard to my feelings are absolutely without foundation."

In a private letter of the same date he added :—

"CAIRO, *October 29th*, 1882.

"I foresee that the trial and ultimate disposal of Arabi will excite the utmost attention at home, and that the sentimental view will have the upper hand. Endeavours are being made to spread the idea that I have a personal object to gain in procuring a condemnation, and as my detractors will have all the talk on their side the public will probably be induced to take this view. This would be bad for my future—that is a matter apart—but I think that

it would be a present embarrassment for you, and I am anxious that consideration for me should not stand in the way of your doing what may be most desirable in the public interests, and I have therefore laid the matter before you by telegraph.

“ I have had none but official communication with Mr. Broadley, but this is, unavoidably, very frequent. He appears to be very anxious that you should be aware that he is endeavouring to smooth matters with regard to the trial and not to create useless difficulties. We shall see, as time goes on, how far he carries out his expressed intention.”

No Secretary of State could wisely disregard such an appeal. From a chief so considerate as Lord Granville it received immediate attention. It precipitated a decision which was no doubt already impending, and the following telegrams were despatched the same day :—

From Lord Granville to the Earl of Dufferin.

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 29th*, 1882.

“ Her Majesty's Government have to request that your Excellency will proceed for a time to Egypt in order to undertake the direction of the negotiations

connected with the settlement of affairs in that country. Your Excellency is at liberty to take with you such assistance as you may consider necessary, and you should leave Mr. Wyndham in charge of Her Majesty's Embassy. Your Excellency should start for Egypt in Her Majesty's ship *Antelope* as soon as you can complete the arrangements for your departure."

From Lord Granville to Sir E. Malet.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 29th*, 1882.

“Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the settlement of the affairs of Egypt involves matters of so complicated a nature, and connected so closely with the whole Eastern question, that the undivided responsibility can hardly, with fairness, be allowed to rest upon one individual. While entirely approving your conduct of affairs and retaining in you their full confidence, they consider it desirable that the Earl of Dufferin, who, in his capacity of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, has been brought so closely in contact with European policy, should proceed for a time to Cairo. Her Majesty's Government rely on your co-operation with His Excellency with all the advantages which

you have obtained by your local knowledge and the respect in which you are held in Egypt."

Sir Edward gratefully acknowledged the receipt of this message. To his father he wrote expressing the relief which he felt at the prospect of Lord Dufferin's arrival:—

"CAIRO, *October 31st*, 1882.

"I am greatly delighted at the prospect of Lord Dufferin's coming. It was necessary that some one should come, and he is the best choice of all. It will give me comparative rest, which I shall be grateful for. I shall be overshadowed, but shall emerge from the eclipse later on.

"My work is getting almost more than one man can manage."<sup>1</sup>

While awaiting Lord Dufferin's arrival he continued to urge the great importance on political grounds of a speedy settlement of the trial of Arabi and others.

On the 30th October he forwarded a proposal

<sup>1</sup> This was an understatement of the case. Lord Dufferin found the work overwhelming on his arrival.

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made by Mr. Broadley for a solution of the difficulties which surrounded the question.

“CAIRO, *October 30th*, 1882.

“I have the honour to enclose copy of a paper which Mr. Broadley has brought to me, and in which a solution of the difficulties connected with the trial of Arabi and the other political prisoners is suggested.

“These proposals will not improbably meet with favourable consideration here, because there is much anxiety to avoid the alternative of a protracted State trial. It is natural that Mr. Broadley should wish to save Arabi and his other clients, and to secure for them immunity from farther punishment by a simple sentence of exile.

“I have limited myself to telegraphing the substance of this despatch to your Lordship, and have given no opinion as to the merits of Mr. Broadley's suggestions.

*Enclosure.*

*Project for the Solution of the State Trial Question*

“M. Borelli and myself are agreed in principle :—

“ 1. That merely political offenders, e.g. Arabi, should not be punished except by exile, after the manner of Abd-el-Kader.

“ 2. That against many of the prisoners no other charge is or can be made out.

“ 3. That against others serious common law charges exist, e.g. murder, arson, etc.

“We propose Khedive orders us to examine together the record of the preliminary inquiry, before recommencing the preliminary investigation *de novo*, and for him to report thereon.

“On this, Khedive will issue Decree exiling principal offenders, pardoning some of the accused, and relegating criminals to ordinary Courts, dissolving Special Commission. As this will flow from examination of preliminary inquiry, it will be most regular, will save terrible exposé, recrimina-

tions here, and satisfy every reasonable man in England and Europe.

“Arabi’s only wish is to leave Egypt.”

On the 31st he wrote to Lord Granville officially:—

“CAIRO, *October 31st*, 1882.

“The state of the country remains the same as when I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch of the 17th instant.

“The fellaheen, having given their faith to Arabi, continue to believe that he is still in power. In outlying districts they refuse to pay their debts to Europeans on the ground that they were told by Arabi that such debts were cancelled, and, as yet, Europeans have not been able to resume business or to feel safe away from the towns. The provincial Governors report that they cannot hope to acquire their full authority until the fate of the rebels is decided.

“I do not believe that there is any serious ground for apprehension of disturbance, but it is certain that the protraction of the procedure against the rebels is delaying pacification, and that till their trial is over the present uneasy feeling will continue.

“I do not agree with those who consider that

the death of the principal rebels is essential to the restoration of the Khedive's authority. On the contrary, I think it quite as likely that their death would canonise them, and that they would, if executed, be more than before objects of veneration and fanatical enthusiasm. In the East the loss of power entails at once the loss of adherents, but the difficulty at present lies in bringing home to the knowledge of the population that this loss of power has taken place."

In another despatch he forwarded the following letter addressed to him by Europeans in the province of Galioubieh regarding the attitude of the natives towards them, adding that reports of a similar nature came from many parts of the provinces.

"SEIBIR-EL-ANATER, *October 30th, 1882.*

"We, the undersigned, residing in this village, beg your Excellency by the present letter to kindly direct your attention to the abnormal condition of our province.

"Although the revolutionary movement has been put down in the principal towns and villages of Egypt, among us, on the contrary, disquieting



news is very often spread by the Arabs, who can easily excite anew the fanaticism and renew the sad events. We and our employés are daily grossly insulted by the Arabs, with whom we have commercial relations, who unfortunately suffer immensely, the Government having neglected to send strict orders to the sheikhs and notables of the villages of our province Galioubieh, of which Benha is the capital.

“ We have already addressed ourselves to H.E. the Minister of the Interior, pointing out the guilty persons who continue to hold situations, but unfortunately for the Government and for public security no steps have been taken against them. Having submitted the above in a condensed form to your Excellency, we trust that you will take all measures necessary to convince the native population that the reign of the rebels has disappeared for ever, and that they owe a certain respect to Europeans.”

He wrote again on the 4th November :—

“ I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of a despatch addressed to me by Mr. Vice-Consul Borg, transmitting a despatch from Mr. Carr,

British Consular Agent at Tantah, regarding the attitude of the natives towards Europeans.

“The Egyptian Government, to whom I have frequently spoken regarding similar reports, are perfectly aware themselves of the state of the country, but say that as long as the trial of Arabi lasts there is no hope of a better state of things. Riaz Pacha has told me that he has prevented provincial Governors from reporting openly on the subject lest it should be supposed that pressure is thus brought to bear by the Government to unduly hasten the trial, although he is of opinion that the delay with regard to it is positively dangerous.

“Mr. Bradley, Arabi's counsel for defence, informed me to-day that the trial will probably last several months; his words were ‘eight or nine.’”

*Enclosure 1.*

From Vice-Consul Borg.

“CAIRO, *November 3rd*, 1882.

“I have the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of a despatch and enclosure just received from Mr. Consular Agent Carr calling attention to the fact that European residents are subjected to gross insults and threats of violence at the hands

of natives, and suggesting that prompt and decisive steps should be taken by the authorities to put a stop to such demonstrations of ill-feeling, which might lead, at no distant period, to acts of violence.

“I may add that parties having business in the villages have frequently told me that the ill-feeling against Europeans has not abated, and that they consider it as being rather on the increase.

“I may here state that even at Cairo an unfriendly feeling exists among the lower orders towards Europeans, which finds vent in gross insults. On four different occasions I called the attention of the Prefect of Police thereto, but notwithstanding the very stringent orders given by him it does still continue.”

*Enclosure 2.*

From Mr. Carr to Vice-Consul Borg.

“BIRKET-ES-SAB, *November 2nd*, 1882.

“It is with regret that I have to inform you that I am in daily receipt of complaints from the European residents in this district that they cannot attend to their business in the villages without being grossly insulted and threatened with violence by the natives; these complaints, instead of dimin-

ishing, have lately considerably increased, and I am of opinion that prompt and decisive steps should be taken by the authorities to put a stop to such demonstrations of ill-feeling, which, if left uncurbed, must shortly lead to acts of violence. As far as I can learn, the present unfriendly bearing of fellahs towards Europeans is caused by their finding that their debts have not been cancelled by Arabi as they were led to believe; and owing to the delay in the trial of Arabi, there is a general feeling among them that he will return to power, the most absurd rumours being daily current.

“ I enclose, as a sample of the complaints I am daily receiving, a letter from some Greek merchants resident at Birket-es-Sab.

“ I have duly communicated with the local authorities, who seem most anxious to put a stop to the growing evil complained of, and I trust that you will see fit to make suitable representations on the subject in the proper quarter.”

On the 7th he wrote privately :—

“ CAIRO, *November 7th*, 1882.

“ I am expecting Lord Dufferin to-day and I shall be heartily glad of his arrival. The important

matter is to get Arabi tried somehow. Mr. Broadley speaks of the compromise which I have reported to your Lordship as being suggested by him, and endeavours to make out that unless an arrangement of this nature is come to, he will find it necessary to bespatter the Khedive and Government with scandalous evidence, and he holds out *in terrorem* the duration of the trial for months and talks of 420 witnesses in Arabi's case alone. In plain words this is what his language amounts to, 'Let Arabi off with simple exile or I will make the place too hot to hold you, and will prevent the trial from being brought to a conclusion for months.' Now, neither the Government nor the Khedive fear any disclosures. But they are justly most anxious about the indefinite protraction of the trial because it is producing a very bad effect. Yesterday the new Greek Consul-General was received in state by the Khedive. The street in front of the prison was crowded by Arabs, who believed that the procession was Lord Dufferin coming by order of the Sultan to liberate Arabi. It is not possible to reason on such matters, and to consider how it is possible that the Arabs should be so foolish as to believe such nonsense. The fact is there, and until

Arabi is sentenced very little progress will be made in any direction."

Lord Dufferin arrived, as expected, on the 7th November, and, of course, took the supreme direction of affairs. The change brought to Sir E. Malet a diminution but no cessation of labour. As he had said in his letter to his father, the work was getting to be more than one man could manage.<sup>1</sup> A division was made, and Sir E. Malet continued to transact various matters with the Egyptian Government and to address reports on them to the Foreign Office. To his mother, who had felt some discomfort at what appeared to her to be his supersession, he wrote a letter which is remarkable for its freedom from all petty feeling and its candid, and perhaps almost over-modest, view of his own claims on the public confidence:—

“CAIRO, *November 10th*, 1882.

“I take a spare moment to write a line about

<sup>1</sup> A vivid description of the work which Lord Dufferin found awaiting him is given in Sir A. Lyall's *Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava*, Vol. II, p. 33. He wrote privately to the Foreign Office: “I am already nearly dead with all the work I have on hand” (p. 38).

myself. I have no thought of resigning. Lord Dufferin's arrival is in answer to an appeal which I made to Lord Granville myself, and which I am sure I was right in making.

“ First of all I want it clearly to be understood that in all the work I have ever done and shall ever do, I hope, I think of the work itself and not of myself. This is not an unselfish policy. It is the best for self in the long run, only few people are willing to wait the length of time which this line takes to bring its fruits. To me it has brought them tolerably quickly.

“ In the present instance I saw clearly that Egypt had become the arena of home squabbles and a source of political contention between Parliamentary parties. My career has not enabled me to gain the confidence of the public at home, because till this question arose I was comparatively unknown except to a small circle. I felt that my authority was not sufficient, and at the same time I was convinced that our policy ought to be shaped by what is passing in Egypt rather than by the miserable bickerings of the House of Commons.

“ The House will listen to Lord Dufferin when it will not listen to me, and if I have to forgo the satisfaction of settling Egypt by myself, I hope to

have the greater satisfaction of seeing affairs settled as they ought to be. It is a matter of indifference to me how the matter is done, provided it is done.

“I think you will see that we shall pull through, whereas, had I been left to myself, I think that in a short time a general mess would have ensued and I should have been the *bouc émissaire*. The papers have been civil to me. The *Times* says I have ‘served my country admirably.’ What more can I desire? I enclose our local newspaper, where you will see I am treated far beyond my deserts.

“I own I have not felt so happy for many a long day as on that on which Lord Dufferin arrived. He is charming, as you know. I feel sure that we shall work together as one man, and I am certain that my general reputation will greatly increase by being associated with him in the work which we have in hand. So do not be anxious. In this matter I have only acted on what you always advise *fais ce que dois advienne que pourra.*”

The condition of the various prisoners who had been arrested in different parts of the country on charges connected with the rebellion had been the subject of constant anxiety and inquiries, and occa-



sionally of remonstrances by the Agency. On the 15th November Sir Edward Malet sent home a report by Sir Charles Wilson suggesting measures for shortening the detention of some at least of those under arrest.

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *November 15th*, 1882.

“With reference to my despatch of the 31st ultimo, respecting the number and treatment of the political prisoners in Egypt, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a Memorandum on the subject by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, who suggests that, in view of the large number of political prisoners awaiting trial at Cairo, Alexandria, and all the principal towns in Egypt, some arrangement should be made, viz. by the appointment of a sub-Commission of the present one, to make a summary examination of the cases against all the prisoners, and discharge those men against whom there is not sufficient evidence to go before a court-martial.

“The matter is under the consideration of Lord Dufferin, and I propose to speak to Cherif Pacha on the subject.”

*Enclosure.*

“I visited the prisoners at Cairo, excepting those at the Citadel, during the week, and found the rooms clean and the prisoners well cared for. A large number complained of the delay which was taking place in their trial, and a few that their families were not allowed to leave their houses.

“In my Memorandum of the 22nd October last I drew attention to the number of prisoners at Cairo and in the provinces, and suggested that power be granted to the Commission to make a summary examination of each man's case, and to discharge those against whom there were only trifling accusations. I also suggested that Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart should be sent on a tour of inspection in the provinces.

“The state of affairs has since become much worse. The arrests commenced eight weeks ago, on the 16th September, and some of the prisoners have been in confinement the whole of this time without having been interrogated or having any definite charge brought against them.

“It seems to me that, as we are in military occupation of the country, we are, to a certain extent, morally bound to see that men are not thrown into prison for the gratification of private

revenge, and that the cases of all prisoners are looked into with as little delay as possible. In Cairo there are at present above 150 political prisoners, and the Commission, after six weeks' labour, has only examined the cases of fifteen. It will take six weeks more, perhaps much longer, to complete the examination of these cases and send the prisoners before the court-martial.

“ The President, in answer to my inquiry, told me that the Commission could not commence the examination of the other cases until the first fifteen were disposed of. Under this arrangement 135 men will be kept in prison for at least fourteen weeks without knowing the crimes of which they are accused, except the vague one of complicity with the rebellion.

“ As long ago as the 20th October the President of the Commission asked Riaz Pacha, Minister of the Interior, to supply a list of prisoners, setting forth the crimes with which they were charged. His Excellency, up to the present moment, has only furnished the charges against nineteen. They are such vague ones as ‘Stirring up public feeling against the Khedive,’ ‘Assisting the rebels,’ etc. I have myself spoken to Riaz Pacha on the subject, but unfortunately without result. On the 22nd

October I urged that Riaz Pacha should be pressed to furnish a list, and trust that some steps may be taken to obtain it.

“ At Alexandria there are 443 prisoners, of whom 36 are officers, simple prisoners of war, who surrendered at Kafr-Dowar ; the remainder are charged with having taken part in the rebellion, in the disturbance of the 11th June, and in subsequent events.

“ At Tantah there are 434 prisoners, 359 of whom are said to be confined for political offences, or for having been engaged in the riots and massacre.

“ Of the number of prisoners at Zagazig, Mansourah, Kafrzayet, Siout and other towns, and of the state of the prisons at those places I know nothing. I fear, however, from Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart's report of what he found at Tantah, and from the difficulty we have had at Cairo of protecting prisoners and their families from insult, the state of affairs must be very bad. Zagazig is the place from which, I understand, the report came that two Notables were chained together.

“ I think the Egyptian Government should be strongly urged to make some arrangement for a speedy gaol delivery, and I would suggest the appointment of a small Commission, or of a sub-

Commission of the present one, to make a summary examination of the cases against the prisoners, and discharge those men against whom there is not sufficient evidence to go before a court-martial. An English officer should watch the proceedings of this Commission.

“As regards the provinces, I would suggest that an English officer be sent as early as possible to report on the prisons and prisoners, and that, on his report, steps should be taken to send a Commission similar to that suggested above to each province.

“Unless pressure is brought to bear on the Turco-Egyptian officials in the provinces, they will do nothing.

“Since writing the above the President of the Commission has informed me that he proposes to carry on the investigation of the cases of the other prisoners during the period of fifteen days allowed to Mr. Broadley, to make himself acquainted with the document already in the hands of the Commission. I am afraid, however, little progress will be made, as there will be many interruptions.”

Sir Edward Malet addressed a note to the Egyptian Government recommending this proposal :—

“The length of time which must necessarily expire before the trial of the principal prisoners renders the position of those prisoners who are not to be tried with these principal offenders one of possible hardship and injustice. It is very desirable that their cases should be at least superficially inquired into, as it is believed that amongst many of them the accusations are of so slight a nature that two or three months’ imprisonment would be sufficient even if the charges are proved.

“It is therefore suggested that a small Commission should be immediately appointed, or a sub-Commission, emanating from the one presided over by His Excellency Ismail Pacha Eyoub, whose duty it should be to inquire into the charges on which these persons have been arrested, to release those against whom there is not sufficient evidence to go before a court-martial, and to liberate those on bail against whom the charges are of so light a nature that a sentence of short imprisonment would be the result of conviction.

“It would be advisable that an English officer should be present at the proceedings of the Commission.”

Lord Dufferin gave his own personal support to Sir E. Malet’s representation, and Cherif Pacha

promised to give it his attention, and to discharge as many prisoners as he could.<sup>1</sup>

On the 21st November Sir E. Malet wrote to his mother :—

“ Having got through the messenger I am going to Helouan for a few days or rather nights (I shall be back here during the day), as a little change before settling down for the winter is useful, also I have got work on hand which can be better worked out uninterrupted by visitors. Lord Dufferin is confident that he and I together shall be able to hammer matters out by degrees, and though he will necessarily get the lion's share of merit I think you will see that in the long run I shall not be the loser. I get to know him better daily, and my opinion of his ability increases as I do so.”

To Lord Granville he wrote on the 28th :—

“ I shall now, for a time, cease troubling you with letters, as Lord Dufferin has become the mouth-piece.

<sup>1</sup> Of the prisoners charged with political offences, about 150 were sentenced to exile or police supervision, the rest were amnestied under a Decree of January 1, 1883. Special Commissions were appointed to examine the charges against those accused of crime. Many were released, the rest were sent to trial before a court-martial.

“ I feel each day more convinced of the great advantage of his being here, and it seems to me that he arrived exactly at the right moment.”

In the meanwhile the question of Arabi's trial was being gradually brought to a conclusion.

On the 15th November Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin :—

“ In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the delay of the prosecution in the matter of the trial of Arabi Pacha is assuming grave importance. They consider that it is desirable that the Commission of Inquiry should complete at once the record of the evidence, and come to a decision as to whether it supports any criminal charge other than rebellion against the authority of the Khedive.

“ Should it not support any other such charge, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that His Highness might consider whether Arabi should not be dealt with summarily instead of proceeding to a formal trial.”

Lord Dufferin replied asking for a few days' delay :—

“ CAIRO, *November 16th*, 1882.

“ I had the honour of submitting to your Lordship by last mail the very course with regard to the



trial of Arabi Pacha recommended in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date, and I have been pressing it on the Egyptian Government. Riaz Pacha, the Minister of the Interior, has already promised me that the record shall be concluded at once, and that within four or five days they will let me know whether they have evidence of a sufficiently positive character to connect Arabi with the massacres and conflagration of Alexandria. If not, they will be ready to adopt the course I have recommended. Here, however, arises a difficulty. I am strongly of opinion that, if convicted of revolt, Arabi's banishment should have a penal character—that is to say, he should not be at liberty to repair to London to be fêted by his partisans. Such a result would produce disastrous consequences here. But though he could be 'exiled' by a Decree of the Khedive, he could not be 'transported' without trial and sentence. If he were to plead guilty the difficulty would be obviated, but I have no reason to believe that he is inclined to do so, though he would probably consent to reside as a political exile in any place we might appoint.

“The two prisoners just arrived from Crete, who were the principal agents in the conflagration, have made important revelations, and one of them asserts

that he was commissioned by Arabi to have the Khedive shot ; but, of course, his evidence is tainted.

“ In any event, I think the Egyptian Government is entitled to the few days’ further delay it demands before deciding whether it will persevere with the trial or accept my suggestion.”

Two days later he telegraphed :—

“ CAIRO, *November 18th*, 1882.

“ I saw the Khedive to-day, and gave His Highness to understand that I thought it very unlikely that sufficient proof would be forthcoming to authorise the execution of Arabi and the political prisoners, and I suggested the alternative of deportation.

“ I was glad to find that His Highness was prepared, if required, to accept this result, provided Arabi and his family were removed from the country *en bloc* and his property forfeited, in which event the Egyptian Government would allow a maintenance for his women and children, who, the Khedive observed, ought not to be punished for their father’s fault. At the same time His Highness begged that no decision should be come to before the few days demanded by his Government to consider the question had elapsed.”

On the 21st he sent a further message :—

“ I suppose that, in the event of Arabi being exiled on parole, there would be no objection on the part of Her Majesty's Government to his being relegated, with his own consent, to a place on British territory, as we should not in that case be responsible for his safe custody.”

To this he received an affirmative answer.

The following telegrams report the final settlement :—

From Lord Dufferin.

“ CAIRO, *December 3rd*, 1882.

“ At 9 a.m. to-day the court-martial assembled under the presidency of Reouf Pacha. On Arabi being brought before the Court, the President said : ‘ Arabi Pacha, you are accused before this Court, in accordance with the instructions of the Commission of Inquiry, of rebellion against His Highness the Khedive, under Articles 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and 59 of the Penal Ottoman Code ; are you guilty or not guilty ? ’

“ Broadley, on behalf of his client, replied : ‘ Of my own free will, and in accordance with the advice

given to me by my advocate, I acknowledge myself guilty of the crime alleged against me.'

"A paper in Arabic signed by Arabi to the above effect was also handed to the Clerk of the Court and was read out.

"The Court has now adjourned to deliberate upon the sentence, which it is expected will be pronounced at three this afternoon."

From Lord Dufferin.

"CAIRO, *December 3rd*, 1882.

"My previous telegram of to-day.

"During the interval which elapsed between the adjournment and reassembling of the court-martial Messrs. Broadley and Napier sent me a solemn undertaking in writing, signed by Arabi and witnessed by themselves, that he would remove to any locality indicated by the Egyptian Government, and there remain until invited to change his abode. At 3 p.m. the court-martial reassembled, and the following sentence was pronounced on Arabi: 'Arabi having avowed that he has been guilty of rebellion, the Court, in conformity with Article No. 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article No. 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code, pronounces

sentence of death upon him ; this sentence to be submitted to His Highness the Khedive.'

"After this sentence had been pronounced, a Khedivial Decree was read by the Court commuting the capital sentence into perpetual exile, the commutation to become null and void should Arabi return to Egypt. When Arabi's counsel advised their client to plead guilty, Messrs. Broadley and Napier knew that the confiscation of the prisoner's property and degradation from his military rank would follow by Khedivial Decree."

From Lord Dufferin.

"CAIRO, *December 7th*, 1882.

"Sultan Pacha called on me to-day to express his great satisfaction at the way in which the trial of Arabi and his fellow prisoners had been brought to a close. As Sultan Pacha possesses considerable influence and authority in the country, his expression of opinion is important."

From Lord Dufferin.

"CAIRO, *December 7th*, 1882.

"Four more of the rebel prisoners, Mahmoud Sami, Ali Fehmi, Abdel-Al and Toulba, have been dealt with by the court-martial to-day in the

same way as Arabi. There remain only two more, whose cases will be finished the day after tomorrow. Thus, by the end of the week all the seven chiefs of the rebellion will have been disposed of.

“A vessel will be engaged by this Government to take the prisoners to their destination.”

From Lord Dufferin.

“CAIRO, *December 11th*, 1882.

“On the 10th instant the court-martial assembled for the trial of Yacoub Pacha Sami and of Mahmud Pacha Fehmi on a charge of rebellion against the Khedive. The prisoners pleaded guilty, and the sentence of death was passed on them. This sentence was commuted by Khedivial Decree to perpetual exile.

“Each of the prisoners sentenced on the 7th instant, as well as the two above named, have signed formal promises to reside in the place to which they may be sent by the Government. These promises have been witnessed by their advocate, Mr. Broadley, and are in my possession.”

Lord Granville informed Lord Dufferin that Ceylon had for the present been selected by the

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British Government as the place to which the prisoners should be sent.

The following letter, addressed to Sir Edward Malet, by Arabi, may fitly close this chapter :—

Arabi to Sir E. Malet.      “ *December 4th, 1882.*

“I feel bound to present to you my heartfelt thanks for the noble efforts you have made in order to ensure my treatment with fairness and justice, and for all that you have done to rescue me from the dangers which surrounded me. I hope, therefore, that you will accept the expression of my gratitude and of my highest respects, and of the friendly and sincere feelings I shall always entertain towards you.”

(Signed) AHMED ARABI, *the Egyptian.*

## CHAPTER XVI

WORK WITH LORD DUFFERIN AND AFTER HIS  
DEPARTURE—CHOLERA EPIDEMIC—DEPARTURE  
FROM EGYPT

ON the 2nd January, 1883, Sir Edward Malet wrote to Lord Granville :—

“ I must not let this mail go by without wishing you a very happy New Year. I am happier in my mind than I was this time last year, for though the work is still hard there is no anxiety.”

In addition to frequent interviews there was a constant interchange of notes between Lord Dufferin and Sir E. Malet during the period of Lord Dufferin's special mission in Egypt, and among these was one of which Sir E. Malet subsequently quoted an extract in a letter to the *Times* of October 16th, 1907. A series of letters had appeared in a daily paper giving an account of the rebellion and its causes. The writer had omitted in them to make



any mention of Sir E. Malet's action. Sir E. Malet wrote to him on the subject and told Lord Dufferin he had done so. Lord Dufferin replied :—

“CAIRO, *January 14th*, 1883.

“I am very glad you have written, and I am sure —— will meet you in a friendly spirit. No one recognised sooner than myself the admirable judgment and correct appreciation of the situation which you exhibited, and, long before I came here, I never lost an opportunity of doing you justice. Since I have been here and learnt more of what passed, I am more than ever confirmed in my original impressions. I am sure —— shares these views. He never speaks of you except in the most friendly manner ; and I make no doubt that part of his programme is to devote a considerable space to exhibiting the claims you have on the gratitude of your country. . . .”

Lord Dufferin added :—

“In me also you have a warm admirer, and, I may now say, a sincere and affectionate friend, who is most grateful to you for the frank and loyal assistance you have given him, and for the pleasant way in which you have done it.”

Later in the month Sir E. Malet wrote to his father :—

“CAIRO, *January 30th*, 1883.

“Our work is going steadily on, and I think Lord Dufferin will be here certainly till March. He is now writing a big report on Egypt, and is engaging my help in several of the component parts, and I enclose a line from him which will show you that he is not ungrateful for such assistance as I can give him. It is a happiness to work with so pleasant a chief.

“There is a deal of work yet to be done in Egypt, and sometimes I tremble about my leave, but I shall certainly ask for it in due time. My present wish is to start about the 1st of May.”

The enclosure was as follows :—

“*January 30th*, 1883.

“What a good fellow you are! Nothing can be clearer than your paper, and it will go into the *magnum opus*<sup>1</sup> as it stands. Your assistance will have saved me from a paralytic stroke, to which I certainly should have succumbed without it.”

<sup>1</sup> Lord Dufferin's Report on Egypt.

From the British Admiral (Sir Beauchamp Seymour) came in February a letter of farewell :—

“MALTA, *February 12th*, 1883.

“Good-bye! I cannot quit the Mediterranean without again telling you how fortunate I esteem myself in having been associated with you during a momentous period, or how sincerely I wish that you may be as fortunate in your diplomatic career as you deserve to be.”

Parliament met on the 15th February, and the Egyptian question and Lord Dufferin's special mission were naturally topics for discussion in the Debates on the Address. Nothing could have been more complimentary than Lord Granville's allusion to Sir Edward Malet on this occasion. Replying to Lord Salisbury, he said :—

“The noble Marquis is perfectly justified in speaking of the great abilities of my noble friend, Lord Dufferin. All I can say is that we have chosen an excellent colleague to Sir Edward Malet. If any one ever deserved the confidence of his country, Sir Edward Malet deserves it in consideration of the way in which he conducted the affairs of

Egypt in times of extraordinary difficulty. But we thought it would not be fair to centre in one man constructive as well as diplomatic duties, and, therefore, we looked out for a man who should be best fitted to assist him in the work of construction in Egypt. We found that person in my noble friend, Lord Dufferin, who had arranged in so permanent a fashion the affairs of the Lebanon, who had had great experience of government on the other side of the Atlantic, and who had also been so successful in diplomacy. He was, we thought, of all men especially fitted to work with Sir Edward Malet in carrying out exactly the principles which the Government had laid down. I trust and believe this policy of the Government will be that which is best calculated for the prosperity and peace of Egypt, which it is the interest of France and all the Powers, as it undoubtedly is of this country, to secure and maintain."

On the receipt in Egypt of the report of the Debate, Lord Dufferin at once offered Sir Edward his congratulations. In a short note of February 23rd he wrote :—

“ Please see the Minister of Public Works when

you have an opportunity, and try and settle Baker's affair for him.

“I was so pleased to see Lord Granville's handsome compliment to you. No one is in a better position or more ready to confirm everything he says than I am.”

Sir Edward Malet wrote to his mother :—

“CAIRO, *February 26th*, 1883.

“Lord Granville's speech was very pleasant. He could not have said more. I doubt whether any diplomatic servant ever had so much said of him. As it stands in the *Times* it would do for my epitaph.

“I have received many congratulations, and none more hearty than Lord Dufferin's.

“On the other hand, it is deplorable to see Lord Hartington talking of withdrawing the army of occupation in six months. It will be impossible to do so. We shall be here inevitably for a long while to come if we do not wish all we have fought for to disappear in a trice.”

In the earlier part of April Sir Edward was at last able to take a few weeks' leave, and come over

to England for a brief stay. He wrote a farewell letter to Lord Dufferin, as it was uncertain whether they would have the opportunity of meeting on his return. He received the following letters in reply:—

“*8th April, 1883.*”

“I cannot say how much I was touched by your kind letter. It is very nice of you to have made me understand your friendly feelings; all the more so as you are one of those who never go beyond what they really mean. I can only pay back all that you say in the same golden coin, and I shall never forget the frank and hearty good will with which you received me on my arrival. How can I sufficiently thank you for the effectual assistance you gave me throughout my stay here? It was such a comfort to me to feel that I could always recur to you for advice or help, with the certainty of meeting with a sympathetic response. As you already know, I have the highest opinion of your judgment and ability; and I have never lost an opportunity of letting Lord Granville know what I think of you; though, indeed, it was not necessary to incense him on the point, as it is evident from his letters to me that he thinks very highly of you. I have urged your promotion unless your salary

here could be considerably increased ; but I have rather favoured the former than the latter alternative. In case of my recommendation being adopted, I have suggested as your successor an ex-Colonial Governor, rather than a diplomatist, as a man of that kind has had a thorough training in administration as the head of a Crown Colony, as well as experience in indirectly guiding a Constitutional Ministry. Lord Granville has not replied to my letters, but has asked me what I thought of —. Another man Lord Granville mentioned was Major Baring. This, of course, would be an excellent appointment, but I should doubt whether he would be willing to come at the low salary. This would also be the difficulty, perhaps, with an ex-Governor, and I hardly imagine the Treasury would submit to any increase in the salary attached to the post.

“ My Report is out, and seems to have fairly stood the ordeal of criticism both here and at home. We have made one blunder, however, in putting down 52,000 as the number of Egyptian ‘ Civil ’ Servants. In this 52,000 are included the Army and the Navy, as well as other categories that can hardly be reckoned as Civil Servants, in the sense at all events in which the term is used by those who have raised the cry of Egypt for the Egyptians.

The number of Civil employés properly so called appears to be about 10,000, and the proportion of Europeans to natives about 8 per cent.

“My wife starts next Tuesday, and my children the Thursday following.

“And now good-bye, my dear Malet. Within a year or two I hope to see you an Ambassador.”

“CAIRO, 11th April, 1883.

“I had a long interview with the Khedive to-day, in which he spoke of you in the very highest terms. He would like nothing better than to see you back here. Cherif Pacha spoke in the same sense. I have written this to Lord Granville, but, still, I think it is for you to consider what is best for your own career. Henceforth this will be an exceptional location, and, though very important, the man occupying it will be in a kind of backwater. I am rather inclined to recommend you to go on with your profession, and to take promotion, if it is offered to you, in an acceptable form instead of remaining where you are.”

Sir Edward Malet was back in Egypt by the beginning of May.



To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *May 7th*, 1883.

“I arrived safe and sound on the 3rd. Lord Dufferin had deferred his departure until my return, and I breakfasted with him on board the *Helicon* and had a long talk with him afterwards on affairs in general.

“Everything is going smoothly, and my work will be comparatively light. There is a rumour that Evelyn Baring is to be my successor. He was Controller-General here on my arrival and is now Finance Minister in India. I shall be very glad if the report turns out to be correct, as no better nomination could be made. Of course I know no more about myself than when I left London. I see there was a telegram in the London papers shortly after I started to say that I was probably to go to Brussels, and I say generally in reply to questions that, though nothing is absolutely decided, that is my probable destination.”

Lord Dufferin's official acknowledgment of Sir Edward Malet's assistance was written in the most generous terms :—

To Lord Granville.

“H.M.S. *Helicon*, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1883.

“Having quitted Egypt, as I have already announced to your Lordship in my last despatch from Cairo, one further duty is still incumbent on me, namely, to convey to your Lordship my deep sense of obligation to Sir Edward Malet, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, with whom I have been associated for the last six months in the important mission your Lordship was pleased to confide to us. It would be presumptuous on my part to dwell upon those qualities in Sir Edward Malet which have already gained for him the high position he holds in the Diplomatic Service, as well as in your Lordship's confidence; but having had exceptional opportunities of becoming personally acquainted with the high estimation in which he is personally held by all classes in Egypt, by the Khedive, by His Highness's Ministers, and by the English, and, I may say, by the European colony at large, it is but natural that I should desire to add my tribute of respect to the general voice. From first to last Sir Edward Malet gave me the most cordial support. His knowledge of Egyptian affairs and of the leading personages in the country

rendered his opinions extremely valuable, and I have no doubt that on many occasions I have been kept from adopting erroneous views and from taking many a doubtful step through having had the advantage of his advice.

“He was of the greatest assistance to me in the elaboration of my General Report, many of its paragraphs having contained more of his handiwork than my own. On taking leave of the Khedive nothing struck me more than the unmistakable earnestness with which His Highness expressed his hope that Sir Edward Malet might return to Cairo, and similar expressions of regard emanated with equal warmth from His Highness's Ministers.”

On his arrival at Constantinople Lord Dufferin wrote privately to beg for a continuation of correspondence :—

“. . . Would it be asking you too much to let me have a line occasionally as to how matters are going on in Egypt? I am so glad to think that you will still be there for some time to keep the Egyptian Government up to the mark and to induce them to carry out all they have undertaken. I was very much impressed by the strong desire both of the Khedive and of the Egyptian Govern-

ment to have you back. It was the only genuine and sincere expression of feeling I have ever observed in the Khedive. This will give you a great advantage. . . .”

For some time after Sir Edward's return matters went smoothly. He wrote to Lord Granville :—

“CAIRO, *May 16th*, 1883.

“I find that all the different reforms which have been inaugurated by us are in their grooves and are moving slowly along. They are nearly all of them too weighty to move fast, but I think the pace is as good as can be obtained with due regard to their going steadily and safely. There are little frictions here and there which have to be carefully watched, and over-zeal and too great hurry on the part of some of the English officials have to be repressed now and then. I find no backsliding on the part of the Egyptians, now that the Elchee is no longer present.”

In July and August, however, Egypt was visited by an epidemic of cholera, which tried to the utmost the energy and resources of the Egyptian Administration, the European officials, the British military

authorities, and not least those of the British Agency. Sir Edward Malet complained that the flood of telegrams and appeals of every kind with which he was deluged from all parts of the country equalled in volume those with which he had to cope during the military operations of the previous autumn. His letters to Lord Granville and to his mother give an interesting picture of the state of affairs :—

To Lord Granville.

“CAIRO, *July 22nd*, 1883.

“My time has been so entirely taken up by cholera correspondence with all parts of Egypt that I have no time to write about it to you. Indeed, there is not much for me to say on the subject, as an official report of its existence here is hardly required. I have had some anxiety, as a little pressure has been put upon me to take over the government of the town and give it to our military officers. I have, however, found a *mezzo termine*, which I trust may prove sufficient. Irresponsible people, and some whose responsibility does not weigh upon them, are fond of heroic measures in times of difficulty, but I think that you would have

been a little astonished to hear that we had assumed the reins of government even temporarily."

To Lady Malet.

"CAIRO, *July 22nd*, 1883.

"The mail goes a day sooner than usual, and being altogether overwhelmed by cholera business, I have no time to write. I am sorry for these poor people, but the only wonder is that they do not have it regularly every summer.

"I have had my house beautifully disinfected by a professional chemist from the Laboratoire Khédivial all on your account, for I don't believe it makes a bit of difference. The weather is delicious, and though I cannot say that we are exactly gay, still we are by no means the reverse.

"Last night at midnight General Stephenson came to me to know if I would consent to his stopping the people coming in from Boulacg. They were pouring all over the place with their household goods. I don't wonder, as they had become aware that they were to be hunted out of their houses, or rather hovels, for sanitary purposes. I consented, and in half an hour it was all stopped by our own military police. To-day I have told the Minister of the Interior that I disapprove of

such a necessity arising through the tactics of the Government, and that I insist upon our three Generals—Baker, Wood and Stephenson—being taken into the Council of Ministers on cholera measures.”

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *July 27th*, 1883.

“I can assure you that my great anxiety during this cholera time is about you. I know how you must worry about me, and it vexes me more than I can say. As to myself I am perfectly safe. It is a tiresome period to go through on account of the work it involves, never ceasing telegrams and letters till I don't know which to take up next. I have been to the great hospital at Kasrain and visited the wards. There were about one hundred and twenty cholera patients in all the stages. The thing that struck me most is that none of them seemed to be suffering. Death seems always to be painless, as it is preceded by a sort of stupor. People who are frightened are in more danger than others, so I send off my butler and valet, both foreigners and weak-kneed creatures. The number of cases has diminished continually for three days, but I cannot but think that it will go

up again when it gets well hold of the interior of the town. I continue to get my game of lawn tennis every day towards sunset, and you may be sure that I do not fatigue myself, and lead so orderly a life, and am in such excellent bodily health, that I am personally perfectly safe. In fact, with few exceptions it only carries off those who are poor in body and sickly."

To Lord Granville.

"CAIRO, *July 30th*, 1883.

"I have had some difficulty lately to smooth asperities between General Baker and the Prefect of Police, but I hope I have been able to put things straight by getting Sir E. Wood to lend Chernside temporarily and to allow him to be attached to the Prefect.

"I lost my porter the day before yesterday from cholera. He had been ill all night, but I only heard of it at 7 a.m. I gave him the remedies which I had by me, and he did not seem to be in much pain. Surgeon-General Hunter came to see him and pronounced it a distinct case of cholera, and did not hold out much hope of his recovery. I had him removed to the hospital, and when I went there at three in the afternoon his bed was



already vacant—the poor fellow had died half an hour before. There were one hundred and twenty patients in the hospital. They none of them seemed to be in much pain. I spoke to those in the European ward, trying to say a word or two of comfort to them. When my people heard at home that the porter was dead they became demoralised, and two Europeans left me on the following day, the butler and the valet. I am happy to say, however, that the cook, who is a Frenchman, has apparently nailed his colours to the mast, and shows no sign of desertion. I have been obliged to have a deal of disinfection and whitewashing done; most houses now smell like hospitals, and the sulphur fires in the streets and open places give a weird aspect to the place, to say nothing of the constant funerals and ambulances. However, we keep up our spirits very fairly, and go to hear the English band in the evening or to the open-air Italian theatre.”

To Lady Malet.

“CAIRO, *August 2nd*, 1883.

“I am appalled at reading the accounts of cholera at Cairo in the London papers when they arrive here, especially those in the *Standard*. But they are made up for party purposes to show the in-

efficiency of every Egyptian authority and the necessity of our taking things into our own hands. As a matter of fact, our daily life is not changed from what it is at other times, and unless one crosses the streets leading to the cemeteries one need not know that anything unusual is going on. I have taken all the precautions that can be taken. The house has been thoroughly cleansed from top to toe with disinfectants. My household drinks nothing but boiled water. I prefer and use St. Galmier. The doctors have arrived. I hope they may be of use. Dr. Hunter seems to rely very little on doctoring, cleansing is his stand-by. But the Egyptians of the lower orders are always dirty and their residences foul. We continue to burn rather freely, and I am sorry for the poor wretches turned out of house and home for sanitary purposes."

To Lady Malet.

"CAIRO, *August 5th*, 1883.

"I have been annoyed at reading the accounts of affairs at Cairo as furnished by the London papers. It is very cruel on the relations of those here to be so deceived. Cairo has never been unlike its usual self during the cholera. It is entirely untrue

that 'one cannot go a hundred yards without seeing a corpse or a coffin.' Unless one goes to the streets leading to the cemetery one never sees either one or the other. At night the town is much more cheerful than usual owing to the fires which are lit in the open places and streets, showing the architectural features of the neighbouring buildings. These in the hands of our correspondent become 'the lurid glare of the fires emitting sulphurous fumes,' etc. It all merely teaches that the public likes to be harrowed, and that the papers find it pay to pander to the taste. I see I am in bad odour with the *Times* correspondent because I do not admit that there ever was famine at Mansourah. There is no doubt that there was no famine, but that does not suit the sensational writer, so those who take a sober view of affairs have to suffer and be held up to public obloquy. But these things always right themselves in the long run when the excitement is over."

Sir Edward Malet's appointment to be Minister at Brussels had been practically settled during his visit to England in the previous April. On the 1st June Lord Granville had written to him that the appointment would probably be made in

August. The formalities were completed on the 29th of that month, though the arrangement and the selection of his successor had been matters of common knowledge for some time previously. The first half of September was mainly taken up with the preparations for departure. From Cherif Pacha, who continued to hold the office of President of the Council of Ministers, came a most cordial letter :—

“CAIRO, *September 10th*, 1882.

“I thank you for your photograph and for the kind letter which accompanies it. Herewith mine. It certainly does not equal yours, but it will suffice to remind you sometimes of one who has always had for you an attachment and unalterable friendship.

“If calm has succeeded the storm, it is thanks to the loyalty of your character, and to the steadfastness of your bearing.

“The hand of time will not efface my affection for you, or the sentiment of high esteem which I have always entertained for your attractive qualities.”

Lord Dufferin wrote :—

“ LONDON, *September 18th*, 1883.

“ I am suddenly summoned back to Constantinople, but before leaving England I must leave behind me one word of welcome to greet you on your return to your native land. I hope sincerely that they will give you a good long holiday before you go to Brussels. That you will have a most friendly and enthusiastic reception at the hands both of the Foreign Office, of Lord Granville and of all your friends is, of course, to be expected. Baker, Wood and everybody who has returned from Egypt are loud in your praises, and certainly what you have gone through during the last two years more than represents the burden of a long lifetime. Personally I am most grateful to you for the energy and goodwill with which you have carried on the good work upon which we were both engaged.

“ I see you were given a farewell dinner in Cairo, and I am sure you do not leave a spark of ill will behind you in the breast of any human being.

“ In Brussels you will have time to recruit your strength before you are promoted, as I trust you will shortly be, to some still more important post.”

On the 7th September Sir E. Malet addressed to Lord Granville a detailed report on the progress which had been made in the various reforms initiated during Lord Dufferin's special mission. He stated :—

“The time which has elapsed since His Excellency's departure on the 3rd May was actively employed in pushing these reforms forward, until the appearance of the cholera towards the end of June compelled the Government to divert its attention from them, and to concentrate it upon the measures to be taken to meet the epidemic. Yet, notwithstanding the interruption, enough has been done to prove the good faith and activity of the Ministry in executing the task which they have undertaken.”

The report is too lengthy for insertion here ; the main points may be summed up as follows :—

The Electoral Lists for the Legislative Council had been drawn up and examined. As soon as the cholera had subsided the elections had taken place, and all was ready for the convocation of the Provincial Councils within the first fortnight of October, of the Legislative Council during the

first fortnight of November, and of the General Assembly if the necessity should arise.

A decree had also been drafted for the constitution of the proposed Council of State.

As regards the native Courts of Justice drafts of a new Organic Law and of new Codes had been drawn up by a Special Commission and revised, and were in course of being printed. A sufficient number of foreign judges had been procured from Holland and Belgium, and lists had been prepared for the selection of native judges.

Proposals had been made to the foreign Powers for extending the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to criminal cases, and for the institution of a house-tax applicable to foreigners.

A scheme had been drawn up for granting a Municipal Government to Alexandria.

A new system of Land Survey had been instituted on the lines advocated in Lord Dufferin's Report.

The services of Colonel Scott-Moncrieff had been retained for the superintendence and organisation of Irrigation Works, and he had been dili-

gently engaged in preliminary investigations since his arrival in the month of May.

Remarkable progress had been made in the formation and discipline of the Egyptian army, under Lieut.-General Sir E. Wood. His work had been materially facilitated by the intelligent co-operation of the Minister of War, Omar Pacha Soutfi.

Progress in the reorganisation of the constabulary had been much delayed by the cholera epidemic, and the new force had not yet been brought up to its proper strength, but it was stated to be working well, and to be fulfilling the objects for which it was created.

The reorganisation of the police had also moved slowly, its formation being in some degree dependent upon the institution of the new Courts of Justice for natives, but so far as it had gone the results were considered to be satisfactory.

The service for the suppression of slave traffic had been completely disorganised during the rebellion. A special bureau had now been created and would be in working order by the end of the month.



Sir E. Malet concluded his Report with the following observations :—

“ It will, I think, be clear from the foregoing summary of the progress made in carrying out the projected reforms that the Ministry of the Khedive has done all that lay in its power to advance them. Those reforms which depended upon the Ministry alone have gone steadily forward. Those which depend upon negotiation with foreign Governments have been carried to that point at which action here ceases until replies can be obtained from abroad.

“ There is one point in connection with the work in hand on which it is necessary to make an observation. It has been asserted that the Ministers are mere figure-heads, and that the country is indebted to the foreigners in the service of the Egyptian Government for the good or ill which is done, the Ministers being without authority.

“ This is a misrepresentation. It is only by the good will and support of the Minister that the foreign subordinate can be of use. If this assistance is wanting, the power of the subordinate is completely paralyzed. It is due to the intelligence and largeness of views of the Ministers that Egypt is likely to become the one well-governed auto-

mous Mussulman State. Without their authority no reform would be possible, and a clear injustice is committed when it is asserted that the reforms will be carried out, not by them, but in spite of them.

“The Council of Ministers meets twice a week ; all questions, down to the most minute, are submitted to it. At this Council no European is present, with the exception of the Financial Adviser, who has a voice on financial subjects ; but all others the native Ministers alone examine and decide. What would be the power of the European official if these Ministers in Council were narrow-minded and obstructive ? It is from them alone that the impulse and the sanction can come. Theirs is the authority which is a power in the country. The respect in which they are held induces the population to await with confidence the result of measures which it does not understand or appreciate. They have undertaken a noble task, which may be beneficent as an example to all Mussulman States, and they have deserved, up to the present moment, continued support. It is their rule, under an honourable and large-minded Prince, that makes the future of Egypt hopeful, and allows me to leave the country, after watching it through its

darkest hours, with the confident assurance that it will recover from its misfortunes, and ultimately become a prosperous and well-governed State."

A farewell luncheon was given to Sir Edward Malet by the British community at Cairo, at which Sir Evelyn Baring (now Earl of Cromer),<sup>1</sup> Lieut.-General (now Sir Frederick) Stephenson, Sir A. Colvin, and other British officers and Anglo-Egyptian officials were present. Mr. Moberley Bell, the correspondent of the *Times*, occupied the chair, and proposed Sir Edward's health in a speech of which two passages may be quoted as singularly apposite:—

"Those of you who were here during the eventful months of June and July, 1882, will bear me out when I say that nothing more contributed to the maintenance of the English character for coolness, clearheadedness and common sense than the

<sup>1</sup> Sir Evelyn had just arrived from India to take up his appointment as successor to Sir E. Malet. In a brief speech at the close of the proceedings Sir Evelyn expressed the peculiar pleasure which it had given him to join on this occasion in doing honour to the principal guest. "No one," he said, "can have been as intimately connected as I have been with Sir Edward Malet, without recognising the sterling worth of his character, and without feeling a sincere pleasure in the fact that his high merits are appreciated by all classes in this country."

perfect self-possession and the ready foresight which reigned at the British Agency in Cairo.”<sup>1</sup>

“In the eighteen years that I have lived in Egypt, it has been my good fortune to know nine or ten representatives or acting representatives of Her Majesty. Of all of them I have heard and known much good; of all of them I have heard some unfavourable criticism. Sir Edward Malet has been no exception. Luckily we cannot all think alike, and owing to circumstances, he has had, perhaps, more than his full share of criticism—but this I will say, that among those nine or ten not one has done more to uphold, in Egypt, the honour of the English name and the English word, that word which has become a proverb and a familiar saying, signifying justice, among the fellaheen. In England if a peasant wishes to confirm his statement he may say on *my* honour, on *my* word, but in Egypt the fellah will say *Bil Kclam Inglisi*—by the word of an Englishman.

“Gentlemen, Sir Edward Malet has been the incarnation of *El Kclam Inglisi*. Whether addressed to the highest or the lowest, to the Minister

<sup>1</sup> This compliment included Mr. Cartwright and Sir A. Colvin, by whom the Agency had been carried on during Sir E. Malet's illness and absence.

or to the fellah, whether in praise, in gentle remonstrance, in advice, or in blame, his words have been *Bil Kelam Inglisi*, strong, true, sincere and, moreover, never failing in their execution."

Sir Edward Malet's reply is given in full, though it is the latter part which is most significant :—

"I beg to thank you with all my heart for the manner in which you have received the toast of my health, proposed by our Chairman in terms which made me rather desire to have the wishing cap for a moment, and make myself invisible. Gentlemen, I beg also to thank you for the honour which you have done me in giving me this farewell breakfast. I can assure you that no more grateful compliment can be paid to an Agent and Consul-General, on quitting his post, than such a proof that, in the discharge of his duties, he has obtained the esteem and good will of his fellow-countrymen in the country in which he is accredited. The times through which I have passed since I came to Egypt have been full of trouble, full of anxiety, but I have been sustained through these anxious moments of heavy responsibility by the forbearance, nay more, the support which I have constantly met with from those whose esteem and support have been neces-

sary to me. I thank you for it, gentlemen, from the bottom of my heart, and shall never forget it. The closing moments of my stay here are very painful to me, because I leave so many friends; the dearest friends are those which are made in adversity, and of such are mine in Egypt; my consolation is that as I go I see a brighter future for it ensured. It was a joyful day for me when I learnt that Lord Granville had been able to induce Sir Evelyn Baring to come here as my successor. Sir Evelyn in relinquishing the high position which he held in India, with all that it brought with it, has afforded another proof, if one were wanting, that he subordinates personal considerations to the needs of his country. The direction of the affairs of Her Majesty's Agency being in his hands must give you complete confidence that it will be conducted in such a manner as to increase the honour and respect in which the English name is held, and conduce to the welfare and prosperity of Egypt, the common object of the Khedive, of His Highness's Ministers, and of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. On such an occasion as this I desire to abstain entirely from touching on politics, but I cannot mention His Highness's name without expressing the respect which I feel for him. There can be no better

Prince to guide the country in that liberal path on which it has now entered. Loyal, courageous and good-hearted, tried by an ordeal under which most men would have succumbed, he has proved himself to possess qualities such as I have never met with before in any Prince of the East and very few Princes of the West. Supported by Ministers who are bent on carrying out his liberal and enlightened views, His Highness will, by degrees, lead his country to prosperity and his people to happiness. But on that point I must say a closing word. For this prosperity and welfare there is but one foundation. The country may have an excellent army, excellent Chambers and well-intentioned Ministers, but the only solid foundation for public weal is public justice, without this it is but building a house upon the sand ; and with my last breath in quitting a country which I love, I ask for Justice! Justice! Justice! When that is established His Highness will have built himself a monument more noble than the Pyramids, but until that is done, he ought not and, as I know him, he will not be satisfied."

With this last appeal for justice in the native tribunals, a reform which he had so constantly urged on every opportunity, the four years of Sir

Edward Malet's work in Egypt—years full of patient self-sacrificing effort, pursued with a calm intrepidity and a steady beneficence of purpose, which neither danger, nor detraction, nor many checks and disappointments could disturb or discourage—came to a close.

One further document may be added to the record :—

“ ISMAILIEH PALACE, *October 15th*, 1883.

“ My dear Edward Malet,—I have the pleasure to send you by my Equerry, Captain Ibrahim Effendi Edhem, who is on leave, a souvenir<sup>1</sup> as a token of all my profound affection and esteem for the sincere interest which you never ceased to show in my behalf during the sad events through which we have passed. I wished to present you with a souvenir, which is altogether Egyptian, to remind you always of me and of my dear country.

“ Your very affectionate

“ THEWFIK.”

<sup>1</sup> The “souvenir” was a complete set of appurtenances for the writing-table, including a massive inkstand and candlesticks, modelled in silver in the form of ancient Egyptian symbols, and inscribed with hieroglyphic texts.



## CONCLUDING REMARKS

THE documents set out in the preceding chapters have no pretension to present a comprehensive view of the phases of the Egyptian crisis to which they relate. In particular they give a very inadequate idea of the difficulties with which the British Government had to contend on account of the extraordinary oscillations of the French Government (with whom they were bound, both by engagements and by considerations of policy, to act in concert), of the obstructive and shifty conduct of the Turkish Government, and of the divided condition of English opinion both in the general public and among their own supporters in Parliament. The compilation is merely an attempt to give an account of Sir Edward Malet's impressions, objects and intentions as they appear in his own words written at the time when the incidents were occurring.

Imperfect as is the record, many readers may think that it suggests an answer to the enigma which Sir Edward Malet declares in chapter iv. of his narrative that he was still unable to solve : how it happened that the Ministry of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville found themselves engaged against their will in a course which inevitably placed them in administrative possession of Egypt for an undetermined number of years. From the moment that the Khedive's personal rule was completely shaken by the insubordination of the army there were, in fact, only three alternative issues : (1) constitutional progress under the guidance of a national party, paying due regard to European rights and interests, or if this should prove impracticable without some external control, then (2) either Turkish intervention under proper limitations and conditions, or (3) intervention by some European Power or Powers. The attempt of the Egyptian nation to work out its own salvation under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty was commenced with some signs of good promise, but in a short time proved to be a signal failure. Cherif Pacha was set aside,

and the leaders of the Military Party who took the reins of power, whatever moral excellences they may, or may not, have possessed, were altogether lacking in the knowledge, moderation and skill which were essential for their task. Moreover, the forces behind them of national exclusiveness and religious fanaticism were beyond their control. The Sultan's moral authority, exerted in an ambiguous and hesitating manner, failed altogether of effect, and forcible intervention of some kind became inevitable if the country was to be saved from ruin.

Here, perhaps, it may be said (with the wisdom which comes after the event) that there was an error in calculation. Both Lord Granville and Sir Edward Malet, while deprecating intervention except in the last resort, greatly preferred Turkish intervention (under proper limitations) to that of Great Britain, either alone or in conjunction with France. The French Government and French public opinion had a rooted aversion to Turkish interference, and it was only by slow degrees that they were unwillingly brought to acquiesce in an invitation to the Porte to intervene. In England

the supporters of the Liberal Ministry viewed such a course with strong suspicion and jealousy. Consequently the invitation, when it did come, was made in a manner and under circumstances which did not render it attractive. But was it in any case to be expected that the Sultan would interpose his authority to effect a solution satisfactory to the Western Powers? At the commencement of his reign Abdul Hamid had granted a Constitution to his Empire, but after a brief trial had abandoned the experiment and had sent the Minister who had advised it into exile. In his audience of the Sultan on the 13th September, 1881,<sup>1</sup> Sir Edward Malet was expressly warned by His Majesty that he could not concede the demand for Constitutional Government; "it was not possible for him to allow a Constitution in one province of his dominions and to withhold it from the others." Moreover, in proportion as his system of government had become more and more one of personal rule, the Sultan had shown an increasing tendency to base his authority on his position as Caliph—as the representative of

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 143.

Mussulman sway, entitled to the veneration and support of all the followers of the orthodox Mohammedan creed. Forcible intervention to secure constitutional progress in Egypt and to protect the interests and privileges of the Christian European nations against a fanatical Mussulman movement would have been in diametrical opposition to the guiding principles of his policy. It might, as Lord Granville argued, have been to His Majesty's advantage internationally to appear as effecting a solution of the Egyptian difficulty without the necessity of European intervention, but it was an advantage which could only be secured by appearing in an odious light to his personal surroundings, and to those of his subjects on whose support he most relied.

Turkish intervention of the kind that would have been acceptable to Europe was not really to be hoped for. France and Italy declined to co-operate, and England interposed, not because the Government wished to do so—Lord Granville had written to Sir Edward Malet that he detested the thought—but because, in homely phrase, they could not help

it. The interests of Great Britain in Egypt, political no less than financial and commercial, were of too serious a nature to admit of her leaving them at the mercy of the leaders of a military insurrection; other nations in a less degree were also suffering, and British intervention was called for by the great majority of the public in this country, was acquiesced in by other European Governments, though attacked in some sections of the Continental Press, and viewed at least with resignation even in Turkey. From the moment indeed that it was found necessary to send ships of war to Alexandria in support of British policy, a pledge was given of intervention in certain eventualities, for a naval demonstration, if not in itself successful, can only lead to one of three alternative issues—compromise, retreat, or ulterior and more decisive measures.

Those who have watched the progress of international questions in their more acute phases have probably noticed that there are occasions when each successive expedient, however carefully combined, seems to fail at the critical moment from

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some unforeseen defect of detail, or some miscarriage in execution which is brought into prominence apparently by perverse fate. The responsibility of failure is thrown on the principal actors, but the ultimate event generally shows that the popular sentiments and passions arrayed behind them were so disposed that compromise was really impossible until in some manner their relative strength had been tested and ascertained. So it was with the Arabist movement. Each side was determined; each underrated the resolution of the other. A conflict became inevitable before a solution could be found. The moral of the history recorded in this book is that the Egyptian nation in its then condition and circumstances was—as, according to the judgment of those best qualified to pronounce an opinion, it still is—incapable of working out its progress towards constitutional self-government, except under the tutelage and control of a strong foreign Power. The experiment, however, of independent national effort had to be tried, and if it failed it was not on account of any want of sympathy on the part of the British

Representative. There is surely something that commands respect and admiration in the spectacle of this comparatively young diplomatist—he was in his forty-fifth year, and this was his first independent post—working undauntedly at his impossible task, swallowing his disappointment when his suggestions were disregarded, or adopted in such a manner as seemed to doom them to failure, offering the idea that he might be recalled under an unmerited cloud of failure if the cause of progress might thereby be advanced, keeping on good terms with what was virtually a party of insurrection until driven into opposition by proceedings which appeared to his colleagues, as well as to himself, to be tantamount to an attempt at political massacre thinly veiled under a pretence of legal form, refusing to take any measures for his personal safety which might excite alarm among the rest of the European community, preaching clemency in the hour of victory to the Khedive and his Ministers, but carefully avoiding any expression of opinion to others which might embarrass his Government before they had announced their decision,



and finally asking that he might be superseded when he felt that his opinions and action would not command sufficient weight with the public at home. Courage, straightforwardness, calmness of temper, unswerving loyalty to his official chiefs, a complete disregard of personal considerations where public interests were involved, a generous sympathy for the people among whom he was residing, and, dominating everything, the strong love of justice are written in unmistakable characters in these papers. They are qualities which the great mass of the English people instinctively understand and appreciate, and it was not without reason that a statesman, whose wide experience of men and accurate knowledge of human nature have never been questioned, summed up his encomium in the pithy sentence, "If any one ever deserved the confidence of his country Sir Edward Malet deserves it."



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
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