THE THEÂTETUS

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

BY THE

REV. LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A.

VICAR OF MILFORD, HANTS:
LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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TO

EDMUND LAW LUSHINGTON, ESQ., M.A.,
PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,
THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEÆTETUS
IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED
BY HIS OLD PUPIL
LEWIS CAMPBELL.

May, 1861.
PREFACE.

The Text of this Edition differs in some respects from that of the Zurich Editors, from which it has in the main been printed.

1. All conjectural emendations have been excluded, except such as appeared to be absolutely required for the correction of mere clerical errors: and these latter have been enclosed within brackets [ ]. The Student is thus at once enabled to distinguish between the (sometimes corrupt) reading that is found in MSS., and that which has been created by the ingenuity of scholars.

The guesses even of the highest genius do not pretend to certainty; and the admission of conjectural readings into the text has this disadvantage, that it tends to lull curiosity asleep, and to put an end to conjecture.

Some of the readings which have been thus removed exist in almost all the editions from Stephanus downwards. He appears to have received them on the authority of Cornarius, who, after long study of the ancient medical writers, translated Plato in his old age. In the execution of this work (according to his son, who published it at Basle in 1561) he
used the three printed editions then extant, and one MS. from the Library of Baron Hassenstein. This MS. was probably destroyed with the others in the same Library before the end of the 16th century.

Unfortunately, in the Eclogæ, or Select Readings, which he appended to each quaternion of dialogues, Cornarius has not distinguished between the readings of this MS. and his own conjectures, of which, as Fischer says (in an Epistle prefixed to his edition of the Eclogæ, Lips. 1771), 'magnam attulit multitudinem.' The formula 'legendum est' appears to serve equally for both. In his remarks on the Theætetus he only once names the MS., and then to differ from it: and in this case (πνοελαθων p. 147) the 'Codex Hassenstenius' is in agreement with the twenty MSS. which have been collated since.

The claim of any single reading of Cornarius to MS. authority, unless supported by other evidence, must be allowed to be very slight indeed. And nothing is known of the value of the MS. in question, beyond what may be gathered from the fact that it was probably bought, towards the middle of the 16th century, for the sum (according to Fischer) of 2000 ducats.

2. Of MS. readings, that of the 'Codex Clarkianus' in the Bodleian Library has, with rare exceptions, been preferred. The value of this MS., which no editor except C. F. Hermann has yet sufficiently appreciated, is evident from the following facts. 'It was written,' (so the last page informs us) 'by the
hand of John,' (well-named) 'Calligraphus, for Arethas the Deacon, of Patræ,' in the year 896. It was brought from Patmos by Dr. Clarke the traveller, from whom it was bought for the Bodleian Library. Thus it is not only considerably superior in known antiquity to any other MS. containing the Theætetus, but has probably been preserved from adverse influences to which others may have been exposed. The two MSS., Vat. Δ. and Ven. II. (the latter of the 12th century) are very closely related to the Bodleian (though apparently not copied from it), agreeing as they do with it in its peculiar mistakes, and in the lacuna from p. 208, πάνυ μέν οὖν, to p. 210, δοξάζομεν, inclusive. The errors of the Bodleian MS. (which probably did not originate with John Calligraphus) are of a very simple kind, consisting chiefly either of the repetition of a syllable or initial consonant by a sort of memory of the eye, or the substitution of a word apparently from conjecture, or the introduction of a gloss into the text. Here and there a word is dropped or misplaced (though this is less common than in other MSS.) or the accentuation is at fault, or ο and ω, ε and η, ι and ει are confounded. In one or two instances a marginal reading in the ancient hand seems to indicate that the scribe had several texts amongst which to choose.

The notes contain a few readings of this MS. not mentioned by Gaisford. These are due to a collation made in the year 1856, and have since been verified with the kind assistance of some
friends. Where the readings of all the MSS. appeared corrupt, that of the Bodleian MS. has been printed between obeli, ††.

For a full account of the various readings, the student is referred to the notes of Bekker and Stallbaum, and to Gaisford's Lectiones Platonicae.

The present editor is under obligations to Heindorf, Stallbaum, Ast, Deycks, Socher, Zeller, Munk, Lassalle, and other scholars and writers, of whose labours he would have availed himself more largely had circumstances permitted. He has not been contented, however, until the data acquired seemed enough to justify him in forming his own opinion on each point.

For valuable information concerning the MSS. of Plato, he begs to express his acknowledgments to the Rev. H. O. Coxe, Bodley's Librarian, Oxford. His thanks are also due to the Rev. Dr. Badham, for having pointed out several difficulties in the text.
INTRODUCTION.

GREEK philosophy had passed through several phases before Plato wrote. The reflective and creative impulse, which had long striven with forms of the imagination, experiences of history, and impressions of Nature, and to which Socrates had added the energy of moral life, found its crowning form and development in his mind; while different tendencies of thought, which had till then seemed independent of each other, became woven by him into a kind of unity. This is not, however, the unity of a plan, foreseen by the author himself: or of a system, into which earlier ideas are moulded; nor even such perfect unity of treatment as would result if previous conceptions were seen and handled from an unaltering point of view: it is rather the common impress given by a growing mind to the various surrounding aspects of inquiry which it has made its own. The philosophy of Plato is one long dialogue, in which Socrates (its moving centre) becomes the pupil of each school, and teaches where he seems to learn. Protagorean scepticism, Eleatic transcendentalism, the mysticism of the Pythagoreans, the rhetoric of Lysias, are alike penetrated and weighed by the same searching spirit, which enters every labyrinth without losing itself in any.

In the Theætetus some earlier and some contemporary theories are made to converge upon the question, What is Knowledge? The method followed in it, and some of the leading thoughts, are akin to the earlier Megarian philosophy; while in itself the dialogue may be considered as a gradual advance from the consciousness of particular and relative impressions towards the contemplation of the universal and absolute Idea. This progress here takes the subjective form of an attempt to define knowledge; and in the course of it sensation and opinion are analysed, and shewn to be wholly indeterminate.

The antithesis between sense and knowledge, opinion and certainty, appearance and truth, the relative and the absolute,
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has never ceased to exercise the human mind since the dawn of reflection. To Plato, and still more to those who preceded him, the antithesis and the problem which it involves were new. The mind of an educated Athenian in the time of Socrates was subtle, imaginative, comprehensive, in all practical and artistic matters fully awake, curious and ready for inquiry, but little familiar with the study of abstract ideas. The youth, who in this dialogue is presented to us as an embodiment of the philosophic nature, childishly attempts to define knowledge by an enumeration of the arts and sciences. Yet he proves capable of following the most sustained philosophical argument. So from crude beginnings the Greek mind was led onwards to discover for itself, by the light of its own young but noble intelligence, thoughts which its experience had not anticipated.

The endeavour to trace the origin of these thoughts, which have been so fruitful since, resembles the investigation of the sources of mythology. As the Homeric poems present a cycle of mythological ideas, the analysis of which, by the help of known analogies, reveals the dim features of an earlier and simpler cycle, so in the writings of Plato there are left many traces of earlier philosophies, by comparing which with their genuine extant fragments, and with the testimonies of later writers, some light is thrown, perhaps on those earlier philosophies themselves, certainly on the intellectual atmosphere in which Plato lived. The same inquiry brings out and illustrates his position in regard to contemporary opinion.

In the following Essay it is proposed in the first place to view some of these historical elements in connexion with the Theaetetus, and to examine what indications this dialogue itself affords of its relation to them.

The answer to this question will be found useful in considering further, (1) the general scope and purpose of the dialogue, (2) its genuineness (if necessary), (3) its position amongst the other dialogues of Plato, (4) its supposed occasion, and the date of its composition; (5) its relation to Aristotle, and (6) to philosophy in general.

§ 1. Contemporary opinions.

Although the chief names mentioned in the Theaetetus are older than Socrates, and "the problem has come down to us
from ancient times," a careful reader is soon led to suspect that the dialogue contains allusions to living men. The 'disciples' of Protagoras, and the 'friends' of Heraclitus, evidently play an important part in it: whilst there are others, the 'hard, repellant,' 'illiterate' persons, who are expressly forbidden to have any share in the discussion. These and the like touches, which may be paralleled from other dialogues, naturally provoke inquiry.

Before entering upon this, it may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato's manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of 'a certain theory,' or of 'certain men.' We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippus, or of Euclides and his band (οἱ δὲ τοῦ Εὐκλείδην), but 'I have met many such men,' 'there are numbers who keep saying this,' or more familiarly, 'there are certain refined persons, to whom we must shew courtesy.' Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philosopher, who 'knows nothing of his neighbour.' But it is also reasonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. The above remark does not apply to schools already formed, nor to persons contemporaneous with Socrates himself.—It is from later writers and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age. The chief amongst them in relation to the present subject were three friends or at least companions of Socrates,—Euclides, Aristippus, and Antisthenes.

I. Euclides of Megara. Plato's contemporary and fellow-disciple, seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Eleatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical definitions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His ἐρμηνεία must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar ἀργολογία so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject in a less degree to the same defects. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premises of an opponent. — One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to
definition by comparison, because if things are unlike, they
should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with
the thing itself than its resemblances.a

The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he
said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intell-
gence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence.
Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of
Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth
and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wis-
dom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is
opposite to, or other than the Good.

His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than
that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of
sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain
ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so
far at least as they entered into human language.

It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of
Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or
of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a
tendency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly
than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable,
however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a
new element into the Megarian school. At all events he
gave a new and not altogether wholesome impulse to its para-
doxical side.

The following are the chief points in which the Theaetetus
affords indications of its connexion with the school of Megara.

1. Its controversial tone.

Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such
a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination
to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing,
but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves
in danger of being on a par with "those skilful men."b Pro-
tagoras is imagined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming
it by the reflection, which is dwelt upon also in the Phædo,
that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are more-

a Cf. Plat. Rep. p. 476: το ὑπεράτ-
πειν ἄρα οὗ τὰ ἐστίν, ἢν τοῦ ἄρχον 
τοῖς τε ἐγγυγορᾶς τὸ δικαίον τὴν μὴ δικαίον,
ἀλλ' ἂντι ἡμᾶς εἶναι ὃ καὶ δικαίον. Ar.

b Theae. p. 164.
over oppressd throughout the discussion with the fear of an
imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons.
And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is
that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we
are compelled to answer 'a negative dialectic.' The first im-
pression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even
our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination
to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the
sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon; which in another
aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the
man-midwife Socrates. In this sense the Theaetetus may fairly
be regarded as an "eristic" or Megarian dialogue; since, al-
though it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized
by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists
in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the
passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of μακευ-
τική.

And the form of refutation used corresponds to that which is
described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof
is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and anni-
hilated. Man is not the measure, for if so, then why not every
other creature endowed with sense? Motion cannot be the sole
principle, for if so, language would be impossible. Protagoras
is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines
him challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining
that they use only negative proof.

2. Besides this correspondence of method, there are also
some coincidences of idea.

a. The turning point of the whole dialogue, the fulcrum, by
means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of
sense, is the mention of the good, expedient, just and honour-
able, which Theaetetus had at first unwarily included amongst
the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of
what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those
motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because
it regards the future.

This thought is also the occasion of the eloquent digression,
in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (μετὰ
φρονήσεως) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And
the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcen-
dent, as in the Republic c, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name, (ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ἀφέλιμον, δικαίον, δύναμιν, φρόνησις.)

β. In its general aspect the Theætetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards absolute being, terminating with the conception of λόγος as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (πρὶν ἡ σμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σμοτήτων ——διαφορά τι μεμείλεν——κατάθηται) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge.

This intermediate character of the Theætetus is indicated by Plato's own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. This position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (λόγος). It may be added, that the two conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguishing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophista, but more or less embodied in the Theætetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity.

γ. It will appear in the sequel, that the difficulty about false opinion, which fills such an important place in the inquiry, and the distinction between the ἐπιστήμη and ἄλογα (p. 201), which occasions the last answer of Theætetus, can be referred with greater probability to the Megarians than to Antisthenes.

3. In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides.

The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it d, may be compared with the ἐγκεκαλυμμένος of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself,
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τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον εἶναι, we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, ἔτερον ἔτερον μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, 'to part everything from everything,' τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποχωρεῖσθαι. A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three φασματά or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound; or in the repeated difficulty, Ἀρ' οἶνον τὲ τὸν εἴδορα μὴ εἴδεινα, which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes.

The story that Plato and the other philosophers took refuge with Euclides at Megara, although hardly sufficient ground to build upon, is interesting as illustrating the friendship which clearly existed between Plato and Euclides.

If we add to these coincidences the fact that Plato represents this dialogue as having been preserved by Euclides, and asked for by Terpsion, (the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates,) and that it is read in the house of the former, we have enumerated the chief points at which the dialogue seems to touch upon Megara.

Perhaps there is no more satisfactory account to be given of variations and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind.

This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding converse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading whole dialogues. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokesman may still be Plato's, although they seem pervaded by an almost pedantic consciousness of method not found in others: a similar remark applies to the Parmenides: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is perceivable; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things

* p. 190  † p. 155.
to all philosophies: (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato's, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises: (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative 'elenchus,' was reflected in Euclides of Megara.

Aristippus. II. We scarcely need the testimony of later writers to the fact that Euclides and Aristippus were opposed. It is sufficiently obvious from the statements of their doctrine which remain. They were natural enemies on the metaphysical side, as the Cyrenaic and Cynic were on the ethical. Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the Phædo it is emphatically remarked that he was not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the Republic [p. 509. οὐ γὰρ δὴ που σὺ γε ἡ δουλὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν ἵ ἐγὼ], it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries. The tone of Xenophon's representation conveys a similar impression. Attending like Socrates to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled by the impulse of Socratic inquiry to give a philosophical form to the popular doctrine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories: adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea.

Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the Theætetus to the hypothesis, Sense is Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the 'disciples of Protagoras,' if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A comparison of the following extracts tends to establish this: although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be
supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers:

Diog. L. II. 86. Διὸ πάθη ἐφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἠδονή τὴν μὲν λειαν κίνησιν τὴν ἠδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχείαν κίνησιν.


Sext. Emp. adv. Math. VII. 191. Φασάν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνονται καὶ αἰδάγησταν τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιθότων τὰ πάθη µηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτόν µηδὲ αἰδάγηστον, διὰ µὲν γὰρ λευκανόμεθα, φασάν, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυσανόληπτων λέγει, αἰδαργεῖστας καὶ ἀνεξέλεγκτως διὰ δὲ τὸ ἑπεμοντικόν τοῦ πάθους λευκῶς ἢ γλυκῶς ἐστι, οὐχ οὖν τ᾿ ἀποφαινεῖσθαι.

192. καθά γὰρ ὃ µὲν σκοπεῖς καὶ ἵστεροιν ἀχριστάκις ὑπὸ πάθων κινεῖται, ὃ δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρευνᾶται, ὃ δὲ παραπλῆσις τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῦ κινεῖται, ὃ δὲ μεμερώς


See also Phileb. p. 42. μὴ κινοῦμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ᾿ ἐκάρτερα—οὐχ᾿ δὲ ἠδόνη γίνεται· δὲ οὔτ᾿ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.


—ἐὰν τις το στήσῃ τῇ λόγῳ, εὐδηλεγκτος τὸ τούτο ποιάν. 154. δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκῶν κ.τ.λ. 156. λευκότερον περιπλησθῆ. 159. Ὅταν δὴ οὖν πίνω ὑγαίνων κ.τ.λ. 167. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέν ἢστα δυσανόληπτα οὔτε ἄλλα παρ᾿ ἄν πάσχῃ ταύτα δεὶ δεὶ ἀληθῆ. 178. ἦκὼν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κρυπήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οὔτα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἴόμενος, ἀληθὴ το οὕτωι αἰτφ καὶ ὡσ.

p. 157. λείπεται δὲ τὀν κρητὶς τὲ πέρι καὶ τόσον, τὸν τὶ ἄλλων καὶ μανιᾶς, δι᾿ τοῦ τὸ παρακούον ἢ παραρέχῃ ἢ τὶ ἄλλα παραπλησίων λέγεται. 158. δοκεῖ—πολλοῦ δεὶ τὰ φαινό-

This argument is met by Aristotle, when he is discussing the theories of Heracleitus and Protagoras, Met. K. 6. 1063 a: οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦρ̄
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The apparent force of the above parallel must be slightly qualified by two observations. 1. Very similar language about the senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. 2. In the early part of the Theaetetus, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the Cyrenaic theory, and in the Philebus, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, "like the sea in a calm."

But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that Aristippus and those
who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the Philebus affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy Theaetetus should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy Philebus should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather Socrates for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspiration from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion.

There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these Pseudo-Socrates in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether Aristippus was really, or only by implication, a 'disciple of Protagoras,' and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the Heraclitean theory of the Universe, are questions which it is perhaps wisest to leave undecided.

III. More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euclides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good-humoured pleasantry. But he boasted justly enough of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen, probably genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous intercourse with Gorgias.
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There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (φρόνησις) is the chief good, and so on.

But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical: approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian subtleties, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part practical, part logical nominalism. "I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see." —"There is only one term applicable to one thing." Hence controversy is impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition is only a complex term, and accordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the imperfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of Education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy as much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras: denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative, or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things.

1. It has been thought that the Γυγενεῖς of the Sophista (p. 246 sqq.), who are manifestly identical with the 'hard and repellent' persons shut out from discussion in the Theaetetus, are meant to include Antisthenes as their chief. More than one critic has even fancied that an allusion to his name lurked in the epithet ἀντιτύποις. But (1) the abnegation of physical studies by the Cynics is inconsistent with this. The picture drawn in the Sophista especially contains several features (amongst which we may notice the repeated mention of body as

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h See Isocrates Ελένης Φιλάκιμος ad init. καταγεγράφασιν αυτού ὁ μὲν οἱ φάσκοντες οἴον τ' ἐναι ψευτὶ λέγειν, οὕτως ἀντι- λέγειν, οὔτε δὲ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πράγματων ἀντιλειψάν, οἷς δὲ διεξόμενας ἢς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαίωσιν ταύτων ἐστιν, καὶ φώσι μὲν οἴδηθα αὐτῶν ἔχομεν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἀπάντων ἐστίν. Socrates seems to be alluded to in the latter part of this. In the former part Protagoras and Antisthenes seem to be opposed.

1 μακρὸς λόγος. In which there is probably the same derisive force as in Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος, ὅταν μηθ' ὁ γιης λέγωσι. Αρ. Μετ. Ν. 3.
something to be touched and handled, and the conception of ἀναθεματικός to which Plato drives them) which seem to indicate rather a physical than a logical materialism. The question thus raised will be discussed presently. (2) It is a fair inference from the tone of the passage in the Theaetetus, that the 'disciples of Protagoras' would affect contempt and abhorrence of the 'uninitiated' persons in question. At all events there is a marked opposition drawn between the refined sensationalism of the one and the hard materialism of the other. But frequently (as in the Euthydemos) the saying of Antisthenes, οὐχ οὕτως ἀναθεμάτευσα, is represented as hardly distinguishable from the theory of Protagoras.

The hypothesis, therefore, at least of an exclusive allusion to Antisthenes here, is not altogether satisfactory.

2. When the disciples of Protagoras and the Heracliteans are reduced to absurdity by the negative dialectic of the Megarian Socrates, the position to which they are driven is very much that of Antisthenes, that argument is absurd, and no assertion can be considered false. (pp. 161. 183.)

3. This difficulty emerges afterwards in a more formidable shape in the question, Is false opinion possible? The statement that it is impossible to speak falsely, which Aristotle attributes to Antisthenes, by inference from his saying that controversy was absurd, appears to have been very commonly put forward (Cratyl. 429). The deeper inquiry, whether it is possible to think falsely, is seriously raised by Plato as a necessary step towards the true conception of Knowledge. It is shown to be impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood in opinion without the measure afforded by a higher light, viz. Knowledge of true ideas. The difficulty thus raised was certainly felt by others than Antisthenes, and probably by the Megarians, who perhaps disposed of it, as Plato does, to the disadvantage of Opinion in comparison with Knowledge. The arguments and images by which the discussion is conducted are certainly not borrowed from Antisthenes, and are probably Plato's own. The only argument that forcibly recals what we know of Antisthenes.

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k For a different view, see a paper of Plato. — Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, Vol. X. Part I. on the genuineness of the Sophista.
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is that which proves that right opinion is not knowledge.

Compare

Antisthen. Aj. ad init. : Ἐβου-λόμην ἃν τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἤμιν δικάζειν ὑπὲρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρῆσαν οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει σωφῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἄν οὐδὲν ἦν πλέον λόγον, ὅπερ δὲ οἱ μὲν παραγεγόνευσαν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιείσθης, ὡμὲς δὲ οἱ οὖδὲν εἰδότες δικάζεστε. καὶ τοῖς πολλὰ τις ἢν ἔκει δικαστῶν ἢ εἰδότων γένοτο, καὶ ταύτα διὰ λόγους, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἐγώ τρέφῃ.

With

Thest. p. 201: ἢ σοὶ οὖδε δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι δοτε ὃδε μὴ παρεγένοντο τιμεῖς ἀποστεροῦμενοις κρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένους, τούτους δυσκόλα πρὸς ὅσον μεγαλόν ἔμειν ἀληθεία;—Οὐκοῦν δὲν πεισθήσατε δικασταί περὶ ἣν ἱδοντι μόνον ἄτοιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταύτα τὸν ἀκοῇ κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἂνεν ἑπιστήμης ἱκριναν;—

And here, even if the argument was suggested by Antisthenes, (though it may have originated with Socrates), the application is certainly Plato’s.

4. It has been commonly supposed of late that the passage which follows the above (p. 201), in which it is said that knowledge is true opinion with definition (μετὰ λόγου), and that the elements of things are known only in their combinations, contains a direct allusion to Antisthenes. The passage of Aristotle, which is quoted in support of this, is certainly a very apposite illustration of Plato’s meaning.

Metaph. II. 3. 1043 b. “On inquiry then it does not appear that the complex (ἡ συλλαβή) consists of the elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων) and their combination, nor is a house merely a combination of bricks. And this is right; for combination and mixture do not result from the things combined and mixed. And the like holds in the case of other processes; e. g. if the threshold is so by position, the position does not result from it, but rather it from the position. Accordingly, man does not consist of animal and biped, but, seeing these are the material part, there is required something over and above them; and that neither an element, nor resulting from elements, but the essential part (ἡ οὐσία), leaving which out of view, they (Democritus and other physicists, see c. 2.) comprise in their definition the material only. Now seeing that this (the essential part) is that which gives being and substance, this must be
meant by those who speak of absolute substance. Now this must be either eternal, or perishable without perishing, and created without creation. But it has been proved and expounded elsewhere, that the Form is not made nor generated by any, but the concrete thing is made, and that which is generated results from particular elements, (γινεται δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ.) Now whether the essential part in things perishable has a separate existence, is not clear as yet, except that it cannot be so in some cases, in which there is no universal, as in a house or an implement. Perhaps indeed we should not even give the name of substances to these, nor to any other (of things perishable) that is not constituted by Nature: for in things perishable Nature alone can be conceived of as the essential part. And hence the doubt raised by the followers of Antisthenes and other narrow minds (ἀπαιτεομενοι) (that the nature of a thing cannot be defined, for definition is a roundabout expression (μακρὸς λόγος), but it is possible to indicate by definition what a thing is like, e. g. Silver may be defined not in its own nature, but as being like tin)—is not wholly irrelevant, but may be applied so far as this: That of one kind of substance, viz. that which is composite, (i. e. of matter and form), whether sensible or intelligible, definition is possible: but not of its prime constituent parts: since definition is a species of predication, and this requires the presence both of matter and form."

The paradox referred to is attributed, not to Antisthenes, but to his followers, who may have extended or modified his opinion. How much is attributed to them? This will be best seen by examining the context. Aristotle is speaking of sensible substance (αισθητὴν οὐσία), which he has shown to be threefold, viz. matter (ἐνν), form (ἐἶδος), and their combination (σύνθετος οὐσία). Having determined this, he proceeds in his usual manner to the solution of difficulties. It is clear, for instance, how to settle the question whether the complex whole (ἡ συλλαβή) is the same with its elements (τῶν στοιχείων) or different from them. The elements are only the material part, and no agglomeration of them can create the form. It is this which makes them one. It is clear also, how much ground there is for the difficulty raised by some narrow minds, that real definition is impossible, because definition is only a rigmarole expression for the name. (Aristotle seems to be reminded
of this by the mention of certain things which are not really substances.) As Definition implies predication, every thing, whether sensible or intelligible, may be defined, in which there is matter and form. But mere matter (e.g. the στοιχεῖα mentioned above) and simple form (e.g. καμπυλότης, cf. Met. Z. 12. 1037 b. 1.) cannot be defined.——Few will doubt that the last sentence, which argues from the nature of predication and from matter and form, contains Aristotle's own opinion. If so, it means that whereas the followers of Antisthenes, improving upon their master's saying, that nothing could be expressed but in one way, said that nothing could be defined, or rather that all definitions were merely nominal, Aristotle thinks that most things can be defined, but some cannot, namely, elements and the most abstract forms. That the Antisthenicans are not quoted throughout is evident from the word ἄδοξεν. Aristotle would not have applied this epithet to persons who agreed with him.

To return to the passage of the Thestetus: It may be fairly argued, that several points in it are against a direct or exclusive allusion to Antisthenes. Is the invocation or use of the term επιμέτρος consistent with his blunt scepticism? And if it were, which according to him would be more known, that which is named, or that which is defined? Whatever faults Antisthenes had as a philosopher, mysticism or obscurity was not one of them. Would Plato, then, have spoken of any of his fellow-pupil's tenets as having been heard by Socrates "in a dream?" Then, even supposing that the logical assertions are his, must not a different origin be sought for the physical conception of the elements, of which we and other things are composed? Lastly, Antisthenes' notion of λόγος was probably a very simple one, corresponding to the first of the three meanings proposed to Thestetus, the expression of thought in language. He rather opposed it to reality, (see the passage quoted above, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἐγένετο ἐργῇ,) than identified it with knowledge. All that remains therefore in common between this passage and what we know of Antisthenes is the assertion, that that which is represented by a

1 This appears to be the meaning of ἔδει αἰτῇ πρᾶγμα.
2 This argument also excludes Democritus, with whom the πρᾶγμα were certainly more real (ἐργῇ) than their combinations.
name cannot be defined. Now it is manifest that this might be held by persons who inferred from it that names do not convey knowledge, as well as by one who thought that the only knowledge was of names, and that definitions were superfluous.

The further discussion of this passage may be reserved as for the present irrelevant.

5. One or two places may be referred to, in which a covert allusion to Antisthenes has been, or may be, supposed.

α. The allusion supposed to lie hid in the epithet ἀντιτύπος (p. 156) does not seem to be quite in Plato's manner, even if it were consistent with the language held in the Sophist. Contrast the playfulness of Rep. 614. οὗ μέντοι—'Ἀλκίνου γε ἄπολογον ἐρῷ, ἄλλ' ἄλκίμου μὲν ἄρδρος—. It might be said with about equal plausibility that the name Ἀριστείδης (p. 150.) contained an allusion to Aristippus.

β. Ἡρακλῆς, p. 169. Hercules was certainly a favorite hero with Antisthenes, who may be said to have resembled him as one of the physical force logicians—οἱ τὴν βίαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ξηροῦντες (Ar. Met. I. 1011 a.)—Still he was not singular in his choice (compare Prodicus), and probably the annotation of the Scholast is not far from the truth of Plato's meaning. Ἡρακλῆς τε καὶ Ὠθησεῖς] οἱ ὸρασύμαχοι, Καλλικλεῖς, Διονυσίδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι, καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. That some allusion is intended appears probable if we compare the spirit of Euthyd. 297. πολὺ γὰρ πού ἐμὲ φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, δὲ οὖχ οὐδὲ τῇ τῇ τῇ τῇ δόξῃ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστὶ καὶ σοφία—καὶ καρκίῳ τινι ἐτέρῳ σοφιστῇ, ἐκ ταλάντης αἰθιγμένῳ, νεωτί, μοι δοκεῖ, κατατευκνύσ. γ. Θρακτοῖ τις—ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, p. 174. This has been thought to be pointed at Antisthenes, whose mother is said to have been a Thracian slave. The grounds for this conjecture are slight, and the epithets ἐμμελῆς καὶ χαρίσσα (more appropriate to the rhetorician than the Cynic) must be allowed to detract from its merit.

δ. One other guess may perhaps be allowed to stand on a par with the two last mentioned. Antisthenes wrote a dia- 
tribe called Ἀρχελαος, ἡ περὶ βασιλείας, in which he attacked Gorgias. In the Gorgias of Plato, Archelaus the Macedonian usurper is called happy by Polus. Is it possible that in the passage Ἐκ βασιλείας εὐδαιμόνις κ. τ. λ. p. 175, Plato ridicules the combatants on both sides of such an argument?
The following slight parallels may also be mentioned:

Antisthenes, like Protagoras, is said to have written an 'Αλήθεια. Perhaps this may be alluded to in the Cratylus, p. 391: Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τῷ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου διόλος οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ἢθέλων διαπέφην σὺ τοῦ ἔξω.

As Theodorus calls dialectic ψιλοί λόγοι (p. 164), Antisthenes called the Ideas of Plato ψιλαὶ ἐννοια, 'bare notions.'

The words ἵππου δὲ οὕτω ὀράμεν ὀὕτω ἀπόρεθαι (p. 195) recall Antisthenes' ἵππου μὲν ὀρᾷ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὀρᾷ, and Plato's retort, 'You see with your eyes but not with your mind.' Lastly, when Theætetus tries to define σ, by saying, 'It is as if you hissed with your tongue,' we are reminded of the Antisthenean saying quoted by Aristotle, 'You cannot define what silver is: you can only say it is like tin.'

Unless Antisthenes is wronged by Xenophon and Aristotle, the traces of his mind are to be sought rather in the Euthydemus than in the Theætetus, Sophista, or Philebus. It deserves to be said however, that some of the names in the list of his works given by Diogenes Laertius are difficult to reconcile with the general account of him. These are φιλοσοφομνοικός, περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης and ἐφώμα περὶ φύσεως. But the name of a work gives little insight into its real import, and Diogenes is far from being always trustworthy.

IV. Beyond the circle of those who had heard Socrates, the most interesting of Plato’s contemporaries in connexion with the Theætetus are the enthusiasts of Ephesus, with whom the exact soul of Theodorus is vexed, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus. They are ridiculed with less than Plato's usual reserve, as a congeries of self-taught heads, who support their master's principle of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. This picture, the Oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the Cratylus (part of which is written in facetious imitation of the same school) where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol fire. By one it is interpreted to mean the Sun, by another the principle of heat, by another mind.

n An indication of the nature of these works may be sought in Cic.Tusc. I. c. 15. § 32. 'Atque eiam Anti-sthenes in eo libro, qui physicus in-

sribitur, populares deos multos, naturalc unum esse dicens, tollit vim et naturam Deorum.'
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Although Heraclitus is mentioned early in the dialogue, these professed followers of his are not adverted to, until the principle of motion is being separately discussed, after the maxim of Protagoras has been dismissed. The arguments by which the same principle is upheld in the opening are almost expressly attributed to the “disciples of Protagoras” and are probably more in keeping with the refined scepticism of Cyrene than with the dark proverbs of Ephesus.

If Plato ever really followed Cratylus, as Aristotle implies (Met. I. 6. Κρατύλος συγγενόμενος καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλείτειας δόγμαις), these passages acquire something of a personal interest, like those sonnets of Shakspeare that touch on theatrical life.

V. The Theætetus presents few traces of Pythagoreanism. Pythagoreanism.

The only place in which this side of Plato’s teaching clearly shows itself is the mention of the region pure from evils, which is to receive the wise and righteous soul at its departure (p. 177). But a re-examination of the passage about the elements just now considered, (Theet. p. 201.) may perhaps justify the conjecture that the person from whom Socrates heard the opinion quoted, ‘as in a dream,’ may have been some ‘Italian or Sikelian man.’ This is suggested by the following fragment of Philolaus:

“As concerning Nature and Harmony, the absolute being of things is eternal, and to know nature in its essence belongs to Gods and not to men, except so far as this. Nothing that is and that is known could have been known by us, did not Nature enter into the things, both determining and determined, of which the order of the universe is composed. And seeing that these elements were not similar nor of one kind, they could not even themselves have been reduced to order, had not Harmony arisen between them, howsoever it arose.”

That is, The Absolute is not the object of knowledge, but things are known only so far as they partake of it. Without harmony, which is the participation of the absolute, the contrary elements of the universe could not even be combined.

Compare Aristot. Met. A. 5. Ἐοικάστε ὧς ἐν Ἵλης ἔδει τὰ στοιχεία τάττειν ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ὃς ἐνυπαρχόντων συνεστάσαι καὶ πεπλάσθαι φασί τὴν οὐσίαν. Δ. 7. ὡσοι δὲ ὄπολαμβάνουσι, δόσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύδηπιος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον μὴ ἐν ἄρχη ἐστι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτία μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ
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ὅρθως ὀλονταί. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐς ἐκεῖρῶν ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον.

See also Plato Philebus p. 18. Καθορῶν δὲ (ὁ Θεόδ) ὃς οὐ δηλεῖ ἡμῶν οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐδὲν ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τούτοις τὸν θεσμὸν αὐτοκράτωρ λογισμάτων ὃς ὁμοῦ ἔνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς ποιεῖται μιᾶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθαζόμενον προσεκτῶν. And compare Phæd. 92.

The presumption raised by the comparison of these passages may be strengthened by some further considerations.

In the Theetetus the relation of the elements to the whole is illustrated from number and music⁶, as well as from grammar. And in the passage of Aristotle already quoted (Met. H. 3.), immediately after the conclusion that the elementary parts of substance cannot be defined, it is added, “And clearly, if substances are numbers, they are so in this way (as combined of matter and form), and not, as some say, of units.”

The words λόγος, ἀλογος, ρητός, in connection with the relation of parts to a whole, are not inconsistent with Pythagorean usage. The word συλλαβή is used by Philolaus, though in a narrower and technical sense.

The union of these examples and expressions with the cosmical turn of thought, has a Pythagorean air. It may be added, that in two other passages where Socrates speaks from hearsay (Phæd. 62.), or repeats what he has heard long ago, perhaps in a dream (Phil. 20.), the Pythagoreans are probably referred to.

But on the other hand, the logical phraseology, the mention of predication, the distinction between the name and the proposition, and between αἰσθητά, δοξαστά, and γνωστά, together with the term ἐπιστήμων, argue a different origin.

That origin is possibly Megarian⁷. The Megarians, like the Eleatics, waged war against sensations and impressions, and relied solely upon reason (λόγος). It is quite conceivable that the term ἐπιστήμων may have been coined by them, in common possibly with αἰσθητῆς, δοξαστῆς and ποιῶν ἐργασίας. In the Sophist it is said of the ‘friends of ideas,’ that they break down the ‘bodily

⁶ Pp. 204, 206.
⁷ This was Schleiermacher’s opinion. (Not. ad. Theæt. p. 520.) The objection of Deycks, that every fol-

lower of Socrates must have drawn a sharp line between opinion and knowledge, proves too much for those who seek here a reference to Antisthenes.
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substance' of their opponents into little bits, and refuse to acknowledge it as 'being.' The extreme analytical tendency animadverted on in the same dialogue (τὸ πῶς ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποχωρίζειν) may also be detected in the words οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκείνῳ—προσοντίζου—ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχουσα πᾶσι προσφερεσθαι, ἔτερα δύτα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται (Theet. 202.) The distinction between δύναμι and λόγος is not unlike Euclides; and it is worthy of a Socratic philosopher to have made capability of definition the test of the object of knowledge. Nor is it inconsistent with the general spirit of his philosophy, to have reduced 'simple ideas' to nothingness, and yet to have attached reality to 'complex' ones. It agrees with his tendency to hold unity and diversity in solution together: ἵνα, πολλοῖς ἄνθρωποι καλοῦμεν.

It is true that no doctrine of elements remains amongst the fragments of Euclides, any more than a doctrine of ἕνη, which still is probably alluded to in the Sophist. Diodorus Cronus, however, a later Megarian (B.C. 300), argues from the conception of indivisible particles or monads.

But there are two points which it is difficult to reconcile with an exclusive reference to Megara; the cosmical expression, ἵνα ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα, καὶ τὰλλά; and the distant way in which the allusion is made. Would Plato have spoken of hearing anything from his familiar friends 'as in a dream?' Contrasts with this Soph. 248: Τάχι! οὖν, ἢ Θεάξητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακοβεῖς, ἕγω δὲ ὅσως διὰ συνήθειαν.

These data lead to the conjecture that here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, Plato has fused together two theories, which from different starting-points appeared to him to meet in one. The more prominent is that of Euclides, which gives the key-note to the remaining argument, that knowledge is right opinion with definition (λόγος). According to this, nothing is the object of knowledge (ἐπιστήμων) but that which is expressed in a proposition. That which corresponds to a name, is the object, not of knowledge, but of sensation. From the position where the simple sensation was regarded as the only knowledge we have gradually come round to this. And as the hypothesis, Sense is knowledge, was supported by the

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9 See Theet. p. 186: Ἐν μὲν ἂρα τοῖς πάθημασιν οἷς ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐναόνυν συλλογισμῷ
the theory of change, so this, that definition (λόγος) is essential to knowledge, is strengthened by the Pythagorean theory of harmony. The sensible things, which can be named but not represented by a proposition, are regarded as elements, which cannot be known except as they are combined in nature. But this is merely a conjecture. There is still the alternative of falling back upon our ignorance of the time, and saying with truth, that amongst the many shades of opinion on these subjects which existed, a nearer parallel might have been discovered, if more had been preserved. And this impression is rather strengthened by the perusal of the fragments of the old Academy.—Cf. Arist. Met. Δ. 7, quoted above.

VI. Who are the ‘impenetrable nay the repellent’ men, with whom the ‘disciples of Protagoras’ will not deign to argue, as ignorant of their Heraclitean mysteries, and utterly illiterate? Who believe only in the existence of what they can clutch between their hands, and refuse to attribute Being to any action or natural process, in short to anything unseen? (p. 155.) They are more fully dealt with in the Sophist, and it has been shewn that the account of them in both dialogues taken as a whole, is unfavourable to the hypothesis that Antisthenes is meant. May they have been in any way related to Democritus? This supposition has been objected to on the ground that the Atomists (according to Aristotle, Met. I. 4.) in upholding their κενῶν, asserted the existence of the μὴ ὅν. Whereas Plato (Soph. 246.) says of these men, τῶν ἄλλων εἶ τῆς φησί μὴ σώμα ἔχουσι εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαυ. (Here the ‘bodiless’ is evidently equivalent to the ‘unseen’ of Thest. I. c.)

The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a distinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm
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grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity and weight.

It does not seem very hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity: the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of physic and metaphysic was not impossible. The 'Plenum' of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature.

The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. 'Being is full of being, it is continuous, for being touches being.' Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchangeable, was also that which has extension, solidity and weight. Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something absolute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (νόμῳ): depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various combinations.

How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may have alluded to in the passages already mentioned of the Theaetetus and Sophist?

1. It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything 'bodiless' or 'unseen.' For the 'bodiless existence' which they are represented as denying is the 'immaterial essence' of the ἀμύθων φῶς; and the 'unseen process,' which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the 'void space' of the Atomist, which is only asserted as
the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that ἀτομον and κενὸν together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as τὸ ὑποκειμένου σῶμα.

2. A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally be either seen or handled: but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See Ar. de Sensu. c. 4: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἰ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτομωτάτοι τι ποιοῦσιν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπὸ τοιοῦτο.

The sense of touch and resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those 'primary' qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the Theaetetus, and in language which is much more suggestive of something hard. Note especially the words, Theæt. p. 155: Ἀπρὸς τοῖν χερῶν λαβέσθαι. Soph. 246: Ἐλκ γῆν—ἐλκονι, ταῖς χερεῖν ἄγεχνος πέτρας καὶ ὄροι περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιοῦτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων δύσχερον τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον δ' παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἔπαφὴν τινα. P. 247: Πότερον ὄρατον καὶ ἄπτον τι αὐτῶν. Ἰβ.: Πᾶν δ' μὴ δυνατὸν ταῖς χερῶν συμπίεσειν εἴποι.

3. It may be observed further that in the Sophist the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (1) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (2) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philosopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system?

They are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being. 'Every thing in which there is either an active or a passive power,' i. e. they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognised surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus.
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See Ar. de An. I. 2. Δημόσκοτος περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων γλαφυρωτέρας εἶπεν.

4. It may be urged against the above conjecture (1) that, although Democritus might fairly be called ἀμονστός, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to rhetoric and poetry, and ἀμορτός, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of coarseness which Plato's picture conveys would seem to be unmerited.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(2) That the elenchus of the εἰδὼν φύσις is described as levelled at the ἀλήθεια of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Protagoras in the Theætetus. To which it may be replied, that the account in the Sophist appears to be generalised from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of 'sprung from the ground' (σπαρτόλ καὶ αὐτόχθονες). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title 'hard and repellent' in the Theætetus. The difficulty must however be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted.9

If these passages really contain any allusion even to degenerate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recognition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle's saying, that Plato's dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies; and of Lord Bacon's, that time brings down the lighter goods of antiquity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view.

5. Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (οἴδαιν ὅν φανεραί εἶναι).

(6) It is possible that the διανεφείς of the Philebus, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an ac-

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9 Another ἀλήθεια is spoken of in the Cratylus, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory.
count to give of pleasure while they deny its reality, may have been also in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for instance, the fragment Ἐνόμενοι ἀνθρώπωι ἱδον- ται κ.τ.λ. and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analysed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βία διαχειν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν, Phil. p. 46. ad fin.)

VII. One other distinct reference to contemporaries remains to be considered. It occurs at what may be called the turning point of the dialogue: where it is remarked that the stronghold of the doctrine—"What appears to me, is to me"—lies amongst sensible things, but that its weak point is in the answer to such questions as, What is wholesome? What is expedient? And it is added, that those who hold a partial Protagoreanism, (οἱ τὰ Πρωταγόραυν μὴ παντάπασι λέγοντες,) while insisting that honour and justice are merely conventional, admit that, in regard to things expedient and good, mistake is possible, and one councillor and one state is wiser than another. These men seem to be brought forward as witnesses to the existence of something above sensation and convention, just as the "fastidious persons" are made to testify in the Philebus to the existence of mixtures of pleasure and pain. But it seems impossible to identify them with any known school. Euclides denied reality to impressions. Aristippus admitted no good beyond the present pleasure. Plato here alludes to some intermediate teachers, of whom our knowledge is a blank.

This notice of the relation of the Theseutetus to contemporary theories may be concluded with a few general remarks.

Such an inquiry must necessarily be scanty in its positive results. Its true value, however, lies rather in the consciousness which it implies, and which it tends to strengthen, that Plato, though in advance of his contemporaries, was not isolated from them, but held living intercourse with the present as well as with the past. In studying any author, it is invigorating even to attempt to breathe the atmosphere in which he moved, and to see with his eyes the men and the ideas surrounding him. Without making this attempt, the modern reader of Plato cannot but lose much. He will be like one reading a letter without knowing to whom it is addressed. Many of the ideas and sentiments may be intelligible to him, but the living tone
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and expression which it would otherwise convey are lost. A few cautions however are suggested to us as the inquiry proceeds.

1. In piecing together the fragments of an ancient statue or group, a sanguine and inexperienced eye might naturally imagine some things to fit, which were really independent of each other, and some things to be incongruous which were really not so. Supposing the whole discovered, the mistaken adaptations would be displaced by more perfect symmetry, and the apparent discrepancies harmonised by the intermediate parts. The contemporary remains of Plato's time are such a fragment. The more we study them in the light of his works, the more we feel, that while distinct and opposite tendencies were at work, the various thinkers of that age (especially those who followed Socrates) had much in common; and that many shades of opinion existed besides the opposite extremes. The few names and the few sayings that have been preserved to us by no means exhaust the whole field.

2. Plato's relation to these contemporaries must not be conceived of as closer than it really was. Their theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance, but the occasion. He views them in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves differently according to the point at which we stand.

For instance, the materialist and sensationalist, who in the Theaetetus are opposed, in the Sophist appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. And in the Cratylus, the Heraclitean and Protagorean doctrines are contrasted. Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be narrowed to this or that individual, nor extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might so "orb into the perfect star" as to be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought, but from the speculative height from which Plato surveyed the present, rival opinions might at one time be generalised into one view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct.
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3. Plato was by no means absorbed in the controversies of the hour. The grand movements of Greek thought, hidden from inferior intellects, were comprehended in one glance by him, not observed as by Aristotle, but consciously realised. Thus in the Theaetetus he gathers up into a single formula one side of the alternative which philosophy had hitherto presented to the Greek mind. Looking above and beyond Aristippus, and even Protagoras, whose personal influence hard hardly yet died away, he fixes his eye upon Heraclitus, who had given the highest expression to the relative side of thought. The struggle, outwardly waged between the Megarian and the Cyrenaic, is in reality a far deeper one, between Parmenides and Heraclitus, or rather between the two opposing streams of Greek Philosophy, which were seeking their unity in the mind of Plato.

§ 2.

As after-ages saw amongst Plato's contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Protagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or conceptions and impressions.

In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus and Protagoras really were, it would be necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato. But, although not always brought into prominence, it is of the essence of what they were to him.

This is not the place for a detailed account of the earlier stage of Greek Philosophy. But a brief sketch of it is necessary in order to make Plato's position clear.

It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate, to say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest, Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two.
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Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves; inhaled by some in the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous embodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of Δίκη is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the εἰμαρμένη of the one is paralleled by the ἄδαγκη of the other.

The endeavour to pierce this veil of language* is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the common opinions of men. The words of Plato in the Phædo, οἱ πολλοὶ ψηλαφώνεις δόπερ ἐν σκότῳ, might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testimony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being.

With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought. [τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα. Parm.] All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of "nought and night;" the fulness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to Divine, and not to human knowledge.

Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of that age, what were the distinguishing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Parmenides; and it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these philosophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a

* Cf. Parm. ἄδαγκην κροτάφων ἵπτο χερσὶ καλύτερα.
Platonist sees in the Ionian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two; they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences.

Heraclitus. I. Heraclitus of Ephesus (B. C. 500) was an Eastern Greek, and it is not merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anticipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew from them some of his happiest expressions; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. "The voice of the Sibyl," says Heraclitus, "although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years." This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and Neo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect.

It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching 'lives after them.' One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate
thoughts in distant ages, and a late sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Eleatic One.

Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had “looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the One was God,” so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the Ægean and said that water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of an homogeneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law.

He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being something in themselves,—‘not fluctuating but fixed,’—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. “The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by measures and extinguishing itself by measures;” i.e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as “the invisible harmony” which is “better than the visible,” as the “Thought which guides all through all,” as the “Universal Word” or “Reason,” as the “One Wisdom,” as “Time,” as “Righteousness,” as “Fate,” as the “Name of Zeus.” This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato, “The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone,” viz. the Ionian: Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, “War is the Father of all things;” and in a saying of more doubtful

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1 Thus the dialectic of Rep. B. VI. is a sort of ὁδὸς τὸν ἄλλο πλῆς. See also the Sophist and Parmenides.
meaning, Παλληνονος ἄρμονια κόσμου, διόπερ τάξιν καὶ λύρας. Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Perhaps it might be paraphrased, "As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cf. Plato Rep. IV. p. 489), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Universe is the same." Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. "The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger." Each thing is ever producing or passing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: "All coming out of one, and one arising out of all." Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions: Συνάγειας ὁδαὶ καὶ ὁχῦ ὁδαὶ κ. τ. λ. *Εν τῷ σοφῶν γιγαντικέοβαι εἶθελε τε καὶ οὐκ εἶθελε, Ζηνὸς ὅνωμα.

But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In every thing there is contrariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i.e. between the absolute process itself and the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire*, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower and a higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhalations; e.g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other

*a Hor. Epist. I. 12. 'Quid velit et poscit rerum concordia discors.' and Cleopatra. 'I am fire and air, my other elements I give to baser life.'
*Compare Shakespeare, Antony
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upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other’s life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (πύρ, μέτρα) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (κοσμοί); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is inseparable from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them, quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (IX. 8.): Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν εἰς γένεσιν ἄγων καλεῖονται πόλεμον καὶ ἔρων, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐκπόρρωσιν ἐμολογίαν καὶ ἔφημην. On the other hand, which is wearied with the “Eternal process moving on,” is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being; and to this is attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, Her. vol. I. pp. 123 sqq.)

What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human knowledge, and on human life?

1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a continued act or utterance of mind (γνώμη ἡ κυβερνήσειτα πάντα, τὸ ὑπὸ σοφὸν, θεώς λόγος). This, though more or less personified (as Zeus, Δίς, Θεός) is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance itself is the soul of the World, not exactly “immanent,” but ever moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into itself again. Yet while thus pervading

γὰρ συμφέρεται. ἐποίησεν ὡς καὶ ἄγαθον,—κάρματος ἄνδρ.

* Cf. too the words τούθων ἡμείπαν παυσι.
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all things, it essentially holds the upper ethereal region, and embraces all, being opposed to the things beneath it as universal to particular.

2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the best, which most partakes of it; that which lives in its own world of particular impressions and notions, is "nearer earth and less in light." This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expression. "A dry soul is the wisest and the best, flashing through the body as lightning through a cloud" (cf. ἔτρα ἀναθυμλασίας). "The moist soul: (e.g. with wine) 'embodies' itself like a gathering cloud" (cf. ῥηρα ἀναθυμλασίας). "The Law of things is a law of universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own." "To live in the light of the universal Order is to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep." "Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not, their speech betrays that though present they are absent mentally." It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory, the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened. As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if a man awake, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows all through all. Sensation is not annihilated, but is absorbed into the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent medium of true vision. (See the expression κατὰ φῶς ἐπαίλευ, where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. Cratyl. p. 412. διὰ τοῦ λόγου λέναι παντός) distinguishing all things into their true elements (κατὰ φῶς διαφέρου ἔκαστα δκώς ἔχει), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen harmony (πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρύει καὶ καταλήφεται). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for
man, who "lights a taper for himself in the night," and "is but an ape to compare with God." The subtilty of Nature far exceeds the subtilty of the human intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in his Heaven there is no rest, so even in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This however never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but of its revelation to and comprehension by man.

3. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever absorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awaking of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, who toils much and finds little, [cf. Plat. Rep. 450 b.], and often his truest wisdom is to know himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire.

Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The Αόγος or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the infinity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is impossible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Heraclitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts,
as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than his own followers had done.

The fate of Heraclitus' teaching at Ephesus reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Universal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylus at length only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the system ended consistently in a kind of war.

a Perhaps the two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, Sophist. 242: διαφερόμενων γὰρ (σ. τ. δε) δει ζυμφέρεται, φασίν αλλοι συντονότεραι τοῖς Μονοιοί, (with which contrast Sympos. 187, where the saying is explained away,) and Cratyl. 412: δοσι γὰρ θηκοῦν πᾶσι εἶναι καὶ νομή, τὰ μὲν τοιαύτα ὑπολαμβάνον τοιούτου ιγία, οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐχει, διὸ δὲ τούτῳ πατέμει εἶναι τι δειξοῦν, δὲ οὐ δύνατα τὰ γεγραμμένα γέγραγμαι. Εἴμαι δὲ τάχυστον τότε καὶ λαθέσθαινον οὐ γὰρ ὁ διγόνθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ λόγου λεύναι χρῷα, εἰ μὴ λαθέσθαιν τὴν ἐν δειγματικὸν ἀλλοι. Εἴναι δ' εἰν συντονότεραι τὰ ἄλλα πάντα δικάνει π.τ.ά.

b This may be illustrated by the continuation of the passage of the Cratylus just quoted, μεὺς μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, δὲ τὸν δὲ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ τόλμου ἐξελέγομεν τοῦτο εἴναι τὸ δικαίως. ἄμεθα δὲ, ἔμεθάμεθα, ὅτι λατρεῖ τούτων δὲν αἰτήσεως, τάτα μὲν πάσα διέλυσε καὶ ἄρσε, ὃς τούτῳ ἐλέγεν τὸν δικαίον καὶ τὸ κακόν—δι' τὸ γὰρ γέγραγμ' ἡ τοιάτοι τὸν δικαίον—καὶ ἔτι καὶ καλεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τότε ὅρθως ἔχειν διὰ τοῦτο ἐπεὶ ἐντεὶν δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἐναποτελεῖται.
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But its influence on the other side of the Ägean was far greater, and by warring with other ideas it renewed its vitality. As was fitting, however, before finding its true place in the Platonic Philosophy (see especially the Parmenides), it was bound again in the prison of sense, and made to fight the battle of Opinion against the reigning ideal system. Whether or not Protagoras, and after him the Cyrenaics, openly made the Heraclitean dogma the basis of their scepticism, it is certain that Plato, and probable that Euclides also, regarded this as its only real philosophical support.

The peculiarity of the traces of Heraclitus in the Thestetetus is, that his doctrine is there brought forward in support of a subjective theory; that its influence is partly direct, partly derived through his Ephesian followers, and (possibly) through Aristippus; and that it is carried to its remotest consequences by being subjected to the Socratic or Megarian logic. He thus becomes merely the representative of the principle of the perpetual flux of all things, and their absolute diversity, in opposition to the perfect rest and unity of the Eleatic Being:—the notion that, as it is put in the Phædo, like the tides in the Euphrates, all things are ever coming and going, and swaying up and down and to and fro. Nothing is, everything is ever becoming. That this was a faithful representation of the theory in its later stages, appears from what Aristotle tells of Cratylus, that he found fault with Heraclitus’ maxim: δις εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὖν ἐν ημβαλις’ αὐτὸς γὰρ ὕμοι οὐδ' ἀπάξ.

The passage which most distinctly recalls Heraclitus himself, is that in which this doctrine of ‘becoming’ (γένεσις) is first stated and confirmed by proofs, though even this is perhaps coloured by the ‘disciples of Protagoras.’

The quotations from the poets (whom the early philosophers despised [παλαιά τις διαφωτά φιλοσοφία τε και ποιητικῆ]) and the subtle illustrations from natural and mental phenomena (contrast Heraclitus’ “The drunkard has a wet soul”) belong rather to the refined philosophers whom Plato is quoting (or to his own invention) than to the prophet of Ephesus. But the mention of the fire which begets and rules all else, and is itself created by motion, is thoroughly Heraclitean, and the

* Τὸν λεγομένην αὐτών Ἀλήθειαν γένεσιν ὁμώς οὐδεὶς προσαγωγέων προφοράς

Plat. Soph.
word περιφορά (which occurs again p. 181) is perhaps used, together with the symbol of the Sun, not without reference to the circling process of the elements\(^d\), the δόσις ἄνω κάτω μιὰ, which would be reversed if the diurnal motion were interrupted, καὶ γένοισ' ἄν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα. Cf. Simpl. in Arist. Categ. p. 105 b. Bas.: Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἑναντίων ἑπιλειπεῖ, οἶχον τὸ πάντα ἀφαιρεθέντα. διὸ καὶ μέμφεται 'Ομήρος Ἡράκλειτος, εἰπότι,

\[άν \; ποιεῖ \; ἐκ \; τε \; θεῶν \; ἐκ \; τ' \; ἀνθρώπων \; ἀνθυλοίο, \; οἰχύσεσθαι \; γὰρ, \; φησι \; πάντα.\]

In the fuller statement of the doctrine of sense, p. 156, the obscure words (rendered more obscure by the interpolation of Cornarius) regarding the comparative swiftness and slowness of the different motions, are probably to be explained in connection with Heraclitus. Sensation is a process between opposites (ποιόν and πάσχον). If we imagine it under the image of the δόσις ἄνω κάτω, the process is higher, and therefore swifter than the things between which it moves\(^f\); they may be contrasted as fire and earth, as the sun and the cloud, as mind and body. (In this case the process itself has an objective and subjective element). E. g. man and stone are slow motions and of the nature of earth, but vision and whiteness are swifter and more of the nature of fire. In modern language, they have a higher power or law\(^g\). There is probably some intermediate

\(^d\) See Lassalle, II. 114 n. 3. 119.
\(^e\) The image of the 'golden chain' is differently applied by Milton, Par.
\(^f\) The image of the 'golden chain' is L. B. II. 1. 1005 (Chaos loq.)

Another World
Hung o'er my realm, linked in a golden chain
To that side Heaven from whence your legions fell.

Ib. l. 1051:

And fast by, hanging in a golden chain,
This pendant world.

\(^g\) Cf. Heracl. fr.: 'Ερακέων ναστὶ καὶ psychological application of the idea of 'quicker' and 'slower' elements, περιφέρεσα.

Shakespeare has made a fanciful in Sonnets 44, 45.

But ah! thought kills me that I am not thought
To leap large lengths of miles when thou art gone,
But that, so much of earth and water wrought,
I must attend time's leisure with my moan;
Receiving nought by elements so slow,
But heavy tears, badges of either's woe.

The other two, slight air and purging fire,
Are both with thee, wherever I abide;
The first my thought, the other my desire,
refinement upon Heraclitus which would more completely illustrate the words of Plato. But their interpretation is certainly assisted by a nearer acquaintance with the Heraclitean theory.

In p. 157 the following words forcibly recall Heraclitus: ἀλλὰ κατὰ φῶςιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιοῦμενα καὶ ἀπολλόμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα.

And in p. 158 the doubt raised about waking and dreaming reminds us of one of his favourite reflections: τούτι δὲ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος λανθάνει δκοσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν δκωστερ δκοσα εὐθοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

θάνατος ἐστιν δκοσα εὐθοντες ὅρεομεν' ὅσα δὲ ἐγερθέντες, ὑπνος.

In one other passage, where there is no direct allusion to him, an expression occurs which is eminently descriptive of his mind: p. 173.

tὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πολεῖ κείμαι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιθημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια, τάσιά πάντα ἡγγησαμένη σημικρὰ καὶ συνδέν, ἀτμίσσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται κατὰ Πλάτωνον, [τὰς] τὲ γὰς ὑπένερθε, καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, ὁμοιότατ' τὰ θερίσεις, ἀντίκεισα, καὶ πάνω πάντῃ φῶςιν ερευνώμενη τῶν συντομεν ἐκάστου δλοι, εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς συνδέν αὐτὴν συγκαθεῖσαν.

When the doctrine of motion is again taken up and criticised in pp. 180 sqq. the more immediate reference is to the Ephesian followers of Heraclitus, the humorous account of whom has been already noticed. They are compelled to state more distinctly what is meant by motion, and to acknowledge that it comprises not only locomotion (which has hitherto been spoken of, though in a vague sense), but also change. This agrees with what Aristotle says, that the Heracliteans had nowhere defined their principle of motion. The elenchus is therefore

These present-absent with swift motion slide. For when these quicker elements are gone In tender embassy of love to thee, My life being made of four, with two alone, Sinks down to death, oppressed with melancholy: Until life's composition be recurled By those swift messengers returned from thee, Who even but now return back again, assured Of thy fair health, recounting it to me: This told, I joy; but then no longer glad, I send them back again, and straight grow sad.


1 Phys. Auscult. VIII. 3 § 3: Πρὸς ομα, καὶ καίρως διαρίξεσθαι των κίνησιν λέγουσιν ή πάσας, οδ χαλεπῶν ἀπανθησι.
here applied to them, and their doctrine is exploded by being precisely stated.

Lastly, it should be noticed that the conception of λόγος, with which the Theaetetus closes, has no connexion with the technical and objective use of the word in the Heraclitean system; it is rather employed in a Megarian, i.e. a semi-Eleatic sense, not without a trace of the definitions of Socrates. This appears from the opening of the Sophista. With Heraclitus, δύναμις and λόγος were symbolical expressions for the same thing.

II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final conception of the Greek mind. While life and death and the succession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the Αηγεαν, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in Magna Græcia: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato’s. Xenophanes had already said—

“There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind.” “He is all sight, all thought, all hearing.” “He even abides immoveable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro.”

Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explanation of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere.

The main effort of Plato’s dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract
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conception it is the problem of the one and the many (τῶν λόγων
ἀγίρων πάθος παρ’ ήμῶν), or of motion and rest. In this effort
he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a
sort of middle term in number.

The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the
Theaetetus, from which the discussion of it is expressly ex-
cluded; but his influence is notwithstanding present in the
Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno
(see above), in whose hands the One had acquired a negative
power, and was used rather to distinguish than to compre-
hend, so becoming rather the form than the sole object of
thought. This Eleatic influence appears chiefly (1) in the
relentless way in which sensation and motion are reduced to
nethingsness, and because they have no unity are shewn to
present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of
the dialogue, where it is admitted that there are universal
perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of
these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar
to that of Zeno about motion,—not ‘it is impossible for a thing
to be in two places at once,’ but ‘it is impossible to know and
not to know at the same time,’—and is solved in the same
way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the
form of argument with which this paradox is enforced, ὃ ἐν γί
τι ὑπὸν δύν τι ὑπὸ: (5) in the question about the whole and its
parts, pp. 203, 204.

But it is rather in the objective side of Plato’s teaching
that the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno is examined and
brought to bear.

III. Protagoras, who gives to the inquiry in the Theaetetus Protago-
its subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had
ran.
died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the
trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation.
The real share borne by him in the dialogue is less than ap-
ppears at first sight. It is to his "disciples" that the doctrine
of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he
is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians
whom he has left will not defend his "orphan" theory, yet
when challenged to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates
falls back upon the saying quoted at first, "Man is the mea-
sure of all things," and the explanation of it, "Things are to
me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you." The same words occur also in the Cratylus. This, then, is all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise 'Ἀλήθεια, the sceptical fragment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as μεγαλευστέρως, πολυάραος. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples "in a mystery," (cf. Cratyl. p. 413, quoted above, p. xliii. n. b), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the Theaetetus. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the Theaetetus, and Aristotle. The similarity of the language in which different sensationalist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of that section of thought.

It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one saying of Protagoras which is here preserved: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ἐντικῶν ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐντικῶν ὡς οὔτε ἐστι. Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than the absolute relativeness of knowledge? Might it not even be interpreted to mean, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus?" In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Protagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own saying, ὡς οία μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιάρα μὲν ἐστίν ἐμοὶ, οία δὲ σοι, τοιάρα δὲ αὖ σοι. But it may be added, secondly, that the distinction between the race and the individual, between the general term "man," and the singular term "this man," was probably not distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the distinction between abstract and concrete, exhibited, for instance, in the first answer of Theaetetus, or in the attempt of Meno to define virtue, it
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becomes evident that the term man, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race collectively, but of "a man," "this or that man," an individual, "you or me," not however conceived of as an individual, nor consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination. [Cf. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, Thuc. I. 140, which does not correspond to the modern generic use of the word.]

Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unattainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for the truth, of which, however, he is not to be supposed a careless lover. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm advocates at Athens, was one purely objective; although beginning and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought into the world of being.

Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, he was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according to the common notion, "many men, many minds."

From the pit of scepticism into which Philosophy was thus in danger of being lowered, the impulse given by Socrates to speculative inquiry rescued it, and by vindicating the unity of truth, and the importance of the search for it to human life, gave to the old philosophies their true weight and significance through the Dialectic of Plato.

As embodied in the Theaetetus, however, the above doctrine receives some fresh characteristics, first as being made the type of a contemporary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus; secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a sharpness and precision to the term ἄθρωπος, as equivalent to ἔκαστος ἦμαν, which it probably had not
when first used; and, thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only 'man' but 'each man,' not only so, but 'every creature,' and even the same person at different times.

Gorgias.

The name of Gorgias (of Leontini, who flourished B. C. 480, and is said to have been alive at the death of Socrates) does not appear in the Theætetus, and there is no distinct allusion to him. But his denial of absolute Knowledge and Being, in which he was followed by Antisthenes, finds a place in the indirect refutation of Protagoras' assertion of relative truth. The passages in which this appears most distinctly have been already noticed (Theæt. pp. 161, 183.) He would also be included amongst the professors of rhetoric who busied themselves about such questions as, Is a King happy?

Other names which might be enlarged upon are those of Euthydemus (who seems to have been a still more worthy predecessor of Antisthenes) and Prodicus.

§ 4.

Socrates.

But the person of Socrates is more interesting than any further scraps of theory. It is this which almost equally with the spirit of the author himself gives life and depth to what might otherwise be a barren conflict of opinion and method. From behind the ironical mask of the Elenchus, as preserved by Euclides, there peep forth characteristics of the man Socrates, which awake the reader's imagination, and rouse in him a kindred spirit of inquiry. The way in which this negative method is represented as a preparatory exercise, ridding the mind of the lumber of its crude notions, the humorous form in which this is expressed, the courteous, but relentless manner in which the method itself is followed, the eager interest shown in the development of a young mind, the kindly sympathy mixed with playful irony with which Theætetus is treated throughout: above all, the enthusiastic joy with which the acknowledgment is welcomed in one so young, that there is something which the mind itself perceives without the senses, belong to Socrates alone. The very soul of the representation is a part of him. Beneath the negative and destructive seeming

\[ \text{οδὴν ἢςιν—ἐι καὶ ἢςιν, ἀκαταληπτὸν ἀληθεὶς—ἐι καὶ καταληπτὸν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς γὰρ ἀνθρωποῖς καὶ ἀνθρώπησιν τῷ πάλαι.—Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. VII. 65.} \]
there is a sober earnestness of belief, which breaks out in such
passages as that about the Divine life, a belief in the existence
of truth somewhere, and in the all-importance of the search for
it, which we feel to be due above all other men to Socrates.
The very form of this inquiry, as consisting in self-questioning,
which we associate with Socrates, is adverted to more than
once (οὐ δυσκολανθοῦτες, ἀλλὰ τῷ δυτὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς ἔξετάκουτες—
βασανίζομεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνομεν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς.)
The conception of a definition at once simple and exhaustive
as the end to be attained by every inquiry, also belongs to him.
Cf. Ar. Met. Μ. 1079 a. δόο γὰρ ἔστων ἡ τις ἐν ἀποδοῖν Σωκρά-
τει δίαλογος, τούς τ’ ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθὸλου.
τὰῦτα γὰρ ἔστων δαμφῶ περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστῆμης.

It deserves to be noticed here that critics have found in the
picture of the dwarfed, shrewd, practical spirit, an allusion to
Lycon, or to some other of the enemies of Socrates, as they
have seen in the contrasted image of the philosophic life, partly
a praise of Socrates, partly a trace of Plato’s residence at Me-
agara.

The person of Theætetus is also an important element. Theætetus.
Whether or not, as seems probable, the dialogue contains a
tribute of affection to a friend and pupil who was no more, the
reader is certainly intended to dwell with admiring interest
upon his character. His dangerous state is the subject of the
most anxious solicitude to the persons who meet us on the
threshold: they say of him that he has fulfilled the promise of
Socrates, who augured most nobly of his future; and presently
we are invited to view his portrait as a youth by the hand of his
own master Theodorus, who ascribes to him the very combina-
tion of qualities described by Plato in his Republic as the ideal
of the philosophic nature. We find Socrates in love with his
mind at first sight, and still more delighted with him as the
argument proceeds.—Theætetus is described by later writers
as a great mathematician, who taught at Heraclea, after the
times of the Peloponnesian war, and as the author of the first
treatise on the five regular solids; and is said to have heard
Socrates and to have been the companion of Plato. The latter
fact may possibly have been derived from this dialogue, but it
is at least natural to identify the persons, especially from the
aptness for mathematics shown by the youth at the opening of
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the inquiry. If we are right in doing so, a passage in the Republic (p. 528.) acquires a fresh interest from the fact mentioned above, that Theætetus wrote the first treatise on the regular solids. When Plato says that the geometry of solids is yet in its infancy, but that he does not despair of its being discovered, we are tempted to suspect an allusion to the labours of his friend u.

What have we then in Theætetus? A youth, whom, as the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist afterwards remarks, no corruption of sophistry could long withhold from the belief in true ideas and the endeavour to grasp them, but full of perplexity and wonder (a proof of this very impulse) at the conflict between common sense, sceptical difficulties, and speculative enquiry, which he heard waged around him, and which found an echo within his mind. Yet until encouraged and helped by Socrates, he is unable to state his opinion on an abstract question, except in a subject which he has systematically studied, viz. geometry, in which he and his fellow-pupil have lately with some labour arrived at a generalised expression. But in this and in the other special studies which he has pursued, his master Theodorus has found in him qualities which are rarely combined, acuteness and gravity, gentleness and courage, a mind unruffled, rapid and unerringly successful in its application to learning and inquiry; and a spirit of generosity unaffected by reverses of fortune.

Theætetus, though a mere boy, is the most desirable of pupils for Philosophy, both as possessing all the requirements of the philosophic nature, and because without being yet irrecoverably devoted to any special pursuit, he amply fulfils the condition, μηδεις ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰλοίτω (See Rep. B. vii.)

Theodorus. The choice of Theodorus as an interlocutor (not to dwell upon the tradition that Plato had studied under him) connects itself with the same belief in the importance of geometry as an introduction to dialectic, though in Theodorus it had not led to this result. Theodorus is also (as already noticed) of Cyrene, the town of Aristippus, and professes himself a friend of Protagoras.

§ 5.

Such appear to be the external elements of the Theætetus;

u Although there may be also an allusion to the Conic Sections, which were discovered in Athens about this time.
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possessing also a more general interest because they supply us with indications of the influences which had surrounded Plato himself, the phases of thought by which his mind had been attracted or repelled, and with some of which it had been perhaps almost identified; but to each of which he could now assign its due place and value in the progress of the mind towards true ideas, or, to use his own image, in its conversion out of the dark cave and prison of sense to mount upwards towards the world of Being.

It is not enough to have taken a work like this to pieces. That is only a step towards viewing it as a whole.

1. After a preface in which the Megarian tendency of the The crument dialogue is indicated, a youth of philosophic genius is brought into contact with the prophet of Greek thought. The mind of the youth is not "a sheet of blank paper," for besides the ordinary μονωσική and γνωστική, he has been instructed by Theodorus in geometry and other sciences, and has been stimulated to inquiry by hearing the report of questions raised by Socrates, while he is dizzy with wonder at the contradictions in common language and ideas pointed out by other teachers (compare the state of Glaucon in the Republic). But though anxious he is wholly unable to give a simple and comprehensive (i.e. abstract and general) definition of knowledge.

Socrates, therefore, approaches him in his character of midwife, professing no wisdom of his own, but only the power of bringing to the birth the minds of young men labouring with new thoughts, and of determining afterwards whether the birth be real or imaginary. Under this curious symbol there is expressed not only Plato's theory of education, which recurs in the figure of the cave and elsewhere, but also the consciousness of that which distinguishes this dialogue, and in a less degree other parts of Plato. Although it would be too much to say that he possessed the idea of the History of Philosophy in the modern sense, he approaches more nearly to it than any ancient writer except Aristotle. No one but Plato could have conceived and executed the design of showing the relation of different theories to each other, and the order of their succession, by representing them as gradually developed in an individual mind. Each theory, though negatived, is not annihilated, it has a real importance assigned to it as a stage in the
progress of the human intellect. This power of tracing the evolution of thought Plato preserved from Socrates, while he retained the negative elenchus in common with Euclides. The union of both is expressed in the above metaphor, and characterises all that follows.

2. Theætetus' first real answer, "Knowledge is Sensation," though spontaneous at the moment, is the expression of a current theory, (that of the men called here "disciples of Protagoras," probably including Aristippus.) Socrates finds in it the doctrine of Protagoras, "A man the measure of what is," which comes to this, Appearing is reality: for what appears to me, is to me.

But this is shown to have been only the popular side of a deeper doctrine, which is appealed to by the current theory, viz. that nothing exists, but all things are ever passing into their opposites, or in other words, Motion is the world. This is supported by all but universal consent, and by the testimony of Nature, (according to Heraclitean interpretation.)

The union of these two principles enables us to conceive of Sensation as a relative process. Each sensation or perception arises relatively both to the individual and to other sensations or perceptions.

Unless we admit that 'more' and 'less,' 'greater' and 'smaller,' are wholly relative, and are therefore subject to continual change, we shall contradict the self-evident axiom, that nothing can become more while it is equal to itself.

Theætetus' curiosity is now fully awakened, and he is prepared to receive a more complete statement of the doctrine, care being first taken not to let any of those 'profane' ones hear who believe only in things bodily, and not in the invisible process.

The motion which is the world is active and passive, and both kinds are infinite. From the perpetual conjunction of these there arise perpetually sensations and sensible things. The active and passive elements are slower, the twin births are swifter, for they flit to and fro between them. Not that the active and passive elements are anything, except as producing that which thus arises from them; nay, active may become passive, and vice versá. Being therefore disappears, and all things become, and perish, and change. This applies to sorts
as well as to individual things. "Borne by the gale" of the argument, we even merge the Good and Noble in the universal flux.

Theætetus, however, does not rebel, and some further difficulties, occasioned by the phenomena of dreams, disease and madness, are triumphantly solved. Every such illusion is real to the subject of it at the moment. This appears most evidently in the case of the sick man’s palate. At the same time the theory of a process between subject and object is more distinctly worked out. And the birth of Theætetus’ first-born is pronounced complete.

3. To the surprise of Theodorus, Socrates now begins to criticise it.

The saying of Protagoras levels all distinctions as to wisdom, and makes argument absurd.

Theodorus is in vain challenged to reply to this, and Theætetus confesses himself staggered.

But Socrates again changes sides, and finds fault with the objection, as begging the question and daring to appeal to common sense.

The theory is, therefore, again examined in the form, Sensation is Knowledge.

After touching on the difficulty of sounds and characters heard and seen but not understood, Socrates dwells on the case of an object of sight remembered but not seen.

(As Theodorus still hangs back, Socrates acts the part of assailant and respondent in one.)

The advocate of sense is driven to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing. He might be reduced many times even to worse extremities (and that on the ground he has himself chosen) by a merciless Eristic adversary.

Still a defence of Protagoras is possible. He is not bound to commit himself to the answers of Theætetus. Memory, he might say, is far inferior in vividness to the present impression. And it is by no means certain that he would have been afraid to admit that the same man may know and be ignorant of the same thing. Or rather he would deny that an individual viewed in different relations, or under different conditions, is the same man. But he would challenge us to prove directly either that sensation is not relative to the individual, or that, if it is relative to him, it does not follow that the object of it is real to him and to him only.
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Differences of wisdom there assuredly are both in individuals and states, and in plants also, but they are differences not in the reality, but in the excellence of impressions, customs, or conditions. To alter these from worse to better is the work of the wise teacher or statesman or husbandman. In conclusion, Protagoras would demand fair treatment, as the contrary leads only to the hatred of inquiry.

4. That his demand may be complied with, Theodorus is at length 'compelled' to engage, and Protagoras' own words are selected for criticism, no advantage being taken even of the admission, that there are degrees of wisdom, which was made in his name.

'What seems to each is true for him.' It seems to all men that some think truly and some falsely. This was the drift of our appeal to common sense. It follows that whether Protagoras is right or wrong, some think truly and some falsely.

Further, if Protagoras' saying is true for him, it is false for all men besides. But he confirms their judgment who say that he himself thinks falsely and they truly. His saying then is true for nobody.

5. The weight of his authority still makes us pause. But one thing is clear, that the strength of the theory we are considering lies in the region of sense, and, as regards the state, in the sphere of law and custom;—if it gives way at any point, it is in the decision of such questions as, What is wholesome? What is expedient? A partial Protagoreanism, relinquishing the latter ground, but still maintaining the former, seems to have been held by some.

—— The magnitude of the question that is thus stirred up reminds us of the blessedness of the life which has leisure for such inquiries. The digression which follows at once affords a rest, and by the elevation of its tone prepares the mind for the higher thoughts which are in reserve. It is of itself a sufficient answer to those who restrict the idea of Truth to particular impressions,—pointing upwards to the pattern in the Heavens and onwards to the life beyond the grave.——We proceed to apply the test indicated above. Even those who assert that what is Lawful is purely conventional dare not seriously assert this of what is Good.

To put the same admission more generally. In every judg-
ment which, like the calculation of expediency, regards the Future, there is the possibility of error. Even if we make the impression of the moment the test of what is true, that impression, when the moment comes, proves one man to have been right in his anticipation and another wrong. This is practically admitted by Protagoras himself, whenever he gives advice to a young speaker.

6. An inroad is thus made into the enemy's territory, but his last stronghold is not yet taken. We have found something independent of sensation, but the "truth" of sensation itself is not yet overthrown. The Heraclitean principle of motion is therefore grappled with. For its Ephesian supporters give us no hold. Theodorus describes the wavering mysticism of these modern Heracliteans, "no friends of his." And Socrates resumes what was said at first of the antiquity of the doctrine, adding that there have been a few who, like Parmenides, have stood out against it, and that our present position is the dangerous middle-ground between two armies. Before closing with the slippery "movement party" we arm ourselves by distinguishing two kinds of motion: locomotion and change. They must admit that all things move in both these ways, or else there would be a way in which they stood still. In the former statement of the theory, sensation and quality were described as fitting between object and subject. But now at the same time that they fit, they must also change. Therefore in the very moment when we are naming them they have become different. Every name is therefore false as well as true: e.g. When I say sensation is Knowledge, it is equally true to say Not-sensation, i.e. according to the theory, Not-Knowledge. Thus the boasted Infinity of Motion becomes the indeterminateness, i.e. the nothingness of Sense. Every thing is nothing in particular.

7. We are now wholly free from Protagoras and from the doctrine of motion. But instead of advancing at once to examine Parmenides, Socrates proceeds with the main argument, and Theodorus is accordingly released. The truth is; there is still some intermediate ground to travel. We have risen above sensation, but the problems connected with Opinion as such (δόξα, as independent of ἀληθεία) remain to be solved.

Theaetetus must first be made conscious of the existence of pure acts of thought. To this consciousness he rises easily,
when, reverting to sensation for a moment, Socrates proves to him that the eye and ear are only the instruments of the mind. There are some ideas common to the objects of different senses, which are perceived concerning them without any such instrument. These the mind itself, reviewing the impressions of sense, immediately contemplates. 'Being' is the most general of them, and is found in company with all the rest. They include also that perception of what is good, to which reference has been already made.

The enthusiasm with which this acknowledgment is welcomed marks it as the highest point actually gained in the dialogue. It is with this that the more advanced teaching of the Sophista immediately connects itself.

The contrast between the contemplation of these ideas by the mind, and the particular impressions of the senses, throws the latter still further into the shade, and we no longer cast our glances backwards, but advance eagerly as into a new-found world.

We examine opinion, not now as it is bound up with sense, but as the pure act of the mind.

8. But all our efforts to grasp the idea of knowledge here only tend to show that Opinion like sensation is indeterminate.

Protagoras said that all men think rightly. This we interpreted to mean that sense is knowledge, and disposed of it rather summarily by a 'reductio ad absurdum.' But the same difficulty now returns upon us in a more abstract form. How is false opinion possible? Considered quite in the abstract, it seems impossible. For whenever we think, our thought is known to us, and real. Or, if thinking be a silent proposition, it seems impossible that we should join two ideas wrongly when both are clearly present to the mind.

We must descend again from this region of pure thought, and have recourse to the conception of degrees of knowledge and of a process between the mind and sensible things. [For otherwise (as Aristotle says) Thought is like a straight line passing over things, not like a curve embracing them.] False opinion will thus be the failure of the mind in bringing together the impressions of sensation and memory. But it is shown by an example that it is possible to mistake between two things, both of which are laid up in the mind. Therefore we must conceive of a more subtle process between the mind and its own ideas, which it may possess without actually grasping them at any
particular time. But when we look steadily at the image we have called up we find that the same difficulty returns. The mind is ignorant of that which is present to it. For, if I have grasped the wrong idea, how do I not know it for what it is? or if an unreal one, how, when I have grasped it, do I not know it to be unreal? The succession of such images must be continued to infinity.

The lesson drawn from this is, that we cannot define false opinion until we have defined knowledge. I.e. Opinion in its own nature is wholly Indeterminate. This is evident at once, if we examine true opinion. An opinion without any real grounds may yet happen to be true.

9. This leads the way to the last unsuccessful effort to define knowledge from the subjective side. Something more than true opinion is required to constitute knowledge. What is that "something more?" The answer is ready. Knowledge is true opinion with an account of its object (μερὰ λόγου). The mind surveying its impressions (see above) cannot give an account of the individual objects of sense; it can only name them; but the complex ideas of the various relations of these are expressed in propositions. These therefore alone are the objects of knowledge. Or, more physically, the elements of all things cannot be known, but the combination of these in Nature is the object of Knowledge.

This theory is first tested in the case of letters and syllables, from which it seems to have been derived. The elementary sounds certainly cannot be analysed, but are they therefore unknown? If separately unknown how are they known together? Is the complex independent of its elements? Can a whole be thus conceived of without its parts? If, as appears probable, the expressions, for instance, 'all the six,' 'all of the six,' and 'the whole of the six,' (τὰ τέσσαρα, τὸ πέντε, τὸ ἅλον) are synonymous, and the whole cannot be considered as separable from its parts, then, if the syllable is known, so are its constituent sounds. The simple is equally known with the complex. But if the whole differs from the all, and is separable from its parts, then it is one and uncompounded, that is, a new element. The complex is equally unknown with the simple. Experience points to the former alternative. In learning grammar or music, we did not know the combinations until after we had learned the letters or notes.
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[In this conclusion a kind of reality seems to be again awarded to the objects of sense, not as they give rise to ever varying impressions, but as they are perceived by the mind, which imparts to each of them its own stamp of unity. At the same time ideas of relation are shown to have as much and as little reality as simple ideas, and in the μὴ ἴδεα ἐμέριστος a glimpse is afforded of the transcendent ideal world. If we compare the Sophist, Philebus and Republic, Plato's doctrine appears here in a rudimentary form. He wavers between abstract and concrete, the one and the many. The necessity is not yet felt of finding an expression for the relation between the ideal and actual.]

10. But, though this theory is rejected, the above definition of knowledge may still be true. What is the 'account' (λόγος) required in it? It cannot be the mere reflexion of thought in language. For this power is possessed by all men. Nor is it the analysis of the complex by the enumeration of its elements. For this may be done rightly in one case and wrongly in another where the elements are the same. But knowledge is infallible. Nor, lastly, is it, what seems plausible at first sight, the comprehension of the distinctive difference. For this is essential to right opinion. And if it is meant that we must have knowledge, and not opinion merely, of the distinctive difference, the term knowledge still remains to be defined.

What then is the result of the inquiry? The answer is simply that given by Socrates, The mind of Theaetetus is prepared for better things. Difficulties have been undoubtedly raised, such as Plato really felt, and which were silenced rather than solved by the contemplation of the Idea of Good; (e.g. the difficulty about false opinion.) Hypotheses have been advanced which he knew to be really valuable, and the equivalents of which have frequently satisfied the human mind, (e.g. the hypothesis expressed in the figure of the waxen block.) But Plato does not rest in these uncertainties, and is by no means satisfied. Nor is it by any means his intention to point out the hopelessness of the attempt to define Knowledge. What he does point out is the impossibility of conceiving Knowledge apart from its object. The perception of the existence of Ideas of Being and Goodness, of sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, and of number, which is just touched upon, is the first step towards the construction of that transcendent
INTRODUCTION.

world, the contemplation of which, in the light of the Idea of Good, is Knowledge according to Plato's highest conception of it (ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταίῳ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱδια). Whether or not he had attained to this when the Thætætæus was written, (he had probably advanced some way towards it), the fact is certain that he was not satisfied with any lower or less triumphant view. The meaning and the merits of that final theory do not fall under discussion here.

§ 6.

The genuineness of the Thætætæus has never been seriously questioned. To put its authenticity in the strongest possible light, it stands or falls with the Republic. No difficulty that may arise in assigning to it its chronological position, or in reconciling special points of teaching or method, can countervail the inward harmony, the manifold coincidences of thought and style, the incommunicable grace and beauty, the intensity of inquiry relieved with ever present humour, which bind this and the other greater dialogues to the greatest, making them one living individual whole.

§ 7.

The comparative study of Plato's dialogues is of importance not so much as leading to a chronological arrangement, towards which little progress has been made, but rather as throwing light upon his manner of dealing with a subject and his mode of composition generally. There are fallacies incidental to the study of one dialogue, which the comparison of others will remove: extreme views are thus corrected, assertions modified, the unevenness of the whole surface becomes more evident, as well as the inherent unity, and we become more cautious in speaking of 'Plato's view' of this or that point; and also in taking literally his development of the tenets of this or that school. It becomes apparent too, on a wider survey, that more varieties of thought existed around Plato than we have names for, or than can be easily summed up in one or two formulæ. And at every step we become more convinced that no limit can be assigned to his fertility either of imagination or thought. Such a comparison is the natural and necessary test of every hypothesis regarding any single dialogue.

Schleiermacher linked the Thætætæus and Gorgias as com-
panion treatises: but when read without the bias of his pecu-
lilar scheme, they do not present features of very close re-
lationship. The interest of the Gorgias is less philosophical
and more dramatic, approaching even to comedy. In the
Theaetetus we breathe the serene atmosphere of friendship and
peace; in the Gorgias, Socrates is engaged in his ironical war-
fare. The Gorgias annihilates rhetoric and the vulgar belief
in success which was its food; the Theaetetus is a criticism of
scientific theories, preparing the way for serious philosophical
inquiry. The Gorgias is written in the strain of the Euthy-
demus, Protagoras and Meno, and of the first and second
books of the Republic; the tone of the Theaetetus is nearer to
that of the Philebus and Sophista, and of the sixth and seventh
books of the Republic. The points of coincidence, and there
are several, between the two dialogues, have as much of con-
trast as of resemblance. The vulgar notion of the philosopher,
which in the Theaetetus is treated with lofty scorn, in the Gor-
gias is represented with humourous zest. The same may be
said of the weakness of rhetoric in philosophy; and the com-
mon incentives to action, which in the Theaetetus are con-
temptuously dismissed, in the Gorgias are stated at length
with ironical gravity. Much nearer points of comparison may
be found in the Philebus, Cratylus, and Meno.

The Philebus presents the other aspect of the controversy
between Euclides and Aristippus, the opposition namely be-
tween pleasure and wisdom taking the place of that between
sensation and knowledge. But the combatants are viewed
from an independent height, and the instruments by which
decision is made and the question solved, are neither Cyre-
naic nor Megarian, but chiefly Platonic, and partly Pythagoro-
ian. A detailed parallel and contrast would extend this
essay to undue length, but would be useful in illustrating the
difference between Plato's earlier and later method, and the
growth of his psychology. Some light is also thrown by the
Philebus on the manner in which Plato treats contemporaries
as witnesses to a truth, for which he has himself found a fuller
expression.

In the Cratylus Socrates is seen moderating between the
modern Heraclitean and the Sophistical or conventional
view of language; thus a point of opposition is found be-
tween the doctrines which are blended in the Theaetetus.
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The Heraclitean or 'natural' theory is ironically set forth at great length; and etymology is tortured so as to bear witness to the flux of all things. The account given in the Cratylus of the earlier and later Heraclitean dogmas has been already quoted. The Cratylus, after acknowledging that there is a conventional element in language, and that it may possibly have no better foundation than the theory of a flux, ends, like the Theaetetus, with a sort of 'dream' of the Ideas.

The Meno opens with the difficulty which haunts us in the Theaetetus, How can one inquire about what he does not know? It is there solved by the half-mythical hypothesis of Recollection, to which the slave is made to bear unconscious testimony. This seems to throw some light upon the words of the Theaetetus (which appear to be partly set aside as the dialogue proceeds), "I leave out of sight the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting, as beside our present purpose." (p. 188.) The image of the waxen block, which seems to take up what is thus reserved, makes it appear doubtful whether these words are meant to hint at any further theory. But a Megarian philosopher would probably know how to distinguish between μαθαίνω and μαθέω, ἔπιλαθαν ἐσθαι and ἔπι-
λαθησθαι. (p. 191.)

It is of more importance, however, to examine the nature of the connexion hinted by Plato himself between the Theaetetus, Sophista and Politicus. There is much substantial correspondence between the Theaetetus and Sophista, which may be regarded as complementary to each other. In the Theaetetus Knowledge is reduced to its elements; the aim of the Sophista is to point out the inadequacy of analysis as a method of Knowledge, and to harmonize opposite ideas, Being and Not-Being, Rest and Motion. The one dialogue is the basis of Plato's subjective, the other of his objective teaching. Heraclitus and Protagoras are examined in the one, Parmenides is brought to the test in the other. The Theaetetus dwells chiefly on mental processes, the Sophista chiefly on ideas. The one is concerned with Knowledge, the other with Being. The possibility of false opinion is the cardinal difficulty of the one: the existence of the non-existent is the corresponding source of perplexity in the other. The highest point touched in the former dialogue is that there are ideas which the mind
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itself contemplates unaided by sense, and which, it is hinted afterwards, have each of them an indivisible unity. These ideas or nobler elements are the foundation of the chief speculations in the latter. And the Megarian method of criticism which reigns almost unquestioned in the Theætetus, in the Sophista becomes criticised in its turn.

There is also an obvious bond of connexion between the Sophista and Politicus. The one is to the intellectual what the other is to the social and moral world. As the Sophist is to the Philosopher, so is the earthly Statesman to the true King.

But is there a common link, by which the three dialogues are bound in one? There is: and it is one which, though subtle, was probably regarded by Plato as of great importance. This is the gradual development in them of a dialectical method. Indeed, in the Politicus this is expressly spoken of as the chief thing, p. 286: νῦν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβληται μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διάλεκτικῶτέρους γλυκεῖσθαι; A similar reason is given for the earnestness with which minute distinctions are pursued in the Sophist, p. 227: ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγοστικὴς ἡ φαρμακοποσίας ὀύδεν ἦττον οὐδὲ τι μᾶλλον τυχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὁφελεῖ καθαύρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἐνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ἐνυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνυγγενὲς καταινεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾶ πρὸς τούτῳ ἐξ ἱκον πάσας, καὶ βατέρα τῶν ἄτερων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ὀὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιοτέρα, σεμνότερον δὲ τι τῶν διὰ στρατηγικῆς θήβησυστικῆς δηλοὺτα θηρευτικὴν οὔδεν νεκρό-κεν, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυρότερον. The same spirit of ironical disregard of the subject-matter in comparison of the method appears in the Theætetus, p. 174 (mingled with a deeper irony), where it is said that the philosopher regards a king as a species of herdsman. In the Theætetus also the Socratic element of this method is described under the image of μαντική.

It is easier to perceive the existence of such a dialectical growth in the three dialogues than to trace the exact steps by which it is developed.

The mere outline of it is perhaps the following. First, the consciousness arises that the aim of all inquiry is to find a simple and comprehensive conception of the thing in question, (ἐν, ἀπλοῦν—ἐνὶ ἐδεὶ περιλαβεῖν—ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσεπείν.) As a
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means to this the Socratic questioning is set forth as the art of 'delivering' the mind. Then after the analysis of sensation, the mind is seen reviewing its sensations so as to arrive at general notions concerning them (ἀναλογίζεσθαι—συλλογισμός.) Further on, thought is described as a sort of question and answer within the mind (mental dialectic).

Again, the object of Knowledge appears first as a combination of unknown elements, then as a simple unity, then as a combination of which the elements are known, and lastly as a whole parted off from others by a distinguishing mark. With this conception of λόγος the Thevetus ends. With the same assumption that Definition implies Division, the Sophista opens. But presently it appears that these unities which are the objects of Knowledge (elementary ideas) are not fully known, until not only the differences but also the relations between them are perceived. I do not know this, until I acknowledge the existence of all that is Not-this. The existence even of that which is not must be acknowledged, as the condition of all existence. But in the Politicus it appears that this is not enough, but that the Other things from which the object of inquiry is distinguished, must not only be acknowledged as 'something different,' but must each be known in themselves, p. 281: τότερον οὖν ἡμῶν ὃ περὶ τῆς ὑφαντηκής λόγου—ικανός ἐσται διωρισμένος, ἐὰν ἂρ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιμελείων, ὁπόσα περὶ τὴν ἐφεύρει ἑαυτὰ εἶναι, τὴν καλλιτηρ καὶ μεγάλην πασῶν τιθομεν; (cf. Thevet. 208: ἡλιον πέρι ικανὸς οἰμαί σοι εἰναι ἀποδέξασαι ὅτι το λαμπρώτατον ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ λύσων περι γινυ.) ἡ λέγομεν μὲν ἂν τι ἄλλης, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε οὐδέ τέλεον, πρὶν ἂν καὶ ταύτας αὐτῆς πάσας περιέλθωμεν; This seems to be in advance of the method of dichotomy, and may be described as a sort of return to the concrete. Compare Phileb. 16: μέχρι περ ἂν το κατ' ἀρχάς ἐν μὴ ὅτι καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἀπειρὰ ἐστὶ μόνον ἧν τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα.

And while fulness of conception as well as logical exactness is thus shown to be essential to Knowledge, Plato also points out the usefulness of the argument from analogy in proceeding from the more known to the less known, and from the lower to the higher, p. 277: Χαλεπόν ὁ δαμόων, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ικανός ἐνδείκνυοθαί τι τῶν μεζόνων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκαστος οἶνον διὰν εἶδος ἀπαντα πάντα αὐτό πάλιν ὁσπέρ ὑπαρ
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The method of comparison, which was rejected as insufficient in the simpler and lower sphere, is embraced as the means of entrance to the higher; and it is shewn to be the part of inquiry not only to separate between things near together, but also to detect resemblances in what is remote. A more minute investigation of the connexion thus briefly sketched would probably repay the student. A slightly different aspect of it has been seized by Professor Thomson. Camb. Phil. Tr. vol. X. pt. 1.

It remains under the present head to consider the relation of the Theætetus to the account of knowledge which Plato gives in the Republic.

It has been common to speak of the Ideas of Plato as if they were the beginning and end of his philosophy; not only its consummation, but its foundation. But to see them as they were presented to him, we must learn to place ourselves behind them, and to regard them as a goal aimed at, but hardly reached. In the Theætetus he traces some of the steps by which he had arrived so far. He leads us upwards from the dark valley of sense, into which however some light from the upper region is allowed to penetrate, and makes us feel the difficulty of the ascent. We are not lifted at once to an ideal height, from which we can look down upon the world (Sophist, p. 216, καθορωντες ψυχθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βλον): every inch of advance is disputed, and we have the firm ground of experience beneath our feet.

Once, indeed, in the conversation with Theodorus, we are permitted to breathe the more serene air of the higher life, and mention is made of a Divine Pattern of goodness, to which the wise and righteous man becomes conformed. Compare Rep. B. IX. ad fin. Ἀλλ', ἢν ὅ' ἔγω, ἐὼν οὐδὲν ὑπ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὄρῃ καὶ ὄρῳ ἐκατοκούσῃ. The passage in which this occurs, in which mention is also made of the region of pure souls, is such as vividly to recall the Phædo.

But in the argumentative part, we are led by slow and painful steps out of the limitations of sense, and to the last no attempt is made to extricate us from its conditions.

At first we are only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other: though binding them together in
bundies for the convenience of naming them. Presently per-
ception and memory are shewn to be separable from sensation,
but they are still occasioned by it. The "bonds" are further
loosened by the observation that in judging of what is expe-
dient for the future, the present impression of sense is worth-
less in comparison with reflection: but still the future is rela-
tive to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom
is the impression of the moment when it arrives. These,
etus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some
things, without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the objects of sense. Fur-
ther inquiry is made into this process of the mind itself. It
can think truly and also falsely. What difference is implied
in this? An attempt is made to conceive this by reasoning
from an abstract alternative (knowledge or ignorance, being or
not being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the concep-
tion of a process between sensation and the recollection of
former sensations, or between different abstractions of the
world of sense laid up in the memory.

Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought
of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination
of the indefinite elements of sensible things, then as an indi-
visible elementary unit arising out of them. But we are re-
minded that if the combination is known, then its elements
must be known also. Yet the power of analysis is an inade-
quate test of knowledge. It is further requisite that the com-
plete whole, which is the object of thought, be distinguished,
by its characteristic difference, from every other.

The nearest approach that is made, in this gradual pro-
gress, to the doctrine of Ideas, consists in the acknowledgment
that the mind in contemplating Being and Goodness is its own
instrument, and in the conception raised for a moment and
then relinquished, of the abstract whole (μη τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἄλλ' ἐκ
ἐκεῖνου ἐν τῷ γεγονός ἔδος, ἤδειαν μὲν αὖρο αὐτοῦ ἔχου). These
form the double summit of this ascent, 'rugged and steep,'
through experience and reflection towards the ideal world,
and upon these the etherial structure of Plato's transcendental
philosophy reposes. In this dialogue the subjective height alone
is fully reached. Being and Goodness are still seen as relative,
and the mists of doubt soon close over the momentary glimpse
of the purely abstract whole as the object of knowledge.
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Yet the consciousness, clearly brought to light, of the indeterminateness, the changes and contradictions of sense and opinion (see Rep. pp. 476, 479, 524), the endeavour to find a resting-place from the merely relative view by the Socratic method of definition, the reflection upon different processes of geometry and arithmetic, the Megarian notion suggested by Zeno and Socrates of Being as the Good, the conception of a pure act of the mind, and the questions raised about the elements, are so many distinct movements in the direction of the Ideas.

The approach is only a partial one, however. Socrates, in the Theaetetus, speaks of Being as the universal attribute, and of goodness and beauty as perceptible by the comparison of the present with the past and future. In the Republic, Being is invested with a sort of Divinity, and the Form of Goodness is seen like the Sun in Heaven, giving light and colour and shape and nutriment to the supra-sensual world. The Ideas are no longer seen from beneath, but have lifted us into their own atmosphere. And yet they clothe themselves in imagery derived from the exploded doctrine of sensation. The sun was the favourite symbol of those who made motion their first principle: it is still used in a figure to typify that which is above motion. As the one principle was imagined to be the cause both of perception and life, so the other is conceived of as the Author both of Knowledge and Being. The Heraclitean element appears once again as the fire by whose glimmering light the shadows of borrowed forms are cast upon the wall of the cave or dungeon in which men lie bound. The combination of agent and patient in sensation, according to the earlier theory, resulted in the twin birth, ever recurring, of sensation and sensible thing. The consummation of the Soul's desires in the Ideal World is the Eternal Union of Mind and Being, the twin immortal offspring of which are Reason and Truth.

In the Republic, knowledge is shown to be inseparable from the reality of its object. And there are two conditions of this reality. The object of true Knowledge is, (1) above sense, (2) conformable to the Idea of Good. Knowledge is also divided into Absolute (or Transcendental) and Scientific.

Two slight discrepancies between the Theaetetus and the Republic serve to be noticed. (1.) The word Ἐπεξερετος is applied to
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It is unnecessary in this brief sketch to carry our thoughts onward to the latest and most complicated stage of Plato's philosophy. But we may allude in taking leave of this subject to the wide interval which separates the vague and simple notion of the diurnal revolution of the sun and of the sky, from the elaborate astronomy of the Timæus, and on the other hand to the close parallel which subsists between the doctrine of sense which is here rejected as a theory of knowledge, and the final theory of sensation as such, in which Pythagorean and other elements are blended with the Heraclitean. (Tim. 43. sqq.)

§. 7.

It is manifest that the dialogue in its present form cannot have existed earlier than the date of the battle in which Theseutus is said to have been wounded; and the preface, at least, must probably have been written a few years later than this.

The destruction of the Spartan Mora by Iphicrates and his peltasts, an event which Mr. Grote, apparently with good reason, has placed as late as 390 B.C., seems on the whole to be most probably the occasion meant. As the Corinthian war continued three years after this, it is possible that some engagement may have taken place as late as the year 387. But if we are driven to suppose a still later date for the scene with which the Theseutus opens, the earliest assignable year is 369 B.C., when the combined forces of the Athenians and Lacedemonians and their allies tried to dispute the passage of the Isthmus with Epaminondas.

So far as any arguments can be raised from the dialogue taken by itself, the hypothesis that it was written a few years later than 390 B.C. is quite satisfactory. It allows sufficient time for Plato's residence at Megara to have become the subject of reflection with him, and for his mind to have advanced considerably towards its final conceptions. If he was 30 at the death of Socrates, he would now be a little over 40. The bitterness caused by that event would not yet be mellowed

mental operations not immediately connected with sensation. In the Republic τὸ λογισμὸν and τὸ διδαστήριον are identified. (2.) ὅροι μέγα, which in the Republic is applied only to practical notions, is used in the Theseutus indifferently of the juror's verdict and of the conclusions of the arithmetician.
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down, or 'rubbed off by travel;' and the unwillingness to
descend 'into the cave,' would naturally still give some harsh-
ness to the contrast between philosophy and Athenian life.

And even should it be necessary to place the Sophista and
Politicus much later, the conception of a trilogy or tetralogy,
though most important (in this case where it is suggested by
Plato himself) as indicating connexion of thought, does not
necessitate continuity of composition. No one supposes that
the OEdipus Tyrannus of Sophocles immediately preceded the
Coloneus in point of date. (οὐδὲ θεαὶ ἄνωρ τουταί, ἐπιμη-
σων καὶ ἄρεων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.)

On the other hand, even the year 369 B.C. (though some
time must surely be allowed for the composition of the dialogue,
and we read of no battle till the year 368 B.C.) would seem
from internal evidence considerably too late. Plato would
then be upwards of 60 years old. He is said to have died in
347 B.C. at the age of 81 or 82. It seems hardly probable
that at a time when he must have been putting his thoughts
into their most perfect shape in the Republic, he should make
an elaborate return to the 'elements' of a rejected philosophy,
or that the perplexities he had encountered in his sojourn with
the Megarian philosophers should 'trouble' him as they once
had done, or present themselves to him with the same vividness
and reality. The slight way in which the two theories 'that
wisdom is the good,' and 'that pleasure is the good,' are
touched upon in Rep. p. 505, 509, contrasts forcibly with the
earnestness with which in the Theaetetus the Cyrenaic theory
of knowledge is treated as an open question, and the strong
Megarian influence which is throughout perceptible. And
while it is most probable that the Theaetetus is written from a
point of view more advanced than any which is allowed to
appear in the dialogue itself, it is very difficult to conceive that
(e.g.) the passage in which the existence and goodness, same-
ness and difference of things, are shown to be immediately
perceived by the mind, was written nearly at the same period
with the account of the Idea of Good in the Republic. (See
the beginning of B. VII. where the sameness and difference
(e.g.) of the fingers is spoken of as one of the first perceptions
of the awakening intellect.) The freshness and individuality
of the person of Socrates, and the close identification of the
method with his teaching are also features which consist better with the earlier date.

The chief difficulty in the way of the above hypothesis is connected with the person of Thestetus; who in the conversation with Socrates is represented as a boy of about 16 (μετάρκιον) while Euclides and Terpsion speak of him in the preface in terms which imply that he was already a distinguished and valued citizen and had justified the prophetic words of Socrates. (Όλον ἄνθρωπος λέγεις ἵνα κυρίως εἶναι—τούτον ἔλλογμον γενέσθαι—ἄληθῆ εἶπεν.) If the date of the battle in question were earlier than 390 B.C. Thestetus could hardly have had time to fulfill the prophecy of Socrates even in the eyes of his personal friends. But an interval of 9 years does seem sufficient for this. The youth of 16 would have become a man of 25, and might well have earned distinction in light-armed combat, and in other ways. Some touches in the conversation would then acquire additional point. Terpsion has no doubt of the prowess of his friend, yet Euclides mentions with some pride that men had praised him for his conduct in the battle. This praise is also the more natural, if the kind of fighting was one comparatively untried, and the occasion one in which the national honour of Athens and Sparta was nearly concerned. The words, too, εἶπερ εἷς ἡλικίαν ἐλθοί, have a more touching significance, if they apply to one who seems likely to be cut off in his prime.

The difficulty is greater, however, when the notices of later writers are taken into account. If Thestetus is supposed to recover from his illness and his wounds, the dialogue seems to be robbed of a great ornament. And yet Thestetus (the same Thestetus who had heard Socrates and followed Plato) is spoken of by Suidas as a distinguished mathematician who taught at Heraclea and was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. That he should be a distinguished mathematician before 25, and even a discoverer in geometry, is not impossible (for, as Aristotle says, μαθητικὸς μὲν πάντα γένοις ἄντι) but that he should have become a teacher of it in a foreign city is less probable, even if he is supposed to live to the age of 28. And the complaint of Plato in the Republic, that the science of solid geometry was in its infancy, would seem hardly
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justifiable, if the treatise on the regular solids had been in existence so long.

But (1.) it is not impossible that Thestetetus may have so far recovered of his wounds as to be able to be a teacher of mathematics. (2.) The point of the difficulty lies in a late testimony, a cross-examination of which, if it were possible, might place the facts in a different light.

Still it becomes worth while to examine the hypothesis of a later date (368 B. C.), the reasons against which have been already mentioned. It may be said in favour of it; (1.) that it allows ample time for all Thestetetus' distinctions; (2.) that a disciple of Plato would fight more willingly with the Lacedæmonians on his side; (3.) that Megara was at this time in alliance with Athens, and hence it would be natural to expect him to put up there. (On the former occasion, however, she seems to have been neutral.)

The preface may be of this date, and yet the chief part of the dialogue may be earlier. It may have been sketched during Plato's residence at Megara (ἐγραψάμην μὲν τὸν εὖθεν—νυκτὸμήματα) and filled up and retouched at intervals (ὑστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμητικὸμενος ἔγγραφον); and long afterwards the preface may have been added to indicate the Megarian character of the dialogue.

Some such conjecture (which in any case is not improbable) would seem to be the natural resort, if it became necessary to suppose the preface written after 368 B. C.

§ 9.

The Thes- tetus and Aristotle.

One chief source of difficulty in the Thestetetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the conception of the Proposition.¹ In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phenomena, bound up with the ever-varying impressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, how is false opinion possible, there appears indeed a

¹ ξυλογισμὸς in the Thest. (p. 186) is nearly equivalent to “abstraction and generalization.”
sort of consciousness that every act of thought implies a subject (p. 188. ὠφρέ περὶ τῶν δύναμεν ὁμο ἄρα ἄρα καθ' ἄρα), and that to think is to say to oneself, "This is that;"—which first shows itself in the example, "I think Theætetus is Socrates," and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that thought is the mind's silent discourse. But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to predicate in any proposition. Thus it is assumed that when one predicate is substituted for another, (as when, in the propositions, "Yonder man is Socrates," or Thersites was handsome," the terms "Socrates" and "handsome" have been substituted by mistake for "Theætetus" and "ugly"); this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were predicated of each other: (thus, "Theætetus is Socrates," "What is ugly is handsome.")

The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block, but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, "the sum of 7 and 5 is 11," and saying "11 is 12."

Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination.

This confusion between subject and predicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of δύναμις with ἐνέργεια. The subject is all its predicates ἄνωμεν, and is that which, together with the opposite quality, becomes τὸ ἔντι. Thus Καλλίας ἄμονος becomes ὑμνημικός: hence Calias is in one sense the material part.

It may be said therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or

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m A close study of this passage (pp. 189, 190) will afford convincing proof of the indeterminate state of the science of logic at this time, and the necessity of getting behind Aristotle (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand Plato.
subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms.

1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the Theaetetus which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two very similar passages of the Metaphysics (Γ. 1005 b.—1012 b., Κ. 1061 b.—1063 b.), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction.

The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, "Every thing at once is and is not." This is at first put forward with the qualification, "Some (i. e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this:" but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, "adopted by many physical philosophers." The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man's impression is true, then contrariety are true (and not true) together.

Aristotle does not profess to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (οι μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦσι βλένναι, οἱ δὲ βλασκον). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue. (1.) "We will not say that the act of predication must either be or not be something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question; but we will say, that every predicate means something, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to predicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, man and not man cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject."

(2.) "The difference between the same man's impressions

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n Cf. Hom. Ι. Β. Π. 188, 198. Ὄντως μὲν βασιλῆς καὶ ἐρωτούν ἄθαντα κρι- χεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἄγανιν ἰσίεσθαι ἵπτενος ἵπτε- σασκε παραστάτος——Οὖν δ' ἀδίκου τ' ἄθαντα θεοί δοκεῖν τ' ἱπτεῖν, τὸν ἀφί- πτερον ἰλάσασκην, ὑμεθύμνωσκε τε μέθυ.
at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the past, present, and future."

There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e. g. "nearer and farther from the truth," necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue, and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it, is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning:

(1.) It is assumed as part of the theory, that everything is thus and not-thus (οὐτως καὶ ὅχι οὕτως.) But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the Theaetetus (p. 183). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite; and this in two ways: first, as "not-this" means "everything but this," it follows that everything must be everything else; and, secondly, (with Plato Theaet. loc. cit.) if οὐτως καὶ ὅχι οὕτως is true, then its contradictory (οὐθ’ οὕτως οὔτε ὅχι οὕτως) must also be true; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (τὸ μὴ δtheless λέγει).

(2.) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown, that in making all impressions true, he makes them also false, and his own theory amongst the rest.

(3.) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknowledges the distinction between good and bad. Everything then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, "as Plato puts it," with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome, than a chance person.

ο καὶ γέγενεν δὴ τὸ ἀναφαγόνον, ὁμοὶ πάντα χρήματα. Aristotle thinks that if this argument had been put to Heraclitus himself, he would have been compelled to acknowledge its force.
Aristotle further points out the absolute relativeness of the doctrine. They cannot say, "What appears, is," but "What appears to me, is to me."

The following scattered touches may be quoted without comment.

"The theory of Protagoras is called ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα διάθεσις."

"My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing."

"The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real."

"Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute."

"When a thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then, (i.e. the healthy one) and not the other, is to be held the measure of things."

"Language is made impossible."

"The man thinks thus and not thus: i.e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks. He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable."

Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down any thing to start with, and allow it to remain firm. Other points of comparison will be mentioned in the notes. In brief, Aristotle meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity of form.

2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place between them, and there is a world in which growth and decay, generation and corruption, are ever going on, viz. the world of sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the relations expressed in mathematics.

This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle's theory of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the indeterminateness of matter (Phys. Ausc. I.) and points out that therefore it can only be the object of knowledge, "by analogy," with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation as a realization of mental life, is very
similar to that expressed in the Theætetus. The ἐνέργεια αἰσθήσεως, which is inseparable from the ἐνέργεια αἰσθησίας, is the meeting point of active and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a process between object and subject.) But the φαντασία or mental image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in thought, in the Theætetus is merged in sensation, although the term is simply the noun of φαντασία (φαντασία ἡρα καὶ αἰσθησία τὰ ἄνων), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle. The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the possibility of error p.

3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or many, e. g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole: much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of receiving a certain form.

At this point Plato (in the Theætetus) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the end (τὸ οὖν ἐνέκα) is bound up with that of the form.

As the tendency in the Theætetus is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element: (i. e. logically.) (Met. Δ. 1014 b.)

4. Among the germs which the Theætetus (like most of

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p (Met. I. 1010 b: Οὔτ' ἡ αἰσθήσις where the φαντασία is false the δόξα
φαντασία τοῦ θέου ἐνθέων ἄλλ' ἡ φαντασία
καὶ ταῦτα τῇ αἰσθήσει.) Again, even

III. 3.

The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue) on this point of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view:

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<tr>
<th>Aristotle thus traces the gradual ascent of the human mind from</th>
<th>ἐνέργεια ( \muθήμα )</th>
<th>each of which is accompanied by</th>
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<td>sense to knowledge:</td>
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These two are in some cases inseparable. (\( \alphaἰσθησίας \) φαντασία.)
Plato's dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formulæ, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (ἐπιστασθαι, θεωρεῖν), —his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a potential and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the Theaetetus only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary symbol. But the distinction latent in the image between the potential and the actual, is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable completeness.

While Aristotle, in adding the corner stone to the fabric of Greek philosophy, could not but draw largely from Plato, either immediately or through the discussions of his followers, yet the presence in him must be admitted of a wholly distinct element, which gives a different value to his speculations, even when in substance they coincide. This may be briefly described as the determination to be at once logical and matter of fact, the conviction that philosophy must be consistent on the one hand with itself, and on the other with experience. This return to common sense, so valuable in restoring the balance of philosophy, and this subordination of all things to logic, may be viewed partly as the natural advance or recoil from the dialectic of Plato, but they are partly the culmination of a separate tendency of the Greek mind.

§ 10.

It has been already noticed, that the completeness with which the doctrine of sense is developed in the Theaetetus, probably influenced the expression of cognate ideas in the later period of Ancient Philosophy. Passing with this slight remark from the Ancient world, we proceed finally to notice in a few words the bearing of the Theaetetus upon modern metaphysical inquiry.

And first it is right to observe the importance of the transition. The comparison of Ancient and Modern Philosophy is very different from the study of the relations between two schools or two periods in either. The links by which they are
historically connected are comparatively slander: the external similarity, though sometimes obvious, is generally superficial: but there is also a deeper analogy, like what may be observed between separate kingdoms of nature.

Modern Philosophy starts from a more inward experience of the mind, from a wider and more varied observation of the external world, than was possible in the days of Thales or even of Parmenides. Ancient Philosophy had contributed to this, but indirectly. Descartes did not start from the Platonic Idea, but from the consciousness of his own highly-wrought mind. Bacon rebelled against the authority of Aristotle, and sought for natural and not logical 'forms' in the Interpretation of Nature. And yet it is not merely fanciful to see a kind of parallel between the resting-place from doubt, 'Cogito, ergo sum,' and the resting-place from what is particular and changeable—"The mind contemplating Being and Goodness is its own instrument:" or between Bacon's 'natural form' and the Platonic or Aristotelian ἄδος. Indeed in the latter case, the mode of expression is adapted from the Greek Philosophy.

That which gives the Thesetetus a peculiarly modern interest is its comparatively subjective character. This is partly inherent in the nature of the question, but is also partly due to the human reference of Protagoras and the self-inquiry of Socrates. An approach only is made to the consideration of abstract Being; the mind is in vain endeavouring to find the determining law of truth within itself. Thus it fails at one time to find any firm standing-ground, at another to conceive the possibility of error. In like manner Descartes, starting from within, is obliged to postulate the existence of God, almost before he can establish his first principle, certainly before he can determine whether the waking or the sleeping life is real, and feels almost as keenly as a Greek Philosopher could have done, the difficulty of conceiving error as possible 9.

Every metaphysical work, ancient or modern, is sure to

9 E. g. Medit. III. p. 18: Jam quod ad ideæ attinet, si sole in se specten-
tur, nec ad alium quid illas referam, falsæ proprie esse non possunt: nam sive capram sive chimeram imaginæ, non minus verum est me unam ima-
 ginari quam alteram. Nulla etiam in ipsa voluntate vel affectibus falsitas est simenda, nam quamvis prava, quamvis etiam ea que nusquam sunt possim optare, non tamen ideo non verum est illa me optare, ac pruinde sola supersunt judicia in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar.
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possess some points of affinity and contrast to the Theætetus. All that will be attempted here is to indicate very briefly the points in the dialogue itself which seem capable of illustrating more recent phases of reflection. These are, (1) The analysis of sensation or perception. (2) The semi-physical theory of 'motion.' (3) The 'subjective' doctrine of Protagoras and the Cyrenaics. (4) The Theætetus as a psychology. (5) Logical difficulties.

1. The Theætetus contains a theory of sensation; or rather a doctrine of impressions of sense, in each of which there is shown to be an active and a passive—in modern language, an objective and a subjective—element. No attempt is made, however, at least in the earlier part of the dialogues, to distinguish the physical from the mental in the act of sense, the recipient from the active state of the Subject, sensation from perception. Warmth, whiteness, even comparative size and number, are viewed, so far as the Subject is concerned, (in common with pleasures, desires, hopes, fears,) simply as phenomena, experiences or impressions. And when presently it appears that there is something more in each of us than a bundle of divers faculties of sense, and that the mind, which receives and judges all, is one; the distinction is drawn, not between the mind's sensation and perception, e. g. of a white object, but between its own perceptions and the impressions which it receives through the body: e. g. the eye informs me that this ball is white, that that ball is red; the mind, reviewing these sensations, perceives that each of them is, that it is one, that it is the same with itself, different from the other, that they are together two: also that the redness and the whiteness are, and that they are different, and that this difference is a real thing.

But towards the end of the dialogue, where it is said that the simplest elements, for instance, of speech and music, may be the objects of knowledge, this may be regarded as an admission that simultaneous with every impression of sense there is, or may be, a perception of the mind.

This reasoning is not without its bearing on modern theories of sensation and perception: (and it probably implies an observation of inward facts not less complete;) but it is not to be confounded with them.
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It stands in a closer and more concrete relation to the mind's experience of itself; it is far simpler, and, though less distinct, is more luminous, expressing a fresh and vivid consciousness, and an intensity of inquiry, which has not yet assumed a set form, or attained to definite results, but is neither overclouded andparalysed by subjective uncertainty, nor lost in the abstractions of logic, nor perplexed by the distracting influences of physical science.

2. For although this theory of sensation is united with a doctrine of motion, and Plato's argument may thus seem to touch upon modern physiological inquiries, or even upon the theories of light and heat and sound, the sense in which the word motion is used is vague in the extreme. So far as it is used with a physical meaning, it is not distinguished from force, nor from matter, for this is left out of view. It is moreover the symbol of relation and change. And the term thus metaphorically used is not accurately defined, for while the object and subject are said to suffer change, sensations and qualities are said to be in locomotion (p. 156). It is not easy for us, with our more definite conceptions, to assign any very intelligible meaning to this. But it may be conceded that there is here an anticipation of the fact, that sensation is in every case occasioned by motion. A nearer approach to scientific truth may be found in the notion of the absolute relativeness of phenomena. Studying the world of experiences from within the mind, 'ex analogia hominis,' Plato regards the objects of sensation as wholly indeterminate, and can find no true 'measure of things' but in the contemplation of abstract Ideas. I am conscious of my own sensation, but I cannot compare it with that of any other being, still less with any universal standard. Therefore I must not look for truth here, but in the world of Ideas. Modern Experimental Science is equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has found means of measuring the 'motions' by which they are caused, through the effect of the same motions upon other things besides our senses. 'When the same wind is blowing' (Theæt. p. 152) 'one of us feels it warm, another cold,'—but the mercury of the thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that
the sensation of heat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law.

3. The philosophy of Protagoras may be described in modern language as a rhetorical scepticism, that of the Cyrenaics as a sensational idealism.

An interesting parallel might be drawn (for instance) between Protagoras and Hume. But it must be kept in mind that scepticism is a relative term, and that while that of Protagoras was directed probably as much against astronomical and mathematical speculation, as against the Eleatic Absolute Being, that of Hume was aimed at the popular belief in supernatural causes, and those a priori notions or innate ideas, which modern metaphysicians had in part elaborated and in part inherited from Greek philosophy. Both poured contempt upon the popular religion of their day; both pointed to the limited and relative nature of human knowledge; and both were content to rest within the clearly defined boundary of a 'certain uncertainty,' without even an aspiration after Absolute or Ideal Truth. Both (if Plato's representation in the Protagoras may be trusted) eminently possessed the faculty of lucid and perssuasive exposition, which is sometimes found accompanying a kind of narrowness in speculation. But here the resemblance probably ends. Protagoras may however with justice be regarded as the type of a class,—the utilitarian or common sense sceptics,—of which Hume is in modern times perhaps the most brilliant example.

On the other hand the Cyrenaic dogma may be compared with the destructive or negative side of Berkeley. But their refined contempt for the materialists, who 'believe only in what they can clutch between their hands,' is of a different order from Berkeley's endeavour to resolve concrete existence into ideas of the mind. His denial of material substance as a metaphysical abstraction, was consistent on the one hand with the most searching physical inquiry, and on the other with his belief in the reality of universals, as thoughts of the Eternal mind. But the Cyrenaic could not be said to analyse phenomena: he merely dwelt upon the consciousness of the instant, and limited his view to that. True, he sought a ground of objective reality in a movement from without, corresponding to the impression
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within, and embraced both, the active and the passive move-
ment, in the formula of universal change, but universal change
is at each instant a mere negation. Hence, to dwell in thought
for a moment on this theory was to reduce it to nothingness.
And, to speak more generally, modern controversies about the
'reality of the external world' would have little meaning for
any of the Ancient Philosophers, who knew so little of the
laws of the material universe, although the spirit (for instance)
of Parmenides and of Democritus may be viewed as typical of
all subsequent ideal and material theories.

4. As an inquiry into the nature of Knowledge and Opinion,
and the boundary which divides them, the Thestetus may be
compared with Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.
Such a comparison would be interesting for many reasons.
Besides the sort of kindred which often exists between minds
of genuine originality even in distant ages, there is in some
respects a similarity of position. Both inquiries commence
from within, in both Knowledge is reduced to its elements
(simple ideas of sensation), both occupy the middle ground
between Material and Ideal systems, both rest upon experience,
both rise by gradual steps from sense to reason; in both re-
flexion and imagination are engaged in bodying forth the
mind's modes of thinking, (with perfect originality in both, yet
with the most curious coincidences in the kind of images em-
ployed: compare Locke's sandstone and marble impressions,
and his dark room or cabinet, with Plato's waxen block and
aviary;) in both the office of the Reason is represented to be
the combination (or comparison) of the impressions of sense.
Both in short present us with a psychology, clear and simple,
based upon experience, and in a certain way complete.

But, not to mention the difference of style, the comparative
absence in Locke of the poetical element, and the influence
which Natural Philosophy exercised upon his method, there is
this radical distinction between the attitude of Plato in the
Thestetus, and that of the English philosopher, that while
Plato's chief endeavour is to rise from the elements of sense to
higher things, the first effort of Locke is to recall the human
mind from a spurious Platonism to its experience of itself; and
while the highest point reached in the Thestetus (that the
mind reviewing its impressions and determining of their Being,
INTRODUCTION.

Unity, or Beauty, is its own instrument) is but the 'topmost round' of 'young ambition's ladder,' Locke rests contentedly within the subjective limits which he believed to be imposed by Providence on the human mind.

5. Lastly, the modified Eleaticism of Euclides, whom Socrates once described as 'capable of arguing with Sophists but not with men,' is not without its counterpart in modern philosophy. It may be described in modern language as the tendency to extreme logical analysis: to rest, that is, in the abstractions of logic, refusing to appreciate the subtlety of Nature and the complexity of the world, and to endeavour to conceive of things as they really are.

(a.) Euclides does not stand alone in his method of following a theory to its logical conclusions, instead of inquiring into the reasonableness of the grounds on which it is based.

(b.) Nor is the 'victim of a mercenary logic,' ἐν φρεται συνεχόμενος (caught in a pit-fall), who is compelled to admit that he sees and does not see, in a much worse plight than the student who finds himself bound hand and foot, by victorious subjective analysis, within the limits of his own organism.

(c.) The paradoxical difficulty, 'Is it possible to know and not to know?'—'How can you inquire about that which you do not know,'—has a still nearer resemblance to metaphysical paradoxes among ourselves: e.g. How is it possible that Knowledge (or Inquiry) should transcend the limits of experience? In both cases the idea of a tentative and partial Knowledge, of a sort of faith of the Intellect, is left out of view, and the result of both is equally fatal to the spirit of inquiry.

(d.) In the Theætetus the Megarian tendency to divide every thing from every thing (ῥῶ πᾶν ἀρκτῶ παρὰ δωμοικρή) is met by the conception of the blending of diverse elements in a higher unity. This thought is further developed in the Sophista, and, as we have seen, is taken up by Aristotle. Though expressed by the Greek philosophers in a dialectical form, this assertion of the presence of a higher unity in every complex whole,—of the inadequacy of analysis as a method of knowledge,—is of permanent value. For it is directed against a confusion to which many others are parallel. Such, for instance, in modern times would be the confusion between facts or phenomena, and their principles or laws, or between
organism and life, or between experience and reason, or between the forms of language or imagination, and the creative mind. We may doubt, with Plato in the Theætetus, whether the higher can even be known apart from the lower, but this difficulty ought not to lead to their identification in thought.

(e.) The barren sophistry into which the method degenerated in the hands of the followers of Euclides affords a useful warning to 'intellectualism' in every time.

The mind of Plato in the Theætetus is keenly alive to the presence of logical difficulties, but is neither irritated nor deterred by them. He unravels them with the utmost patience, but at the same time treats them with a kind of compassionate irony, as if he refused to be bound within the framework of contemporary thought.

In an age when so much yearns for reconciliation, when, for instance, the paths of natural and mental science, after swerving far asunder, promise to converge again, when the abstractions of the intellect begin to stand in a new relation to the forms of the imagination, from which they had seemed to be finally severed, it is an interesting and suggestive labour, to turn again the earlier pages of the book of human Inquiry: to find there 'anticipations of Nature' indissolubly woven together with the reflections of the mind upon itself: to see a fast-ripening philosophy labouring with an imperfect logic; and language, and poetical imagination, with mixed modes of sense, casting their many-coloured veil over the irregularities of mental growth, and giving form and life and substance to dialectical and speculative thought. This Attic prime of intellectual manhood is beautiful to contemplate, even if philosophy may not hope from such fountains to renew her youth.
ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ.

"ΑΡΤΙ, ὁ Τερψίων, ἡ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ;
ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σὲ γε ἐξήτουν καὶ ἀγορὰν καὶ ἔθαμαζον, ὅτι υἱὸς τὸ σοῦ εὑρέιν.
ΕΥ. Όὐ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ πόλιν.
ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;
ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαινὼν Θεαίτης ἐνέτυχον γερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθηναῖες.

ΤΕΡ. Ζώντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι;
b ΕΥ. Ζώντι καὶ μάλα μόλις. χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ

3. ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ]
Euclides and Terpseion appear also in the Phaedo as the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates, p. 59: Καὶ Μεγαρὸντες Εὐκλείδης τὸ καὶ Τερψίων. Compare with the preservation of this dialogue by Euclides, and the introduction of Thedorus of Cyrene, the preservation of the Pythagorean dialogue by Phaedo, and the introduction in it of Simias and Cebes (Φιλολόγων συγγενεῖς).

6. καὶ σὲ γε] With some emphasis. I have been looking for you.

7. καὶ ἔθαμαζον] It is perhaps intimated that Euclides, like his master Socrates, was to be found daily in the marketplace.

9. μὴ expresses surprise.

11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου] For the expression compare Charm. p. 25: 'Εκ Ποιείδαιας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου. The date is either earlier than B.C. 387, or later than B.C. 369. Either supposition presents some difficulty. See Introduction.

13. Ζώντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι] Spoken not, as Stallbaum says, in jest, but in serious alarm, occasioned by the word φερομένῳ.

14. Ζώντι καὶ μάλα μόλις] 'Indeed, hardly alive.' 'Only just alive.'
εἴχε καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτῶν p.142. αἱρεῖ τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία;
ΕΥ. Ναί.

5 ΤΕΡ. Οἶον ἄνθρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.
ΕΥ. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἁγαθὸν, ὦ Τερψίων, ἐπεί τοι καὶ νῦν ἠκούον τινῶν μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἀτοποῦ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυματοστότερον εἰ μὴ τουτόσον ἤν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ εἰς Μεγαροῖ κατέλυεν;
ΕΥ. Ἡπείγετο οἰκαδε' ἐπεί ἐγωγ' ἐδεόμη καὶ συνεβούλευσα, ἀλλ' ὦκ ἦθελε. καὶ δῆτα προσείμηναν αὐτῶν, ἀπὸν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἑθαύμασα Σωκρ-15 κράτος, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τοῦ τούτου. δοκεί γάρ μοι ὅλογον πρό τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακίρ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενομένος τε καὶ διαλεξθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι 'Αθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους οὓς διελέξθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἄξιος ἀκοῆς, εἰπε τε ὦτι πᾶσαν ἀνάγκη εἰς τούτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἥλικιαν ἐλθοῦ.

5. οἶον ἄνθρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι] 'What a noble life is then in peril!' 'What a loss such a man would be!' It is natural to conclude from this that Theodorus must have been already distinguished; although, perhaps, not in war.
10. αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ] 'Why did he not stop where he was, and come and put up at Megara?'
14. ἀπὸν πάλιν] 'as I returned.'
16. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives a slight uncertainty to the expression. It here qualifies rather the mark of time ἀκ. p. τ. τ. than the infinitive ἐντυχεῖν. So below, p. 144, δοκοῦσι belongs more in sense to ἀλεφάσαναι than to ἕτοι. 'I think it was a little while before his death that he met with him.'
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p.142. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἄληθι γε, ὦς θοικεν, εἴπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἃν διηγήσασθαι;

ΕΥ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, οὐκον οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στὸ-

p.143. ματος· ἀλλ’ ἑγραφάμην μὲν τὸν εὐθὺς οίκαδ ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὑστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμνησικό−5 μενος ἑγραφὼν, καὶ ὅσηκις Ἀθήναξ ἀφικοίµην, ἐπανηρτῶν τὸν Σωκράτη δ ἡ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνορθοίµην· ὡστε μοι σχεδόν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται.

b ΤΕΡ. Ὄληθι· ἥκουσα σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέν−10 τοι ἀεὶ μέλλουν κελεύσειν ἐπιδείξιν διατέρπετο δεῦρο.

1. Καὶ ἄλθη γε — εἴπεν In the editions before Heindorf these words were given to ΕΥ. But in the Bodleian MS. (in which the initials of the interlocutors are generally omitted) a small capital Τ has been inserted over καὶ. [Bekk. — : καὶ Δ. vulgo enim : τάρ.] 3. οὐκον—γε] Not, at least, in the way you seem to expect. οὕτω as we are, on the spot. Comp. the use of ὁνιν οὕτως. 4. ἑγραφάμην — ἑγραφὼν I wrote for my own use—I went on writing.

5. ὑπομνήματα [notes.] See Phaedr. 275, where letters are called ὑπομνήμασι φάμασιν. 7. ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην] = αἱ τι μὴ ἐμεμνήμην. μὴ gives indefinitelessness to ἐπ. Is it possible that we have here an indication of the mode in which the dialogue was really composed? 10. ἄλθη ἡκουσα] The clauses are parallel and not consequent, hence the ὁποιοτὸν.

καὶ μέσον, κ. τ. λ.] 'And, now I think of it, I have always meant to ask you to show it me, but have let opportunities slip till now.' That which is really most emphatic is expressed by the participle. It has been objected to this rendering, (a) that δεῦρο is not used as an adverb of time except with μέχρις or ἄει, (β) that διατρίβειν, meaning 'to delay,' could not have been used here without an adverb of place. But, (a) such transference of adverbs from place to time is not unusual, and it occurs in the case of δεῦρο in Plat. Tim. 21: ἦν ὢδε η σᾶλς ἑραβεῖ μὲν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἑγραφαμένων οὐ διάρκεισε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. In the present passage, the deviation from common use is softened by the neighbourhood of ἄει. Comp. Ἀσκ. Eum. 596: Καὶ δεῦρό γ’ ἄει τὴν τύχην οὐ μέμφομαι. Such a refinement upon a common phrase is in the manner of Plato. And (β) there is no reason why διατρίβειν should not be used here absolutely, with a touch of blame in it, as meaning not simply 'to delay,' but 'to waste time.' See Rep. 472: Λέγε, καὶ μὴ διά-

τρίβε. Aristoph. Equ. 515: Ψηνι

B 2
ἀλλὰ τὶ κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγονε π.143.
καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὥς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἥκων.

ΕΥ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρωῦ Θεα-
τητοῦ προσπεμψά, ὡστε οὐκ ἂν ἄρδῶς ἀναπαυόμην.
κὰ ἂς ἰωμέν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἁμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀνα-
γνώσεται.

ΤΕΡ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΕΥ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὃ Τερψίων, τούτι ἐγρα-
ψάμην δὲ δὴ οὐσῳ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη
διηγούμενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον ὦς ἔφη
dιαλεξθήναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδάρῳ καὶ
tῷ Θεατήτῳ. ἦν οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιν εἰ
πράγματα αὐτοῖς τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐ-
tοῦ τε, ὡπότε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης οἶνον Κάγω ἐφὴν ἦ

γὰρ ἄλλῳ οὐχ ἐν' ὀποίᾳ τούτῳ πε-
πονθεὶ διατηρεῖν, where it is
used with a participle as here.
Thuc. VI. 42, 43, 47.

1. πάντως ἔγονε] This asyn-
deton is very frequent. Infr.
162: Πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλι
ἐμεῖς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὅποιοις.
Polit. 269: Πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκ
φεύγεισι παῦναι ἦν.

2. καὶ ἀναπαυόμεθα διόμενοι]
' Besides, as I have walked in
from the country, I should any
how be glad of the rest.'

3. 'Ερωῦ] A spot on the Ce-
phisus, close to Eleusis, where
it was fabled that Plato had de-
scended with Proserpine. Paus.
I. 92. There were other places
of the name.

4. ὁ παῖς] Euclid's servant.

5. οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον
κ.τ.λ. ] These words are parallel
to οὕτοι τῶν λόγων, depending
on ἐγραφάμην. Compare Apol.
19: Ταῦτα—ἐσοφαί—Σωκράτη
—περιμερόμενον.

11. τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδάρῳ]
Theodorus the mathematician
of Cyrene, with whom, accord-
ing to a tradition, Plato once
studied. Two points in him
are of importance as regards
this dialogue: he is a geome-
trician, and stands thus on the
threshold of philosophy; and
he is of Cyrene, the city of
Aristippus, with whom he is
also connected as being one of
the friends of Protagoras. See
infr. 164: Οἱ εἰπτροποί οἱ προ-
ταγόρας κατέληκαν—δὲ Θεοδαρὸς
εἰς δίκη.

12. οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, κ.τ.λ.]
Imitated by Cicero, de Amic.
c. i: Quasi enim ipsos induxi
loquentes, ne inquam et inquit
sepsius interponerentur.

13. ἀι μεταξὺ] The bits of
narration in the interstices of
the dialogue.

14. This is the
reading of the Bodleian MS.
If it is adopted, περὶ αὐτοῦ δε-
ΕΘΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 143. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ αὕτη περὶ τοῦ ἀποκριμομένου, ὅτι Συνέφη ὅ Οὐχ ὠμολόγει, τοῦτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὡς Ἐυκλείδη.

ΕΥ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκτὸς, ὡς pends immediately on διαγράφοις, and ὅποτε λέγων is epexegetical.

1. ἢ αὕτη περὶ τοῦ ἀποκριμομένου] sc. λέγων. ἡ κ. τ. λ. referring to ὅποτε λέγων is introduced instead of the regular καὶ κ.τ.λ., answering to περὶ αὐτοῦ τε. The interruptions both concerning Socrates himself, when he told me, (e.g.) 'said I,' or 'I replied,' or again, when he told of the respondent, that 'he assented,' or 'he did not agree.'

4. οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου] Comp. Rep. 47ο: Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἢ πρὸς τρόπον λέγει—'Ορα δὴ καὶ τάδε εἰ πρὸς τρόπον λέγε. See also Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (Act. II. sc. 3): 'Why bird and beast from (i.e. contrary to) quality and kind.' (ἀπὸ is the Bodleian reading.) It is not necessary to suppose any allusion to the form of the Megarian dialogue, but it adds point to this expression if we suppose that it was cast in this dramatic mould. There is then a touch of nature in the approbation of Terpion. This is at any rate better, if a reason must be found for everything, than to suppose with Schleiermacher, that Plato is acknowledging an error in his own earlier style. But perhaps it is enough to say that the form is adopted for the sake of clearness, which was of great importance in this and the two following dialogues. And it is equally natural that Euclides should omit Κέων ἢ πρὸς, &c. in a written report, and that viva voce reporters in other dialogues should insert them. In this Preface we have been introduced to Thestetus as a distinguished citizen. In what follows we are to see the promise of his youth. We are told of Thestetus by later writers (besides the fact that he heard Socrates and followed Plato) that he taught mathematics at Heraclea, and that he was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. The interval which this seems to require between the trial of Socrates and the death of Thestetus (to which it is difficult not to suppose an allusion here) increases the uncertainty of the date. See Introduction.

6. Εἴ μὲν—] 'If my heart were in Cyrene.' There is an imperfect sequence of clauses, arising out of the interposition of the clause ἣττον γραφεῖ—ὁπειρασθείς, the last words of which form a transition to the main thought, to which Socrates gradually returns. The opening is characteristic of Socrates. He starts from an analogous instance, in which the person addressed is interested.
Theodorus in an Athenian palestra, asks what youth of promise he has met with, not in Cyrene, but in Athens. Theodorus speaks warmly in praise of Theseutas, who, though not beautiful, is at once bold and gentle and

Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνων ἄν ἡρῶταιν, δὲ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ή τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαι ποιούμενοι· νῦν δὲ — ἠττων γὰρ ἐκείνους ἤ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἑπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτῶς τε σκοπῶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἄν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἑθέλοντας ἵνα γίγνεσθαι. οὐτὶ δὴ οὐκ ὁλίγοιτοι πλησιάζουσιν, καὶ δικαίως· ἀξίοι γὰρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὸ γέωμετρίαν ἑνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἀξίωρ λόγου, ἱδέας ἄν πυθοῦμεν.

ΤΕΟ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σάκρατε, ἐμοὶ τε εἰπέιν καὶ

1. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν—περὶ ἐκεῖνων ἄν [ἐκεῖνων is masc. ἀγρότων, the reading of several MSS., is inappropriate here, and is perhaps due to the parallel passage of the Charmides, p. 153: ἄλλας ἐγὼ αὐτῶς ἀγρότως τὰ τήδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχω τὰ νῦν, περὶ τῶν νέων εἴτεν εἰς αὐτῶς διαφέροντες ή σοφία ή καλλίες ή ἀμφιθέρες ἔγγεγοντές εἰν. The only difficulty of the reading ἄν ἡρῶταιν is the repetition of ἄν after the pronoun. It may be accounted for by the emphasis which the antithesis gives to τὰ ἐκεῖ and ἐκεῖνως, and also to εἰπέιν being an after-thought: cf. Rep. 526: Οὐκ ἄν ραδίως ὅστε πολλὰ ἄν εὑροις. In both cases we may avoid the reduplication of ἄν, which would be difficult to explain, by supposing a repetition of the verb understood.

2. ἦ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφίας] 'or other liberal pursuit.' Comp. Tim. 88: Μονοτκή καὶ πάσης φιλοσοφίας προοριζόμενοι.

3. τινες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων] ἡμῖν is not emphatic. The expression is anticipated in τούσδε.


10. εἴ] interrogative; 'whether.' Cf. infra p. 207.
intelligent, a rare combination! Like a stream of oil, flowing smoothly and swiftly without a murmur.

3. µή καὶ τῷ δόξῳ] The expression is softened by the impersonal τῷ. 'Lest it might be thought'—'Lest I should give the impression.' This indirect reference to persons is more common in Plato than appears at first sight. Cf. (in this dialogue) p.175: 'Οταν δὲ γε τιμα—δεκαύη ἄνω, υἱ. τῶν δικαίων ἔκινων. Phaed. 63: 'Αἱ ὁ Κέβδης λόγους τιμᾶς άνεφευγώ, 80, ἐμοῦ.


5. τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὁμμάτων] This passage and the speech of Alcibiades in the Symposium (p. 215: 'Οτι μέν τὸ εἴδος ὄργεν εἰ τούτων (τοῖς Σελήνοις—καὶ τῷ Μαραθία) οὐδὲ αὐτὸς δὴ που ἀμφιβολήσητε.) are the chief allusions to Socrates' personal appearance in Plato. See below, p. 209: Τὸν συμών τε καὶ ἰχθύδαμον. Comp. Xen. Symp. V. 5, where Critoibulus, who has been boasting of beauty, is challenged to compete with Socrates. Socrates first shews that each thing is beautiful in relation to its use, and then asks: 'Ὀρθαλμῶν τίνος ἐνέκα δεόμεθα; Δῆλον ἐφι δι τοῦ ὀργῆν. Οὕτω μὲν τοῖν τῇ οἱ ἐµοὶ ὀρθαλμοὶ καλλίους ἄν τῶν σῶν ἐπήκουσαν. Πώς δὲ; 'Οτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ' εὐθὺ μόνον ὀρώσαν, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐνί πλαγίῳ διὰ τὸ ἔπτωείον εἶναι. Δέγεισ σι ἐφι καρδίνων ἐφοβολμάτωστον εἰναι τῶν ἐφι. Πάντως δήπου, ἐφι ἐπι καὶ πρὸς ἐνων τοὺς ὀρθαλμους ἀρισταν πειραμάτω τέχνας. Εἰπεν, ἐφι τῶν δὲ μων ποτέρα καλλίων, ἡ τῇ ἢ ἡ ἐµή; 'Εγώ μὲν, ἐφι, οἴμαι τῇ ἐµῆν, εἰτερ γε τοῦ σουφαίνοντια ἐνέκεν ἐποίησα ἡµῖν ῥίνας οἱ θεοὶ. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοι μυκτηρεῖς εἰς γῆν ὀρώσων οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ ἀνακόπτονται, διότι τὰ πάντοθεν ὁμόμ προσεδεχόμεθα. Τὸ δ' συμών τὴν ῥωσ πῶς τοῦ ὀρνου καλλίων; 'Οτι, ἐφι, οὐκ ἀντιφάντητε, ἀλ' εὐθὺς ἐγ' τὰς δόεις ὀργῆν ἄν ἐν βουλώματι. ἡ δὲ ἤνηλθ' ἐλε τοτε ἐπέμεινον διατητείχε τά ἑμετά. Τοῦ γε μὴ σωμάτων, ἐφι ο Κριτόβουσο, ὑψίστοι. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποδάκεν ἐνακε πεποίησα, πολὺ ἂν σὺ μεῖζον ἢ ἐγώ ἀποδάκε. Διὰ δὲ τὸ παχέα ἑχεν τὰ χελη οὐκ οἴη καὶ μαλακότερον ἑχεν τὸ φίλημα; Ἔοκαι, ἐφι, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ δωνι αἰχίνου τὸ στόμα ἑχεν. 'Εκεῖον δὲ οὐδὲν τεκμήριον λογίζετο, ἀν ἐγώ σοι καλλίων εἰμί, δι' οἱ καὶ Ναίδες θεῖα οὐσά τοὺς Σεληνοὺς ἐμοὶ ὕμοιστερον τίκτων ξυν ᾗ σοι.
which it has been proposed to substitute—so as to be ill-tempered with another,’ or (with ἄλλα) ‘so as in another case to be ill-tempered’—is objectionable, (a) as awkward in itself, (β) as breaking harmony (ὡς ἄλλα χαλεπὸν, διαφερότως, παρ’ ὀντινοὺς), (γ) as anticipating what is afterwards stated as a fresh thought (οτὲ τῇ ἀδείᾳ, κ.τ.λ.).

5. γενέσθαι (τοιούτων τινα) ‘I should not have thought there could have been an instance of this combination, nor do I find it usual.’


οὔτε ὅρῳ γεγομένους, κ.τ.λ.] The thought is exactly paralleled in the Republic, where the same combination of qualities is described as essential to the philosophic nature, and its rarity is dwelt upon in almost the same words. Rep. 503: Ἐν θείαις καὶ μήμονες καὶ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄξιοι οἷον ὅτι οἷον ἡθοποίους ἡμᾶς φιλέσθαι καὶ μανείκου τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστας πᾶσι διανοίας, οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιώτητος ἐθέλοντες, ἀλλ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι τοῦ ἐξέντητος φεύρονται δὴν ἔν ἡχοῖ, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐξήγηται. Ἀλῆθες, ἐκεῖ, λέγει. Οἷοι τοῦ βέβαιου ὅτι ταῦτα ἠθῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐλπιστόλει, οἷοι τῷ μᾶλλον ὅτι πιστοὶ χρήσαντο, καὶ τὸν τὸ πολέμον πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυνάμειποτὸ ἔστα.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 144. ὃξεῖς ὅσπερ οὔτος καὶ ἀγχῦνοι καὶ μηνύμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι εἰσί, καὶ ἀπον-βες φέρονται ὅσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρείότεροι φύονται, οἳ τε αὐτ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροὶ πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λή-θης γέμουντες. ὦ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπαίστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς προοίμως, οἷον ἑλαίου ἐρύμα ἄψωφη ἑρέντου, ὡστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον οὖτα οὕτω ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἑστὶ τῶν πολιτῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μυθμονεύω δὲ οὗ. τὸ ἄλλα γὰρ ἑστὶ τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.

πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις ἂν ποιεῖ ταῦτα, δυσκύπτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθεῖς, καὶ οὕτως τε καὶ κάσιμος ἐμπυππλαντά, ὅταν τι δέν τοιοῦτον διαποιεῖ; So the difficulty of combining bravery with gentleness is dwelt upon, ib. 375, 6. See also Polit. p. 309, 310. The essentials of the philosophic nature enumerated in the 6th Book of the Republic are, love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, liberality, justice and gentleness, temperance, courage. Theetetus is the embodiment of this nature.

1. ὃξεῖς] This seems the generic word for quickness of intellect. Rep. l. c.: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μηνύμονες καὶ ἀγχύνοι καὶ ὃξεῖς.

2. πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι] 'Impetuous.' 'Of a quick temper.'

3. ἀνυσίμως] 'Successfully.' 'Making rapid progress.'


5. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἑστὶ—ἀλλὰ σκό-πει] This double ἀλλὰ is frequent in Plato. Comp. Soph. Phil. 520: Ἀλλ' ἀσχορὰ μὲντοι σοῦ γ' ἐμ' ἐνδεικτον ξέφων φαιναὶ πρὸς τὸ καίρον πονεῖν ἀλλ' εἰ δο-κεῖ, πλῶμεν. The second ἀλλὰ puts definitely forward the proposition for which the first ἀλλὰ has cleared the way.
ἀρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἥλειφθεντο ἑταῖροί τε τινες p. 144. οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψά-μενοι δεύορ ἰέναι. ἄλλα σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Γεγυνόσκει ὁ τοῦ Σουνίων Εὐθρονίου ἔστι, 5 καὶ πάνυ γε, ὁ φίλε, ἀνδρός οἶνον καὶ σὺ τούτον δε- γεί, καὶ ἄλλος εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλῆν κατέλεπε. τὸ δ' άνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὁ Σωκράτες, τὸ γε ἄνομα την δ' μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσι μοι ἐπίτροποι τινες διεσφαρκέ- 10 ναι αλλ' ὁμοσ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθε- ρίτητα θαναστός, ὁ Σωκράτες.

ΣΩ. Γεννυκὼν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίσθαι.

ΘΕΟ. 'Εσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεύορ παρὰ Σω- 15 κράτη.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποίον τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. φησί γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὁμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῦν ἔχοντοι ε

1. ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ] The scene then is a gymnasium, perhaps the Lyceum. Compare Euthyphr. 2: Σὺ τὰς ἐν Δοκείῳ καταλιπέναι διατρίβας ἐνδίδα ὅν διατρίβειν περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στόὰς; taken in connection with Theat. below, p. 210: Νῦν—ἀπαινήτων μοι ἐν τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στόας. Theodorus had seen the young men in the portico as he entered. The word δρόμος seems to have been applied to several parts of the gymnasium. Euthyph. 273: ἐν τῷ καταστήμα θρό- μῳ. (See the whole passage.) Aristias ap. Polluc. IX. 43: Ἥν μοι παλαιόταρ παρὰ δρόμος ξύνοτές παλαι.

2. ἑταῖροι τε τινες] Evidently two from the words ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. One, Νέος Σωκράτης, is named in this dialogue, and is an interlocutor in the Politicus. The other remains mute. Such κώφα πρόσ- ωπα occur in many dialogues; e.g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc., in the Republic. The scene is natural and not merely dramatic. In Plato's "School of Athens" there are spectators as well as actors.

3. καὶ πάν] και is intensive.

4. καὶ μέντοι] 'And, now I think of it.'


6. τὸν ἄνδρα] not meirakion.

7. 'He must be a noble fellow.'

THEAIHTOS.

p. 144. ἐκατέρων λύραν ἐφ' αὐτὰς ἰρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εύθος ἃν ἐπιστεύομεν ἣ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἃν εἰ μονοκὸς ὁν λέγει;  
THEAI. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἃν.  
ΣΩ. Ὁυκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὖροντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἃν, 5 ἀμονοκὸν δὲ, ἡπιστεύομεν;  
THEAI. Ἀληθῆ.  
ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γ' οἴμαι, εἰ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν  
p. 145. προσόπων ὁμοίωτητος, σκεπτέων εἰ γραφικὸς ὁν λέγει ἡ οὖ.  
10  
THEAI. Δοκεῖ μοι.  
ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;  
THEAI. Οὕξ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.  
ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;  
THEAI. Πάντως δὴ ποι, ὃ Σώκρατες.  
ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ  
μονοκὸς καὶ ὁσα παιδείας ἔχεις;  
THEAI. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.  
ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σοματὸς τι ὁμοίως  
φροῖν εἶναι ἐπανών πη ἡ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ 20  
ἀξίων τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.  
THEAI. Ἰσος οὖ.  

b ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπάνω πρὸς  
2. εἰ μονοκὸς ᾧν λέγει] The man then is not the measure of the likeness of musical sounds! Yet afterwards Theetetus is wholly unconscious of contradicting this his first admission.
τυχόντας ἢ παθικῆς ἢ παθικῆς ὁν;  
13. ὅνγι, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι] Bekker has received γ' ἑμί from a few MSS., the greatest number (including the Bodl.) reading γέ με. ἑμί seems more pointed, 'not that I know of,' but με is possibly right. Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 1264: Οὐκ ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.
14. Ἅρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς οὐ] 'Nor a geometrician, eh?' There is an archness in the expression, making doubtful what is a matter of notoriety.
16. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς] 'I wonder if he is also an astronomer.'
23. εἰ ποτέρου] 'The mind of
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἂρ’ οὖκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἄκοι- p. 145. σαντι προθυμεῖται ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἐαυτὸν ἐπιδικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. "Ὡρα τούτων, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπι-

dείκνυναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖται· ὥσεi ἢ τῷ Θεό-

dόρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ

ἀστούς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνευεν ὡς σε νῦν δή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἴ τιν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ ὤρα μὴ

παῖζων ἔλεγεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρῆτος Θεοδόρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύον τὰ ὁμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζωντα λέ-

γειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν πάντως

γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκίθησε αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἐμεμενε τῇ

ὁμολογίᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ ταύτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

one of us." The indefinite πό-
teros occurs several times in Plato.—E. g. Soph. 252: "Εσται πότερον αὐτῶν, οὐσίας μὴ προσκοι-

νῶν τοὺς; Though not common in other writers, it is precisely analogous to the indefinite use of τις, ποι,-

να, ποιεῖ, etc.

9. Εἴ ἂν ἠχεῖ] 'That is

good!'—'I am glad to hear it.'

Or perhaps more hypotheti-
cally, 'It is well, if it is so.'

Compare Menex. 249: Χάριν ἠ-

χεῖ τῷ εἰπόντι. Σ. Εἴ ἂν ἠχεῖ.

ἀλλ' ὅπως μοι μὴ κατερείς. Polit.

277: Κυνδυνεῖ τελεῖς ἢ ἡμῖν ἠ-

χεῖς. Σ. Καλῶς ἔρ, ὦ Σ., ἢμῖν ἠ-

χεῖς. δεὶ δὲ μὴ σοὶ μόνη ταῦτα,

ἀλλὰ κάροι—ἐνδοκεῖν.

11. μὴ ἀναδύον τὰ ὁμολ.] 'Do

not shrink from what you have

agreed to.' Comp. Hom.Π.ΧIII.

225: Οὔτε τις δεκα ἐκοι ἀνδρό-


V. 5, where Critobulus says,

when his challenge is taken, οὐκ

ἀναδύομαι. Euthyd. 302: Οὐκ ἦτοι

gάρ μου ἀναδύσει.

14. ἐπισκίθησει] The verb ἐπι-

σκίθεσις, to accuse of murder or

false witness (φάνος, ψευδομαρ-

τυρίων) is more commonly found

in the middle voice, because the

accuser in such cases is generally

an interested party. But comp.

Aesch. c. Timarch. p.142: "Ἡ (sc.

tήν τόλμη) οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυρίων δέ-

μεν ἐστίν ἐπισκίθησαι; and for the

passive, Legg. 937: 'Εάν ἐπισκέ-

φή τὰ ψευδή μαρτυρήσαι. Soph.

Ant. 1313: 'Ως αἱρεῖς γε τῶν κα-

κεῖνων ἔχων πρὸς τὴν θανατώσθη τις'

ἐπισκήττου μόρον. The ellipsis

of ψευδομαρτυρίων is easily bornε

with μαρτυρεῖν preceding.
p. 145. ΣΩ. Δέγε δή μοι μανθάνεις ποιν παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἀττά; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡγογγε. d ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ λογισμοῦ; ΘΕΑΙ. Προσβυμοῦαι γε δή. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὃ παῖ, παρὰ γε τούτον καὶ παρ’ ἄλλων, οὖς ἂν οἶωμαι τι τούτων ἐπαίειν. ἀλλ’ ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐξω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίωσ, σμικρὸν δὲ τί ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκέπτεσθο. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἀρ’ οὗ τὸ μανθάνειν ἔστι τὸ σοφότερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ δ’ μανθάνει τις; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Σοφία δε γ’ οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοὶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
e ΣΩ. Τούτῳ δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον; ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἡ οὖχ ἀπερ ἐπιστήμωνες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοὶ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

1. μανθάνεις] There is a stress upon the word. 4. τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν] ‘Astronomy, and what relates to it.’ 6. Προσβυμοῦαι γε δή] ‘I certainly do my endeavour.’ He is more modest about these higher subjects. 7. παρὰ γε τούτον] γε (the MS. reading) may be defended: ‘from such a master,’ referring to προσβυμοῦαι: although τε, which is supported by the version of Ficinus, reads more harmoniously; and the change is slight. The Zurich editors, in their last edition, omit the particle. 8. ἀλλ’ ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα—σμικρὸν δὲ τί ἀπορῶ] Comp. Rep. 367: Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, δει μὲν δή τιν φῶς τοῦ τοῦ Υπάκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδεμάτου ἰγάμην, ἀπαρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάντι γε ἤσθην. 18. ἀπερ ἐπιστήμωνες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί] For the indefinite plural comp. Gorg. 457: Οὐ μάλιστα δύνασθαι—διαρκομένου πρὸς ἄλλως—οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνοικίας. Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. 6, 7: ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἐκαστος ταῦτα καὶ σοφὸς ἄστων.
What, then, is knowledge?

ΣΩ. Ταύτων ἥρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;  

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τούτων αὐτοῦ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λάβειν ἰκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη δὲ τὶ ποτὲ τυχάναι ὑπ' ᾧ ὁδὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτὸ; τί π. 146. 

φατέ; τίς ἄν ἡμῶν πρῶτος ἔστω; ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτών, καὶ ὅσα ἄν ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδέται, ὅσπερ φασίν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὅνος. ὅς δὲ ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει δὲ τῇ ἂν 

A pause.  

10 λαβίτησαι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί συγάτε; οὔ τί που, ὁ Ἐθοδώρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἄγροικοί μοι, προθυ- 

µούλεν ἡμᾶς ποιήσῃ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίνεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. "Ὑκιστὰ μὲν, ὥ Σόκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν ὁ ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μετακεῖν τι κέλευε σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἁθῆναι τῆς τοιαύτης δια- 

λέκτου, καὶ οὐδὲ αὐτῷ συνεβίβασθαι ἡλικιαν ἔχω τοῦτο τε 

4. λαβίτων ἰκανῶς] 'To grasp thoroughly.' To get a clear conception of.

λαβίτων ἰκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ] Phileb. 50: ἰκανωτά ἄν τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφικείει με, κ.τ.λ.

6. ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτὼν] 'but he who makes a blunder, or whoever is in error from time to time.' 

7. καθεδέται — ὅνος] Schol. 

Τῶν οὖν παιζόντων ταῦτα τούτο μὲν παρὰ κακῶς βασιλεῖς ἀκάλουν, καὶ ὅ τι ἄν προσετάτων τούτο ἀλλοι ὑπή- 


13. προσηγόρου] The active and passive meanings are combined. 'Mutually convertible.' Compare Republic 546: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ βητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν. There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical meaning here: 'to make you friends, and bring you into relations with one another.' 'To create a little friendly intercourse.' Compare Rep. 534: 'Αλόγους δένως δοπερ γραμμας, and the phrases ζύμωμα καὶ πο- 

τάγος, — Ομία καὶ ποτάγος, in later Pythagorean writings.

15. τῶν μετακεῖν τι] Steph. 

οι. τι, but cf. Euthyd. 277: ἰγοὺς βασιλείζομεν τὸ μετακεῖν, 

βασιλείζομεν ἀσπασάμεθα αὐτό. And see below, p. 169: Τάδε πάντα πλὴν οὐ παύλα ἐστι. 

16. διάλεκτον] 'conversation,' with a tinge, perhaps, of the more technical meaning. Compare Rep. 454: "Ερεῖ, οὐ δια- 

λέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρόμενοι."
p. 146. δὲ πρέποι τε ἄν τούτο καὶ πολὺ πλείον ἐπιθυδώδειν· τῷ γὰρ οὗτι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίθεσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἡρώω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαίτητον, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δὴ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἀ λεγεὶ Θεόδωρος, ὁ ἄψυστειν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὗτε σὺ ἐθελῆσεις, οὗτε σὺ θέμευ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφοὶ ἐπιτάττωντι νεωτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἴπῃ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' χρὴ, ο Ἔκκρατες, ἐπειδῆ περὶ ὡμέις κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἄμαρτω, ἐπανορ-θώσετε.

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἶοι τε ὡμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τούτων μοι καὶ ἂ παρὰ Θεόδωρον ἂν τις μάθων ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἂ ν ὑπὸ δή ὅ συ δίηλθες, καὶ ἂν σκυτοστομική τε καὶ ἂί τῶν ἄλλων ἰδιορρυγῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἀλλο τί ἡ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναίος γε καὶ φιλοδόρως, ὁ φίλε, ἐν αἰτή-θεῖσι πολλὰ δίδωσι καὶ ποικίλα ἄνθροποι.

5. οὗτε δίω̃ —νεωτερον ἀπειθεῖν] Instead of making ἀπειθεῖν depend on δίω̃, a new clause is introduced expressing the particular points in this disobedience which make it unlawful. The like change occurs often in Plato, and is part of the fulness of his style. See above, p. 145: "Ὅτε βασιλέα, κ.τ.λ. and note.

10. πάντως γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Theaetetus is not yet alive to the difficulty of the subject.
17. ἐπιστήμην] Not 'a science,' but 'science.' Theaetetus does not make the distinction. The sentence is, however, humoured by the introduction of the singular ἐκάστη.
18. Γενναίος γε] Referring to εὖ καὶ γενναίως above.
19. ποικίλα] Either 'a rich variety of things,' or 'many complex notions for one simple one.' The analysis of terms which follows points rather to the latter meaning; but the former is more natural, and is supported by comparing Phile-
ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες;  
ΣΩ. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. 
ὅταν λέγης σκυτικήν, μὴ τί ἄλλο φράζεις ἡ ἐπιστήμην 
ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;  
5 ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. 
ΣΩ. Τί δ’, ὅταν τεκτονικῆν; μὴ τί ἄλλο ἡ ἐπι-
στήμην τῆς τῶν ἔυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;  
ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἁμφότερος, οὐ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, 
10 τοῦτο ὄριζεις; 
ΤΕΑΙ. Ναί. 
ΣΩ. Τὸ δ’ ἐπερωτηθέν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἢν, 
τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὀπόσαι τυνέα. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμή-

bus, p. 12 (at the opening of the 
dialogue): Ἐν ἐκ θεοῦν οἴνοπ 
δὲ ἐστὶν ποικίλον.—ἐστὶ γὰρ 
ἄκοις μὲν ὑπαξεῖς ἀπλῶς ἐν τι, μορ 
φᾶς δὲ δὴ παντοῖας εἰδοτε καὶ 
tων ἑρωτούν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλήλων. 
The two objections (πολλά, ποι 
κίλα) are discussed in the re 
verse order. See below: Τίνων 
—ὀπόσαι, Πρώτον γε ποι—Ἐπειτ 
α ντι γε ποι, κ.τ.λ. 
1. Πῶς τί; What (τί), and 
with what meaning (πῶς). Compare Soph. 262 : Πῶς τί τοῦτ’ εἰ 
πεις; ὅπερ ἄφθην, κ.τ.λ. 
2. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν] sc. λέγω, 
‘perhaps I am talking non 
sense.’ 

δὲ μέντοι οἶμαι] sc. λέγων. 
3. σκυτικής] This is said to 
have differed from σκυτόμεκη 
(above); and the change of 
word is an instance of Plato’s 
love of variety. Perhaps the 
one was a generic, the other a 
specific term. At least they 
do not exclude each other in 
Plato. See Rep. 374 : Ἡ οὖν 
σκυτικής δὲ μᾶλλον κηδεσθαι ἡ πο-

λεμίκας; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα τὸν 
σκυτότομον, κ.τ.λ.—1b. 601 : Ποι 
ήσει δὲ γε σκυτότομος καὶ χαλκεύς; 
—οὐδὲ ὅ ποιδαις δὲ τας καλκεύς 
καὶ ὅ σκυται; 

ὅταν—φράζει [You express 
by the term ‘shoe-making.’ 
12. Τὸ δ’ ἐπ.] ‘What I went 
on to ask you.’ v. supr. μὴ ἄφι 
εσθε κ.τ.λ. 
13. τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὀπό 
sαι τυνεῖς] The first answer of 
Men to the question, ‘What is 
virtue?’ is exactly analogous to 
this of Theaetetus about knowl 
dge. Instead of attempting to 
generalize, he enumerates the 
several kinds of virtue. 
Men. 71 : Ἀνθέξε ἄρετήν—γυ 
ναικός ἄρετήν—παιδὸς ἄρετή, 
κ.τ.λ. Socrates replies (Men. 
72) : Πολλὴ γε τις εὐτυχία ἐσκα 
κηρυσσαία, ὁ Μένων, εἰ μᾶς ἔτεω 
ἀρετήν σφόδρον τι ἀνεύρηκα ἄρετάν 
παρὰ σοι κειμέναν, κ.τ.λ. The 
whole passage should be com 
pared with this. See also 
Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates 
finds a similar difficulty in lead-
THEAITHTOS.

p. 146. συν αυτὰς θεωρούντυ τρομεθα, ἀλλὰ γνώναι ἐπιστήμης αὕτω τὸ τοῦ ἔστιν. ἦ οὐδὲν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ὢρθος.

p. 147. ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαίλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἐρωτεύοντο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, δὲ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν, εἰ ἀποκραναμέθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χωτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἱπποπλασθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλωτοῦργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσα. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνεῖματε ἑκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τῶν ἐρωτῶντας, ὅταν εἶπομεν ἢ πηλὸς, εἰτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἰτε ἄλλων υἱῶν υἱῶν, δημιουργῶν. ἦ οἰε, τίς τι συνιήσῃ τινος υἱόμα, ὁ μὴ οἴδα τι ἐστίν;

ing the respondent to the conception of a general notion,—
and Soph. 240, where Theseustus is again entangled into a similar mistake in defining the word ἑδολω.


4. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκραν- 


tῶν φαίλων τι καὶ προχείρων] Some trivial and obvious matter.

7. ἱπποπλαθῶν] For this, the reading of all the MSS., κοροπλαθῶν has been substituted in the margin of some MSS., for the sake of the uniformity which Plato avoided. See below, note on κοροπλαθῶν, 1. 12.


12. εἰτε δ' τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσ- 

θέντες] It is in Plato's manner to surprise us with a fresh example at each step of the argument, instead of dwelling upon one already adduced. Rep. 333 : ὁστερ δ' ἀδαρκητικὸς, κ.τ.λ. —Prot. 312 : ἐστερ δ' ἀδαρκη- 

τῆς, κ.τ.λ.—and in this dialogu, p. 161 : Βαργάκου γυρήσων.— 169 : Συ δὲ καὶ Ἀτείλα, κ.τ.λ.— 178 : Οὕτο ἦ τοῦ καβαριστοῦ.— 190 : Ἐγκαίνεται ἢ μικρόμενον.

13. ἦ οἰε, τίς τι] οἰει is pa-

renthetical, and therefore does
being the first pure abstractions which the mind arrives at, are peculiarly fitted to guide it to the contemplation of abstractions generally. So at least thought Plato, Rep. VII. 522–531. We find here the same difficulty which meets us often in Plato. We have to think of that as in process of elaboration, which is already familiar to ourselves. See Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. p. 197: “A number of Plato’s dialogues are intended merely to produce the consciousness of a general notion, which we possess without the trouble of acquiring it. Hence his discursiveness has often the effect of tediousness to us.”

In reading what follows, it must be borne in mind that, by the ancients, arithmetic was studied through geometry. If a number was regarded as simple, it was a line. If as composite, it was a rectangular figure. To multiply was to construct a rectangle, to divide was to find one of its sides. Traces of this still remain in such terms as square, cube, common measure, but the method itself is obsolete. Hence it requires an effort to conceive of the square root, not as that which multiplied into itself produces a given number, but as the side of a square, which either is the number, or is equal to the rectangle which is the number. The use of the Arabic notation and of algebra has greatly assisted in expressing and conceiving the properties of numbers without reference to form.

5. Περί δυνάμεων τι ήμιν Θεόδωρος οδεισθήσατε, ἢ μὴν διαγράφησις ἡμων, ἢ ποιήσεσθαι τὸν διάλειμμα τὸ ἅμα τὸ σημαντικόν τοῦτον Σωκράτην. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ, ὁ Θεατήτης ἢ. ΘΕΑΙ. Περί δυνάμεων τι ήμιν Θεόδωρος οδεισθήσεται. 5. Περί δυνάμεων τι ήμιν Θεόδωρος οδεισθήσατε, ἢ μὴν διαγράφησις ἡμων, ἢ ποιήσεσθαι τὸν διάλειμμα τὸ σημαντικόν τοῦτον Σωκράτην. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ, ὁ Θεατήτης ἢ. ΘΕΑΙ. Περί δυνάμεων τι ήμιν Θεόδωρος οδεισθήσεται. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ, ὁ Θεατήτης; 5. Περί δυνάμεων τι ήμιν Θεόδωρος οδεισθήσεται, ἢ μὴν διαγράφησις ἡμων, ἢ ποιήσεσθαι τὸν διάλειμμα τὸ σημαντικόν τοῦτον Σωκράτην.
He relates the discovery of the integral and potential root.

quantity is afterwards spoken of. Δύναμις is an abbreviated expression for ἡ δύναμις εὐθεία. So ἡ τρίγωνος (δύναμις) = εὐθεία ἡ δυνάμις τρίγωνος, i.e. (a foot being the unit) √/3. Cf. Polit. 266: Δάματρος ἡ δυνάμις δίπους. Similar abbreviations occur below in the terms μέγες and δύναμες. Cf. Eucl. X. Prop. 21: To ὑπὸ ὑπὸ δύναμις μονὸς συμμέτρων εὐθείων περιμετρὸν ἀρθουχόνοις δοκο- γόν ἐστι. καὶ ἡ δυναμικὴ αὐτῷ δοκο- γόν ἐστι. Καλεῖ δὲ μέγε. Ibid. infr. Deff: Ἐκ δύο ὑπομέτρων πράγμα, δευτερά, &c. ἀποτομῇ πράγμα, δευτερά &c.

2. μέχρι] In linear measurement. They are δυνάμεις σύμμετροι, i.e. their squares are commensurable, viz. by the unit.

3. κατὰ μέχρι ἐκάτοτηρ] Why did he not begin with √/2? Was it because the δύναμις δύναμις is less than the unit, viz. 1 ft.? The ending with ἐκατεδεκάτος is a mere accident, as shown by the words, εῦ δὲ ταύτη πως ἐνέσχετο. 6. ἑυλαβεῖς εἰς ὑπὲρ] εἰς is not the antecedent to ὑπὲρ; the construction is, πρὸς τὸ σημα- νόμενον, as if it were εἰς ὑπὲρ, κ.τ.λ. 'By generalizing, to find an expression that should embrace them all.' Cf. Soph. Philoct. 341: Τοιαύτα τὸ σώφρονον αὐτὸ πάλιν μοι πράγμα, ὅπως γ' ἐνεβρωσαν. Charm. 166: Ἐπὶ αὐτὸ ἦδεις ἔρευνω, ὅπως διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη.


12. δυνάμεων] Used here in its ordinary sense, without any reference to δυνάμεων above.

ἐνοῦ ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι] i.e. to be made as a square number, which, as Euclid says, is ὁ ἡμῶν ἔργο, ἡ ὁ ἐνοῦ δυνῶν ἡμῶν ἀριθμῶν περιμετρὸν. 'To arise by the
multiplication of equal numbers."

7. \( \text{προμήκης} \) These terms were distinguished by the later Pythagoreans. Nicomachus says that \( \text{προμήκης} \) \( \text{άρμος} \) has one factor greater than the other by \( \text{ι} \), \( \text{προμήκης} \) by more than \( \text{ι} \).

10. \( \text{τετραγωνικοῦ} \) Form as their squares.

11. \( \text{δοσι} \ \text{δὲ} \ \text{τὸν} \ \text{έτερον} \) 8c. \( \text{τετραγωνικοῦ}. \) See Eucl. 11. 14.

\( \text{οὐ} \ \text{μὴ} \ \text{μὲν} \ \text{οὐ} \ \text{ξυμμετροῦ} \ \text{ἐξείναι}, \ \text{τὸς} \ \text{δὲ} \ \text{έπειδος} \ \text{ά} \ \text{δύνα}-\text{τα} \] Translate either, ‘not commensurable with the former in linear measurement, but in the surfaces (composite numbers, see Deff.) of which they are the roots,’ or ‘not commensurable with them in linear measurement, while they are mutually commensurable in the surfaces of which they are severally roots.’ I. e. the lines which are (or stand for) the irrational roots are not commensurable with the integral roots or with unity (\( \text{τῇ} \ \text{χώρᾳ} \)), but their squares, being integers, have a common measure of unity. They are commensurable not in themselves, but in their squares, that is, they are potentially commensurable (\text{δυνάμει} \ \text{μὲνον} \ \text{σύμμετροὐ}). For the constr. \( \text{ά} \ \text{δύνατα}, \ \text{comp.} \ \text{δυνάμει} \ \text{αὐτά} \) in the Deff. above; also, Eucl. X. 22: ‘\( \text{Η} \ \text{δύναμι} \ \text{αὐτά} \). It remains doubtful whether the one set of roots (\text{δυνάμει}) or both are the nominative to \text{δύνατα}, and consequently, whether \( \text{τοῖς} \ \text{έπειδοις} \) refers only to oblong number, or to both oblong and square number. The former alternative may be adopted as the simpler; although the latter would be the more accurate expression. Instead of enumerating all the irrational roots, which seemed infinite, they conceived the idea of finding an expression which should embrace them all. They first went for assistance from arithmetic to the less abstract forms of geometry (\text{Ἀρ. Met. I. 2: αἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλάφων ἀκριβότεροι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγόμενον, ἄλον ἀριθμότητος γεωμετριῶν}). Here they at once found a generalization. All numbers
which can be produced by equal integers they called square numbers. The rest, formed of unequal factors, they called oblong. The roots of the former can be measured by unity, the roots of the latter cannot, though the numbers themselves can. Hence a general distinction, and a simple nomenclature. The roots of square numbers they called μήκος, i. e. μήκες σύμμετρος, commensurable in whole numbers, the roots of oblong numbers, δυνάμεις, i. e. δυνάμεις μόνον συμμετρῶν. And similarly, in regard to solid quantity, i. e. the cube roots of numbers.

In other words, $\sqrt{16} = 4$ or $16 = \boxed{4}$; and $4 = 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4$ = the line forming one of its sides.

On the other hand

$\sqrt{12} = 3.464$ or $12 = \boxed{3} \left( \begin{array}{c}
   \frac{6}{6} \\
\end{array} \right)$ and $\boxed{3.464} = \boxed{3.464}$; and $3.464 = 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4$, which is not commensurable with the side of the former square, although its square is commensurable, because it can be measured by unity. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term, and distinguishing the thing from that with which they had confused it. So a real advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distinguished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself.

4. οὐκ ἔνοχ. τ. ψ. ἔσσαβαι] 'Will not be found guilty of perjury.' See above, οὔδεις ἐπισκέψεις, and note. The article refers to what has been already mentioned.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 148. οὔτω δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντυχεῖκενα, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχύστου ἦττήθης, ἦττον τι ἀν οἴει ἄληθή τούτο ἐπανέσαι; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀσπερ νῦν ἤγε τε ἐλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἴει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἄκρων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νὴ τοῦ Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

ΣΩ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυφὶ καὶ τι οἴου Θεό- 

d ἄκρων λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων περὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγου, τι ποτε τυγχάνει οὖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Προδυμίας μὲν ἔνεκεν, ὡ Σωκρατε, φαι- 


στειται.

ΣΩ. Ἱδε δή καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ύπηγήσων πειρῶ 


μονύμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ἀσπερ

1. διαθίσω] Running a course. Comp. Prot. 355: νῦν 8 ἰστὶν ἄσπερ δὲν εἰ διοίδο μαν Κρίσαν τῷ ἑμεραί δρομεῖ ακμάζοντι ἑπεσθαί, η τῶν διαλογισμῶν τῷ τῶν ἅμορ- 

dρῶν διαθίσει τε καὶ ἑπεσθαί. Where Socrates speaks of himself as past the ἄκρων ἄκημη, (Rep. 406.) which Theseutus here has not reached.

5. ἄσπερ νῦν δὲ] See above, 


σμικρὸν δὲ τι ἀπορῶ.

6. τῶν πάντη ἄκρων] The Bodl. MS. has ἀκαίρωσι, with an accent over the α, and a dot over each of the letters ι, ι. άκρων is re- 


quired by the words which follow. Comp. Lach. 193: Τῶν 

tῶν καλῶν πράγματων ἤγει σὺ ἄνδρας εἷλαι; Ἐδὲ μὲν οὖν ἵσθη διὶ 

tῶν καλλιστῶν. The mistake perhaps originated in not per- 


ceiving that ἄκρων is masc. "Knowledge is no trifling mat- 


ter to find out, but it belongs to men every way complete;" i. e. not, like the runner, in one way only.

8. τῶν ἀκροτάτων] The superla- 


tive might seem unnecessary; but cf. Legg. 906: Τῶν παντά- 


πασῶν ἀκροτάτων δισοσπῶν.

12. ἐπιστήμης is governed part- 


ly by περὶ, but chiefly by λόγον.

14. προβομ. — ἔνεκεν — φαι.] 


Comp. Phaedr. 272: Πειρῶ λέ- 

gεώ—Ἐνεκα μὲν—πειρᾶς ἔχουμ' ἄν. Polit. 304: Πειρᾶς μὲν τοῖν πε- 


ῖκα.

16. καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ύπηγήσω] 


Comp. Gorg. 455: Αὐτὸς γὰρ κα- 


λῶς ύπηγήσω.
ταύτας πολλάς οὕσας εἷν εἴδει περέλαβες, οὗτω καὶ π. 148.

ΤΑΣ πολλάς ἐπιστήμας εἷν λόγος προσεπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἈΛΛ’ εὕ ἱσθι, ὁ Σάκρατε, πολλάκις δὴ
αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέφασθαι, ἀκοῦσώ τὰς παρὰ σοῦ
ἀποφημομένας ἐρωτήσεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτι αὐτὸς δὺ
ναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανός τι λέγω, οὕτι ἄλλον
ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει: οὐ μὲν δὴ
αὖ ὡς ἀπαλλαγήναι τοῦ μέλεων.

ΣΩ. Ὀδίνεις γὰρ, ὁ φίλε Θεαίτη, διὰ τὸ μὴ
10 κενῶς ἄλλ’ ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ Σάκρατες, ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα
λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὁ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ π. 149.
εἰμι υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαι-
15 ναρέτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡδη τούτῳ γε ἕκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρα καὶ, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην,
ἀκήκοας;

1. εἴν εἴδει περέλαβες—ἐνι λό-
γῳ προσεπεῖν] To classify and
name (as above, συλλαβέως εἰς
ἐν—ὅπως προσαγορεύσωμεν) are
considered as different aspects
of the same thing.

8. μέλεω] The reading is
doubtful. μέλεω has on the
whole the best authority; but
the reading of the Scholiast,
εὔρεις, which is found on the
margin of several MSS., sup-
posing it to have been origin-
ally a gloss, agrees better with
μέλεω, though it might have
been suggested by either. There
is an idea of uneasiness in μέ-
λεω which suits well with the
context. On the other hand,
οὗτος ἀπαλλαγήναι τοῦ μέλεων (sc.
λακάς τι λέγων) is a thoroughly
Greek expression. For μέλεω
used personally, comp. Aesch.
Ag. 370: θεῶν βραχίων ἀξιούσων
μέλεω. Soph. Elect. 342: Κεῖ-
να λαθίσω τῆς δὲ τυχόντας μέλεω
(where it may be impersonal,
as perhaps here). Eur. H. F.
772: Θεοὶ θεοὶ τῶν ὄλεθρος μέ-
λουσιν.

οὕτω λήγοι ὁδίνος, πρὶν ὃ ὀβ.

14. μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλο-
συρᾶσ] 'Truly noble and va-
liant,' or 'commanding,' 'of no
common or feeble mould.'

γενναίας] 'Of the right sort.'
βλοσυρᾶς, 'burly.' Comp. Rep.
535: Γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροῦς
τὰ Ἐθι.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 149. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὖδαμός.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ε ἐν ἀθ' ὅτι: μὴ μέντοι μοι κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους: λέληθα γάρ, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ταύτῃν ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δὲ, ἀτε ὅκι εἰδότες, τούτῳ μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοποπάτατος εἶμι καὶ ποῖῳ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν ἥ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἴπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἰτίον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐκνύσθην δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς τὸ ἔχει, καὶ ῥάζων μαθήσει ὁ βούλομαι. οἴσθα γάρ ποῦ ὁς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἐτί αὐτή κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τικτοῦσα ἄλλας μαίευεται, ἄλλ' οἱ Ἰδὴ ἀδύνατοι τίκτευν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

· ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δὲ γε τούτου φαίνω εἶναι τῆν Ἀρτέμιν, ὁτι ἄλοχος οὐσα τῆν λοχείαν ἐλίθηξε. στερίφασις ε μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἐδώκει μαίευσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἡ λαβείν τέχνην ὃν ἄν ἡ ἀπειρος ταῖς· δὲ δεί ἥλυκιαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν αὑτής ὁμοίωτις.

5. ἀτοποπάτατος κ.τ.λ.] 'That I am the strangest of mortals, and bring men to their wit's end.' ἀτοποπάτατος is the very word to express Socrates' idea of himself,—αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς λόγους. Symp.215 : ὅ γὰρ τι βάδων τὴν σφι ἀποτέλει δὲ ἑξοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταμβήσει.

ἀτοποπάτατος ἐμι καὶ ποιώ τους ἀνθρώπους ἀπορείς] Comp. Men. 79, 80 : Ἡ ποιειν μὲν ἔχων καὶ πρὶν συγγενέσθαι σοι δὲ σὺ οὐδὲν ἐν ἡ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποίης ἀπορεῖν.—καὶ δοκεῖ μοι παντελῶς, ει δὲ τι καὶ σκέψης, ὁμοίωσις τοῦ τε εἰδός καὶ τάλα μαίευς τῆς πλείστης μάρη τῆ θελατια. This whole passage is at least as much in favour of the MS. reading ἀτοποπάτατος, as of Stallbaum's conjecture, ἀτοποπάτατος, which was suggested by the former part of it.

15. Αἰκίας] An adj. agreeing as predicate with Αρτέμιν. 'Artemis is responsible for this.'

16. ἄλοχος] Used etymologically, as if from ἄ priv., and λέχως or λοχεύω.

17. ἄρα] According to this tale.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθ.] 'It is not in human nature to become skilful where it is not experienced.'

19. ἀτόκοις] Bodl. p.m. ἀτόκοις. τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοίωτητα] In
fully, and not unlawfully.

THEAI. Eikóς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κνούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαίων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

5 THEAI. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ ἑπάργουσαν δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὀδίνας καὶ μαλακώσερας, ἀν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτευν τε ἐκ δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὅν δοξή ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

10 THEAI. Ἑστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἔσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμηθρίας εἰσὶ δεινόταται, ὡς πάσοφοι οὐσαί περὶ τοῦ γυνών ποιῶν χρῆ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνούσαι ὃς ἁρίστους παίδας τίκτευν;

15 THEAI. Οὐ πάνω τούτο οἶδα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἵσθι ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μείζων φρονοῦσιν ἡ ἕπι τῇ ὁμόλογορμῇ. ἐννοεῖ γάρ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡ ἄλλης οἷς τέχνης εἶναι θεραπεύαν τε καὶ ἐνυκρομίην τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποιῶν γῆς ποιῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ στέρμα καταβλητέον;

20 THEAI. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

honour of their resemblance to herself,' τιμῶσα, 'prizing.' Cf. Symp. 208 : Τὸ αὐτοῦ ἄποθέλησμα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾶ.

6. φαρμάκια] The Diminutive is noticeable. 'Gentle remedies.'

8. τίκτευν τε δὴ] Sc. ποιεῖν.

9. κεῖν δὲ] Sc. τὸ βρέφος, Said here of the embryo, 'At an early stage,' i.e. before it is dangerous to do so. Cf. Hipp. de Morb. Mul. § 3, 97: Ἐν μμαιόν φθείρῃ τῷ παιδίῳ, where the same thing is spoken of. For the ellipse, which is a little difficult, v. infr. p. 161. το γε οὖν, sc. κίψμα. Δύνανται is lost sight of as the sentence proceeds. Such a transition to the indicative mood is not unfrequent. Cf. Rep. 455: Γέρα δέχονται, ζωτίες τε, καὶ τελευτάσαντες ταφής άξιας μετέχουσιν.

14. ποιῶν χρῆ] 'What woman should be married to what man, to produce the noblest offspring.'
p. 149. ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναίκα δὲ, ὃ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἰεὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτου, ἄλλην δὲ ἔγκυκλωσθής;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ ουν εἰκός γε.

p. 150. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ. ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἄδικὸν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ἔναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἢ δὲ προαγωγεῖα συνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμηθείαν ἀτε σεμώλα σοιαί καὶ μαίας, φοβοῦμεν μὴ εἰς ἑκείνην τὴν σιγίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν. ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὅντως μαίας μόνας ποι προσήκει καὶ προμηθείας ὅρθος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοιῶν τῶν μαίων τοσοῦτον, ἔλλην ἃ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναικῶν ἃ εἰσοδεῖ μὲν εἰδολας τίκτεω, ἐστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθών, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνώσται. εἰ γὰρ προσήκει, μέγιστον τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἢν ἀν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς τε καὶ μή. ἢ οὐκ οἰεὶ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγηε.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῆ τέχνη τῆς μανεύσεως τα μὲν My art is greater still
ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἑκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας p. 150. ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναίκας μαιεύσεσαι καὶ τῷ τᾶς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τυκτοῦσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγαστον δὲ τούτ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τεχνῇ, βασανίζειν 5 δυνατῶν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἴδωλον καί σ

ζοτὶ δὲ τούτο δεῖον τὸ πράγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θυσίᾳ δεῖ τῇ ζῷᾳ ἄδεαν ἔστω, ἡ κύριας καὶ ἡ γίνορας.

—δεῦν δὴ τῷ κυούντι τοι καὶ ἔνθε σπαργάντι πολλή ἡ πτούσις γέγονεν περὶ τὸ καλόν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ἀδύνασιν ἄπολειπον τῶν ἐχθρών ib. 209. τοὺτων αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ νεόν εἴγαμων μὲ τὴν ψυχήν δεῖον, κ. τ. λ. τοῦν ἐκ τῆς εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄρα ἡ αἰώνια ἡ τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ἡ καὶ τρέφοντο καὶ ὄντων λίγαν ἄδειον, πρὸς ὄσ. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see Phaedr. 276, 278: Πολῦ δ', ομια, καλλίων ἐποδή περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρῶμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσέχουσαν, φυτεύει τε καὶ σπειρή μετ' ἑπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ ἐαυτοὶ τῷ τῇ φυτεύοντι σπερέων θειάκον, καὶ οὐκε ἄκεραι ἀλλὰ ἐχοῦσι σπέρμα —δεῖ δὲ τοῖς τούτοις λόγως αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον ψεύδος εἶναι, πρὸςτὸν μὲν τῶν ἐν ἀντὶ, ἐὰν εὑρεθῇ νῦν, ἐπιτελεῖ τε ϊτεῖ τουτό ἐκγονοὶ τοῖς καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἄμα ἐν ἀλλαίων ἄλλων ψυχαῖς καὶ ἄξιοι ἐνέφυσαν. For the theory of teaching and learning thus illustrated see Rep. 518: Δεῖ δή, ἐπειπών, ἡμᾶς τοιούτω νομίζω περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἅλθη, τῇ παιδείᾳ, οὐχ οὖν τενε ἀπαγγελλό-
p. 150. ἰεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια ἡ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθείς. ὤτε τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅτε ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονος εἰμὶ σοφίας, καὶ ὅτε ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὄνειδον, ὅς τοὺς μὲν ἀλλοὺς ἑρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὖν εὗρον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθεῖς οὐνείδουσί· τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν τούτων τόδε μανεύσεθα με ὁ θεός ἄναγκηξε, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκάλυψεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὐν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάντα τις σοφός, οὐδὲ τί μοι δέστιν εὐφημα τοιοῦτο γεγονός, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ- γεγονον· οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ ἔγγεγινόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαι- νονται ἐνοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἁμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προίκοι- σης τῆς ἐξουσίας, οὕσπερ ἀν ὁ θεός παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὡς ἐπιβιῶστε, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ τὸς ἀλλος δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργεῖ ότι παρ' ἐμοί οὐδὲν πώ- τοτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοί παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ 15

1. ἀποτίκτει 'Is delivered of.' 2. τόδε γε 'For I have the same previous condition which the midwives have, in being barren of wisdom.' 7. ο θεός Who presides over my art as Artemis does over that of the midwives. This must not be identified with τὸ δαμάμον, though they are probably connected (see below, and cf. Apol. 40: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημείον), but belongs rather to the belief expressed in Apol. 21, 23, where he speaks of his cross-questioning as a Divine service, because occasioned by the oracle at Delphi; and Phaed. 85: 'Εγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὀμόδουλος εἶναι τῶν κύκων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, viz. of Apollo the god of the true μονοικία (Phaed. 61: 'Ας φιλοσοφίας οὕσης μεγίστης μονοικίας): but here, as in one or two places of the Apology, the feeling is general- ized.

8. τίς Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. οὐδὲ τί μοι 'Nor have I had such a prize of my invention born to me, the offspring of my own mind.' Perhaps there is a slight play upon the word εὐφημα. Compare Soph. Ed. Τυρ. 1107: Εἴθ' ὁ Βακχείος θεός εὐφημα δέξοι ἐκ τοῦ Νυμφῶν Ἐλι- κολάνθων, αἰς πλείστα συμπαθεί; but the primary meaning is 'invention,' cf. Phaedr. 278: Υἱ௴ς γεγονός — κατοικ., ἐὰν εὑρε- θείς εὖ, καὶ εὑρέστεις υπό. 9. ἐστι—γεγονός This differs from γέγοναν as ἔχω with sor. or perf. partic. differs from the perf. act. 13. εὐπικιδώντες] Sc. φαινοντα. 14. καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργεῖ ότι 'And that manifestly:' τοῦτο sc. τοι- ύσιν, viz. εὐπικιδώσων. ἐναργεῖ ότι A strengthened form of διὸν ότι. 'As clear as day.' Plato frequently thus ex- tends an idiom.
if I am permitted to receive them, they again improve.

καλα εύρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τής μέντοι μανείας p. 150.
ο θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὥδε δὲ δήλουν πολλοὶ ἥδη οὐ
tοῦτο ἄγνοήσαντες καὶ ἐαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ
dὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλων πισθέντες,
σ ἀπῆλθον προϊαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά
tε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ ποιηρᾶν ἔννοιαν καὶ τά
ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ μανεθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπόλεσαν,
ψευδὴ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ
ἀληθοῦς, τελευτώντες δ’ αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

10 ἐδοξάζαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὃν εἰς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ p. 151.
Λυσιμάχῳ καὶ ἄλλοι πάνω πολλοὶ. οἰς, ὅταν πάλιν
ἐλθοσὶν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἔννοιας καὶ θαυμαστὰ
dρώντες, εἴνιοι μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον ἀπο-
κωλύει ἔννειαν, εἴνιοι δὲ ἔκ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπι-

4. ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ’] 'They left me, whether it was that they de-
spised me, or were themselves won over by some one else.' The
minuteness of the antithesis need not throw suspicion on the
reading. πεισθέντες, 'captivated,' v. Thucyd. VI. 54.
(One MS. however has αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ’.)

Nub. ι 37. φροστίθ’ ἐξήμβλωκας ἐπετριβένην.

διὰ ποιηρᾶν ἔννοιαν] Symp.
1. c.: Τίσενδ’ ἢ μὲν αἰσχρόν οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ.

10.'Αριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχῳ] We
read of the introduction of this youth to Socrates in the Laches,
p. 179: Λυσιμ. Ἡμῶν εἶσιν νεῖσι
οὐν, δὲ μὲν τοῦτο—ἐμὸς δὲ αὐ-
δὲ εἰπτόροι δὲ καὶ ᾗθος ἄδομα
ἐχει τοῦτοι πατρὸς, Ἀριστείδην γὰρ
αὐτοῦ καλοῦμεν. Lysimachus and
Melesias are consulting Nicias and Laches, in the presence of
Socrates, about their sons, Aristides and Thucydides.

12. θαυμαστὰ δρώντες] 'Show-
ing extraordinary solicitude.'
'Going on their knees to me.'
Cf. Apol. 35: Ἐφρακᾶ τινας—
θαυμάσια ἐργαζόμενους, ὃς δει-
νον τι οἰονέον πείσας εἰ ἄπο-
θαυρώντα.

13. τὸ—δαιμόνιον] Here, as al-
ways, not commanding, but for-
bidding; and, as generally,
neuter and impersonal. This is
not the place to discuss the
subject. It suits well with the
intensely self-reflective nature
of Socrates (lost sometimes for
whole days in thought) that he
should pause suddenly on the
ev of doing something, with-
out being able (at the time) to
explain to himself and others
the motives of reason or feeling
which checked him.

14. αὐτοὶ] v. 1. αὐτοὶ. αὐτοὶ
has the best authority, and is
perhaps also preferable as the
more difficult reading. It is
certainly admissible. 'In some
cases I am permitted to do
so, and the men themselves im-
prove.' Not unfrequently the
p. 151. διδάσκει. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ἐγγεγινόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταύτων ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὀδύνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπτει καὶ ὑπάρχει τῇ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὀδύνα ἐγείρει τε καὶ ἀποθανεῖ τῇ ἡμᾶς τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὔτων μὲν δὴ οὕτως. 5 ἐνίοτε δὲ, ὁ Θεαίττης, οἱ ἀν μοι μὴ δοξωσί ποις ἐγκυμόνες εἶναι, γνωσὶ ὅτι οὖν ἐμοὶ ἐμοὺ δεόνται, πάνυ εἰμινὸς προμονόμαι, καὶ ἔχων θεὸ ἐπέειν, πάνυ ικανὸς τοσάξῳ οἶς ἦν ἐγγεγινόμενοι ὅμως. δὲν πολλοῦς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκην, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλους σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδρᾶσι. Ταύτα δὴ σοι, ὃ ἀριστε, ἐνεκα τοῦτο ἐμὴν καὶ πάσαν μεταφέσαι, τι ὅπερ καὶ ἄντος οἶει, ὀδύνει την κυνήγια ἐμοῦ. προσφέρομαι οὖν πρὸς ομὲ ὦς πρὸς μαῖας υἱόν καὶ αὐτῶν μακεντικοῦ, καὶ ἄν ἔρωτός, προθυμοῦ ὅπως δόει τ' ἐν, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. 15 καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενος τι ὦν ἄν λέγης, ἠγισθομεν εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἄλληθες, εἰσα ὑπεξαρωμα καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὅσπερ αἱ προτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἦδη, ὃ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὅστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἐτοιμοὶ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ δάν τυν ἱηρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ ὁ ὅσπερ καὶ οὗτε] Cf. supr. p. 148: 'Αλλ' εὐλογο; προσβά λέγων.

6. ἐνεκα] Qualifying μὴ δοξάσῃ. 'Whom, somehow, I perceive not' etc.

10. ἐξέδωκα] For the word, cf. Soph. 242: ἢ μὲν ὅπως ἐπαίνεσθε (τὰ δύνατα), ἑγρον καὶ ἑρόν ἢ τριβολον καὶ ψυχρόν, συνεξεις τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδιδωσίν. For the thing, see Lach. 200: Νικ. οὐ μὴ νικηρατο τοῦτο ἢδοτα ἐπιπερεύμα, εἰ ἐθλοὶ οὕτως ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἐκάστοτε συνιάσθησαν.


17. ὑπεξαρωμα] Bekk. corr. The MSS. have ὑπεξαρωμα. See below, ἀφαιρῶμαν, ἀποβάλλοντα] Bodl. ὑποβάλλοντα.
εἵναι τὸ πρῶτον πνεύμα, πῶς ὑποτεύχει τὸ εἰδέναι ὑπὸ ὑπάρχει p. 151.

θεὸς ὑστόναν ἀνθρώπους, ὡς ἐγὼ δυσνοεὶ τοιοῦτον δ ὑπὲρ ὁδὸν ἀλλὰ μοι περὶ τὸν ἥγετον καὶ ἀληθεὶς ἀφανὶσαι ὑπάρχει θέμας. Πάλιν ὅποι ὁ ὡς ἐν ἀρχῆς, ὧς ὅ τι ποτὲ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἡ ἐνεργεία ὁ ὅτι ἐξ Ὀδυσσείς καὶ ἀνδρίδας ὃς ὁ ὂς τ' ἐλεύθερος ἔστη. ἐὰς γὰρ θεὸς ἔδοξε καὶ ἀνδρίδες, οὐκ ὁ ὃς ἐστι.

ΤΕΕΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελεομένου αἰσχρῶν μὴν οὕτω παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμείσθαι ὃ τι τοῖς ἔχει λέγειν. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ὁ ἐπιστήμονες τι ἄνθρωπος ὅτι ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ὃς γε ἐν τῇ προκείμενῃ, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀπόστησις.

(21.) τῶν λέγων] Some 'barren stuff.'

ὁστατο] Plutarch in quoting this passage reads ὁστατι με.

1. οὐδεὶς θεὸς] 'And therefore not the presiding genius of my Art.'

8. σοῦ γε] I. e. 'You, whom I respect so highly.'

9. μὴν οὐ] See Appendix B.

12. ἐπιστήμη — ἀπόστησις] The term ἀπόστησις is more simple and more extensive than any one by which it could be rendered in English. See below, 156: ἂν μὲν οὖν ἀπαίτησε τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῶν ἥξοναν ὁφόρας, ὡς τοίς καὶ ἀκολούθησις καὶ ὡς τοῖς καὶ ἑρωτευται γε δὴ καὶ λυπηθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμησαι καὶ φέβουσα κ.τ.λ.

Perhaps 'to see and feel is to know,' is the nearest equivalent to what Theaetetus means. But 'feeling' has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word 'Sinn' presents a nearer parallel.

Before reflection begins, our individual impressions are those of which we are most conscious and most certain. And subjective certainty is the primitive meaning of τὸ ἐπιστασθαι. Hence ἀπόστησις seems at first sight identical with ἐπιστήμη. Vid. Phaed. 83: 'Ὅτι ψυχῇ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται καὶ τοῦ ἡσύχασα, σινξὶν ἐντόλῃ ἃς ἔγεις, τοῖς οὕτω χείρῴζοτος καὶ ἀλθὲνον, σοῦ οὖτος δὲν. Aristot. Metaph. III. 1009 b: 'Ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐναι ἐκ τῶν ἀληθῶν ἐλληκτόν. — ἀλός δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνων φύσης μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἐστὶ ἀλλοίως, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς ἀνάγκης ἀπεκδόθη εἰναι φαντασίαν. The saying of Theaetetus is shown to be the meeting point of two lines of speculation: the one of which may be termed in modern language, subjective, the other objective: the one regarding all knowledge as relative and apparent to man: the other regarding things without reference to man as in a state of transience or
p. 151. ΣΩ. Εδ γε κα γενναίως, ὁ παῖς ἡ γάρ οὖτως ἀποφανύμενον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φέρε ὅτι αὐτῷ κοινῇ σκεφτόμεθα, γόνυμον ἢ ἀνεμιαίον τυχάνει ὄν. ἀισθήσις, φήσι, ἐπιστήμη;
ΤΕΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαίλον εἰρη-
p. 152. κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ ὅν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δὲ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα. φησὶ γὰρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν οὗτων, ὡς ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ μὴ οὗτων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ ποὺ;
ΤΕΑΙ. 'Ανέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὖτῳ πώς λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἔκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ, οἶα δὲ σοι, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀνθρώπος δὲ σὺ τε κἀγὼ;
ΤΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὖτως.

relation; thus sense cannot be knowledge, unless knowledge is relative, and being is change. This leads to an analysis of Sensation. We are made aware of its real nature, and so taught to distinguish Knowledge from it. See Aristot. de An. III. 3: Συνει ὑµεῖς καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀληθῶς τι εἶναι ἐν ἄµφοτεροις γὰρ τούτοις ἢ γιοι γρί-

When he said, 'The man the measure of what is,' i.e. What appears to me, is real to me.

6. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι] 'Well, after all, I should not wonder if'——

13. ὡς οἷα μὲν, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. Cratyl. 385, 6: ὁσπέρ Πρωτα-

γόρας ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημά-

των μέτρου εἶναι ἀνθρώπον, ὡς ἄρα

οἷα μὲν ἀν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πρά-

γματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ,

οἷα δ’ ἂν σοι, τοιαῦτα δ’ αὐτοὶ.

F
ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν ἔταβο κολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἂρ γὰρ ἔνιστε πνεόντος ἄνεμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἔμοι ῥίγοι, ὁ δὲ οὐ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἥρεμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὸτε αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἦ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἦ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ρίγοντι ψυχρῷ, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστι γάρ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστειγεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρος; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστὶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστὶ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Φαιναντία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταῦταν ἐν τε εἰς

1. μέντοι [‘Well, at all events,’

2. eikós ménuts sofón ándra mi λ.]


6. ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ The accusative may be defended from Thucyd.

11. 141: To ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἐκατόστο σπευδὲ. IV. 28: Tò épi sofás énou. The prep. is used in a slightly pregnant sense, = ἔρχοστε, ἀσ ἀσ ἂν στί στι, and no further.’ V. nfr. p. 160:

13. Tò δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστὶν] ‘When you say

15. [appears, it is that he has a

16. The example is kept in view throughout. There is MS. authority for αἰσθάνεσθαι. (Cf. inf. 164: Tò δὲ γε οὐχ ὅφ᾽ οὐκ ἐσπευσάται λέγει, εἰπερ καὶ τὸ ὅρα ἐπιταναι.) But the change of subject makes αἰσθάνεσθαι preferable. Cf. inf. 187. Tò οὖν δὴ ἐκλαίγοντο αὐδιδόμα δυνα, κ.τ.λ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγγορ. Crat. 411: Tò γὰρ γεγοαὶ γεγονήσθαι λέγει. And the repetition of the termination is a more probable corruption than the recurrence of σιδ in the same word. Φαίνεσθαι appears as a correction for φαίνεται in two MSS.

18. In regard to heat and cold and the like your theory and that of Protagoras agree.’ Φαιναντία occurs here simply as the noun of φαίνεσθαι, = ‘appearing,’ rather than ‘appearance,’ and must be
kept clear from the notion of faculty, and the associations due to Aristotle, (see de An. III. 3, where he defines it, κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γεγονότητος.) Appearance (or relative being) becomes a middle term between sensation and being, so that all is merged in sensation. Thus, while the answer of Theaetetus is shown to coincide with the saying of Protagoras, the reader is gently led to acquiesce in their common point of view.

1. ἔν τὲ θερμῷ  Cf. infr. p. 205: "Ἐν γε τοῖς δόγμα ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ ἐστιν. They are instances of Plato's tentative method.

οἶνα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται[Sc. αὐτά, which however is purposely omitted; viz., τὰ θερμά, κ.τ.λ. Ὅτε, while τὰ θερμά, κ.τ.λ. are subj. of κωδ. οἰα may be cogn. acc. “For they would seem to be each according to his sensation.” As we dwell upon the above example in support of the identification of appearance and sense, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἁγιοῖται φωνῇ, τῷ δὲ μὴ ὕπι, (where, however, ἐστι was carefully excluded,) we are led insensibly to substitute “relative being” for appearance, by a play of words, which may be preserved in English, “What appears to me, is to me.” And from relative being (ἐκάστῳ εἴναι) we argue at once to ‘being’ (Αἰσθάνω ἁρὰ τοῦ ἅπας). For a similar recapitulation, in which the argument is really carried a step further, (with γὰρ) cf. p. 191: Οὗτε γὰρ τὰίνθα ὅδε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαινεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἕμῳ ὁμοιοὶ δόξα.

4. Αἰσθάνω ἁρὰ] Sensation then is of being, and, as being knowledge, (in accordance with your theory,) is infallible. Compare with ὅποι ἐπιστήμη ὁμοίο, infr. p. 160: Κατὰ τῆν Πρωταγόραν.

7. ἁρὰ ὅν—] If sensation is of being, then being is not being but change.

9. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the real truth, not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples. Cf. Crat. 413: 'Εγὼ δὲ, ὃς ἔρμηνες, ὅτε λαμβάνῃ ἐν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπένθυμα ἐν ἀπορρήτου. (He had just given a derivation of the word ἰδιαορθός, which he thus ironically attributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doctrine.) By a similar irony, he

This theory of Knowledge, then, depends upon a theory of Being, which Protagoras reserved for his disci-
ples, to whom he told the real truth in a mystery.

2. If sensation is knowledge, being is change. Things are not, but become. Heraclitus, Empedocles, Homer, Epicarmus, all agree in this.

says here that the 'friends of Protagoras' have learnt their doctrine from their master 'in a mystery.' Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates proceeds to develop, was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the interpretations of his followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, 'disciples of Protagoras,' has been discussed in the introduction.

(9.) τὴν Ἀλήθειαν] There is probably a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards.

2. καὶ μᾶλ' οὐ φαίλων λόγοι] 'I will tell you, and it is indeed a high argument.' He had spoken of a λόγος οὐ φαίλως above.

3. οὖδέ ἂν τι προσείπων] 'Nor can you call anything rightly by any name.' Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent.

8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς Ἀληλα] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and decay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic influence. His Muse is called in the Sophist χαλαρωτα, because his friendship and strife do not possess the world together, but alternately.

11. ἦσις μὲρος τούτου] MS. authority preponderates (numerically) in favour of ἦσις μὲρος, which, however, gives no meaning. Stallbaum fails to defend it, by quoting ἦσις τε καὶ σὺ Ποδαργος κ. τ. λ.; because we can hardly argue from Homer's use of the dual to Plato's, and because philosophers do not run in couples. Stobæus, who quotes this passage, has ἦσις μὲρος. In the Bodleian MS. there is an erasure to the left of the omicron, which seems originally to have been o. An accent on the penultimate has also been
'Οκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,
πάντα εἴρηκεν ἐκγόνα ῥόης τε καὶ κυνήσεως. ἦ οὖ
dοκεὶ τούτο λέγειν;
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εμοιγε.

Σ.Ω. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον στρατό-
πεδὸν καὶ στρατηγὸν "Ομηρον δύνατο ἀμφιβητήσας το
μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

Where the form is in question, ἐπη are distinguished from τρα-
γοδία: as in Rep. 394. Where this is not the case, they are
combined as tragedy, this being another name for σπονδαία μ-
μητική: e. g. Rep. 605: 'Ακρο-
όμενοι Ὀμηρού ἢ ἄλλον τοὺς τῶν
τραγῳδοτέων.

ἐπὶ τῶν γάρ add. C. H. et re B. (Bekk.) Flor. a. b. c. (Stallb.) So
in the similar passage, p. 175.

The passage quoted by Diog. Laert. I. I. 10. (who says that Plato bor-
rowed from Epicharmus) though interesting, if authentic, is too
long for quotation here. (V. Mul-
lach. Fragment. Phil. Gr. Epici-
charm. vv. 177—194.) Epici-
charmus (c. 490 B.C.) is called
a Pythagorean. One or two
of his γνώμαι remind us of
Heraclitus.

11. μὴ καταγ. A few MSS. have
μὴ οὖ, which has been adopted by
most editors. See Appendix B.

See Appendix A.

3. τραγῳδίας δὲ, "Ομηρος"
Τὸν 'Ηρακλείτου μοι δοκοῖ καθορᾷν παλαι' ἀπὸ σοφὰ λέγειν, ἀτεχνάσα τὰ ἐνὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ρέας, ὡς καὶ ὁμηρος ἱλεγε. πῶς τοῦτο λέγει; λέγει που 'Ηρακλείτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοή ἀπεικόζε τὸν ἄνει πάντα ἄνει ὡς διὸ ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ποταμῶν οὐκ ἐν ἐμβαθεὶς κ.τ.λ. Two Orphic lines are quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod: ὁμεάσων πρώτος καλλίμησε ἡγεῖ γάμον, ὅσα μας κατεγέννησε διόμηται ποτα μὴν ὑμῖν. S. adds, τὰ μὴν ὡς ὁκὲ διὸ καὶ ἄλλως συμφαίνει καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ 'Ηρακλείτου πάντα τείνει. The last words are a good commentary on ξυμφερέσθων.

The theory of knowledge, 'All impressions are true,' is shown to require the theory of being, 'All things come and go.' And thus of the Pythagorean and Heraclitean traditions there is woven a doctrine of sense, similar to that which was held by the Cyrenaics and perhaps others at this time. As a doctrine of sense it is received, as a doctrine of knowledge and being it is negatived. And yet some such relative view will return upon us after every effort to bind things in an abstract unity. Compare the way in which dōxa is treated in the Republic, p. 429: Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μὲν τί ἐστιν, δὲ οὐκ ἀληθῶς φανείται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, δὲ οὐκ ἄλλως; καὶ τῶν ἀποκονδ. δὲ οὐκ ἀκόντων; κ.τ.λ. τί δὲ τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἤτοι τὰ ἡμῖνα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; οὐδὲν. Καὶ μεγάλα δὲ καὶ σιμπλα καὶ κούφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τὶ μᾶλλον δὲ ἀν φθόνωμεν ταῦτα προσφήςθηται ἢ τάνασσαι.

2. ἐπει καὶ τάδε] Cf. Thuc. Ι. 2. Καὶ παράδειγμα τὰ διὸ τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἄλλοτρόπιον ἐστι, διὰ τὰς μετοχικὰς ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὠμοίως αὐξηθῆναι ἐκ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 3. δοκοῖ] The expression is a little harsh; and Badham proposes to read ὑποκαθ. But cf. 152: 'Α δὴ φαμέν εἶναι. 154: Καὶ δὴ ἐκατόν εἶναι φαμέν χρώμα. Cf. also p. 176: θεωρήτης τὸ δοκοῖται. 'Being so called.' 5. πῦρ, δ ὁ τάλλα γεν unnatural] Which is assumed to produce all other things. The symbol of fire as the primal element, is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See Cratyl. I. c. (401.) ib. 413. (speaking of the Heracliteans): ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸς φόσος τοῦτο ἐνίκανον, τὸν ἴλλον τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαὶνεται καὶ καυτά ἐπιτραπείνει τὰ ὁλὰ. ἐπειδὴ οὖν τῷ λέγει αὐτὸ δαμαμεν ὁ λόγος τὸν ἴλλον καὶ τὸν ἴλλον γὰρ μόνον διαὶνεται καὶ καυτά ἐπιτραπείνει τὰ ὁλὰ οὕτως ἐπειδὴ δὴ ἴλλος δή, λυπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοὶ δὲ τὶ αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φοσὴ τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐνίκανον εἶναι. δὴ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φοσὴν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνός, δὴ τοῦτο μὲν πάντων καταγελάνοιρον φιλούσιν, εἴη δὲ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ λέγει 'Ἀνάπαγορας, νοῦν ἐγὼν τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.
THEAIHTHOS.

p. 153. γεννά καὶ ἐπιτροπεῖει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως; τούτῳ δὲ κινήσεις. ἤ ὡς αὐταὶ γενέσεις πυρὸς;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Αἱται μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; ΣΩ. Τί δ’; ἢ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἴσω-

χίας μὲν καὶ ἁργίας διόλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σάξεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. ἢ δ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις, οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως

Thus the mythology of the doc-
trine was rationalized by its ad-
herents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from
the most sensuous symbolism (ήλιος, χρυσὴ στεφά) to the most
abstract principle (τὰ πῶς κίνησις ἢ, p. 156), and its most remote
application. See also the famous
saying of Heraclitus: (fr. 27.
Mullach.) Κάσμον τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπα-
τῶν, οὐτε θεῶν τε οὐτε ἀνθρώπων
ἐπόισεν, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ
ἐστὶν ποῦ δέοικοι ἀπόρροιν μέτρα
καὶ αφανήσεως μέτρα. But the
symbol fire was by no means
confined to Heraclitus, (—the
Atomistes, Pythagoreans, etc.)
Cf. Rep. B. VI., where the sun
appears as the chief of the sen-
sible world, and the symbol of
the idea of good.

2. τοῦτω δὲ κινήσεις] The Bodl.
margin, (rather indistinctly) with
several MSS. has τῶν κινήσεως,
which is perhaps right. τοῦτο
will then refer to τρίψεως. It
seems unnecessary to assert that
φορὰ is κίνησις. The ω of τοῦτο
in the Bodleian MS. is partially
erased. But the note Διακόος in the
margin is in the ancient hand.

Thus the mythology of the doc-
trine was rationalized by its ad-
herents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from
the most sensuous symbolism (ήλιος, χρυσὴ στεφά) to the most
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Atomistes, Pythagoreans, etc.)
Cf. Rep. B. VI., where the sun
appears as the chief of the sen-
sible world, and the symbol of
the idea of good.

To a great extent; or 'for a long time.'
So the Bodleian MS. The others
vary between ὡς ἐπὶ πολύ, and
ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, from which ὡς ἐπὶ
tο πολύ has been conjectured.
12. ἢ δ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις] ἔξις
in Plato, like φαντασία, is less
technical than in Aristotle. It
is simply the noun of ἔχω, and
waves between the active and
neuter meanings of the word.
The body is said ἔχων πῶς, the
mind is rather said ἔχων τὰ μα-
θήματα; hence ἢ τοῦ σώματος ἔξις,
the condition of the body; but
ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις, the having
ψυχῆς τιμωτέραν ἔξιν λαμβάνει σω-
φρ. κ. δικασιο. μετά φρον. κτωμίνη.
Ar. Met. Δ. 1022, 6: ἔξις δὲ λε-
γεται ἐνα μὲν τρόπον οὗν ἐνέγρεια
tis τοῦ ἔχων καὶ ἐχομένων—
ἀλλον δὲ τρόπον διάδεικτε, κ. τ. λ.

For a similar transition from
one sense of a word to another,
cf. p. 158: τὸ αὐτοῦ δοκοῦτα τῷ
dokouinai εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

'But with regard to the hav-
ing the mind, is it not through
learning and practice, which are
motions, that it gains and pre-
μὲν καὶ μελέτησε, κινησεὶς ὄντων, κτάται τε μαθήματα p. 153. καὶ σῶζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ἵπτο δὲ ἑσυχίας, ἀμελητησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας ὀφθης, οὔτε τι μανθανεῖ ἃ τε ἄν μάθη ἐπιλαμβάνεται; ... 

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἄγαθόν, κίνησις, κατὰ τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοῦνατιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ οὔσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἡτί οὖν σοι λέγω νυνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας serves what it learns, (or gains what it learns and is preserved,) and becomes better? The sentence proceeds as if ψυχή were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cf. Rep. 532: 'Ἡ δὲ γε, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, λύνει τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσμάτων κ. τ. λ., where there is a similar 'nominativus pendens.'

1. κινησειῶν δυτῶν] Cf. Prot. 329: ἢ κινησειῶν τῆς ἄρετής μόρα ἐστιν ἡ ἐρωτάς. 'Ornus is neuter; 'things which are of the nature of motion,' like τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις above.

2. σώζεται] 'Retains' (middle), or 'is preserved' (passive). 'Εξης, as above interpreted, the preceding κτάται τε—καὶ, and ἐπιλαμβάνεται in the corresponding clause, are in favour of the former: for which cf. p. 163: 'Ετι ἔχοντα μνήμης τούτου καὶ σοφίματον. Rep. 455: Μαρι' ἢ ἔμαθε σώζετο. But when it is rendered as passive, there is a more natural progress in the thought, 'gets knowledge, is preserved, improves,' while ἐπιλαμβάνεται may be as justly opposed to improvement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines above and below: cf. Symp. 208: 

Μελετῆτι—σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. See the whole passage. In the indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not unconscious, ambiguity? 6. τὸ μὲν ἄρα] 'The one, then, viz. motion, is good.' There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato's usual explicitness without κίνησις; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cf. Rep. 434: 'Εκάμμαλα ἄρα—ἡ—δύναμι; inf. p. 156: Τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις.

9. Ἡτί οὖν σοι λέγω—ὅτι] 'Must I go on to mention still weather and calms, and the like, showing how quietness in every case corrupts and destroys, while its opposite preserves: and for my crowning instance, pressing it into the service, shall I insist upon it that by his golden chain Homer means the sun? For the meaning here given to προσβιβάζων, 'making it yield to my theory,' cf. Phaedr. 229: ἂ τι τις ἀπόκτων προσβιβάζατε κατὰ τὸ ἐκεῖ ἔκατον.—'If one is to force each of them (the myths) to harmonize with probability.' Cratyl. 427: Καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζειν—ὁ νομοθέτης, viz. 'the sound of words to square with the sense.' Mythology, poetry, nature, body, mind, the elements, had already been 'pressed
into the service.' But this final instance requires still greater force. The position of the accusative τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν is possibly due to the attraction of the active προσβιβάζων, and the previous acc. τὸν κολοφόναν ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν somewhat remote.) 'Ως κ. τ. λ. depends on ἀναγκάζω, πρὸς τὸ σημανόμενον, as a sort of cognate accusative, for it contains the final argument, and not the thing convincingly proved,) and τὸν κολοφόναν is accusative in apposition to all that follows. Both τὸν κολοφόναν and ὡς κ. τ. λ. are softened by the influence of λέγω, for which ἀναγκάζω is substituted.

Or (c.), This construction might be a little modified by taking ἀναγκάζω absolutely. 'Shall I clinch or complete my argument, forcing your assent?' But the two latter interpretations are perhaps a little violent.

1. αἱ μὲν ἣνυχία] There is a slight redundancy of expression in order to bring the instance in question under the general theory.

3. τὴν χρ. σειρὰν] II. VIII. 18, sqq. At this point Socrates has entered fully into the Heraclitean vein; as when he says of himself in the Cratylus, 407: "Οὐφρα ἵκθαι οἷοι Ἐδώφρονοι ὑππο, or in the Phaedrus, 238: Οὐκέτι πόρρῳ διαφαμωνυφέγχωμαι. This is the crowning argument, because it aduces the capital fact of nature witnessed to by the oldest and gravest authority (στρατηγῆς Ὀμηροῦ). The lines chiefly adverted to are 23—26: 'Αλλ' ὅτε δὴ κεν ἐγὼ πρόφρον θείοιομε ἢφισαναι, αὐτὴ κεν γαῖρ ἢφισαμε· αὐτῇ τε βαλόντεν σειρῆν μὲν κεν ἑπίμενα περὶ πάνω Θεόκριτον ἰδομαίρειν, τὰ δὲ κ' αὐτῇ μετέρα πάντα γένοιτο. Cf. Heracl. fr. 36: (Mullach) Εἰ μὴ ἰδίος ἐφ'
ment is clinched with Homer's golden chain. If the revolution of euchrony in ἴν. Fr. 34: ἴλιος
οὐχ ὑπερβήσατα μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, Ἐρίνες μὲν Δίκης ἐπικουροῦ ἔξευρήσουσι. As fire was the
symbol of motion, so the sun was the still more concrete sym-
bol of fire. See Rep. p. 508, where the sun is allowed to
be paramount in the region of sense; being essential to vision
and to life. For the way in which the authority of Homer
and the poets is used, ironi-
cally by Plato, but seriously
by those whom he imitates, cf.
Cratyl. 391, where an argument
is based upon the line ὁν Ἁρμίνων
caléσσωσ θεοί, ἀνδρεῖς δὲ Ἐκαμανθρόν,
and infr. p. 194: "Ὅταν τοίνυν λά-
sυν τοῦ τὸ καίρ ἥ, δὲ ἔτη ἐπηνεσσέν ὁ
πάντα σοφὸς ποιήσης. See also
Log.): Οταβά τε οὖν ἔθνος, ἔθη
μεθωρέσων μάρφοδων; ὦ μὰ τῶν
Δι’, ἔθη ὁ Νικήταρος, ὁδόνν ἐφύγειν
δοκεί. Δῆλον γάρ, ἔθη ὁ Ζωκράτης,
ὅτι τὰς ὅπονιας οὐκ ἐπιτίθηται.
2. ἡ περιφορά ἡ κυν.—καὶ ὁ ἴλιος]
The motion of the whole uni-
verse, and the perpetual inter-
change of the different elements,
was symbolized in the Heracli-
tean theory by the revolution
of the sun, who not only rose
and descended, traversing the
sky, but was also quenched and
rekindled daily, Νησί ἐφ’ ἵμαρη.
See Lassalle II. 119. sqq., who
compares Aristot. Meteor. I. 9:
'Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁσ κυνοῦσα καὶ κυρία καὶ
πρόστις τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστὶν' ἐν
φάκειρός ἦν τοῦ ἴλιου φορὰς ἀνακρι-
nυσά καὶ συγκρίνουσα τῷ γένεσιν
πλησίον ὁ πορθότερος, αἰτία τῆς γε-
nέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστι—
"Εστὶ δ’ ἡ μὲν ἐξ ἑδάτος ἀναθηματισ-
αμι, ἄτριος ἡ δ’ ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὀδωρ, νε-
φος.—Πάντα ἐς κύκλος ὁστὸς μυ-
κωνεῖς τὸν τοῦ ἴλιου κύκλον, ἀμα
γὰρ ἐξεισὶ εἰς τὰ πλάγια μεταβάλ-
λει, καὶ ὀστὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Διὸ
dε νοήσαι τοῦτον ὁστήρ ποταμὸν
ῥέουσα κύκλῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κοιν BLE BBO
ἀρέω καὶ ἑδάτοι.—"Οστ’ ἐπερ ἱνιτ-
tουτο τῷ Ὀκεανῷ οἱ πρότεροι, τάχ’ ἐν
tοῦτον τοῦ ποταμὸν ἱέομεν τὸν
cύκλον ῥέουσα περὶ τὴν γῆν.
Cf. infr. p. 181. τὴν ἐς περιφορὰν.
4. εἰ δὲ σταῖν]
Cf. Phaedr. 245. (where the point of view is
nearer Plato's own.) Ὁ ἀνθίστυ-
tον ἀδάτων, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο καίνην καὶ
ὑπ’ ἄλλου κοιμομένην, παῦλον ἔχον
κυνήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς—
οὐτω δὴ κυνήσεως μὲν ἀρχή τὸ αὐτὸ
αὐτοῦ καίνην. τοῦτο δ’ ὧν’ ἀπόλ-
λυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, η
pάντα τὸ ὧμον πᾶσαν τὸ γένεσιν
συμπεριένευσαν στήριξα καὶ μήποτε
ἀδής ἔχειν δὲν κυνήσειν γενέσθαι.
In the text all is made to de-
pend on change; in the above
passage all change depends on
that which is self-moving, but
in both, motion is essential to
being. See Ar. Met. a. 994 A :
Τῶν μεν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος κυν-
ήσιν, τοῦτον δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἴλιου, τὸν
dὲ ἴλιον ὑπὸ τοῦ νεκρός, καὶ τοῦτον
μεδεὶς εἶναι πέρας. Cf. Simpl. in
(quoted by Lassalle) Eἰ γὰρ τὸ
ἔτερον τῶν ἐνακτίων ἐπιλείπει, δι-
χοτο ἂν πάντα ἀφαιρεθέντα διὸ
cαι μέμεντα Ὁμήρῳ Ἡράκλειτος
εἰπόντι, ὡς ἔρις κ.τ.λ. Ὀλυγοσθει,
 Serena, πάντα. Schol. Ven. ad
Iliad. XVIII. 107: (Ὡς ἦσε ἐκ
to théon ἐκ τ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιο
‘Ὑπόλαβε τὴν τῶν δύτων φώτον
cs ἐν συνεστάσει νομίζων μέμφε-
tαι. Οὕροι, σύγχωρος κόσμου δοκῶν
αὐτῶν εὐχεθαί. In the words
ὡς καίω there is perhaps an
allusion to Heraclitus’ οὔτως ἀνω
cάτω μία.

Some of the latest guesses at
truth have sometimes had a
real or fanciful resemblance to
the earlier ones. See Comte in
Miss Martineau’s abridgment,
Vol. I. p. 429. ‘Amidst the con-
fusion and obscurity which exist
on this subject, I think we may
conclude that no organism, even
the simplest, could live in a
state of complete immobility.
The double movement of the
earth, and especially its rotation,
may probably be as necessary
to the development of life as to
the periodical distribution of
heat and light.’

5. Ὑπόλαβε If being then is
motion, how are we to conceive
of knowledge, i.e. of sensible
perception? This is now
evolved, a fresh appeal to expe-
rience being made at every
step. Each sensation is the
result of a double movement
from within and from without.
Hence they are, 1. relative to
the individual (ἐκάστῳ ἰδιων γε-
γονός); 2. relative to each other.
1. is proved chiefly of the sen-
sations of colour, warmth, &c.:
2. of the perceptions of size and
number.

κατὰ τὰ ὅμορα] ‘In the sphere
of vision.’

9. δὲ MSS. ἄν.

15. πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φο-
rάν] The theory does not con-
sider the origin of this mo-
tion. The instinctive belief in
the reality of external things is already dissolved.

1. δή ἐκαστὸν εἰναὶ φαμέν
Cf. p. 152: ἃ δὴ φάμεν εἰναί. τὸ προσβάλλον, ἢ ἐφορ. τὸ προσβαλλόμενον, ἃ ἐὰν ἐρωματ. Cf. inf. ἀλλο τὴν προσπέσσα—ἀλλον προσ-
elθόντος.

2. οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον
Neither that which gives, nor that which receives, the impulse.

12. φ. παραμετρούμεθα] Cornar. (followed by most editors), read ἃ. *Ficin. Id, quod men-
suramus. Their difficulty was created by not observing that there is a tacit reference to the example adduced below—ὅ ὅταν φώμεν ἐμὲ τηλικῶς ἐντε 
κ. τ. λ. If this is borne in mind, the text of the MSS. reads smoothly enough, the middle voice is ac-
counted for, and pára retains its full meaning. 'If that, with which we compare ourselves in size, were large,' &c., (ὁς is em-
phatic.) We are introduced to a new class of objects, and ad-
vance a step in the argument at the same time. All that I
see, hear, feel, &c., is seen, heard, felt, &c. by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again I view the size of other bodies in relation to my own, or I com-
pare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, ex-
cept in relation to some other magnitude or number. For the use of pára. cf. Lucian. I. 198: Ὅτω γὰρ ἃ τὸ μέγα δειχθεῖ ἃν 
μέγα ἐν τῷ μικρῷ παραμετροῦτο. For a similar anticipation of an illustration, see Rep. 495: 'Ως-
περ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἴρημάτων ἐστὶν ἔν 
λέον ἀποδιδάσκασθαι—Νεοστι 
μέν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένοι, where Plato seems to have the alle-
gory of the cave in his mind. Cf. also Thucyd. I. 7: Ἀι δὲ πα-
λαῖς—ἀπὸ υβάλασης μᾶλλον φε-
σθήσαι, αἱ τε ἐν ταῖς νῆσοις καὶ ἐν 
ταῖς ἰππείροις ἐφερεν γὰρ ἄλληλοις 
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσιν ὕστε σὺ 
βαλάσαντο κάθω σκόν, where the fact that the islanders were the chief pirates, which is men-
tioned in the next chapter, is assumed.
avra, μέγα ἡ λευκοῦ ἡ θερμῶν ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἄλλο γροστεοῦν ἄλλο ἃν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτὸ γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· ἐξεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ παραμετροῦμεν ἡ ἐφαπτόμενον ἔκαστον ἢ τοὺς τούτους, οὐκ ἂν αὗ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἡ τι παθόντως αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθῶν ἄλλο ἃν εἶ ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὃ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχέρως ποισ ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὅσ φαίν ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τα αὐτὰ ἕκεινα εἰπερών λέγειν.

Ἔδαι. Πῶς δή καὶ ποία λέγεις;

ὑ. Σῷ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα ἐσεὶ ἃ βούλομαι. ἀντραγάλους γὰρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγγισι, πλεῖους φαμὲν εἶναί τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιλίους, εἶνα δὲ δόδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἂν ἂν ἄνεξείς;

Ἔδαι. Οὐκ ἔγονε.

Ὑ. Τί ὦν; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρται ἡ τις ἄλλος. Ὁ Ἐδαιτήτης, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖξον ἡ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἡ αὐξήθεν; τι ἀποκρινεῖ;

Ἔδαι. Ἐὰν μὲν, ὡ Ἐσκρατεῖς, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἂν ἄρωτιν ἀποκρίμοιμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

3. τὸ παραμετροῦμεν ἡ ἐφαπτόμενον] Ἐ. Ἐ. 'Ἰ, the subject.' Cf. p. 182, τὸ πάσχον. Ἀρ. Εθ. Ν. Χ. 4: Λεύθν δὲ (τῆς αλασθης) λέγειν ἐνεργείην ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐστὶ μηδὲν διαφέρειν.

7. εὐχέρως ποις ἀναγκαζόμεθα] 'We allow ourselves to be driven to use strange and contradictory expressions.' Protagoras would not find fault with us for calling the six dice more than the four, but for using the verb εἶναι to express the relation.

12. ἀντραγάλους γὰρ που ἔξ] The difficulty has been stated with regard to size, it is now illustrated with regard to number.

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε νή την Ἡραν, ὃ φίλε, καὶ θείος. ἀτάρ, p. 154. ὡς έοικέν, ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρίνη ὅτι ἐστιν, Εὐριπίδειον τι ξυμ-βάςσεται: ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἐσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἡμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξήγησατε, ἡδή ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειράμενοι, ἠμελ-θόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἐλόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούσσεμεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτε ἰδιῶτα πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί ποτ' ἐστιν ἀ διανοοῦμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλους ἐμφανεί η οὐδ' ὀπωσδήνουν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοιτ' ἄν θουλοῦμην.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγογη. ὅτε δ' οὔτος ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἡ ἧρεμα, ὅσ πάνω πολλῆς σχολῆν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανα-

1. Ἕφ γε—καὶ δεῖος] Theaetetus' answer showed great dialectical aptitude. He perceives the contradiction, and yet will not answer para ὁ δοκοῦν.
2. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα] 'Our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.' Eur. Hipp. 612: 'Ἡ γλῶσσα οὐκομοχή, η δὲ φρήν ἀκόμοιτος.
4. ἐκ περιουσίας] 'Out of our superfluity,' 'for mere pastime.' Dem. de Cor. 226: οὔτὸς δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἐμοῦ καταγιρεί.
6. ἐκρούσσεμεν] 'Would have knocked our arguments together,' like swords in a sham fight; 'would have bandied arguments.'
7. αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά] Compared with one another. The reading of the old edd., αὐτά πρὸς αὐτά, might be defended; but αὐτά is the Bodleian reading.
p. 155. σκεφόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνωστε, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὁντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς ἐξετάζωντες, ἅτα τον ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; δὲν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὅς ἔγορο εἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἄν μείζων μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενεσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἐως ἴσων εἰν αὐτῷς ἐαυτῷ. οὗ καὶ οὕτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

Σ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὃ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιρεῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε ἱμίνειν, αἰεὶ δὲ ἴσων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

b. Σ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μη πρῶτερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ύστερον τούτο εἶναι ἄνεω τοῦ γενεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δή.

Σ. Ταῦτα δή, οἰμαί, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται

1. οὐ δυσκολαίνωστε] 'With no feeling of irritation.' Cf. Men. 75: 'Ελ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἰς καὶ ἐρημιτικῶν ὁ ἐρώμονος, εἴπομή ἀν αὐτῆ, ὅτι ἐσμένεν ἐξήρασα· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρχαίς λέγω, σὺν ὥραν λαμβάνεις λόγων καὶ ἐξέχεις· εἰ δὲ δέσπορων ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ παντεὶ φίλος ὑδετι βουλλοντι άλλοις διαλέγσατο, δεῖ δὲ πρώτερον ποισ καὶ διαλεκτικότερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.


5. όγκῳ] Cf. Phed. 102. 'Simmius is at once taller and shorter, taller than Socrates, shorter than Phedo.' Where the difficulty is met in a different spirit.

12. δ μη πρῶτερον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. 1. What existed not before, but afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming. 2. What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production, and so.

The latter is the more subtle, but is probably right. Schol.: 'Ο Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρελεκτον λέγει. Prorsusque ita Latine dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse. Heind. 'Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards.' Cf. Soph. 265: 'Ἡ τε ἃν αὐτία γίγνεται τοῖς μη πρῶτερον ὁδοίν ύστερον γίγνεσθαι.'
These seem to jar, when we say that the dice which were fewer are now more without being increased: or that I, that was taller than you, am now shorter, without becoming so. Themistocles is full of

1. τηλικόνδε] Of the height you see me.

5. μηδὲν τού ἕμων δύχοιν αὕραρβεστόντος] 'My size having been stripped of nothing,' i.e. 'Without anything being taken from my height.' Badham conjectures μηδὲν ἕμων τοῦ δύχοιν αὕραρβεστόντος. But this is unnecessary.

7. ἂνυ γὰρ τοῦ γύρνασθαι γενόσθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is supplementary to the 3 former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενόσθαι), the present in the second (αὕραρβεσθαι, φθίνειν). Both (γενόσθαι καὶ γύρνασθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because unnecessary. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156: οὗτος τε πρότερον υστερον κωπίσθαι καὶ πρότερον κωπίσθαι υστερον ισότανα, ἀνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβαλλειν ὑπὸ ὁμοὶ τοῦ ἑσταί ταῦτα πάσχειν—'Ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ μὲν μεταβαλλεῖ ἀνευ τοῦ μεταβαλλειν.

9. καὶ, which implies a subtle connexion between ταύτα and ἄλλα μυρία, can only be expressed in English by the emphasis on 'these.' Cf. Soph. Εδ. Col. 276: ὅταν με κανεσσάθαι, ὅτε σύζετε.

10. παραδεξόμεθα] Sc. παρὰ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου. 'If we are to take this at his hands;' i.e. not only accept, but adopt this as our own difficulty. Cf. Charm. 162: Ἐὶ οὖν ἐνγχυρεῖται γιὰν ἐνα σωφρ. ἄτιρ αὐτοῦ τὴν καὶ παραδέχει τοῦ λόγου, ἐγιγνώσκει ἅρτι ἄν ῥοῖον μὲν καὶ σκοπόμενο—'Ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐνγχυροῖν, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι.

[ἐπει] γὰρ τοῦ 'I assume this (ἡ), for I suppose I take you with me.' Cf. Euthyph. 12 : Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ νῦν γε; Ἐθυ. πάντω γε. The MSS. have εἴπε, but there can be little doubt about the emendation. The six dice are more when compared with four. They were fewer when compared with twelve. They cannot be more without having become more, and they cannot have become more without increase. Protagoras would say; It is true the same thing cannot be more without addition, but the dice in the two cases are not the same thing, for they are in
a different relation. The distinction between relative and absolute quantity is so familiar to us, that this is apt to appear a mere verbal quibble. But the solution of such difficulties was one of the steps by which the Greeks arrived at that distinction.

6. [Page 49] Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὃ φίλε, φαίνεται οὗ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τούτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ ἄρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἡ αὐτή, καὶ ἐσκεκρίσθη ὁ τὴν Ἱρων Θαύματος ἐκγονὸν φήσας οὗ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον ὁ μανθάνεις ἡδή διὸ τὸ ταῦτα τοιαύτ' ἐστίν εἴ ὃν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγεω, ἢ οὕτω;


8. [Page 50] ΣΩ. Χάριν ὑμὶν μοι εἴσει, εάν σοι ἄνδρός, μᾶλλον

the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras?'

Aristotle, Met. k. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativeness of quantity. Φαίνεται γάρ ό, τι θεωρεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταῦτας κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ἐνεπιλείπεθεν μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶναι τετράπυχον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ εἶναι. ἡ δ' οὐσία κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἀριστερῆς φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τῆς δορίσσαν.

9. [Page 50] 'Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help you to elicit the truth of their meaning from its hidingplace in their minds?'

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

dè ἀνδρῶν ὑνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τήν ἀλήθειαν ἀπο-
κερματίζειν συνεξεργασίζομαι αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ έίσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἀθρεί δὴ περισκοπῶν, μῆ τις τῶν ἀμυνῶν
5 ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ οὕτωι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἴμονεν εἰναι ἢ
οὐ ἂν δύνονται ἀπρέξι τοῖν χερῶν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις
δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πάν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι
ός ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὡς Σῶκρατες, σκληροὺς γε
10 λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὡς παῖ, μάλι' εἴδ' ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ

1. ἀνδρῶν—αὐτῶν] The two genitives are not precisely in
the same construction: ἀνδρῶν is governed by διανοίας, αὐτῶν by
ἐξ in συνεξεργάζω. The pronoun αὐτῶν, however, is frequently used to
recall a noun, which, for the sake of emphasis, has been placed
in the forefront of the sentence, e.g. Rep. 477: Ἐπιστήμην πότερνί
δύναμιν τινα φῆεν εἶναι αὐτὴν, κ.τ.λ.
ἀποκερματίζειν] Is to be taken
closely with συνεξεργάζοντο, as the order shows.
6. ἀπρέξι τοῖν χερῶν λαβέσθαι] What may be 'grasped thus.'
The extreme materialists are here discarded, in the Sophist
they are made better for the argument's sake, that we may be
able to discourse with them. The description there is very
similar. Soph. 246: Οἱ μὲν εἰς
γῆν ἔξι σύραναι καὶ τοῦ ἀόρατον
πάντα Ἰκάναι, ταῖς χερῶν ἄχετοις
πέτρας καὶ δρῶν περιλαμβάνετον.
τῶν γάρ τοισιν ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων
dιαχαρίζονται τούτο εἶναι μό
νοι δ' παρέχει προσβολή καὶ κατα-
φέν τυμα, ταῦτων σῶμα καὶ σύμια
ὁρφόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰ τὰ ἰσχι
μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες
tὸ παράστατο καὶ οὐδὲν ἔθλοντες ἄλλο
akοίουσιν. 247: τοῖσιν οὖν ἃν ἐν
ἐπιστήμῃ τις εἰς αὐτῶν σπαραγω
τε καὶ συνέχεσις, ἀλλὰ διατέινουσιν
ἀν πᾶν δ' ἡ δυνατό τοῖν χερῶν
εὐμετάνωσιν ἢν ὡς ὅρα τούτο οὐδὲν
tὸ παράστατο ἐστίν.
πράξεως] e.g. δύκαλα καὶ ἄδικος
πράξεως. ν. Soph. 247.
7. γενέσεις] e.g. αἰσθησις, κί
νεας, ἡδονή.
9. σκληροὺς—καὶ ἀντιτύπους] 'Hard and repellent,' i.e. stub-
born and impenetrable.' For
the verbal climax, cf. Tim. 62 :
Σκληροὺς δὲ, οὕτωι οὗ ἡμῶν ἡ σαρκ
ὑπείραξα—τὸ δ' ἐκ τετραγωνὸν ἐν
βάσεων — ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδος.
There is perhaps a humorous
intention in the application of
these material epithets to the
men in question, similar to the
play of words by which the
Heracleiteans are called ἱδροντες,
inf. p. 181. For the inquiry,
who are referred to, see Intro-
duction. Cf. Soph. 246: Ἡ
δεινοὶς ἠρμῆς ἄνδρας φήγη γὰρ καὶ
ἔγι γούς τοῖσιν συχνὸς προσέτυχοι.
11. ἄλλοι δ' πολὺ καμψύτεροι] In
comparison with these advoca-
cates of gross bodily "matter,"
Protagoras is almost an idealist.
His disciples believe not indeed in a world of νοητά εἴδη, but in a hidden process underlying appearances, cf. Rep. 477: δονάμεις γὰρ ἐγώ οὕτω τινα χρῶν ὅραν οὕτω σχῆμα, κ. τ. λ. (11.) ἄλλοι δὲ vix. the μαθηταί Προταγόρου, to whom he communicated his doctrine ἐν ἀποφήγματι, p. 152. Schleiermacher conjectured ἄλλα σχῆμα; but they would then be liable to be confused with the ἄνδρες ὀνόματοι above. The 'disciples of Protagoras,' are evidently contemporaries of Plato. Aristippus is probably included. (Κομψὸς and συρφετός are opposed, Hipp. Maj. 288: Οὐ κομψὸς ἄλλα συρφετός.) The word κομψός is used similarly of certain nameless philosophers (who are clearly the Pythagoreans) Polit. 285; Πολλοί τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν ὡς ἄρα μετρητικά περὶ πάντως 'ἐστί τὰ γεγομένα. Cf. Phil. 53: κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινὲς αὐτούν τῶν λόγων ἐπιχειροῦσιν μηρῶς ἡμῖν οἷς δὲι χάρων ἔχειν. (Megarians I)

3. ἵνα 'really is,' according to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Aristotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a general statement. Soph. ÓEd. Col. 117: Τις δὲ ἵνα; The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed. 8. συνεκκολησσοῦσα 'Tumbling forth to light at the same moment.' Compare the lively expression in Rep 432, when justice is discovered, ἀλάς ἡ μακάρες φανεραὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἄνω ἔξω δρόμος κυλεύσανται. For the insertion of καὶ γεννημένη, cf. Soph. Ant. 533: Καὶ ξυμμετέχοις καὶ φέρει τῆς αἰδίας. Aesch. Prom. 339. Πάνων μετασχόν καὶ τετολμήκεν ἡμοί.

10. τὰ τοιάδε—ἔχοντι ὄνομα, δὲνέκεκλημέναι] The slight redundancy helps to connect the sentence. 12. ἰδοὺ ‘γε δὴ] The particles mark the transition to a class of things less familiarly known by the name αἰσθησία.
keklymēnai kai āllai, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, p. 156. 
pamepληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμέναι τὸ ὅ ἀδ αἰσθητὸν 
γένος τοῦτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον, ὡμεί μὲν χρώματα 
pantodapai pantoδαπά, ἀκοᾶς δὲ ὠσαυτὸς φωναί, ο 
καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενὴ 
γιγνόμενα, τῇ ὅη ὦν ἰμῖν βούλεται οὕτως ὁ μύθος, 
ὁ Θεαίτης, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα, ἀρα ἐννοεῖς; 
ΤΕΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνιν, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄδειε ἐάν πῶς ἀποτελεσθῇ βούλεται

1. αἱ ἀνώνυμοι] See Locke, Hum. Und. B. II. c. 3. I think it
will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas
belonging to each sense, nor indeed is it possible if we would,
there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the
senses than we have names for.

3. The Bodleian with nine other MSS. has ἐκάστῃς.

242: Μήδον των ἐκατότο πάθη-
ται μοι δαγκώσθαι πασίν ὡς σῶν
ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. For the spirit with
which all this is done, compare
Rep. p. 545: Φῶμεν αὕτω τραγι-
κῶς, ὃς πρὸς πούδας ἡμᾶς παρό-
σας καὶ ἀρεσχθοῦσας, ὡς δὴ σπου-
δὴ λεγοῦσα, ἵψηλογομένα λέ-
γεις;

7. πρὸς τὰ πρότερα] 'In reference
to what preceded,' viz.
from p. 153. 'Υπολαβὴ — to p.
155, παραδεξίωμα.

9. 'Ἀλλ' ἄδειε ἐάν] 'Well, look
attentively, perhaps we shall be
able to finish it.' Cf. infr. p.
192: 'Ἰδὲ δὴ, ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν
ἐπιστή, ἐὰν = in the hope that.

10. ταύτα] ποιοῦντα, πάσχοντα,
αισθήτα, αἰσθητά.

πάντα — κινήται] Comp. Locke.
'The next thing to be con-
sidered is, how bodies produce
ideas in us, and that is mani-
festly by impulse, the only way
which we can conceive bodies
operate in.'

12. ὅσον μὲν ὦν βραδὺ] 'The
slower have their motion in
one spot, and in relation to
what is in, contact with them,
and are thus the producing ele-
ments; but those which are thus
produced are swifter; for they
are carried along, and their mi-
tion is from place to place.'

13. τὰ — γενόμενα οὕτω δὴ]
Schol. Εἰς τὸ δὴ ὑποστηρεῖον.
The (probably conjectural) in-
terpolation of Cornarius after
οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερα ἓστων; ὅσον
dὲ αὐτῷ, πρὸς τὰ πρόφροντα τὴν
κίνησιν ἵσχες καὶ οὕτω γενή, τὰ δὲ
γενόμενα οὕτω δὴ] is quite un-
necessary, and confuses the real sense. The slower motions are the ἑυπόνωνα and πάχοντα, which, when in contact, produce (without changing place) the αἰωνια and αἰωνεῖος (i.e. qualities and sensations) which are the 'quicker motions,' and pass to and fro between the ποιοὶ and πάχος. Cf. inf. p. 159: 'Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προσωμολογημένων τὸ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ τὸ πάσχων γλυκότερα τὸ καὶ ἀσθήσεις, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. It is not quite clear what is intended by the qualities and sensations being in locomotion. Perhaps nothing more is distinctly meant than that they flow from subject to object, and from object to subject. But when it is said that they are the swifter motions, the idea is vaguely connected with the Heraclitean doctrine. Sensations and qualities are drops in the ever-flowing river of succession. The man or the tree is like the dull weed that clogs it, itself to be carried down in time. Subject and object are more of the nature of Earth, sensation and quality are sparks of the everliving Fire. This is not, however, brought out consciously here. It is shown afterwards, p. 182, that while sensation and quality are flowing between subject and object, they have also changed. The above interpretation was first suggested by Voegelinus, quoted by the Zurich editors—in the preface to their last edition. He seems however, by a curious error, to make γενομον and γενομον equivalent to ποιοὶ and πάχος.

That the ποιοὶ and πάχον are both γενομον, appears from p. 159: 'Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ—τὸ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ τὸ πάσχων, quoted above.

3. τῶν τούτων ἔσωμερον] Men. 76: 'Εστι γὰρ χρώμα ἀπορρήσει σχῆμας ὑφεῖ σύμμετρον καὶ αἰωνίτος. This definition is said to be "κατὰ Γαργάκα." In Tim. 67 colour is called, φλάγα τῶν σωμάτων ἐκατός ἀποφράνοντα, ὑφεὶ ἔσωμερα μόρα ἔχουσα πρὸς αἰωνίτως. Cf. ib. 45, 6.

6. τὸτε δὴ, κ. τ. λ.] Then it is that while these are issuing in the midst, sight from the eyes, whiteness from that which helps to create the colour, the eye is filled with seeing, and sees now, and becomes not sight indeed, but a seeing eye, and that which helps to give the colour birth is covered with whiteness, and it too becomes not whiteness but white, whether stick or stone, or whatever it is that
for their motion is from place to place. e. g. The eye and its appropriate active motion come in contact. Then sight begins to flit from; the eye and

happens to have been coloured with this hue.

(6.) μεταξύ φαρμακῶν] It is doubtful whether this means "whilst they are moving," or "as they are moving in the midst." The former is excellent Greek, but the latter seems preferable if we turn to p. 154: Μεταξύ τι ἐκάστῳ θ' ἄλογα γεγονός, and infr. p. 182: Φέρεσθαι ἐκαστὸν τοῖσιν ἄμα ἀνεθῆκε μεταξύ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος.

3. ἦν ὁ ποιόν, κ. τ. λ.] Heind. who receives ὁ ποιόν—χρῶμα, (Cornarius' emendation,) adds, "ne ipso quidem χρώμα opus fuerit, h. l." It has not been sufficiently remarked that ὁ ποιόν has scarcely more authority than χρῶμα. This is sacrificing too much for a weak reading. One MS. (Par. H.) has σώμα on the margin, but ὁ ποιόν—σώμα, though it has thus some slight authority, would introduce a distinction between organic and inorganic matter scarcely known to Plato, and at all events too novel to be so slightly hinted at. The real text is perhaps restored by dropping χρῶμα, and reading ἄροιν, (ἀροὶν Par. F.) λευκόν, εἶτε ἑξιλοὺς εἶτε ὅταν ἐξειριθηναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρῶματι.

White, whether stick or stone, or whatsoever happens to be coloured with that colour. The repetition of similar consonants is a frequent form of corruption, cf. esp. p. 158: ὅτω χρῆ, κ. τ. λ.: where three MSS. (Bodl. Ven. P.) read ὅτω χρῶμα χρῆ, κ. τ. λ. (Χρῶμα, χρῶμα, χρῶμα, χρώμα, occurring within the next few lines.) Also, p. 149, άροῖσα for ἀρόκοις Ven. pr. Bodl. pr. Ven. P. with ἀρόκοτας a few lines above.

(Yet the reading ὁ ποιόν—χρῶμα, in which most MSS. agree, may possibly be right. For our theory has reduced us to narrow limits in the use of language. We have already been within a very little of saying 'motions move.' Cf. also, Rep. 601: τὸν ποιμηνικὸν φύσιμον χρωματ' ἀττα—ἐπιχρωματίζειν.) For εἶτε άξιος εἶτε λίθος, cf. infr. ἄνθρωπον τε καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ζῷον τε καὶ εἶδος. Hipp. Maj. 292: Καὶ λίθῳ καὶ άξιοι καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεῷ, κ. τ. λ. The sentence is turned like Phaedr. 237: Εἶτε δ' ἄξιος εἶδος λεγεια, έτε διά γίνος μονοικιν τοι' δεινών ταύτην ἐχετε τὴν ἐπανομιαν. Rep. 612: Εἶτε πολυστροφή εἶτε μονοειδῆ εἶτε ὅπη ἔχει καὶ ὅπου. The aorists give a sort of picturesqueness to the expression, referring, as in the Homeric simile, to an imaginary case.
p. 157. ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὅσ φασιν, οὐκ εἰναι παγίως· οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πάσχοντι ξενελθῇ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι τὸ τὲ των ξυνελθὼς καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλο αὐτὸ προσπεδόν τὸ πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. οὔτε ἐξ ἀπάντων τοὺτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὔδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ των ἄρι θεοῦ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμείς πολλαὶ καὶ ἄριθμοι ἡμαῖς ὑπὸ συνεπεθέλοι καὶ ἀνέπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δὲν, ὥσ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε τοῦ οὐτ' ἐμοὶ οὔτε τὸ δὴ οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὔδεν ὅνομα δ' τι ἂν ἰστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι
colour from the
the eye be-
comes a
seeing eye,
and the ob-
ject be-
comes co-
loured.
Neither
seeing eye
nor colour-
ed object
can be
thought of
as existing
independ-
ently of
this mutual
process.
We must
not speak
of anything
as existing,

1. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν] 'For it is impossible to have a firm no-
tion (they say) even of the active and passive elements as exist-
ing separately in the case of any single thing.' αὐτῶν sc. τῶν κινούμενων, 'To distinguish amongst them the active or
passive element as existing in any single case.' οὐκ ἐν ἐνοίκη σε may be
taken differently: 'To con-
ceive steadily of agent and pa-
tient, as each existing separately in one;' i.e. 'as a single thing.'
Cf. Soph. 259: ἐν ἐν 
κυκλῳ,
and the common expres-
sion ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ. But the for-
mer rendering is more pro-
bable. Cf. Arist. Met. V. 20:
Μὴ δὲν ἐξεῖς λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκεῖῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνοίκη. For
αὐτῶν Cornarius suggested ἂν τι. If a change were necessary, ἂν
τῶν would seem more probable.
τῶν ἂν ἐμοὶ, 'of things taken
singly,' might then be compared
with τῶν ἐν ἐκεῖνων, Phil. 16.
2. νοῆσαι—παγίως] Rep. 479:

Kal γὰρ ταύτα ἑπαμφοτερίζεται, καὶ
οὐ' εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐθὲν αὐ-
τῶν δύσανον παγίως νοῆσαι, οὐθὲ
ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. The
word is used by Aristotle.
9. οὐχ ὅτι ἡμείς] The irony of
this appears very clearly, if
we compare p. 197: ἐξ ἑνὸς ἔρι
ἀντιλογικὸς κ.τ.λ.
10. τὸ δ' οὐ δὲ] This may be
regarded as a sentence of which
τὸ is the subject, and all that
follows the predicate. The
idiom occurs frequently in Pla-
Legg. 803. Soph. 244. Its
growth may be traced in the
following passages, Rep. 357: τὸ
δὲ γε ἢν ἄρα, ὅτι οὐκε, προοίμων.
443: τὸ δὲ γε ἢν ἄρα κ.τ.λ. τὸ
δὲ γε ἀληθεῖν κ.τ.λ., 489. τὸ δὲ
ἀληθεῖν πέρικεν κ.τ.λ. See also
Thuc. Π. 44. τὸ δ' εὐπρόσχετε κ.τ.λ.
11. οὗτοι τοὺ] The genitive is a
point of transition to ἐμοὶ.
13. φθέγγεσθαι—] 'To use the
expressions.'
γεγονόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἄλλοι—π. 157. οὖμεν; ὅσ ἐὰν τί τις στήσῃ τὸ λόγος, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τούτο ποιῶν. δεί δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγει καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀδρούσθεντων, δὴ δὴ ἀδρούσματι ἄνθρωπος πόνον τε τίθενται καὶ λίθων καὶ ἔκαστον ὄνομα τε καὶ οἴδος. Ταῦτα δὴ, ο Ἐθείτης, ἃρ ἡδὲ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γεύσοι αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρέσκοντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἐγώγη, ὁ Σάκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἡ ἑμῶν ἀποπειρᾶ.

ΣΩ. Οὔ μημονεύεις, ὁ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ' εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἀγόνος, σε δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτον ἑνεκα ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-15 γεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σοῦ δόγμα ἐννεαγῶν' α ἐξαγεῖντων δὲ, τοῦτο όποια σκέψωμαι εἰπ' ἀνεμαίον εἴτε γόνυ χειρόν ἀναφανήσθαι. ἀλλ' ταρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἄνδρεώς ἀποκρίνων ἀν φαίνεται σοι περὶ διὸ ἄν ἐρωτῶ.

4. δὴ δὴ ἀδρούσματι—τίθενται] Sc. δομα. The subject of τί-θενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to a common name is not ἐν ἐντὸ πολλῷ, nor ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλά, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phenomena. Cf. Parm. 165, where the word ὡς answers to ἀδρούσμα here, but implies something even more vague and formless.
12. ποιοῦμαι] 'Tanquam pro-
2. *ει σοι ἄρασκει*] 'Whether you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.'

3. *ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν*] As, above, *ἀσθένεια* is made to include desire, fear, &c., so by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its farthest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Protagoras is made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as individuals. It is a good example of the irony of dialectic.

8. *Μη τοίνυν*] The doctrine is now so far developed, that we have only to notice an objection, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stumbling-block afterwards, so now false impressions have to be accounted for. The solution is a simple one—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is knowledge, was at first made equivalent to its having a real object (p. 152). But are dreams real? Are the illusions of madness true? Is that really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, it must be so. (In fact, such impressions are not contrary to sense, but to reason.)


*δοσα—τι ἄλλο*] The double cognate accusative is noticeable. 'The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression.'
class of objections is now disposed of. It is commonly said that in dreams and madness nothing of what appears is real. Protagoras says, All that appears to me is real to me. What account does he then give of these phenomena?

There is a doubt which is often felt about them: e.g. when it is asked, Can we prove that we are not dreaming now?

1. pollou de] These words are adverbial.

2. alla tan touvanion oudev en faivetai enva] E. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight: Semeio d' ouc ouk eido phoiei to mh tainta pani faivetoan tois zois, alla d' hmin yluki, toin' allaios puro toin' eteain d'kai allaios drmios, tois de strupoon kai ta alla de oswtaios.

12. oi men — autous] I. e. the madmen.


18. 'O pollakis] δ is not exactly governed by dukeinai, but it is cognate accusative in apposition with the whole sentence that follows. 'What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, &c.' Cf. p. 156: 'A olqoqov en telestetikos abhj mathto-phiros en lnyou erhmenv k. t. l. Rep. 443: 'To evnyvon, δ' erhamen upostevoun, k. t. l.

Arist. Met. Γ, 6, 1011 Α: 'Tα δε τοιατα aporrasma brmor εστι τοι' aporeiv' pteron kathoimov viv h' erethoymen.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 158. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σάκρατε, ἀπόρον γε ὦ τῷ χρή ἐπιδείξαι τεκμηρίῳ. πάντα γὰρ ὁσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἃ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγεμεθα, οὕτως κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅπωρ δοκεῖν ἄλληλοις διαλεγόμεθα. καὶ ὃταν δὴ ὄναρ ὑνείρατα δοκίμωμεν διηγείται σβαί,—ἀτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκεῖνος.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τὸ γε ἀμφισβητήσας οὐ χαλεπόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερον ἔστων ὑπάρ ἡ ὅναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται ταῖς, καὶ δὴ ἂντος τοῦ χρόνου ὁν καθεύδομεν ὃ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡστε ἂν οὐν χρόνον τάδε φαμέν ὄντα εἶναι, ὃντος δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρω διαυχυρίζομεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1. ἀπορον γε ὦ τῷ χρή ἐπιδείξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin.): Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu'il leur plaira, je ne crois pas qu'ils puissent donner aucune raison, qu'il soit suffisante pour ôter cette doute, s'ils ne pressuposent l'existence de Dieu. Descartes however would not say ὀμοίως ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρω διαυχυρίζομεθα. As early as the age of Homer, attention had been attracted by the phenomena of dreams. Π. ΧΧΙ. 199: ὡς δεν ὑνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διάκειν. (Bodl. ὧτ' χρών χρή.)

2. πάντα γὰρ ὁσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ] 'For everything corresponds in each exactly, as if one was the counterpart of the other.'

4. ἐν τῷ ὅπωρ] This is the reading of the best MSS., though ὅπωρ is supported by the greater number. But the article with ὅπωρ is out of place, and the indefinite ὃ is not used adjectively.

5. καὶ ὃταν δὴ] 'And when in a dream we do seem to be telling thoughts which are dreams, —it is strange, the resemblance of this state to that.'

ὀνείρατα—τυγχάνοντα] Not 'to tell dreams,' but 'to give utterance to thoughts which are only dreams.' Cf. supr. πάντα αἱ διανοομέθα ὑνείρωσιν. Ὀνείρατα is a sort of cognate accusative, or rather, is in apposition to the suppressed object of διανοομέθα. Ὀναρ is adverbial to δοκίμωσιν. (Meno 85: ὁσπερ ὑπερ ἀνακεκοίμηται αἰ δόξαι αὕτου.) Τοῦτον refers to the waking, ἐκεῖνος to the sleeping state, like ἑκάτερο, ἑκάτι of the visible and invisible world.

There is probably a slight break in the sentence before ἄτοπος, κ.τ.λ. The collocation διαρ αἰ ὦνείρατα is like κακοὶ κακοί p. 177, and adds intensity to the expression.

Dreams have as much reality to the dreaming mind, as daylight impressions have to the waking mind. And half our life is spent in dreaming. The impressions
of madness, too, though more short-lived, are real at the time to him who experiences them. In both cases it is impossible to demonstrate which is the real world.

Our theory resolves this doubt as follows:

That which is different has a different power,

Whether this be

4. πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλγοτητί
The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. 5. 1009 B: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀλήθεις οὐ πλήθει κρίσισθα ὅσων προσθε-κεινον ὀδὴ οἰκοτητί.

7. τι ἀλο—σαφές] 'Any other certain test.'

11. ὀριζόμενοι] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of the word to them.

14. µὴ ὑπολαβόμεν τῇ µὲν ταῦ-τον] Megarian subtlety is here ironically brought to the help of Protagoras. The language of logic is applied to the sensible world: the language of ideas to things that admit of degrees. And throughout, the idea dwelt upon is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be, ὅλως ἐτέρων, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὅλων τοῦτο ὅλω ἐκεῖνο. For the application of this logic in the mouth of a Sophist see Euthyd. 283. 'Kleis- nias is not wise. You wish him to be made what he is not: i.e. no longer to be what he is. You wish him to be annihilated.' Cf.
ΤΕΛΩΘΤΟΣ.

p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. *Εμοιγε δοκεί.

ΣΩ. Εἶ ἄρα τι ἔμυβαινει ὁμοιόν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἐαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταύτῳ φύσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἔτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἰ ἡ τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἀπειρα, ἀσαίτως δὲ γε τὰ πάσασχοντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμετόχοιν τε καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταύτα ἄλλ' ἔτερα γεννήσει;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δέχομαι δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σε καὶ τάλλ' ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὐτὸν ἄσθενοντα. πότερον ὁμοιον τοὐτ' ἐκεῖνο ἢ ἰσόμοιον φύσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀρα τὸν ἄσθενοντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ἄλλο ἐκεῖνο, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει;


2. El ἀρα] 'What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.' This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350: Ἑγὼν ἐρωτηθήσατο ὑπὸ σοῦ εὖς ἵνα ἄνδρειος βαρβαλέως εἰσίν, ἀμβλοκάζων εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀδικεῖται, οὐκ ἡρωτηθήσατο εἰ γὰρ μὲ τότε ἔρωτα, εἰσάγων ἢν δὲ εἰναι πάντες.


13. Δέχομαι δὴ] Phaed. 100: Καὶ πάντα δὴ ὁτὲν λέγω. Σωκράτης is governed partly by λέγομεν, partly by φύσομεν.

ηδῇ] i.e. Having laid down these premises.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

§Ω. Ούκουν καὶ περὶ νόςων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς p. 158. λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἰσος;
ΘΕΑΙ. ὤρθως.
§Ω. Τι οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ 5 ἀληθὲς ὤρισθηκεται;
ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοίον μεντ' ἂν εἴη πολλαχή.
§Ω. Ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅπως τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

Our theory resolves this doubt as follows:

That which is different has a different power,
Whether this be

4. πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. 1. 5. 1099 B: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλος οὐ πλήθει κράσεως αἰσθανθαί προσή- 15 κεῖνοι οὖσθα διὰ ὀλιγότητι.
7. τι Ἀλ—σαφὲς] 'Any other certain test.'
11. ὀριζόμενο] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of the word to them.
14. μὴ ἐπιλαβῶμεν τῇ μὲν ται-

logic is applied to the sensible world: the language of ideas to things that admit of degrees. And throughout, the idea dwelt upon is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be, ὅλος ἔτερον, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὅλον τούτο ὁλῷ ἐκαίνη. For the application of this logic in the mouth of a Sophist see Euthyd. 283. 'Kleini

nias is not wise. You wish him to be made what he is not: i.e. no longer to be what he is. You wish him to be annihilated.' Cf.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμογει δοκεί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοίων τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἐαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιώμενον μὲν ταὐτ-τόν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιώμενον δὲ ἔτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὅσ πολλὰ μὲν εἰ ὑπὲρ τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἀπειρα, ὡσαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πά-σχοντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμεριθήμενοι καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἄλλ᾽ ἔτερα γεννήσει;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγομεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τάλλη ἡδή κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. Σωκράτης ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτης αὖ ἄσθενοντα: πότερον ὁμοιοι τοῦτ᾽ ἐκεῖνῳ ὧν ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀρα τὸν ἄσθενοντα Σωκράτης, δόλον τούτῳ λέγεις δόλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαῖνοντι Σωκράτει;


2. Εἰ ἂν] ‘What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.’ This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates’ respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350: Ἐγώ μοι ἔφυστρει ὕπο σοὶ εἰς ἄν-δρεις ἀραρραλεῖς εἰσίν, ἀμορλύγησα εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ δεινοῖς ἀνδρείς, οὐκ ἐπαράθησαν εἰ γὰρ μὲ τὸν ἰὸν, εἰςον δὲ ὅτι οὐ πάντες.


Διλο χρεία. The combination of one element with this and another with that, and again with another different from all. Compare with what follows, Ar. Met. E. 2. 1026 B : Εἰςοι γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκόντα γὰρ εἰςεῖν μᾶλτα πάντως, πότερον ἔτερον ἢ ταῦτα ——μουσικὸς Κόρισκο καὶ Κορί-σκος, κ. τ. λ.

13. Λέγομεν δὴ] Phaed. 100 : Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. Σωκράτης is governed partly by λέγομεν, partly by φήσομεν.

ηδή] i.e. Having laid down these premises.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ἵπτελαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω. p. 159.
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ανόμοιον δὴ που.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἑτέρου ἄρα οὖσις ὁσπερ ἀνόμοιον;
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ανάγκη.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεδύσατα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἂ νῦν δήλον θομεν, ὡσαυτὸς ψήσεις;
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εγώγε.
ΣΩ. Ἐκαστὸν δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὃς ἑτέρῳ μοι χρήστειν, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἑτέρῳ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἑτέρα δὴ ἐφ' ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχον καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

15 ΣΩ. Ὁταν δὴ οὖν πῶς ὑγιαίνων, ἡδὺς μοι φαινεται καὶ γλυκὺς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. 'Εγένετο γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύττα τε καὶ αἰσθητὸν συν, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἰσθήσεωι πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὐσα αἰσθανομένη τήν γλῶσσαν ἀπειργάσατο, ἢ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν φερομενή γλυκῶν τὸν οὖν τῇ γυαίνοντι γλῶσσῃ ἐποίησε καὶ εἰναι καὶ φαινεται.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἢμιν οὕτως ὀμολογητο.

5. καθεδύσατα] Par. F. marg. add. καὶ ἑρμηγοροῦσα. Bodl. καθεδύσαται. Is it possible that καθεδύσατα δὴ ἑρμηγορότι may be the true reading?
8. τι ποιεῖ] To act upon something; to be agents. So τι ποιεῖ ἡμὶ, below. Soph. 247 : Etre eis το ποιεῖν ἑτέρον ὅποιον.
12. ἐφ' ἑκατέρου] In either case. Cf. Parm. 130 : Δέχομαι δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους — ἐφ' ἑκατέρου ἀδέχομαι τὸν τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ζήρωνο.
22. ἀπειργάσατο] 'The sensation arising on the side of the subject renders the tongue percipient.'

Accordingly, wine both seems and really is pleasant to me when well.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 159. ΣΩ. "Οταν δὲ ἀσθενῶντα, ἄλλο τι πρώτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίω γὰρ δὴ προσήλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. "Εστι δὴ αὐτ ἐγεννησάτην ὁ τε τοιοῦτος Σω-κράτης καὶ ἦ τοῦ ὀίνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλώτταν ἀσθενῶν πικρότητας, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ὀίνου γευσιμότης καὶ φερομένην πικρότητας, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἄλλα πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσθενῶς ἄλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομβίδη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν έγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενοι· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλον ἄλλῃ ἀσθεσίς, καὶ ἄλλοιον καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· εὖτε ἐκείνῳ το τοιοῦτον ἐμὲ μῆποτ' ἄλλῳ συνελθὼν τινῶν γεγενήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλον ἄλλο γεγενήσαν ἄλλοιον γεγενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ μὴν έγώγε έμαντῷ τοιούτος, εἰκών τε ἐμαντῷ τοιοῦτον γεγενήσεται.

1. ἀσθενῶντα] The constr. is resumed from ὅταν—λαβή above.
2. ἐγεννησάτην] The use of the 3d pers. helps to support the notion of 'Socrates being a different man.' Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine is spoken of as the 'active motion.' The dual is expressive. 'They produce when paired.'

11. οὐδὲν ἄλλο—γεγενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενο] 'There is nothing else from which I can receive the same sensation.' That ἄλλο is the object of αἰσθανόμενος seems required by what follows. For the accusative, see p. 185: 'Α δὲ ἑτέρας δυνάμεις αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνα-τον εἶναι δὲ ἄλλης ταύτ' αἰσθάνει, and elsewhere. There is a stress on οὕτως. For γεγενήσομαι—αἰσθα-νόμενος, see a few lines below, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γέγενη. The words γέγενη, αἰσθανόμενος, have become in a manner technical; cf. p. 182. γεν. αἰσθ. answers to ἐγεννησάτην—αἰσθανόμενον above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For 'Αλλον ποιεί, (the Bodleian reading) cf. supr. οὗ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀλ. (γεγενήσομαι Bodd. Vat. Δ.) 'For a different object implies a different sensation, and makes him who perceives it a different man,' i.e. I and my sensation become different, with every change in the object of sense.
ΘΕAI. Ὡ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Ανάγκη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν π. 160. αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι: αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδὲν δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκείνῳ τε τι νῦν γί- θPaste
5 γινοσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὰ ἡ πικρῶν ἡ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται: γλυκὰ γάρ, μηδὲν δὲ γλυκύ, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἷμαι, ἡμῶν ἀλλήλοις, εῖτ' ἐγὼ, εἶναι, εἰτ' ἐπιμένει, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς οὕσιαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ' ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὲ λείπεται συνδεσθαι. ὡστε εἰτ' εἶναι τι ὄνομάζει, τι νῦν ἡ τινὸς ἡ πρὸς τι ρητέον αὐτῷ, εἰτ' γίγνεσθαι· αὐτῷ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἡ ἡ γιγνόμενον οὐτὲ αὐτῷ λεκτέων οὐ
15 οὖτε ἄλλων λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέων, ὅσ ὁ λόγος ὅν διελπ- λύθαιεν σημαίνει.

ΘΕAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὡ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ὡς ποιοῦν εἰμὶ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὖ; ἂν ὡς ἄλλῳ

ΘΕAI. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆς ἃρα εἰμὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἰσθησίς· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὕσιας ἄει ἐστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Ἐρω- ταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἐστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὖν ἐστιν.

6. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι] It is impossible a thing should ever be, &c. This is a general statement, the aor. is therefore right. Above, in the words αἰσθάνομεν —γίγνεσθαι, the particular case was not lost sight of.
15. ἀποδεκτέων] ἀπολεκτέων Bodl. 21. τὴν γὰρ ἐμῆς οὕσιας ἀεὶ ἐστι] Seeing it is inseparable from my being at the particular time. Vid. supr. : Ἡμῶν ὁ ἀνθρώπος τῆς ὄντος συνεῖ μὲν, συνεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ.

p. 160. ΣΩ. Πώς ἄν οὖν ἄφευδῆς ὄν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῷ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὁστά ἡ γεγομένα ὀν ἐπιστήμων ἄν εἴην ὀντερ αἰσθητής;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδ᾽αμός ὀποῖος οὖ.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι ἐήρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη ὑπὸ ἀλλο τι ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσθησίς, καὶ εἰς ταύτων συμπέπτωκε, κατὰ μὲν Ῥομηροὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἷον ῥεύματα κυνεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφότατον πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων, μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτην τούτων οὐτός ἐχοντων αἰσθήσιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι.

ἡ γὰρ, ὃ Θεαίτης; φῶμεν τούτω σοι μὲν εἶναι οἷον νεογένες παιδίων, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίεμα; ἢ τῶς λέγεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτώς ἀνάγκη, ὧν Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν δῆ, ὧς ἐοικ, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννησα-

Surely what I thus perceive I may be said to know.

5 Thesetetus then was right. Sensation is knowledge. And in this principle the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet.

15 I. a. First criticism


10. Πρωταγόρας τῶν σοφότατων Prot. 309: Σοφότατον μὲν ἄν δήποτε τῶν γε νῦν, εἰ δοκεῖ σοφότατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. Perhaps Plato is ironically preparing the way for what follows, p. 161, 2.

12. αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι] The doctrine 'Sense is knowledge,' is the meeting point of the two theories 'Man is the measure,' and 'All is motion.' The several topics are recapitulated in the reverse order. SoAr. Eth. N. I. 2 : Περὶ μὲν ἀκρατοῦ καὶ πῶς ἀποδεικνύει καὶ τί πρωτισμεθα. 16. Τούτῳ μὲν μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννησαμεν] Our theory is now complete. (1) First the hypothesis was ventured, Sensation is knowledge. (2) This was at once identified with the axiom of Protagoras. The man the measure of what is ; and their common meaning was brought home to us by the analysis of a familiar example. (3) The mystery was revealed which lay beneath this saying, which had been reserved for certain 'disciples of Protagoras,' the Heraclitean theory of the universe that 'All is motion ;' in which all philosophers save Parmenides concur : which is witnessed to by poetry ; and confirmed by the observation of nature. (4) This theory of being was then applied to the phenomena of sense ; by which means the contradictions of common language were removed ; and (5) in meeting the formidable objection drawn from what are commonly called false impressions, the doctrine was still further developed, and shown to be universally applicable.

At each step it has grown in
μεν, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ τυγχάνει ὁν. μετά δὲ τῶν τόκων p. 160.
tὰ ἀμφιδρόμα αὐτοῦ ὡς ἄλθως ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρεκτεύον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένου μὴ λάθη ἦμας οὐκ ἀξίων ὑπὸ τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμαίοιν τε p. 161.
ς καὶ ψεύδος. ἦ σὺ οἵει πάντως δεῖν τὸ γε σον τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἦ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὅρων, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, εἰὰν τοσοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτῷ ύφαιρῇ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὁ Σῶκρατες, Θεαίτητος ὁ οἰδαμῶς 10 γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἴπε, ἦ τι τόιχως ἐξει:

ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἄτεχνος καὶ χρηστός, ὃ
distinctness, and boldness, and
apparent certainty. At first
only warmth, colour, and the
like were spoken of; gradually
our eyes were opened to the
relativeness of size and number.
By and by it was assumed that
the term ἀσθένεια includes plea-
sure, pain, hope, fear, &c. Then
we are quietly asked to concede
that things good and beautiful
have only a relative existence.
And, being now fairly at the
mercy of the argument, we can-
not resist the admission that the
illusions of dreams and madness
are as real as our waking and
sane impressions. They are
real to us at the time when we
experience them; which is all
the reality any thing is per-
mitted to claim.

2. τὰ ἀμφιδρόμα αὐτοῦ] Cogn. acc. in somewhat vague connec-
tion with what follows: like τῶν
κολοφώνων, υπρ. p. 153. Schol.: Ἡμερὰ πέμπτη τοῖς βρέφεσιν ἐκ
γενέσεως οὕτω κληθείσα παρ' ὅσον
ἐν ταύτῃ καθαίρουμε τὰ χείρα αἰ
συνεφαγμένοι τῆς μαύσως, καὶ
tὸ βρέφος περὶ τὴν ἔστειλαν φέρονς
τρέχουσα τύλλης, καὶ τούτων τι-
θεται τούτη, διότι τε πέμπτον τῷ
παθητικῷ ὡς ἐπί πλεῖστον πολύποδος
καὶ στραγγία, οἵ τε φίλοι καὶ οἰκεῖοι
καὶ ἀσύλοι οἱ προσηκοντές.
ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρεκτεύων] 'All
round;' i.e. leaving out no
point of view. There is an
allusion to the etymology of
ἀμφιδρόμυ, as the words ὡς ἄλθως
indicate.

3. τῷ λόγῳ] In our argument.
4. τῷ γιγνόμενῳ] In this and
in some other cases where the
reading has been questioned,
the present or imperfect tense
really gives additional vivid-
ness. 'That which is now born
to us.'

7. τῷ σοῦ] Bodl. p. m. τίστου ῃ
10. γὰρ δύσκολον] Ρ. p. 145: Με-
tά πάσης προαίτησις. p. 155: Οὐ
dυσκολαίνοντες κ.τ.λ.
12. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἄτεχνος καὶ
χρηστός, & Θ. ] Phaedr. 235: Φιλ-
tatoς εἰ καὶ ὡς ἄλθως χρυσόυς, &
Φαιδρ. Ιβ. 264. χρηστός εἰ, οὕτως κ.τ.λ.
Φιλολόγος] 'You are truly
a patient inquirer and an in-
genuous person, Theodorus, if
you take me for a sack full of
different theories; and expect
me without any difficulty to
The arguments of Protagoras, only if we follow his doctrine to its results, all creatures that have sense must be equally infallible. Hence there can be no teaching and no discussion.


The title of Protagoras' work. It is often covertly alluded to in this and other dialogues. The most pointed instance is in CratyI. 391: Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Προ-

tagorōn ouk ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀληθείας ῥήματα ἀγαπῶν ὡς τοῦ ἄξια. Μὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν μαθαίνειν, ὡς τοῦ ἄξια.


κυνοκέφαλος] Something more remote even than the Μυσῶν.
κέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθη- p. 161.
σιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνω καταφρονητικῶς ἦσατο ἡμῶν λέγειν, ενδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀστερέως θεον ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὦ ὅρα ἑτύγχαραν ὑμεῖς ὑπὸ φῶν πρόφητων οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρίσατε, μὴ ὑμῖν ἀλλού τοῦ ἀνθρώπων. ἡ πῶς λέγομεν, οὐκ Ἑθόδουρο; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ὃ ἀν δὲ αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μὴ οὐ τὸ ἄλλο πάθος ἄλλος βελτίων διακρύει, μὴ τὴν δοξήν κυρίωτερον ἐσται ἐπισκέψασθαί ἔτερος τὴν ἔτερου, ὡρθὴ ἡ ψευδής, ἀλλ' ὁ πολλάκις εἰρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστος μόνος δοξάζει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε, δὲ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὡστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξίωσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μοσθῶν, εἰ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροι τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῶν ἂν παρ' ἑκείνου, μέτρον οὔτι αὐτῶ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φώμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μανεικτείς σημών, ὅσον γέλωται ὁφλωσκάμεν· οἷμαι

ἔγγαρος, infr. p. 209. As we might say, Why not the African apes?

2. πάνω καταφρονητικῶς] 'Showing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him.'


13. ὅστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος] The negative form of the same saying, viz., 'Οὐκ εἴσαι ἄντιλέγειν,' is in like manner turned against itself, Euthyd. 287: Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαθετῶμεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διαφωνοῦμεν, ὡμέν, ὅ ἀπὸ Διὸς, εἰ οὕτως ἔσθε, τίνος διδάσκαλος ἔστε;


17. ταύτα] So the Bodelian with the greater number of MSS. C. F. Hermann quotes its authority for καὶ ταύτα, the reading formerly received; judging, probably, from the silence of Gaisford.

19. ὁμοιοὶ δὲ καὶ ξυμπαθῶν] Locke, Hum. Und. 13, § 88: But if it should so happen that two thinking men have different ideas, I do not see how they
δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ
p. 162. γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλους φαντασίας
tε καὶ δόξας, ὅρθας ἐκάστου οὕσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν καὶ
dιωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου,
ἀλλὰ μὴ πάιξονσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύζου ἐφθέγ-5
ζατο;

could argue or discourse with
one another.

1. ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματείᾳ] Λεόντ. Γ. 4, 1006: Τὸ γὰρ
μὴ ἐν τι σημαίνειν οὐδ' ἐν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν, μὴ σημαίνουσαν δὲ τῶν ὄντων
ἀυθετήτα τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀληθείαν καὶ
πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐδ' ἐνδεχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοεῖν ἐν. Εὐθυδ. 286: Τοῦ
τῶν γε τῶν λόγων πολλῶν δὴ καὶ
πολλάκις ἀκριβῶς ἀλλ' ἀκριβῶς. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμβ. Πρωταγόρας σφό
νδα ἠκρότητοι αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ έτι πα-
λαϊκτεροί έμοι δὲ αὐτὸν βασιστά
τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους
ἀνατρίπτω καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῶν. οὕτω
δὲ αὐτὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ
κάλλιστα πείστεθα. ἄλλο τι ή
ψυχή λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι; τοῦτο γὰρ
δύναται ὡς λόγος. Θρ. 481: Εἰ
μὴ τι δεν τοῦς ἀδερφαίους πάθος, τοὺς
μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλο τι, τὸ
αὐτὸ, ἄλλα τις ἡμῶν θαυμά τε ἐπα-
θήσχι πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν
ἥν ῥάδιον ἐνδειξασθαι τῷ ἔτερῳ τὸ
ἐκάστου πάθημα.

3. μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος]
'Great, nay enormous.' μὲν
points forwards to the alterna-
tive implied in ἄλλα μὴ παίξονσα
κ.τ.λ. 'But then perhaps he
was in jest.' Διωλύγιος, Sch.: Μεγάλη, ἢ ἐπὶ πολὺ διάκοινα.
ἄπλι τοῦ περιβοστος—σημαίνει δ' ἐσθ' δὲ καὶ τὸ σκοτεινον καὶ τὸ
νυκτερωμ. The meaning, 'loud'
(if it really existed, but it is
perhaps due to a fanciful deri-
vation from διωλύζω) must have
been derived from the meaning
'long.' Cf. Μακρῶν αὐτῶν, φωνή
οὐρανομήνης. The idea of vast
size, or length, may again have
arisen from the idea of gloom.
If so, the word is possibly re-
lated to ἡλιγνη, λυγγ. Compare
ῥαξ, ραξ: πτόσον πτύσσα, &c.
'Vast in extent, is the only
meaning admissible here, and
in de Legg. 890: Τι δ' οὗ
χαλεπά τε ἐστιν ἐκακολουθεῖν
λόγους οὕσας εἰς πλῆθος λεγόμενα, 
μὴ κτι τ' ἐκέπτησι διωλύγια.
This, too, is the meaning in
which it is used by the Neo-
platonists. For the climax,
compare p. 156: Σκληροὺς τε—
καὶ ἀντίτυπους. P. 174: Σμικρά
καὶ οὐδέν. Rep. 449: Μέγα καὶ
δλω.

5. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύζου]
'If the Truth of Protagoras is
sincere, and was not laughing
when she uttered this from be-
hind her impenetrable screen
of written words.' There is an
allusion to the etymology of
ἀδύτον. (Βύζου, Bodl.: κέκλου,
Ｖατ. et pr. Ven. П.)
Cf. the celebrated passage in
the Phaedrus, about written
teaching, without dialectic, 275:
Δεινῶν γὰρ που ἔλειψε, τούτ
ἐξερχαρίη, καὶ ὧς ἀληθῶς ὤμοιον
ζωγραφίας καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνης ἰκ
γονα ἔστηκε μὲν ἂς ζωντα, ἔως δ' ἀνέρξη τι, σημαίνω πάνω συχά κ.τ.λ.
For the imagery which is here
resumed, see above, p. 152: Τού
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΟ. Ο Σώκρατες, φίλος ανήρ, ἄσπερ σὺ νῦν p. 162. ἔστης. οὐκ ἂν οὐν ἰδαίμῳ δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι; τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβὲ πάντως καὶ νῦν οὐ μᾶλλον ἐμελέσθω σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα ἠλθὼν, ο Θεόδωρος, πρῶτος τὰς παλαιότατα ἀξίως ἂν ἄλλους θεόμενος ὁ γυμνοῦς, ἐνίοις φαύλους, αὐτός μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύων τὸ εἴδος παραπόδουμενος;

10. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, ἐστὲ μέλλοιεν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὃσπερ νῦν οἴμαι ύμᾶς τὸ ἠμῶν μὴ ἤμετα τὸ πολλὸν συν-φεῖτο, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀποφθέγμα τὴν ἀληθείαν ἔλεγεν. P. 156: Τὴν ἀληθείαν ἀποκεκρυμένην.—μὴ τις τῶν ἁμαρτῶν ἑπακούσῃ.—ἴδων μὲν ἐνλέα τά μαντεία πέραν.—οὕτως ὁ μισθος. At first Protagoras himself spoke in riddles—now his 'Truth' is personified, and speaks obscurely from her hidden shrine. Plato often thus follows up a metaphor. Compare the well-known image of the wave, Rep. 441: Ταῦτα μὲν μόνες διασεινεύκαιμεν. 453: Ἀν τί τις εἰς κολυμβηθῶν μακρὰ ἐμπεσε αὖ τε εἰς μέγαστον πέλαγος μέσον, δῶμεν γε ναὶ οὐδέν ἢττον. 457: Ὁδείστε κύμα φάσμεν διαφεύγειν δοτε μὴ καταλυθθήσατε. 472: Τὸ μέγαστον τῆς τρικύμιας. 473: Ὅσπερ κύμα ἐγκελον καταλύσετε.


6. Ἀρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα] It appears from this, and p. 169, that the Lacedaemonians used to compel bystanders to join in their gymnastic exercises. (ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον.—ἀπείνα ὁ ἀποδοθεῖσθαι κελεύσαν.) This is probably the point of the allusion here. There is no reason to suppose that the human form was less visible in an Athenian than in a Lacedaemonian palestra. The law of Solon observed in severer times at Athens, which forbade adults to enter a gymnasium where boys were exercising, perhaps throws some light on this Spartan custom. (Aesch. c. Tim. p. 38.)

8. ἐνίοις φαύλους] Socrates courteously implies his own inferiority.

9. παραπόδουμενοι] 'Stripping beside them,' i. e. to compare with them.
Ο ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ. 71

p. 162. πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐὰν θεάσαται καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη οὗτα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαθαλεῖν.

Σ. Ἄλλ᾽ εἰ οὕτως, ὁ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδὲ ἐμοὶ ἔχθρον, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιάζομενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὐν ὁ ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἴτεν. Λέγε δὴ, ὁ Θεαίτης, πρῶτον μὲν ἄ νῦν δυσλόμεν, ἀρα οὐ συνθαυμαζόμενος εἰ ἔξαιρῃς οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν οὕτως ἀνδρότων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἤττῳ τι ὁιρεῖ τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεούς ἢ εἰς ἀνδρῶν ἑτεροτοκεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μα Δι', οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἑρωτάσθαι, πάνω θαυμάζω. ἦνικα γὰρ διῆκεν δυτὶ τρόπον λέγοντι τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἰ ἦν τῷ δοκούντι, πάνω δὲ μον ὑπὲρ ἑφαινοντες λέγεσθαι: νῦν δὲ τούναντι τάχα ἔσχε μετατέπτωκεν.

Σ. Νέος γὰρ εἰ, οὐ φίλε παίρὶς τοῦ διδέχουσαν ὁξείως ὑπακούεις καὶ πειθεῖς. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρέις Πρωταγόρας ἦ τοῖς άλλον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, θανάτου ἀνθρώπου.


7. συνθαυμάζω.] Cf. supr. δ θαυμάζω. 10. εἰς θεούς] Contrast with this de Legg. 716 : 'Ο δὴ θεός ἦσαν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἢ εἰς μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μάλλον ἢ πού τις δὲ φασίν ἀνθρώπους.

15. τούναντι] Viz., οὐκ εἰς φαινόμενον λέγεσθαι. This word is not the subject of μετατέπτωκε, but in apposition with the subject, forming part of the predicate. Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Me.-non, p. 70 C. 'Εσθάδε δὲ—τὸ ἓπειν τινων περίεσθεν. Heind.

τάχα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. II.

17. Νεός γὰρ εἰ] Parm. 130 : Νέος γὰρ εἰ ἦν, φασίν τῶν Παρμανίδων, ὧν Σάκρατις, καὶ οὗτοι σου ἀν- τελήται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἐτές ἀντι- λήψεται.

ὑπὸ—διδαχήσας ὄξεις ὑπακούεις καὶ πειθεῖς] 'Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular arguments.'
παίδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεξομενοι, p. 162. 
θεοῦ τε εἰς-τὸ μέσον ἂγοντες, οὐς ἔγο ἐκ τε τοῦ 
λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς 
οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἔξαιρα, καὶ ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄν ἀποδέχουντο 
5 ἄκούοντες, λέγετε ταύτα, ὡς δεινὸν καὶ μηδὲν διοίσει 
eἰς σοφίαν ἐκκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὀποιο- 
ου̃ν ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ ἤμινον λέγετε, 

1. δημηγορεῖτε] 'You talk clap-trap.'
2. ἂγοντες] Hipp. Maj. 298: 
Μηδὲν τῶν νῦν εἰς μέσον πα- 
ρέγοντες. Phaedr. 267: Τὸν δ' 
—Εἴδον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἂγομεν.
The Bodl. MS. with its two 
followers, Vat. and Ven. II., 
gives λέγοντες. But the tend- 
en-cy to the repetition of 
consonants, already noticed, 
weakens its testimony in 
this instance with λέγειν and 
λέγετε following. Compare, 
besides the instances adduced 
in the note on p. 156, p. 160: 
Οὖρ' αὐτῷ λεκτέων, οὖρ' ἄλλον λέ-
γοντος ἀποδεκτέων, Bodl.Vat. ἀπο-
λεκτέων, p. 169. ἀντιλέγω, ἄλλ'
ἀγε, Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. ἀντ. 
ἄλλα λέγε. As regards the sense 
there would be a slight awk-
wardness in the repetition of 
the same common word, which 
it is in Plato's manner to avoid, 
though, on the other hand, the 
expression ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ 
tοῦ γράφειν, is made more 
pointed at first sight. But 
the general sense with δημηγορεῖτε 
is enough to occasion this, 
without the introduction of λέ-
γοντες. And if we look closely 
at the expression ἐκ τὸ μέσον 
λέγειν θεοῦ, it is hardly sup-
ported by comparing Herod. 
VI. 129: ἔριν εἰσον ἀμφι μονακῇ 
καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἢς τὸ μέσον; 
de Legg. 817: (the poets are 
addressed) μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς —
ἐπιτρέψειν ὡμᾶς δημηγορεῖν—
πρὶν κρίνας τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ῥήτα καὶ 
ἐπιτρέψεις πεποιησάτε λέγειν εἰς τὸ 
μέσον εἰς ἔριν. Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέ-
σον is not equivalent to δημηγορεῖν, 
but means rather to 'recite in 
public.' Cf. ib. 664: ἐς τὸ μέσον 
φοβομενος. The passages already 
quoted show that ἂγον εἰς τὸ μέ-
σον, meaning 'to adduce in il-
lustration or argument,' is quite 
Platonic. See also Phil. 57: ὤδ' 
ὁ ἔνεκα ταύτα προσηγκάμαθα εἰς 
tὸ μέσον. There is a slight ex-
pression of violence in θεοῦ— 
ἄγοντες which suits the context 
well. *

οὐς ἐγώ] Here, as p. 152, 
Protagoras' opinion is quoted in 
his own words. Diog. Laert. 
IX: Περὶ θεῶν οὐκ ἢς ἐδίκαια, 
οὐδ' ὡς εἰσὶν εἰς ὡς οὐκ εἰσιν. πολ-
λὰ γὰρ τὰ καλύπτετα εἰδίκαι, ἧ τε 
ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχύς ὃν ὁ βίος ὁ 
tοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

4. ἐξαιρῶ] Rep. 492: Θεῶν 
μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν ἐξαιρῶ-
μεν λόγου.

7. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην] In 
dealing with a metaphysical 
theory it is not enough to have 
shown its inconsistency with 
common sense. It must be met 
upon its own ground, and the 
truth which it contains, as well 
as the sources of falsehood,
p. 162. ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, διέ ἐστι Θεόδωρος ἡ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὖν ἐνός μόνου ἄν εἰη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σὺ τε καὶ Θεό-
p. 163. δωρος εἰ ἀποδέξησθε πιθανολογίας τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένως λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' οὖν δίκαιον, ὧν Σάκρατες, οὐτε σὺ οὖτε ἂν ἦμεις φαίμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ σκοπήσων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἀλλὰ.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ σκοπώμεν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἰσθησίς ταύτων ἢ ἔτερων. εἰς γὰρ τούτῳ που πάς ὁ λόγος ἦμων ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτῳ χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀτόπα ταύτα ἐκκύησαμεν. οὐ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

b ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὀμολογήσομεν, ἀ τῷ ὀρᾷν αἰσθανό-

clearly distinguished. This, and not merely, as the Scholiast says, that he may draw out Theaetetus further, is Socrates' motive in relinquishing the ground he has just taken.

3. οὔτ' ἐνος μόνου] Sch. εκ τῆς τῶν κυβερνῶν συνήθειας ἐλαύνει τὸ οὔδενος μόνου, ἵνα εἰς πεθὺ ἐν τῷ παίειν ἐν τῷ ἡλέχυστον.

'Not worth an ace.' Or, if, as Stallbaum conjectures, the phrase originated in the line of Homer, Π. VIII. 234, Ἄνδρειον δ' οὔτ' ἐνος ἄξιον εἴμεν Ἠκτόρος, 'No better than a single man,' where-as he is now ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντά-


5. τοῦτον] Several MSS. have τηλικούτων.

8. δὲ τε σὸς καὶ] Theet. has an-

14. ἐκκύησαμεν] Rep. 450: 'Ο-

16.] The argument is in brief the following: 'If sen-

15. σοφιστής — ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευτέον.
μεθά ἡ τῷ ἀκόειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἄμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; p. 163.
οἶν τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον
οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθεγγόνται, ἡ ἁκούειν τε
καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἄ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ
ἐπιστάμενοι βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὀρῶν, ἡ
ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπερ ὀρῶμεν, διὸ κυριούμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτὸ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, τούτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ
ὁρῶμεν τε καὶ ἁκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν τῶν
μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὀρῶν τε καὶ ἐπὶ
οτερασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὁξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἁκούειν
τε ἄμα καὶ εἰδέναι ἅ δὲ οὐ τε γραμματισταῖ περὶ
αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὐτε αἰσθάνεσθαι
tῷ ὀρῶν ἡ ἁκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

ΣΩ. 'Αριστά γ', ὁ Θεαίτης, καὶ οὐκ ἁξίων σου
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητήσω, ὃν καὶ ἁξίωμη. ἂλλ' ὅρα
δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκοπεῖ τῇ αὐτῷ διο-
σόμεθα.

15. [καὶ αὐξάνῃ] 'That I may
leave you room to grow,' 'That
I may not be always stunting
and stopping you.' Lys. 206:
Οι καλοί, ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτῶν ἐσπαρμ
καὶ αὐξάνῃ. Phedr. 246: Τούτους
δὴ τρέφεσθαι τε καὶ αὐξάνει μάλιστά
p. 497: Ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐ-
tῶς τε μᾶλλον αὐξάνεται. The ex-
pression in Aristoph. Vesp. 638,
Ἡξανάμεν ἀκούον, though more
humorous, also affords an illus-
tration.

We may naturally ask what
objection Socrates would have
raised, had he not feared to
check Theaetetus' growing in-
telligence. This may perhaps
be gathered from below, where
he ventures to puzzle him a
little further, p. 166: 'Ἰσως δὲ γ'
ὁ θαυμάση πλεῖον δν τουαῦτ' ἐπα-
des κ.τ.λ. Socrates might have
asked, Does every one who
sees the forms and colours, or
who hears the sounds, possess
the sciences of them (Σωφρονις,
μονου, p. 145)? Could he give
an account e. g. of the ὁξυς
and βαρύς of what he hears?
Cf. Rep. 524: Μέγα μὴ καὶ δύσι
καὶ συμπλοέω ἐγὼ ἀλλ' οὐ κεχρο-
ρισμένον ἀλλά συγκεκριμένον τι.
Not even the objects of sense
are known by sense, but by a
higher faculty.

16. τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, κ.τ.λ.
] The implied metaphor is prob-
ably that of the wave. It is
continued below, p. 161: Ἀγο
δὲ ἡμᾶς—ἐκ λόγου μείζον ἐξ ἐλάττο-
νος καταλαμβάνει : and is slightly
varied, p. 177: Πλεῖον δὲ ἐπιρή-
οντα καταχώσει ἡμῖν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
λόγον.
ΤΟ ΠΟΙΟΝ ΔΗ;  

ΤΟ ΤΟΙΟΝΔΕ' ΕΙ ΤΙΣ ΕΡΟΙΤΑ, ΑΡΑ ΔΥΝΑΤΩΝ, ΟΤΟΝ
ΤΙΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΩΝ ΓΕΝΟΤΟ ΠΟΤΕ, ΕΤΙ ΞΟΥΝΤΑ ΜΥΗΜΗΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ
ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΝ, ΤΟΤΕ ΟΤΕ ΜΕΜΝΗΤΑΙ ΜΗ ΕΠΙ-
ΣΤΑΣΣΑΙ ΑΥΤΟ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΜΕΜΝΗΤΑΙ. ΜΑΚΡΟΛΟΓΟΙ ΔΕ, ΟΣ 5
ΕΩΙΚΕ, ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ, ΕΙ ΜΑΘΩΝ ΤΙΣ ΤΙ ΜΕΜΝΗ-
ΜΕΝΟΣ ΜΗ ΟΙΔΕΝ.

ΚΑΙ ΠΟΣ, Ω ΣΩΚΡΑΤΕΣ; ΤΕΡΑΣ ΓΑΡ ΑΝ ΕΙΗ
Ο ΛΕΓΕΙΣ.

ΜΗ ΟΥΝ ΓΕΝΩ ΛΗΡΩ; ΣΚΟΠΕΙ ΔΕ. ΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΟΡΘΥΝ 10 ΑΝΔ ΥΕΤ,
ΟΥΚ ΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ ΛΕΓΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΘΙΝΝΑ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ;

ΕΓΩΓΕ.

ΟΥΚΟΥΝ Ι ΙΔΩΝ ΤΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΩΝ ΕΚΕΙΝΩΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΕΝ
ΕΙΩΙΚΕ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΆΡΤΙ ΛΟΓΟΝ;

ΝΑΙ.

ΤΙ ΔΕ; ΜΥΗΜΗΝ ΟΥ ΛΕΓΕΙΣ ΜΕΝΤΟΙ ΤΙ;

ΝΑΙ.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΟΥΔΕΝΟΣ Ή ΤΙΝΟΣ;

ΤΙΝΟΣ ΔΗ ΠΟΥ.

ΟΥΚΟΥΝ ΔΗ ΕΜΑΘΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΗ ΉΣΘΕΤΟ, ΤΟΙΟΤΩΝ 20
ΤΙΝΩΝ;

ΤΙ ΜΥΗΝ;

Ο ΔΗ ΕΙΩΙΚΕ ΤΙΣ, ΜΕΜΝΗΤΑΙ ΠΟΥ ΕΝΙΣΤΕ;

ΜΕΜΝΗΤΑΙ.

'Η ΚΑΙ ΜΥΣΑΣ; Ή ΤΟΥΤΟ ΔΡΑΣΑΣ ΕΠΕΛΑΒΕΤΟ; 25
ΑΛΛΑ ΔΕΙΒΟΝ, ΩΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΕΣ, ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΕ ΦΑΝΑΙ.

ΔΕΙΓ ΞΥΝΤΟΥ, ΕΙ ΣΩΜΑΣΜΕΝ ΤΟΝ ΠΡΟΣΘΕ ΛΟΓΟΝ
ΕΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ, ΟΙΧΕΤΑΙ.

8. ΤΕΡΑΣ ΓΑΡ ΑΝ ΕΙΗ Θ ΛΕΓΕΙΣ]

That is a monstrous supposition.

16. ΤΙ ΔΕ;] So Bodl. p.m. Vat. Ven. II. It seems more appropriate in argument than τι δαι, the common reading.
THEAI. Ἐγώ, ὑ τὸν Δία, ἱπποτεύω, οὐ μὴν p. 164. ἰκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἰστε πῆ.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε: ὦ μὲν ὄρων ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου γέγονεν οὔπερ ὄρων· ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπίστημα ταύτων ὁμολόγηται.

THEAI. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ γε ὄρων καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ εἴρα, ἐὰν μύση, μέμνηται μὲν, οὐκ ὄρᾳ Δ' ἄυτῳ· ἢ γάρ;

THEAI. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε οὖχ ὄρᾳ οὖκ ἐπίσταται ἐστιν, εἰσπερὶ δ' καὶ τὸ ὄρᾳ ἐπίσταται.

THEAI. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμου ἐγένετο, ἐγεῖ μεμνημένον αὐτοῦ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ὄρᾳ. ὁ τέρας ἔφαμεν ἄν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.

THEAI. Ἀληθεστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἄδυνατῶν δὴ τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται, εάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταύτων φῇ εἶναι.

THEAI. Ἐουκεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ἄρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

THEAI. Κυδωνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τι οὖν δήτ' ἄν εἰη ἐπιστήμην, πάλιν ἕξ αρχῆς, ὡς ἐουκε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὁ Θεαῖος τούτε, δρᾶν;

THEAI. Τίνος πέρι;

ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα μοι ἀλεξτρούνον ἀγεννοῦς δύσης,

1. οὐ μὴν ἰκανῶς γε συννοῶ] 'But I do not quite comprehend why it is so.'

4. οὔπερ ὄρων] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. π. ὄρων sc. εἶτιν or γέγονεν. Compare the technical use of αἰσθανόμενος, noticed above, pp. 159, 160. Also p. 157: ἐγένετο οὔτε δὴν ἄλλ' ὄραλατθ' ὄρων. See also p. 160. ἐπιστήμων—οὔπερ αἰ-

10. τὸ δὲ γε οὖχ ὄρᾳ] Soph. 264: Φαινεῖται δ' ὃ λέγομεν.

22. πάλιν] μὴ πάλιν Bodl. Vat. Ven. π. The Bodleian margin however says, ἐν ἑτέρῳ λέιται τὸ μὴ. If μὴ were right, the subjunctive γί would be required to complete the sense.
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 77

p. 164. πρὶν νευκηκέναι, ἀποτελθήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἔδειν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς δέ ἦν;

ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικὸς ἑικαμέν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὁνομάτων ὅμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιοῦτῳ τῶν περιγενέμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶμεν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες εἰ ἀγωνίσται ἄλλα φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταῦτα ἐκεῖνοι τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδρᾶς ποιοῦντες.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὔτω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλώσαι περὶ αὐτῶν τὸ γε. δῆ νομ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δῆ εἰ μαθῶν καὶ μεμημένον τὸ τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸ ἰδιὸν καὶ μῦσαντα μεμημένον, ὡρῶντα δὲ οὐ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἁμα μεμημένον· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὔτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος;

1. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the theory of Protagoras, which we are trampling upon. v. infr. προπηλακίζων.

3. 'Ἀντιλογικὸς ἑικαμέν]' Rep. 453, 4: "Ἡ γενναία, ἣν τον ἐγώ, ἡ Γλαύκων, ἐπόριμος τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τι δῆ; 'Ὅτι, εἰπὼν, δοκοῦσι μοι εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἄκουστος πολλὰ ἑμπίστευν καὶ οὐκ ἐρίζεται ἄλλα διαλέγοντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ δυναμαὶ δι' εἴδους διαρροώμενο τὸ λεγόμενον ἑπικοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὅμοιο διώκοντο τὸ λεγέντος τὴν ἐναντίον, ἔρμη, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὁνομάτων ὅμολογίας] 'With a view to mere verbal consistency.' Lys. 216: Καὶ ἦμι εὐθὺς ἄγεμον ἐπιστήμην ὁδοῦ οἱ πάντοσοι ἄνθρωποι, οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ, καὶ ἠρροῦντο εἰ οὐκ ἐναντίότατον ἔχειν φιλοσοφίας; The tendencies of Ἀντιλογική are, 1st, to argue from contradictions of language, leading in the last resort to scepticism. Phæd. 90: Καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οὶ περὶ τούτου ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγους διατρίβονται ὁμοθέτως δι' ἕκαστον τὸν λόγον ἔδειν. Perhaps the contradiction is only verbal.


καὶ ὁ σῶς ἀμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὡς τ. p. 164. ταύτων ἔστων.

6. ὙΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

5. ΣΩ. Οὗ τι ἄν, οἴμαι, ὃ φίλε, εἶπερ γε ὁ πατήρ 5 του ἑτέρου μύθου ἔγη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἄν ἦμινε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς προσπλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὗ ὁ ἐπίτροπός ὁς Πρωταγόρας κατέληπε, βοηθεῖς ἐθέλουσιν, δὲν Θεόδωρος εἰς ὁδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτῶι κυνικοῦσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖς.

10. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἔγω, ἢ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἴππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπός ἡμεῖς p. 165. δὲ πῶς θάττου ἐκ τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι ἐξομεν, ἕναν αὐτῷ βοηθῆς.


8. κυνικοῦσομεν] Not, 'I will undertake the risk,' but = κυνικά βοηθήσεως, 'It seems I shall have to take his part myself.' Cf. Cratyl. 399: Καὶ κυνικοῦσος ἐκ μὴ εἰλικρίνεις, ἢ τίμημοι σοφότερος τοῦ δέους γενεθῆκα.

12. ἐκ τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων] 'From the mere abstractions of dialectic.' We are accustomed to speak of Geometry as a purely abstract science, but see Arist. Met. I. 2: Αἴ γὰρ ἐξ ὑπάρχουν ἀκριβείας τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λογιμοῖς, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας. The expression ψυλὸς λόγως is used differently in Symp. 215: Ψυλὸς λόγως ἄνω ἄργων, but cf. Phaed. 262: Νῦ ἡ ψυλὸς πός λόγων οὐκ ἔγοντες λειαν παραδείγματα. Antisthenes is said to have called the Ideas of Plato ψυλὴν ἐνναοι. For λόγος = διαλεκτική, cf. Phed. 99: "Εδοξο δὴ μοι χρήσαι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταδρομῆς ét ekeivos sko- πων τὴν διήθεσαν. See also Arist. de An. I. I, where a distinction is drawn between ψυλόσφος, μαθηματικός and φυσικός.

13. μέντοι] σοι is added in the MSS. except Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.
ΤΗΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἀρτι δεινότερα ἂν τις ὀμολογήσῃς μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἂν τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ἄστη, ἡ Θεαίτητος;

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος· σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἤττον ἀσχημονῆσει.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δὲ οἶμαι τούτῳ τε ἁπα τοῦν τε ἡτοι τυπού τοῦτο τε οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὁ Θεαίτητης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον ποιν, οἶμαι ἐγώγα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὦραν γε ἐπιστάσασθαι θήσεις. τι γὰρ χρῆσιν ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενον, ὅταν ἐρωτᾶ ἀνέκπληκτος ἄνηρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τῶν ἔτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ ὁ ὀρᾶς τὸ ἰμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ;

13. ξομον] Theod. speaks on behalf of the ἐπίτροπον Πρωταγόρου. 3. μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἂν τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα] By freeing ourselves from the habitual oppositions of words, we are sometimes reconciled to what at first appears a pure contradiction. Spinoza (Cog. Met. 1.) shows a still loftier indifference to common language: 'At vero si rem accuratiissim eximinar vellemus, possemus forte ostendere Deum non nisi improprie unum et unicum vocari; sed res non est tanti imo nullius momenti iis qui de rebus non verò de nominibus sunt solliciti.' Many of the difficulties in Greek philosophy arose, as Plato himself points out in the Sophist, from the too great stress laid upon logical alternatives; while the complexity and variety of things as they exist was lost sight of.


14. ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενον] 'Caught in a pit,' i.e. unable to stir hand or foot. 16. καταλαβὼν — τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν — εἰ ὁ ὀρᾶς τὸ ἰμάτιον] Perhaps there is here a trace of the spirit which was afterwards de-
reference to memory, within the sphere of sense itself. A relentless adversary will pin you down, covering one eye with his mantle, to confess that you see and do not see, and therefore know and do not know. And thus you will be proved to know both vividly and dimly, near but not far off, softly and violently.

veloped in the sophisms of Euclidines.

5. ὅδε—τούτῳ, κ. τ. λ. Ἡ πλήρως ἐκκεναί οὐ δύνατα ταύτα γενεσθαὶ ἀ συ ἐπιστάσθαι (sc. ἐξευρεῖν). For the sense cf. supr. p. 159: Μὴ ἵπτολαβῳν τῇ μὲν ταύτῃ ἐνα, κ. τ. λ. Cf. Enthyd. 295: Ποτὲ τοῦτο ἐπιστάσαι τῷ ἐπιστάσαι, ἢ ὥστε: ἓποικεῖσθαι, ἢ πέγανεν, ἢ γύνα ψυχῆς. ὅπερ αὐτῷ, ἢ προσπευκρίνεται τοῖσ ἐρωτεμένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἐγγὺς ἑρωτεύεσθαι, ἢ ἐπιστάσαι τῷ, κ. τ. λ. For the intentional abruptness of the expression, cf. Phil. 28: Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν. 'None of that! I never asked you for it.'

τοῦτο—τῷ ὅπως] This, viz. the manner.

13. ἧμαμαν] Such addresses interposed give a tone of increased earnestness to the con-

15. ὅλως—ἀμβλυὰ] These terms are properly applicable to vision. ἐγγύσθεν μὲν — πόρρωθεν δὲ μὴ] This probably refers to the sense of smell, v. τὸ ὀφθαλμίναθα ἐπιστάσθαι.

16. σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτό] To have an intense and slight knowledge of the same thing: e. g. Τὸ ψυχρὸν, p. 152, ῥήγου—ὁ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; but the reference here is probably to sound, v. τὸ ἀκοῦεν below. (Cf. Phil. p. 14: Βαρών καὶ κούφων τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἅλα μυρία.) Aristotle does not feel the difficulty. Met. Z. 1029 B: Τὸ δ’ ἐκάστου γνώμη τὰ ἐκάστων πολλὰς ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώμη. Plato would not allow that anything is known, except what, in Aristotle's language, are ἀπρία γνώμαι.

17. ἃ] An accusative depend-
p. 165. φόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἥμικ ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν
taivn év, ἐμβαλῶν ἀν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνε-
σθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἦλεγχεν ἀν ἐπέχων
καὶ οὐκ ἀνεῖς, πρὸς θανάμασας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν
ξυνεπόδηθεν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὁδ ὅτι σε χειροσαμείνος τε ἐκ
καὶ ἐνυδήσας ἤδη ἀν τότε ἐλύτρον χρημάτων ὅσων
σοί τε κάκεινφ ἐδικεί. Τίν  οὖν ὅτι ὁ Προταγόρας,
φαίη ἂν ἰσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἔρει;
ἀλλα τι πειρόμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἦμεισ ἐπαμύνυσε
αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἴμαι, χωρίσθετα, κατα-
φροῦν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Ὀδης δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὅ

ing chiefly on ἐρόμενος, but
vaguely also on all that follows.
1. μισοθεφόρος ἐν λόγοις] A lo-
gical mercenary.
2. ἐμβαλόν] 'Making his as-
sault.'
411 : ὅταν δ᾽ ἐπέχων μη ἀνεῖ ἄλλα
καλῇ. 'Keeping up the attack.'
4. πολυάρατον] Buttman con-
jectures πολυκρατον, 'cunning,' which
occurs as a v. l. for πολυ-
τροπον in the first line of the O-
dyssee. Heind. πολυάρατον, but
adds, ne hoc quidem satis-
facit. In Ven. II both a's are
erased. Poluvāρtus occurs
twice in the Odyssey, VI. 280;
XIX. 404: 'Ὅπως ὅτι καὶ θείη
παῖδε παῖδι φιλει' πολυάρατος δὲ
to ústw. Protagoras seems to
have affected certain rhetorical
expressions, and perhaps may
have used this word. See Phaedr.
268: ὀρθότερα, &c. Stallbaum
quotes Themist. Orat. XXII.
p. 325. 19. ed. Dindorf. : Τὸν πο-
lυάρατον πλυτῶν τι ἂν καὶ λέγομεν

How would Protagoras defend his
own against the attacks of
such a light-armed mercenary?

For the sense cf. Euthyd. 272 :
Τῆς σοφίας ἐν έγωγη ἐπιθωμίω, τῆς
ἐρματικῆς. Ib. 273 : εἴ δὲ νῦν
ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐφε-
τον, ἔλεψ εὔπον. ἀτεχνώς γὰρ ἐγώγη
σφώ δόσπερ θεῷ προσαγορεύσοι. Ib.
296 : 'Ἀλλὰ βουλήθηι, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ,
δὲ πολυάρατε Ἑὐθύδημε. Ib. 301 :
'Ἡδὲ δὲ τοῖς ἀνδρῶι τὴν σοφίαν
ἐπεχείρου μμείσΤαι, ἢτο ἐπειπούμων
αὐτῆς.

328 : Καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως
τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιαύτων πεποιήμαται. ἔπει-
δαν γὰρ τις παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν
βουλήτης, ἀποδίδωκεν ὡς ἐγὼ πράτ-
τομαι ἀργύρων ἐὰν δὲ μη, μᾶλλον
εἰς ἱερᾶν, ὀμός, ὅσου ἂν φη δέξα
ἐναι τα μάθημα, τοσούτων κατέ-
θεκα.

12. καὶ ὁμόσε ὅ. ἔ.] 'He will
grapple with us.' There is a
change of construction similar
to that in p. 149 : Καὶ τίκτειν τι
dὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ—ἀμβλι-
σκονα.
χριστός, επειδή αὐτῷ παίδιον τί ἐρωτήθην ἐδειχεν, εἰ π. 167. οἶνον τῷ τῶν αὐτῶν τό αὐτῷ μεμνησθαι ἁμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαι ἀπέφησε διὰ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι προοραν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. 5 τὸ δὲ, ὁ μιθυμότατε Σάκρατες, τῷ ἐχει. ὅταν τι τῶν ἔμων δὲ ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς ὀλίπερ ἀν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκριμένου σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχωμαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοι, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς. 6 αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖ τινὰ σοι ἕνσχορήσεσθαι μνήμην 10 παρεῖναι τῷ ὄν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτον τι οὐσαι πάθος, οἶνον ὅτε ἔπαχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δει. 7 ἢ αὐτό ἀποκνήσεων ὁμολογεῖν οἶνον τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰ- δέναι τόν αὐτόν τό αὐτό; 8 ἢ ἐάνπερ τοῦτο δειση, δῶ- σεως ποτὲ τόν αὐτόν εἶναι τόν ἀνομοιοῦμενον τῷ πρίν 15 ἀνομοιοῦσθαι οὔτ; μᾶλλον δὲ τόν εἶναι τίνα, ἀλλ' 4. τῶν ἐμὲ] Cf. Soph. 239: 5 ὁ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐμὲ γε ἤτα τίς ἄν λέγω; Phaedr. 258: τῶν αὐτῶν. Phil. 14: Τοῦ ἐμὲ (see below). Ph. 20: τῶν ἐμὲ. Ph. 59: τοῖς μὲν δὴ σε καὶ ἐμέ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φάληβον. 5. ὁ μιθυμότατε Σάκρατες] 'Slovenly Socrates!' 9. αὐτίκα] 'To begin with.' τῳ δια σοι ἔγχο.] i. e. ἐμ. 11. 'Do you think a man would admit?' μνήμην] 'That the memory a man has of an impression when it is past, is anything like what he experienced at the time.' 10. τοιοῦτον τί οὖσαν πάθος] Hume, Inquiry Conc. Human Understanding: 'Every one will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.'— —'We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind.' ———'When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed.' 15. τῶν εἶναι τίνα τίνα is subj. τῶν pred. Cf. Phil. 14: ἑτ' ὁν λέγει, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φη Πρό- ταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύει πολλοῖς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἄντισεν ἀλλότιοι μέγας καὶ σιμπρόν τιθέμε- νος, καὶ βαρύν καὶ κόλαφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλα μυρλ. Compare a strange fancy of Comte's: Catechisme Posit. p. 2: 'For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneusly from other men.'
p. 166. οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, εάντερ 
ο ἀνυμοίωσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὁνομάτων γε δεῦσθε θη
ρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἄλληλοιν; ἄλλ', ὃ μακάριε, 
φήσει, γενναστέρως εἰπ’ αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνα
σαι, εἰς ἐλεγέχον ὃς οὐχὶ ἵδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν 
γίγνονται, ἢ ὃς ἵδιον γιγνομένον οὐδὲν τι ἄν μᾶλλον 
τὸ φανόμενον μόνῳ ἐκεῖνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ 
ἀνομάζειν, εἰπ. ὃπερ φαίνεται. ὃς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκε
φάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑπενίς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς 
ἀκούοντας τούτο δρῶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματα μοῦ ἀνα
d πείθεις, οὐ καλὸς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν 
ἀλλήλων ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν 
ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ μυρίων μέντοι δια
φέρειν ἐτέρον ἑτέρῳ τούτῳ, οὔτε τῷ μὲν ἄλλα 
ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφῶν καὶ ἰ 
σοφῶν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δὲν τὸ μή φάναι εἶναι, ἄλλ'
αὐτῶν τοῦτο καὶ λέγω σοφῶν, ὅσ ἂν τινα ἡμῶν ὃ 
φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὶ κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ 
φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ ἐναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐ μὴ τῷ ῥῆ-
οματί μοι δίωκε, ἄλλ' ὅδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τὶ ἐπ 
λέγω. οἶον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμη
σθητί, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἂσθενοῦτι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἂ ἐσθίει,

1. καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπεί

2. ἀνομάτων—θηρεύσεις] 'Entan
tanglements of words.' The
genitive is not objective but de
scriptive. Cf. Euthyd. 295: Βου
λάμενος με θηρεύσαι τὰ ὁνόματα πε
ριστήσας. 'If we must really be on
our guard against being entan
gled by each other with words.'

20. μοὺ] To be taken with λόγον.

22. φαίνεται—καὶ ἐστὶ— 

What is to 
the healthy man, also appears to
him. Protagoras asserts that 
what appears to the sick man 
also is to him.
καὶ ἐστὶ, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τάναντι ἕστι καὶ φαίνεται· p. 167. σοφότερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεὶ ποιῆσαι: οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν. οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμων ἀμαθής, ὦτι τοιαύτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιάνων σοφός, ὃ τι ἀλλων μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ βάτερα. ἀμείων γὰρ ἤ ἐτέρα ἔξις. οὗτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ πανδεία ἀπὸ ἐτέρας ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείων μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοι μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστής λόγοις. ἐτεὶ οὖ τι γε ψυχή δοξάζοντα τίς τινα ὡστερον ἀλήθη ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὁντα διατων δοξάσαται, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ᾽ α ἀν πάσχῃ ταῦτα δε ἄει ἀλήθη. ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ποιηρὰς ψυχής ἔξει δοξάζοντας b
p. 167. συγγενής έαυτῆς χρηστή ἐπόίησε δοξάσαι ἔτερα του- αύτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀλήθη καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίως μὲν τὰ ἔτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδὲν. καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς, ὃ φίλε Σώ- κρατες, πολλοὺ δὲω βατράχοις λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν 5 σώματα ἵατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοῦσι. φημὶ

also for the use of the reflexive pronoun, where it cannot be strictly referred to the subject of the sentence, Rep. p. 419:

'Εδώ τις σε φη μὲν πάνω εὐδαιμονοι
toιεν τούτους τοὺς ἄδρας, καὶ ταύτα δὴ έαυτῷ. Supr. p. 152: πάντω

rov—φη έαυτῷ τὸ πνεύμα ψυχρῶν
καὶ οὐ ψυχρῶν φήσομεν.

(12.) δοξάσωσι is preferable as
the reading of the best MS., as
the harder reading, and because
the change to δοξάσων was so
easy with the same word occ-
curring a few lines above. For
the change from the singular
τινα, to the indefinite plural,
cf. Rep. 344: 'Εστειδάν δὲ τις—
ἀυτος—δουλώσῃτα—ἀντὶ τούτων
τῶν άλλων ὁμοίων—μακάριοι
κέκληται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολι-
tῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ
ὅτι πόνωνται αὐτῶν τίνι διήρ
ἀδικίαν ἡλικίνιται: et passim.

For it is not to be supposed
that any one ever makes one,
who thinks falsely, afterwards
think truly. For it is impossi-
ble either to think what is not,
or to think anything beyond
the present impression, which
is always real. But, I suppose,
whereas men, through having
an inferior mind, entertain
thoughts of a kindred nature;
a good mind causes them to have
good thoughts, those, namely,
which the inexperienced call
true.'

If any change of reading were
required, the most probable
would be the transposition of
συγγενής έαυτῆς and ἔτερα τουαύτα.
1. χρηστή] Sc. ψυχή.

ἔτερα τουαύτα] Sc. χρηστά.

'Whereas inferior minds have
opinions kindred to themselves,
a superior mind creates in them
opinions which resemble it.'

2. φαντάσματα This word here
contains no association of false-
hood, seeing that φαίνεσθαι and
ἐιναι are identified; but neither
does it imply truth.

4. ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδὲν] I. e.

'all are equally real.'

6. κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοῦσι

The theory is exposed by being
gravely carried to the farthest
point. Man is reduced to a level
not only with brutes but with
vegetables. Cf. Ar. Met. 1008 B:

Εἶ δὲ μηθίν υπολοιμάζειν ἀλλ' ἵμμαι
ὁμοίας οἶων τε καὶ οὐκ οἶσται, τί δι
διαφέρωντος ξανα τῶν φυτῶν;

This however is only remotely hinted
at. At present we are to re-
ceive this as an additional proof
of Protagoras' boldness. For a
more serious use of the analogy
between human nature and the
vegetable world, see Rep. 492:

Σπέρματος πέρι όν εντε ἔγ-
νειον εντε τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ. Heind.

quotes Aristot. de Plant. I. i,
where after mentioning the
opinions of Anaxagoras and Em-
pedocles on the question, 'Do
plants feel?' he adds, 'Αμαντω
καὶ δ' Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν μόνον αὐτὰ

worse to a
better
state: and
would urge
that until
this is dis-
proved, So-
crates must
be content
to be a
'measure
of things.'
γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοὺς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, p. 167. ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆ, χρηστὰς καὶ ύγιεως αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἰναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οὖν γὰρ ἐκάστη πόλη δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς, ἐως ἀν αὐτὰ νομιζῆ ἀλλὰ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοὺς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἰναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευόμενους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγογεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ ἀξίος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοὺς παιδεύ-θείσι, καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τε εἰσιν έτέρων ετέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καὶ σοὶ, εάν τε βούλη ἕαν τε μή,


2. χρηστὰς καὶ ύγιεως αἰσθή-σεις τε ἐν Impart to them good and healthy sensations, and real ones too;’ i.e. not only real (which they all are), but also good and healthy. The difference of idiom by which in Greek what is most emphatic is put first, though well-known, is often a source of difficulty. E.g. Soph. OEd. Col. 308: ‘Ἀλλὰ εὔνοιαν ἐκ νόμου τῇ θεῷ αὐτῶν πόλει ἔχει τε τις γὰρ ἔσθεν ὧν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ φῶς; ‘May he come, a blessing to his own city, as well as to me. For who by kindness does not befriend himself?’ where the second clause refers to τῇ αὐ- τῶν πόλει as the emphatic words.

Cf. supr. p. 150: Ἀδοῦς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἱδονε ἀμαθεία εἰναι.

Schleiermacher’s conjecture, αἰθέθεια, has been generally received, but αἰθέθεια is very possibly right. For the difficult position of τε, comp. Rep. 466: Καὶ γέρα διώκονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεις ζωντες τε καὶ τεινωσμένες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχοσιν. Πθ. 472: Εἰκότων δρὰ ἀκόμου τε καὶ εἴδεοδει οὕτω παράδοξοι λέγων λόγων τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διακοποῖν. The objection drawn from supr. ἄδεις τινες—ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ κα- λοῦσιν, is cancelled by the pre- ceding ταῦτα δὲ ἄδει αληθῆ. The state of plants has as much reality as that of the wise man: and the latter has no advantage in point of truth.

4. ταῖς πόλεσιν] A further step is thus made in advance. Having already included the good and noble amongst the things of which each man is judge for himself, it is natural to apply the same theory to the state, and to law and justice.
p. 167. ἀνεκτέον ὅτι μέτρον ὑπερτέλον γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ λόγος οὕτως· ὥς εἰ μὲν έξεις ἐξ άρχης ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβητεῖ, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθόν, εἰ δὲ δὴ ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δὴ ἐρωτήσεων. οὖδὲ γὰρ τούτο φευκτέον ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέο τῷ νοών ἔχοντι. ποιεὶς ἐμέντοι οὐτωσοί· μὴ ἀδικεῖ εἰ τῷ ἐρωτή. καὶ γὰρ παλλη ἀλογία ἀρτῆς φάσκουτα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρίς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' οὗν ἄν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενο τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ύψ' εἰστού καὶ

p. 168. τῶν προτέρων συνουσίων παρεκκέρουστο. ἄν μὲν γὰρ 15 οὕτω ποιήσας, έιαύτους αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατριβοῦντες σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μοιὴσουσιν, καὶ φεύγονται αὐτ' εἀυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφῶν, ἵν' ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ προτέρων ἑναι· 20 ἐὰν δὲ τάναντια τούτων δρᾶς ὅσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τάναν—

3. λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθόν κ. τ. λ.] Protagoras himself is represented as master of both styles (Prot. 329: ἵκανος μὲν μακρὸν λόγου—ἐπικεῖν—καὶ ἕκαστος οἶκος ἁπάκε γράφθηκεν κατὰ βραχυῖ), and in the Phaedrus Socrates himself adopts both, of course to the implied disadvantage of the rhetorical, which is more openly ridiculed in the Gorgias. Cf. also Soph. 217: Πάρηκον ἐξ αὐτὸς μακρὸν λόγῳ διεξελθόν—δ' ἔρωτησεν;


13. ἔκανα — τὰ σφάλματα] Those slips and deflections which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept. παρακροίνεσθαι is said to have been a wrestler's term.
πίνοντας ἀντὶ φιλο- p. 168. σοφῶν μισοῦντας τούτο τὸ πράγμα ἀποφαινεῖς, ἔπει- 
δὲ δὲν προσβύτεροι γένονται. εὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ 
πρότερον ἐρρῆθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ' 
ἐλεύθηκα τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθισθεὶς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε 
λέγομεν, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀποφανύμενοι τὰ πάντα τὸ τε 
δοκῶν έκάστῳ τούτο καὶ εἶναι ἰδιότητα καὶ πόλει. 
καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει ἐπτεῖ ταύτων ἐπὶ καὶ ἄλλο 
ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἰσθησίας, ἀλλ’ οὐχ, ὡσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ 
συνηθείας ῥήματων τε καὶ ὅνομάτων, ἀ οὐ πολλῷ ὡς 
ἀν τύχουσι έλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὸς 
παρέχομεν. Ταῦτα, ὃ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου εἰς 
βοήθειαν ἡ προσηρξάμην καὶ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, συμκρά 
ἀπὸ συμκρῶν ’ἐστιν αὐτός ἐμή, μεγαλειότερον ἀν τοῖς 
2. μισοῦντας τούτο τὸ πράγμα] 
ἐλθὼν δὲ λέγω. The unusual 
form ἐρρῆθη was perhaps adopted 
in imitation of Protagoras. 
3. δὲ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρῆθη] 
τῷ τῆς φιλοσοφίας. i. e. μυσ-
λόγος γεγονότα. See the re-
markable passage in the Phaedo 
on this subject, p. 89,90; wher-
a parallel is drawn between 
the growth of misanthropy and 
scepticism. 
4. προσηρξάμην] 
Notwithstanding 
Burmann’s ingenious de-
fence of this word, Lexil. I. p. 
103, it is difficult not to incline 
to the conjecture of Corsius, 
prosirkepsa με. Cf. Soph. Ο. 
Col. 72: ‘καὶ ἀν προσαρκῶν 
συμμέτρει κερδοὔσα μέγα. 
See however p. 
171: Ἡπεγέρθημεν βοήθουσες. 
5. ἐπὶ τῷ συγκαθέσθαι ] 
St. συγκαθισθείσα. ‘Meeting us 
without reserve, in a candid and 
good-humoured spirit.’ 
6. μητρον] 
Soph. 259: Τότε μὲν ἐπὶ ματαρ 
τότε δὲ ἐπὶ ματαρ τοὺς λόγους 
ξίκον. Phil. 57: Τοὺς δεινοὺς περὶ 
λόγων ὅλην.
ΣΩ. Εδ' λέγεις, ὃ ἐταίρε. καὶ μοι εἶπέ· ἐνενόησάς τοι λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ὅμως ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τούς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδός φόβῳ ἀγωνιζόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνώνω δὲ τὸ πάντων 5 μέτρων, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;

ΤΕΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΤΕΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας ὁδον ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἄνδρι, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεὶ εἴρωτωντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλους σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτο γ' ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὅσ παῖξτες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὖ 15 τούτου τὸν λόγον.

ΤΕΩ. Τί δ' οὖν πολλῶν τοι Θεάττητος μεγάλους πώγονας ἔχοντων ἁμείνον ἃν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνωμένο;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τι σοῦ γε, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ἁμείνον. μὴ 20 οὖν οὖν εἴμε μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν τί.παντι τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἢθι, ὃ ἀριστε, ὅλγον ἐπιστόμον, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἃν εἰδὼμεν, εἰτε ἁρα σὲ δεὶ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρων

4. χαριεντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνώνω δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρων] 'Abusing us for a certain quibbling vein, and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.'

15. αὐτοῦ τοῖς λόγοις] Coisl. p. m. Αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων. The Bodl. p. m. had αὐτοῦ τῶν τῶν λόγων. Cf. p.167: Τόν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῆ

µεµατι µου διάκε. τούτον τῶν λόγων, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protagoras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them.

22. σὲ δὲ μηδενί] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative.

24. διαγραμμάτων—ἀντροπομίαν] Note the variety.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἐναυ, ἔτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοῦ ἰκανοὶ ἔαυτος ἑσ τε ὑ. 169. ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τάλλα ὄν δὴ σὺ πέρι αὐτίαν ἐχεις διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὁ Σάκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον 5 μὴ διδόναι λόγου, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάζειν καθάπερ Δακεδαμώνιοι, σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκύφονα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Δακεδαμώνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπειναὶ ἡ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύονσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταίον 10 τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ ὅραμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκασθείσῃ ἀποδύσεσθαι τὸν τόις λόγοις προσπαλαίται.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀριστά γε, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπει- κασάς. ἴσχυρικάτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι 15 γὰρ ἔδει μοι ἃ Ἑρακλείες τε καὶ Θησείες ἑννυχά- νοντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μᾶλ' ἐδ ξυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ὑδέων τι μᾶλλον ἀφιστάμαι· οὔτω τις ἐρως

2. altian ἐχείς] 'You are reputed.' Rep. 435: 01 δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν αἰείαν (τοῦ θυμοειδείς εἷσι). 8. τεῖνει] Cf. Phed. 65: Ἐγ- γός τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθύκαιν, 'You come nearer to the analogy of Sciron.' 9. κατ' Ἀνταίον] The allusion to the Lacedemonian custom is repeated, but, as usual, with fresh imagery, and additional point. The Lacedemonians tell one to strip or go away. But you, like Sciron, strip all you meet with, and, like Antaeus, force them to wrestle with you. 10. τὸ ὅραμα δρᾶν] 'To go about your work.' Supr. 150: Ἐλασ- τον δὲ τοῦ ἕμου ὅραμασιν. 11. ἀποδύσας] 'Having stript him of every excuse.' 14. ἴσχυρικάτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεί-

νων] 'But I have more of the athlete in me than they had.' 15. Ἑρακλείες τε καὶ Θησείες] Schol. Οἱ Ἑρακλῆμαχοι, Καλλικλείς, Διανυσόδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι καὶ οἱ τουοόιτοι. Winkelmann (Fr. Antisthenis) suspects an allusion to Antisthenes here. But the Scholiast is probably nearer the mark. See Introduction; and cf. Euthyd. 297. 16. καρτ. πρ. τ. λ.] 'Men of va- lour in the art of controversy.' μᾶλι' εὖ ἐξουκ.] 'Have bruised me well.' 17. οὔτα τις ἐρως δεινὸς ἐνδέ- δυκε] Sc. μὲ implied in ἐγὼ supr. It is left doubtful whether ὅσῳ is to be joined with δεινὸς or ἐνδέδυκε. 'So strong a passion for this kind of exercise has taken possession of me.'
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p.169. δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν ὦ μὴ ἐπὶ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτὸν τε ἁμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὁνήσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὕδεν ἔτι ἄντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἀγε ὅπῃ ἐθέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην, ἢν ἂν σὺ ἑπικλῶ· σῆς, δεῖ ἀνατλήναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὅν προτίθεσαι οἶος τ' ἐσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτὸν σοι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνυμο, μὴ πον παιδικὸν τὴ λάθωμεν ἐδοὺ τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν ἡμῶν αὐτὸ ὄντως τῆς ὑπουργίας.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ' ὃσον ἄν δύνωμαι.

ΣΩ. Τοῦθεν τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἄντιλαβόμεθα ἐντετεί χρόνος καὶ ἱδωμεν, ὀρθῶς ἡ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔδωκαὶ ἐνεπιτιμῶμεν ἐπίκυκλον τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἔκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔχον χάρης οὗ Προταγόρας, περὶ τοῦ ἁμείνου καὶ χείρους διαφέρειν τινάς, οὖς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφοὺς. οὐχὶ;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

2. προσανατριψάμενοι] 'Giving me a grip,' 'trying one fall with me.'

7. δὲ προτίθεσαι] Viz. διαγραμμάτων πέρι, supr.

11. τοὺς] Somebody; i.e. Protagoras.

15. ἄντιλαβόμεθα] 'Let us attack the question from the same point as before.' Cf. Rep. 544: Πᾶν — ἄνωτερ πολιοῦτε τὴν αὐτὴν λαθὴν πάρεις.


έχωρησα ἅλθη σε λέγειν. In conceding for Protagoras that some men are wise, we went beyond his own words. We must try to prove it out of his own mouth. He says, What appears to each man, is to him. Now it certainly appears to every man that some are wiser than himself, and some less wise; that some think truly, others falsely. Therefore, whether he be right or wrong, it is the case that some think truly, and some falsely.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖς αὐτὸς παρὸν ὁμολογεῖ, ἄλλα π. 169.

.scheme ημέις βοηθούντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἔμεινα τὴν ὁμολογίαν, ὥσ-

σὲ ἀν τὰ λόγια ἐδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι νῦν

δὲ τὰ χ' ἀν τις ἡμᾶς ἁκύρους τιθεῖ τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου

ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τοῦ-

του αὐτοῦ διωμολογήσασθαι ὥσ πάρ τοι σμοκροῦ παρ-

ἀλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἡ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. Δέγεις ἄληθή.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖς δὲ ἄλλως, ἄλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου

λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβομεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. p. 170.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ ἐναὶ

ῥητὲ ποιῇ δὲ δοκεῖ;

ΘΕΟ. Ρητὲ γάρ ὄνω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὃς Προταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου,

μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ

φαινεῖν οὐδένα ὅν τινα ὦ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν

ἄλλων σοφότερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλως ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν γε

τοῖς μεγάλοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατεύσει ἔνοψις

ὁ ἐν θαλάσσῃ χειμάζωνται, ὅσπερ πρὸς θεοῦ ἔχει

τοὺς ἐν εἰκάστοις ἀρχοντες, σωτῆρας σφῶν προσδο-

κώντας, οὐκ ἄλλο τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ

πάντα που μεστὰ ταῦθρόπτειν ξίτουτων διδασκάλους

τε καὶ ἀρχοντας ἐαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἅλλων ᾠφόν τῶν

5 τε ἐργασίων, οἰομένων τε αὖ ἰκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν,

ἰκανῶν δὲ ἄρχει εἰναι. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπαστὶ τῇ ἄλλο

5 καλλιόνως ἔχει] 'It would seem the less exceptional

course.'

6. οὐ γὰρ τι σμοκρῶν παραλλάτ-

τει] It is of no small importance

to the question at issue.

20. ὅσπερ πρὸς θεοῦ ἔχειν] Cf.

Rep. 489 : To δ' ἄληθες πέρικες,

ἐὰν τ' ἐπίταυσας εἰν τ' ἐπί τὴς κάριῃ,

ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἱερῶν θυρας

λέναι, καὶ πάντα τὸν ἀρχεσθαι δεδο-

μένον ἐπὶ τέ διδάσκειν ἄρχειν.

23. μεστὰ] So Bodl. with Ven.

xii. Par. F.
p. 170. φῆσομεν ἃ αύτοὺς τοὺς ἄνθρωπους ἢγείσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσθων;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἢγούνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδὴ δόξαν;

ο ΘΕΟ. Τῷ μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τι οὖν, ὁ Προταγόρας, χρησίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἂν τοὺς ἄνθρωπους δοξάζωμεν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; εἰς ἀμφότερον γάρ ποιῶν ἐξουμάινει μὴ ἂν ἀληθῆ ἢ ἀλλ' ἀμφότερα αὐτοῦς δοξάζωμεν. σκοπείς γάρ, ὁ Θεόδωρος, εἰ ἐθέλω αὖ τις τῶν ἀμφί Προταγόρας ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ἡς οὐδεὶς ἤγείται ἐτεροὶς ἐτεροὶς ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδὴ δοξάζωμεν.

ΘΕΟ. 'Αλλ' ἀπιστον, ὁ Σωκράτης.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτο ὡς ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἤκει, ὁ ἢ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶσ δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ἡρακλῆς τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀποφαίνη περὶ τινος δοξάζων, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκεῖνον λόγον ἀληθῆς ἢστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς περὶ τῆς στίς κρίσεως πότερον υύκ ἐστὶ κριταῖς γενέσθαι, ἢ αἰεὶ σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζων; ἢ μυρίοι ἑκάστοτε σοι μάχομαι ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἤγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνεις τα καὶ οἰσθαί;

ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σωκράτης, μάλα μυρίοι 25 ὁ δῆται, φησίν "Ομηρος, ὥς μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχοντο.”

15. εἰς τούτο—ἀνάγκης—ἡκεὶ ἐστὶν με καθαρτίαν. "Is driven to this.’
25. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκ.[ ’Yes, truly, Socrates, I have oppo-
   nents more than I can tell, as οι 'A world of annoyance,’ lit.

thought; and folly to be false opinion.

It follows that, if all men think truly, some men think falsely.

As a matter of fact men do become judges of each other's impressions.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ p. 170. μὲν ἄληθή δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῇ;
ΤΕΟ. "Εσείς ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἀρ' οὖχ ἄναγκη, εἰ 5 μὲν μηδὲ αὐτῶς φητοὶ μέτρου εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ πολλοὶ, ὅσπερ οὖδὲ οἴνοται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκείνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτῶς μὲν p. 171. φητο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίτεσθαι, οἴσθ' ὅτι πρὸ τὸν μὲν ὅσον πλείους ὦς μὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ὀσὶ δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτον 10 μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐστὶν.
ΤΕΟ. 'Ανάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἐσται καὶ οὐκ ἐσται.
ΣΩ. "Επειτὰ γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον ἐκείνος μὲν 15 περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰνσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζοντων οἰς- σων, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψευδεθαι, ἐγυγχωρεῖ τον ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογον τὰ ὄντα δοξαζεῖν ἄπαντας.
ΤΕΟ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὕκοιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδὴν ἐγυγχωροί, εἰ τὴν 20 τῶν ἡγομενῶν αὐτοῦ ψευδεθαὶ ὁμολογεὶ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;
ΤΕΟ. 'Ανάγκη.

4. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα;] Sc. ἀνάγκη εἶτιν; 5. μηδὲ—μηδὲ] 'If Protagoras himself also did not think so, nor yet the majority, as indeed they do not.' 8. συνοίτειαι] This is present, because it has been asserted just above. 13. 'Επειτα—κομψότατον] 'Now follows the most exquisite touch of all.' Cf. Rep. 558: Τί δὲ; ἢ πρασθήνει ἔνιον τῶν δικαιᾷτων οὐ κομψῇ; ἢ έχει 80. τὸ πράγμα 8. ὁ λόγος.
ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ ἔγγραφον δὲντος ψευδότατον;
ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταῦτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν.
ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμέ-
νον ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ υπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμο-
λογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάναντι λέγοντι ἔγγραφη ἀληθῆ
αὐτῶν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ οἱ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ἔγγρα-
φήσεται μὴτε κύνη μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρώπον
μέτρου εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐν μῇ μάθῃ.
οὗχ οὖτως;
ΘΕΟ. Οὗτως.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδῆ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων,
oüδὲν ἡν εἴη Η Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθῆς; οὐ τέ
τωι ἄλλοι οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.
ΘΕΟ. Ἀγαν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τόν ἐταῖρόν μου κατα-
θέμεν.

7. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα 'So then, what we get from all is this.' 
Cf. Soph. 245: Τούτω δὲ ἄλλως λέγονται ἀδ' θεατόν, ὡς ἕν πάντων εἰδάμεν ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ μῇ οὖσ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰσορῶτερον εἰσεῖν ὅ τι ποτὲ ἐστι. 
Ar. Met. 988 Δ: Τοσοῦτον γ' ἔχωμεν ἓ αὐτῶν, δὲ, κ.τ.λ. The preposition is probably suggested by ἓν immediately preceding. 'On all hands, then, including Protagoras, it is disputed, or rather on his part it is admitted.'

9. ὅταν—ἔγγραφησεν] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, and what follows, from μήτε onwards, depends immediately on ἔγγραφη-
σεται, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cf. Rep. p. 529: οὐ δόκομαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιεῖν ψυχήν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκείνο, ἀν περὶ τὸ δὲ τι καὶ τὸ ἀδιάτον, ἐάν τε τί ἀνώ κεχώρω τι κάτω συμμετο-
κῶς τῶν ἀληθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρήσας μαθήματε, ὅπερ μαθεῖν ποτε φημὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπερ άνω ἄλλα κάτω καίνοντες τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐξ ὑποτέλεος νώμ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν βαλαίτη μανθών.

18. Ἀγαν] 'We are urging my friend too vehemently,' running him very hard.'
καταδίκοις] De Legg. 806:
Could he put his head above the ground, no doubt he might convince us of much folly. But we have done our best. No one will deny that one man is wiser, and another less wise, than his neighbour. It is clear, too, that

ΣΩ. 'Αλλά τοι, ὁ φίλε, ἀδηλον εἰ καὶ paraθέομεν p. 171. τὸ ὄρθὸν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον προσβύτερον ὄντα σοφότερον ἦμων εἶναι καὶ εἰ αὐτικά ἐντεύθεν ἀνακύψει δέ μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένου, πολλὰ ἄν ἐμὲ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, 5 ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σε ὀμολογούντα, καταδὺς ἄν οὐχίωτο ἀποτρέχουν. ἀλλ' ἦμων ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἦμων αὐτοῖς, ὅποιοι τινὲς ἐσμέν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δὴν καὶ νῦν ἀλλο τί φῶμεν ὀμολογεῖν ἄν τούτο γε ὄντινον, τὸ εἶναι σοφότερον ἐτερον ἑτέρον, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθότερον;

ΘΕΟ. 'Εμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. 'Η καὶ ταίτη ἄν μάλιστα ἱστασθαι τὸν λόγον, τὶ δράςομεν, ἢ Κλεισία; τὸν ἔκειν ἐάρομεν τὴν ἡπάρτην ἦμων οὐκ εἰς καθαρμένα; 1. Ἀλλὰ—ἀδηλον  But it does not appear that we are out-running what is right,' i. e. I do not see that we are transgressing any rule of truth or fairness. Τὸ ὄρθὸν means simply (as in Rep. 540 : Τὸ ὄρθὸν περί πλείου εἰς ποιεῖσθαι) 'What is just and true.' There is no necessity therefore for making παράθεια with the accus. mean 'to swerve from.'

2. εἰπά ἄρα Εvous  Socrates admits that there is some ground for Theodorus' remonstrance. 'It is reasonable, I grant, to presume that as he is older so he is wiser than we are.' Ἄρα refers partly to what Theodorus has suggested, but chiefly gives emphasis to ἐκεῖνον and the words that follow, and perhaps marks the illative connexion between them (προσβύτερον ὄντα, σοφότερον ἄρα εἶναι) 'Indeed, when we come to think of it, Protagoras, being older, must be wiser than we are.'

5. καὶ σὲ ὀμολογούντα] Sc. ληρόδη.

6. ἀλλ' ἦμων] Socrates returns to the charge with the second ἀλλά.

7. τὰ δοκοῦντα] P. 154 : Ἐκν μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν, κ.τ.λ. Μεν. 83: Ἐμοὺς δοκεῖν οὖν. Σ. Καλός τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνον. 12. ταίτη ἄν μάλιστα ἱστασθαι;  'Will by preference take its stand (or will take its stand most resolutely) in this position, which we sketched out for it in our defence of Protagoras.' Οὗ μάλιστα may be taken closely with ταίτη, 'Thereabout, as near as we can guess.' Cf. Parm. 130 : ἰδικα ταίτη στά. 'The argument' is more or less personified, as so often in Plato, (cf. Rep. 484: Διὰ μακροῦ τῶν διεξελθόντων λόγου. Πb. 503 : Τοι- αυτὶ δὲ ἐν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξηγήσεις καὶ παρακάλωντες τοῦ λόγου,) and is the subject of ἔνθεσις, ἐθέλησα, ὀμολογήσθη, and τολμήσει, in what follows. ἱστασθαι depends immediately on φῶμεν. May there also be a slight play upon the word ?
p. 172. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰ-το ὁμολογήσει τοῖς ἐπιθετικοῖς, ἄρα καὶ ὁμολόγησίᾳ µή εἰσὶ διὰ τῆς ἡμῶν ἡ ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον διαφέρειν, εἴπερ ποὺ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

p. 173. 'This unstable theory will make a stand hereabouts if anywhere.'
See also Thuc. VI. 34: Πρὸ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ γράφομαι ἵταναι. 1. ἐκαί ἡ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράφαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρας [This 'new wave' of discussion rises upon the last, pp. 167, 168: Καὶ µὴν σῶματα λατροῖς λέγον, καὶ δὲ φιλὴ γεωργίαι—ταῖς πολείτια τὰ χρη-στά ἀντὶ τῶν ποιητῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. οὐτὶ οἷα γὰρ ἔκαστη πολείς δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ, ἵνα ἀν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. The argument is beginning to relax a little under the influence of the ἐγκοφαν καὶ καλὸν thrown carelessly in, p. 157. 6. καὶ θηρίων δὲ] 'Nay, even
justice are matters of convention merely, yet in deciding what is expedient, mistake is possible both to individuals and states. This is the attitude of some who have partially relinquished the Protagorean doctrine. They offer us a new and important handle for discussion.

2. ἐθέλουσιν ἱσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes from what the 'argument' would naturally say, to what certain persons, who are presently defined, actually do say. For a somewhat similar transition to an indefinite plural, cf. Gorg. 457: ἢμας, ἢ Γοργία, καὶ σε ὡμοίων εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ ἀλλοκρατεῖν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι σοὶ βαθὺς δύνανται περὶ τοῦ ἐν ἐπι-
χειρόφως διαλέγεσθαι διορισμένου πρὸς ἄλλους καὶ μακάντες καὶ διδάζοντες ἐναυτοὶ ὧν διαλύσθαι τάς συνωσίας—καὶ ἐνίκη τε τῆς τώντως (cf. καὶ δοσι γε in the pre-
sent passage) κ.τ.λ.


 Aristotle (Met. 1008 A), uses the expression, τοῖς τὸν Προταγό-
ρον λέγουσι λόγων. The digression which follows is not merely an ornament. As in the Sophista the philosopher and the sophist are the counterpart of being and not-being respectively, so here the man of the world and the philosopher represent the contrast between the life of sense and the life of knowledge. There are similar digressions in the Phaedrus and Protagoras.

9. ὁ θεοῦ σχολὴ ἄγομεν] Compare the opening of the digres-
sion in the Phaedrus, σχολὴ μὲν δὴ ὡς ἑοκε — and Cic. de Am. V: Et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosis.

12. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] 'In scientific pursuits.' Supr. p.144:

 Ἰερουσαλήμ ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσο-
 φίαν. Tim. 88: Μοναχὴ καὶ πά-
 ση φιλοσοφία. He takes com-
 mon ground with Theodorus. Cf. infr. p. 173: Τά τε γὰρ ὑπι-
 νερθέ καὶ τὰ ἐπίσημα γεωμετρώσα, οὐφαντου τε ὑπὲρ ἀποτροπομοίους. Compare with the whole pas-
sage the opening words of the Apology.
p. 172. ΣΩ. Κυνδυνεύονσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιῶτῳ διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκεία πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφαι.

ΤΕΟ. Πὴ δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μὲν, τούτῳ ὁ σὺ ἔπες, ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολῇ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιούνται, ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς νῦν τρίτων ἢδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεινι, ἢἐν αὐτῶς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέστη· καὶ τὸν κυνικῶν.] 'Who have been jostled about from their youth.' Compare Aristophanes περὶ τρίτων δικᾶς. (Nub. 447); cf. Dem. de Cor. 269.

κυλινδούμενοι] Τὸ ὕπνοια τοῦ κυλινδεῖται.

3. ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι] Soph. 253 (referring to this): Ἡ πρὸς Δώδεκάμενοι εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπεσεύντες ἐπιστάμενοι, καὶ κυνικῶν ζητοῦσε τὸ συνομφωννον πρὸς τεραπευτὴν ἀνυψηλάβων τὸν φιλόσοφον;


See also Aristot. Met. I. 2: Δήλου ὤν ὁ οὐδὲν, οἷαν αὐτὸς ζητο- μεν χρῆμαν ἐπίραν, ἀλλὰ ἠθρα- ποιαν διάπεμφος ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔσχε καὶ μὴ ἄλλον δεδομένα, οὕτω καὶ αὐτῇ μόνῃ ἐλευθέρᾳ οὐσα τῶν ἐπιστή- μων.

8. τρίτων ἢδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου] 'We are for the third time beginning a fresh argument.' The first fresh λόγος was the criticism of Protagoras and his defense; the second begins where Theodorus is induced to accept Socrates' challenge (see the words, p. 168, αἰς τούτων τῶν λό- γων); the third arises with the mention of the wholesome and expedient, and the partial supporters of Protagoras.

9. οὕτως καὶ τάχειν.] Sc. μεταλαμ- βάνοις, This part of the sen- tence (from δόσητε—) is in apposition with what precedes.


10. καθάπερ ἡμᾶς] Such slight redundancies are natural in con- versation.

ἀρέστη seems to govern the accusative with the meaning to satisfy. The whole sentence is in construction with "Η."
mind which is exercised in the courts of law. The one is the training of a freeman, the other of a slave—

1. ἀνάγκην] See Polit. 386.
4. ἀνάγκην] Hesych.: 'Ἀνάγκην ἢ δυστυχία εἰλικρίν. Pollux VIII. 17: "Ἐνοι τ' ὀλοντα καὶ ἀνάγκην σκέψος εἶναι δυστυχίων." The latter quotation expresses doubt. May not the notion mentioned by the grammarian have arisen from the present passage? The structure of the sentence (τοῖς—καί) forbids our identifying ἀνάγκη here with the clepsydra, which has been already alluded to. It is rather 'the strong arm of the law,' which the adversary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the indictment. 'But the other sort are always pressed for time: for the ebbing water hurryes on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to wield over him the resistless logic of coercion, holding a written outline of the points to which he must confine himself, which forms a running commentary to his oration.'

6. ἅπαντα δἐ καὶ πανικὸν ὑπογραφῆν [Polyb. 10. 18. 1] retains its verbal force nearly as if it were ὑπογραφαμένα, but is not the antecedent to ὄν. See p. 147, note on ὄν.

10. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος. ὡστ' ἐξ ἀπάν—π. 173.
p. 173. των τούτων ἔτονοι καὶ δρμεῖς γίνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωσείσαι καὶ ἐργῷ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὅρθοι τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὐξὴν καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἡ ἐκ νέων δουλεία αφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους καὶ φόβους ἐτὶ ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὐς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ὕσυδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖς τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγ-

XXII. 161 (of Achilles and Hector): 'Εστει οἱ τε θυσίων, οδή βοήησεν ἀφιώσθην, ὅ τε ποιοῦν ἀδύνατα γίνεσθαι ἄνδρων· ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχής δεῖν Ἐκτορὸς ἑπτάδομοι. In Herodotus the metaphor is already softened down, VII. 57: ἐπὶ διατρόπων τρέχων (said of Xerxes). Aristoph. Vesp. 375: Ποιήσω δα-

κεῖν τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον δραμεῖν. The expression τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, is suggested by τὴν ἀλλο. (τὴν ἀλλον Bodl. p.m.)

1. ἔτονοι καὶ δρμεῖς] 'Keen and shrewd.'

3. τὴν γὰρ αὐξὴν—ἀλέθερον] 'Of all mental growth, and all honest and liberal culture;' of self-respect and the spirit of upright independence.' Both meanings are expressed in the Greek.

9. πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλάν-

raí] 'Are continually thwart-

ed and cramped in their growth.' Rep. 495: 'Ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὡς τὰ τεχνὴν τε καὶ βασανισμὸν δοτὴρ τὰ σώματα λειλάβηται οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένως τε καὶ ἀποστερημι-

μένοι διὰ τὰς βασανίας τυγχάνου-

σων. 611: Τεθέαμεν μέντοι δια-

κεκλεμένοις αὐτό, δοτὴρ οἱ τὰς ἀθ-

λήττας Γλυκῶν ὄρεστες οὐκ ἓν τε 

ῥηθεὶς αὐτοῦ ὄνομα τὴν ἄρχαν 

φύσιν, ὡς τὸ τε παλαιὰ τὸ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκεκλασθάνα, 

ta de synteiribhav autò kai pántes le-

laibhthav upò ton kumátov.
κλώνται, ὦσθ' ὑγίες οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς π. 173.
ἀνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτάσθη, δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ
γεγονότες, ὡς οἴωνται. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὁ
Θεόδωρε ἄχι τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει
5 διελθόντες ἐν ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τρεπό-
μεθα, ἵνα μὴ καὶ, δὴ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λιαν πολὺ τῇ
ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρόμεθα·

ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμύς, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.
πάνυ γὰρ εὐ τούτῳ εἰρήκας, ὅτι ὦν ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ
10 τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπρέπει, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι
ὁ ἡμετέροι ὀσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστοι αὐτῶν περι-
μένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ ὁυτε γὰρ δικα-
στὴς ὁυτε θεατὴς, ὀσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμῆσον τε καὶ
ἀρξεῖν ἐπιστατεῖ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὃς έουκεν, ἐπεὶ σοι γε δοκεῖ, περὶ
τῶν κορυφαίων τί γὰρ ἂν τις τούς γε φαίλως δια-

4. τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ] Phaedr. 247: Θρόνος γὰρ ξέω
θείου χοροῦ ἱσταται. Polit. 291: Ἦμφαγον κατιδὼν τῶν περὶ τα
πόλεων πράγματα χορόν. The metaphor is continued in the
words of τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες,
6. τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μετ. 'Our
freedom, which consists, as we
have said, in the power of
ranging from one topic to an-
other.' Cf. Tim. 26: καὶ τίν' ἂν
ἀν ἡ Κρατία, μᾶλλον ἄντι τούτοι με-
ταλάθομεν; Polit. 257: Διαπα-
πάσης ἀυτοῦ πολεμάθους ἀυ-
tοῦ τῶν συγγραμμάτων τόδε Σω-
kράτη; —Καθάπερ εἰσε, μετα-
λάμβανε.

5. διαλλόντες] The expression is a little confused: for the
words πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τρεπό-
μεθα, as understood with δια-
λόντες, are unemphatic, while in
the second part of the clause
they are emphatic. Probably but
for the attraction of the other
participle, διελθόντες would have
been διαλλόντες. (Coisl. τραπώμ.)

ἔσαντες] Since here, as in
the Sophista, we have stumbled
prematurely on the philosophical
life.

11. οἱ ἡμετέροι] oi is suspicious.
If genuine, it still belongs to
the predicate,—' our servants,'
i.e. those which, as philosophers,
we have.

15. ὃς έουκεν] 'Waits our plea-
sure for its completion.'
13. ἐπιτιμήσων] 'Stands over
us to criticise and to compel.'
16. τοὺς φαίλως διαρίβοται ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι] in f. is empha-

13. ἐπιτιμήσων] 'Stands over
us to criticise and to compel.'
15. ὃς έουκεν] 'Waits our plea-
sure for its completion.'
16. τοὺς φαίλως διαρίβοται ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι] in f. is empha-

They know nothing of politics and

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tic, i. e. 'in such a pursuit.' For an account of these gentry, see Rep. 489—496., where they are called παρμύηνοι—δουσκοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν εὐθυμήν ἔλε τὰ ἐπὶ ἀποδι- δράσκοντες, κ. τ. λ.

1. Ὅθειν δὲ τοὺς.] Compare the less ironical description in the Republic 488: νόσον γὰρ τοιούτου γενόμενον, κ. τ. λ. The contradiction between philosophy and common life is here stated in its most paradoxical aspect. Nor do there appear any features of the transcendental philosopher. (V. infr. τῶν δυτικῶν ἐκάστου διακ.) We find a trace of him for the first time in the Sophist, as of the ideal king in the Politicus.

5. σπουδαῖ δὲ, κ. τ. λ.] 'But the ambitious striving of political clubs for power, and public meetings and banquets and revellings with minstrelsy, are actions which do not occur to them even in dreams.'

For a similar nominativus pendens, cf. Rep. 532: Ἡ δὲ γε λύσι—ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν—ταύτην ἦσσο τὴν δύναμιν. The irregularity is softened in the present instance by the fact that the earlier part of the sentence forms a sort of collective no-

The philo-

sopher's public life, still less of reveals and intrigues for power.


7. κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The fragment is thus quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. Y. 707 : πέτασα κατὰ Πίνδαρον τάς τε γάς ὑπένερθεν ὁμανος τε ὑπέρ ἀτρομομοιών, καὶ πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνάμενοι. (v. 1. ἐρευνάμενοι.) He seems to have had the poet's words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed πέτασα into the more prosaic φέρεται, (πέτασα occurs as a marginal reading,) and to have introduced the words κατὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, (perhaps also δοτρομομοιώα,) in compliment to Theodorus, adding τῶν ὀντῶν ἐκάστου k.t.l. Plato almost always thus weaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poet's measures to the rhythm of prose; e.g. Rep. 365 : πέτασε διὰ τείχους ὑψων ἢ σκολοὺς ἀπάταις ἀναβλεπει τὰς ἐναντιόν τους περιφέρασα διαβλεπούσα; ib. 364. : τὴς θ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρύσα τοιο προτάρων ἔθηκα καί τως ἐκεῖνοι μακροκάς καὶ ἀνατίτη.

9. τά τε γάς] Bodil. τάκα. Is it possible that Plato wrote τάς τε, as in the quotation of Clement? This seems probable, when it is considered that τά ἐπίπεδα k.t.l. is an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is somewhat abrupt; and also that the term γεωμετροῦσα is more naturally applicable to the surface of the Earth.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

πέντε τούτο λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅσπερ καὶ Θάλην ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὡς Θεό-

δωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Ὁραττά-

tὸς ἐμμελῆς καὶ χαρίσσασα θεραπανις ἀποσκῶψαι λέ-

γεται, ὅπ τὰ μὲν ἐν ὦρανῷ προδυμοῖο εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ τόδε λαυβάνου αὐτῶν.

ταῦτὼν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκόμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὤσοι ἐν φιλο-

λοσφίᾳ διάγονοι. τῷ γὰρ ὅντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν

πλησίον καὶ ὁ γεῖτω ἕλθεν, οὐ μόνον ὃ τι πράττει,

ἀλλ' ἄλγου καὶ ἐς ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν ἢ τι ἀλλ' ἄρμαμα-

tὶ δὲ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσει

προσῆκε διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,

ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερεύνομενος. μαθάνεις

γάρ ποι, ὡς Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὐ;

ΘΕΟ. 'Εγώομε καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὡ φίλε, ἱδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενοι ὁ

the Republic, 474 : δεί δυν ἄν

φόμεν φιλίν τι, δεί φαινει αὐτῶν,

ἐλαν ὑβάς λέγηται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φι-

λούντα εἰκονου, τὸ δὲ μῆ, ἀλλὰ πῶς

στέργοντα, κ. τ. λ. And ib. 486 : ἐγνατίστατον συμβολῳομενοι πηυχή

μιλούσην τὸ δύο καὶ φαντὸς ἀς

ἐπορέσκαν θίου τε καὶ ἄνθραπο-

νου.—ἐὰν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγα-

λοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία ποιεῖ τὸς

μὲν χρόνον, πάσης δὲ σαίνας, οἷον τὸ

οἷς τούτῳ μέγα τι δικείν εἴναι τὸν

ἄνθρωπον δυν. δυο, 'In its

universal aspect.'

(10.) εἰς τῶν ἔγχος 'Not low-

er herself to contemplate any

of the things surrounding her.'

Θράττα τε] Θράττα σα πτραισία ancillam hanc dicit. ἐμμελῆς

autem h. l. ad leporem et ver-

nustatem in jocando trahendam
docuit Ruhnken. ad Longin.

p. 261. Fabellam hinc forte

duxit Laërt. I. 34. (Heind.)

Do not the epithets rather refer to the slave's neatness in her own department ? v. toruws
cai δῆτος p. 175. 'A trim and
dainty Thracian handmaid.'

7. ταυτῷ δὲ ἀρκεὶ σκόμμα] 'The

same piece of raillery does not
to fail to apply, — 'will serve.'—

For the metaphorical use of

ἀρκεῖν ἐπι, cf. Soph. Ant. 611 :

το τ' ἐπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλων καὶ τὸ

πρὶν ἐπαρέσει σὺνος ὄνα.

For the application of the

σκόμμα in the mouth of an

enemy, see the speech of Cal-

licles in the Gorgias, 484 sqq.,

which presents many points of

similarity to the present pas-

sage.

11. τῇ τοιαύτῃ φ.] Sc. ἄνθρω-

ποίη.
παπήγγελμα τιμήσεως, ἵππος ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, p.174. ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἦν ποι ἀλλοθε ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τὸν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλοια παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θρήταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ 5 ἀλλῷ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατα τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπιπτὼν ὑπὸ ἀπερίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχωμένη. ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιποῖσιν ἤδειχε οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιποῖσιν, ἀτ' οὐκ εἰδῶς κακῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενός ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελητηκέναι ἀπὸ τῶν γελοίων φαίνεται. ἐν τοῖς τεῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλυχαίας, οὐ προσπονήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἔνθελος γιγνόμενος ληρώθης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τῷ ρανόν τε γὰρ ἡ βασιλέα ἐγκωμίασμον ἐνα τῶν νομέων, οἰνον συζώτην, ἡ ποιμένα, ἡ τις βουκόλου

1. ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον] These words refer only to ἰθημοσιά.
2. ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη] 'And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, and makes him seem no better than a fool.' Supr. 165. τὸ λεγόμενον εἰς φρέατι συνιχόμενος.
3. ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη] 'And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, and makes him seem no better than a fool.' Supr. 165. τὸ λεγόμενον εἰς φρέατι συνιχόμενος.
4. τῶν λόγων] These words refer only to ἰθημοσιά.
5. εἰς φρέατα] 'Into pitfalls and all manner of perplexity.' Supr. 165. τὸ λεγόμενον εἰς φρέατι συνιχόμενος.
6. οὐδὲν ἀρχόμενον] 'He cannot use personality in inventive.'
7. ἡ βασιλέα] Governed by δικοῦ, implied in δικοῦν below.
8. ἐνα τῶν νομέων] Comp. the Politics, p. 266, where this is regarded as the most universal conception of the king office. Regarding νομετικός as a whole, the philosopher thinks of ἀρχι- λοχος only as a part of it. ἦν τῶν ῥώμη τῶν λόγων οὐδενε σέμ- μετοφίος μάλλον ἐμέλετον ἢ μή, τῶς τὲ σεμέτοφοισιν οὐδέν ἠτίμας πρὸ τοῦ μεμίσον, ἀδεὶ καθ' αὐτὴν περαινεῖ ταλαθίστατον. Soph. 227.
p. 174. ἢγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονίζομεν πολὺ βδάλλοντα·
δυσκολότερον δὲ ἐκείνων ἥμων καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον
ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς· ἀγροκον
δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ὅταν τῶν
ομοέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι, σηκοῦ ἐν
5 ὅρει τὸ τείχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία
πλέθρα ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀκούσῃ ὡς τίς ἢ ἀρὰ κεκτημένος
θαυμαστά πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνημικρα δοκεί ἀκούειν
ἐάς ἀπασαν εἰς ὥσθις τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη
ὑμνοῦντων, ὡς γεναιός τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάπτοις πλούσιος
10 ἔχων ἀποφήναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμυκρὸν
p. 175. ὅρων τῶν ἢγεῖται τὸν ἑπανοῦν, ὑπὸ ἀπαίδευσις οὐ
dynαμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἢ ἐλάττων τάς βούς ποίησις.
1. πολὺ βδάλλοντα] Lit., As
being rich in milk, i.e. sucking
out no small advantage. Compare
the speeches of Thrasymachus in Rep. B. I.
2. ἐκείνων] masculine.
3. ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν]
1. To be of a less tractable and
more insidious nature.'
2. ἀγροκον δὲ] 'rough and un-
civilized from stress of work'—
8. ὑμνοῦντων] 'And when
they cant of pedigree'—
11. παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ—ὁρῶν-
tων] 'Betraying a dull and
contracted vision'—
14. ὧν πάπτοις καὶ προγόνων]
Compare the comic fragment
ascribed to Epicharmus or Me-
nander. (Krußenmann’s Epichar-
mus, 119.)
Ἀπολεῖ μὲ τὸ γένος· μὴ λέγ', εἰ φιλεῖς ἐμὲ,
Μήτηρ, ἐφ’ ἐκάστη τὸ γένος· οἷς ἄν τῇ ἡφιέ
Ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχῃ μιθέοι ὀκεῖοι προσῶν,
Ἐκεῖνον καταφεύγουσιν εἰς τὰ μεσάτα,
Καὶ τὸ γένος, ἀρέσκομεν τε τοὺς πάπτους δοσι.
Οὐδ’ ἐνα δὲ ἔσχοι ἤδειν ὅν, οὗδ’ εἰστὶν, διότι
Οὐκ ἔσθι πάπτοι· πώς γὰρ ἐγίνοντ’ ἀν ποτὲ; κ. τ. λ.
16. βάρβαροι τε καὶ Ἑλληνες]μυρίαις ἀναρίθμητοι] This ex-
expression recurs frequently in
later Greek authors.
These words belong to all the
preceding nouns.
F 2
λάκις μυρίοι γεγονόσιν ὄστροφιν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ ῥ. 175. εἶκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τοῦ Ἀμφιτρόωνος ἂτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς συμκρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ Ἀμφιτρόωνος εἰς τὸ ἁνω πεντακαιεκοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἢν, οἵ δὲ συνέβαινον αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἄπ' αὐτοῦ, γελά ὡς δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνοτίτα ἀνοίγου ὕψιστά ἀπαλλάσσειν. ἐν ἀπασι δὴ τούτως ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερ- 10 ηφάνον ἔχον, ὡς δοκεί, τὰ δὲ ἐν ποσίν ἁγνοῦν τε καὶ ἐν εὐκάστοις ἀπορῶν.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέεις, ὡς Ἵστορ.

1. ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἶκοσι] The order is ἐπὶ καταλόγῳ πέντε καὶ εἶκοσι προγόνων.
2. ἀναφερόντων] Sc. τὸ γένος, The genitives depend upon συμκρολογίας, or rather, more vaguely, upon the sense of the words ἀτ. a. κατ. t. συμκρ., as δυναμένων upon γέλα below, —κατα in καταφαίνεται being probably used in its condemnatory sense.
3. ἂτοπα—τῆς συμκρολογίας] The genitive is not quite analogous to ἅμήχασθαι εἰδαμονίας, ἀρ. 41., which is rather quantitative: nor is it exactly equivalent to ἂτος ἡ συμκρολογία, (like ἄσημα—βοῆς, —φώνων ἀθλίων λέγηρα, in Sophocles), though as in these last cases the adjective is isolated for the sake of emphasis, but the genitive has the additional meaning, 'in respect of,' as after interjections and epithets. Cf. Protagor. 317: ἐπιλή μορία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρημάτως. ἡπ. 328. ἀλλα ποίῳ τῷ βίον (for its way of life?) Rep. 532: πάμπολυ ἄργον λέεις. τοῦ παροιμίου, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ; Phaed. 99: πολλῇ ἰν καὶ μακρᾷ ῥαβδίᾳ ἐν ἐλη τοῦ λόγου.

The whole sense lies somewhere between σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφέρόντων—ἀτοποι φαινόται τῆς συμκρ. and σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφέρόντων—ἀτοποι φαινόται ἡ συμκρολογία.

5. οία συνέβ. ] The Bodl. reads οία συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη. Perhaps rightly. The meaning in both cases is the same. 'He was,—what Fortune made him.'

p. 175. ΣΩ. 'Οταν δὲ γέ των αὐτός, ὁ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἀνα, ο καὶ ἐθέληση τις αὐτῷ ἐκβηναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἡ σο ἐμὲ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἡ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον; ἡ ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ βασιλείας εὐδαίμων κεκτημένος τι ἀδ πολύ χρυσίων, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίω τε τινὲς ἔστω καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει το μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖ,—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὐτῇ δέχῃ λόγον τὸ διδόναι τῶν σμικρῶν ἐκέεις τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δρμῶν

1. τωι—τις] The indefinite is used with an indirect reference to the philosopher and to the σμικρῶν ἐκέειν καὶ δρμῶν καὶ 

5. Εἰ βασιλείας εὐδαίμων] See the passage of the Gorgias (p. 471.), in which Polus contends that Archelaus is happy. (Diog. mentions a distribute of Antisthenes, called Ἀρχιλαός, ἡ περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gorgias was assailed.)

Buttmann thus defends Εἰ, which three MSS. omit:—"Quamvis certum exploratumque haberent vulgares illi oratores, regem propter divitias suas unice beatum putandum esse, tamen rem ita in encomius tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea videri posset, multis eam exemplis argumentisque proborent. Quidni igitur v. c. encomii aliquos in Cresum argumentum his verbis indicari potuerit; εἰ τριφος εὐδαίμων;" It may be questioned, however, whether εἰ βασιλείας might not give a better meaning.

In the words which follow, το seems to impede the sense, and ὁ is superfluous. If Plato is really quoting from a rhetorician, this is possibly not a fatal objection, though the conjectures πάν πολύ, πάμπολυ, (Heusd. Hirschig. Badh.) would seem probable. Possibly, however, the words βασιλείας—χρυσίων are adapted from some poet. (Cf. Theogn. εὐδαίμων ἄνω, καὶ θεοῦ φίλος ἀδικώτως, Κύρος, φρετὴς δ' ἄλλης εὐδαιμονίας ἔργαμαι.) In which case γὰς πο-

λύκρος π is perhaps the true reading. For κεκτημένος in such an adaptation, cf. (besides Protag. 340., quoted above), the quotation of Tyrtaeus in the Laws, p. 629: οὗτ' ἐν μυρσίναίν οὗτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠδηρα τελείμην, οὗτ' εἴ πλοιούστας ἀνθρώπων εὖ, φησιν, ἐοτ' εἰ πολλὰ ἀγαθά κεκτημένοι, εἰτῶν σχέδον ἄντα, κ.τ.λ. There is a close parallel between the present passage and page 174. τοιαύτα κ.τ.λ.

Cf. τι ἐγὼ σε ἀδικεῖ, with εἰ δικαιοσύνη—ἀναγκασθή λέγειν: ἡ σο ἐμὲ, with εἰ ταῖς λαοθηρίαις: εἰ (οἳ) βασιλείας—with τύπον τοι ν γὰρ—.

7. ἐπὶ σκέψιν] MSS. ἐπίσκεψ.
καὶ δικανικῶν, πάλιν ἂν τὰ ἀντιστροφὰ ἀποδίδοσιν. ὁ 175.
ιλιγγών τε ἂφ᾽ ύψηλοι κρεμάσθεις καὶ βλέπων με-
tέωρος ἀκοθεὶν ὑπὸ ἀπθείας, ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀτοροντι καὶ βαρβαρίζων, γέλατα Ἐραττας μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδὲ
σὲ ἀλλῷ ἀπαθινῷ οὐδὲν, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τόσο δ᾽ ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδους τραφεῖσιν ἄπασιν. Οὕτως
δὴ ἐκατέρου τρόποο, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὥ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἔλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, διὸ δὴ φιλόσο-
φον καλεῖς, ἄνεμεντον εὐθείᾳ δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδὲν
ἰδώνει, ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπεσῇ διακονήματα, οὐν
στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συνεκκαταστάθαι
μὴδὲ ὅτι ἡ δύναμις ἡ θὰ πᾶς λόγος: ὅ δ᾽ ἄδ τὰ μὲν
τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένοι τορὸς τε καὶ ὄσεος δια-
κονεῖν, ἀναβαλλόσθαι δὲ οὖν ἐπισταμένον ἐπιδέξα

2. διγγάνων τε] 'He gives the
philosopher his revenge; (for)
dizzied by the height where he
finds himself hanging by a
thread, and from which he
looks downwards into space,
(a strange experience to him),
and being dismayed and lost,
and broken in his utterance, he
is laughed at, not by Thracian
handmaids, nor by any other of
the uneducated, for they do not
perceive his plight; but by all
whose nurture has been the re-
verse of servile.'

The sentence probably divides
after ἀπθείας, and ἀδημονῶν τε—
answers to διγγάνων τε. (διγγάνων
τε. γὰρ add. Ven. Ι. This is
quite unnecessary.)

9. δ᾽ ἀνεμέτρων] 'Who may,
without our surprise or cen-
sure, appear simple and a mere
cipher, when some menial ser-
vice is required of him, if he
has no skill, for instance, in

tying up bed-clothes with the
proper knot, nor in flavouring
a sauce, or a fawning speech:—
the other character is that of the
man who is able to do all such
service with smartness and di-
spatch, but has not the skill to
throw his cloak over his right
shoulder with a gentlemanly
grace; no, nor to celebrate
aright with the music of dis-
course, in his turn, that life
which is lived in truth by the
immortals and by heaven-fa-
voured men.'

Ven. Π. ἐπισταμένος cett.

13. τορὸς] 'Smartly.' ἂν δὲ ἰς-
μοὶ ἄν.

14. ἀναβαλλόσθαι—ἐπιδέξα] Pro-
bably, 'to wear his garment over
his right shoulder in a gentle-
manly fashion.' Aristoph. Αν.
1566: οὕτως, τῷ δρᾶσι; ἔτοι ἄριστη
ὁμορ ομεμέχθη; οὐ μεταβαλέσθης θολ-
μάτων δὲ ἐκεῖ δεῖξιν; Cf. Hor.
\textbf{ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.} 111

p.176. ἐλευθέρος οὖν ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βιῶν ἀληθῶς ὕμνησαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βιῶν ἀληθῆ.

ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὁ Σωκράτης, πείθοις ἐν δίκαιος ὁσπερ ἐμὲ, πλεῖον ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττως κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἶπη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὖτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνάτων, ὃ θεόδωρε, ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη' οὖτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θυντήν

Ep. I. § 96. si toga dissidet impar, Rides. Quid, mea cum pugnat sententia secum? A possible rendering at first sight is, 'to strike up the song in his turn.' Vid. sīdē γ' ἀρμονίας λόγων ἱδίων, and cf. Rep. 420: κατακλήσεις ὑπὶ δεξα πρὸς τὸ πνῦ διαπίστωσα. Symp. 177: εἰσὶν ἔτσιν ἔφωτος ὑπὶ δεξα. But one person could hardly be said to sing ὑπὶ δεξά, and the antithesis requires the other rendering. The slave can tuck in bed-clothes, the freeman wears his garment with a grace. The slaves' contribution to the banquet is literally ὑπὸν ἠδίων, figuratively δεξας λόγους ἡδ. (Cf. Gorg. 465: τὴν ῥητορικὴν—ἀντιτροφον ὑφοποιαίς εἰς ψυχή ὡς εἰκὼν ἐν σώματι.) The 'freeman's' is literally the lyre and song; in a higher sense, discourse of philosophy and virtue. This is his proper ἔρως. Cf. Symp. 177., where the minstrel is dismissed, and Eryximachus proposes that they should discourse of the praises of love. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι χρήσαι ἐκαλεῖν ἡμῶν λόγων εἰπεῖν ἔτσιν ἔφωτος ὑπὶ δεξα ὡς καὶ δύναται κάλλιστον. v. Prot. 347. There is a further 'harmony

between the discourse and life of the philosopher. Lach. 188: καὶ κομίζῃ μοι δοκεῖ μουκενε ὁ θυμός τοῦοτος εὑρεῖ, ἀρμονίας καλλίστην ἤρμοσεμένος ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ παυνίας ὑγρα, ἀλλά τῷ ἄντι ἱδρύσα μερεῖς αὐτοῦ τῶν βιῶν ξύμων τοῖς λόγοις, πρὸς τῷ ἔργῳ ἀντίκεις διαμικτῆ ἀλλ' ὑπὸ λαστὴ τοῖς διαμικτῇς λαστῆς διαμικτῇς ἀλλ' ἐπερ μὴν Ἐλληνικὴ ἐστὶν ἀρμονία.

There is an allusion to the well-known custom of taking the lyre in turn. δεξας λόγους is perhaps rightly supposed by Ruhnke, ad Tim. p. 146. to be a poetical expression, quoted probably from Euripides or Epicurhaus.


7. ὑπεναντίον γὰρ] Compare the saying of Heraclitus, παλιντονος ἀρμονίας κόσμου ὑπερ τόξου καὶ λύρας. The prep. conveys the idea of 'bearing up against.'
Men will not hear

I. тόνδε τῶν τόπων] νῦν. τῶν σοματοειδῶν τε καὶ ὄρατων τόπων. Rep. 532. The imagery of place in which Plato’s philosophy is enfolded appears most prominently in the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and Rep. B. VI. and VII.

The notion that evil must exist in everything but the Divine Nature reappears in a curious mythic form in the Politicus, p. 270. and is implied Tim. 87: τά δὲ περὶ ψυχήν (sc. νοσίματα) διὰ σώματος ξένων κ. τ. λ. Ib. 69: ἐνεργεσίμοιο τ’ αὐτά ἀναγκαία τὸ θυτον γένος ἑυνῶθε- σαι. In the Phaedo evil is almost identified with the bodily principle. Our ignorance on the subject is, however, confessed in the Lysis, p. 220, 1: πότερον, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόλαγα, οὐδ’ πειρήμη ἢν ἐστι οὐδὲ δεσφήν οὐδὲ Ἀλκ. οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων—ἢ γελοῦν τὸ ἐρώτημα, δ’ τὸ πο’ ἐστιν τότε ἢ μὴ ἐστιν; τίς γὰρ οἴδας;

3. φυγῇ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεί] Phaedr. 252, 3: ἢ ξενώντες δὲ παρ’ ἄλλων ἀνυπρίκες τὴν τοῦ σφαιρόν θεοῦ φύσιν, εἰποροῦσιν διὰ τὸ συνώνυμον ἡραγκάζοντα πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτῶν τῇ μορίᾳ, ἐνδούσιμοιτε, εἰς ἐκείνοι ζωοδοκοῦσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐντυπωσίματα, καθ’ δόνων διαταγῶν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπων μετασχήματι.


4. ὁμοίωσις δὲ] ‘And to be made like to Him is to become righteous and holy, not without wisdom.’

μετὰ φρονήσεως] Is virtue possible apart from knowledge? This question is discussed in the Protagoras and the Meno. The answer given is, that practically it would appear so, but that virtue can be
proved to be inseparable from knowledge. And in the Meno
the paradox is solved by saying that practical virtue is a Divine
gift, θεία μορφή προσωπικομενή ἄνευ νοῦ, but that if there
should be a virtuous man who
could teach virtue, he would
be like Tiresias amongst the
shades; διοτέρ πάρα σκιάς άλλης
ἄν πράγμα εἶν πρὸς ἀρέτην. In
the more dialectical dialogues
one side of the contradiction
disappears, and it is assumed
that philosophy is essential to
real virtue. Phaed. 69: ὁ μά-
κάριος Σωκράτης, μὴ γὰρ ὅξιν ἀνή
ὁ ὄρθος πρὸς ἀρέτην ἄλλης
ὅλως πρὸς ἤλλος καὶ λίπας πρὸς
καὶ φόβων πρὸς φόβων καταλαλ-
τισθαί—ἄλλον ἀντὶ τῶν
μαχαίρων ὀρθῶν,—φρονήσεως—καὶ
ξυλισθῆναι ἄλλης ἀρέτης ἡ μετὰ
φρονήσεως,—χαριζόμενα δὲ 
φρονίσεως καὶ ἀλλήλουν ἀλλή-
λαί, μὴ σκαραβαίνω τις ἦ τοιοῦτον
ἀρέτης, κ. τ. λ. In the Republic
it is again acknowledged that
it is possible to partake of
virtue without philosophy, but in
an imperfect way; e. g. in the
case of the soul which laments
its choice of another life.
P. 619: εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ
ουρανοῦ ἡκόνων, ἐν τεταγμενῃ
πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ βίω βεβαιο-
κότα, ἔδει ἄνευ 

φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς

μεταξιωσέως. And the education
of the φίλουκας generally (not of
the rulers) is independent of
reason, though in harmony with
it. Rep. 401, 2. (In the Phile-
bus also the perfect life con-
tains the knowledge of prac-
tical things. The philosopher
must know his way home.)
Thus the contradiction felt at
first is reconciled by acknowl-

dgeding the existence of dif-
ferent parts of our nature, which,
though connected, and indis-
ensible to each other's per-
fection, are not identical.
There is a slight emphasis on
μετὰ φρονήσεως in opposition to
what follows.

4. ἢν ἢθικη ἡμιαὶ πολιτείᾳ


γαρ ζημαίαν ἀδελφας] The whole of this passage is parallel to the

speeches of Glaucon and Adi-
mantus in the 2nd book of the

Republic, and the same thought

differently worked out in the

Gorgias.

5. ὁ λέγομενος γραῶν ὥδης]

'This is what men commonly
repeat, an old wives' fable, it
appears to me.' The meaning of

λέγομεν here (not = 'as the
saying is') seems determined
by λέγομεν following.
wards, by becoming just and pure with wisdom, so becoming like to God.

This is a man’s true ‘cleverness’ and proof of virtue. And the real penalty of vice is one which cannot be escaped by clever shifts. For to act wrongly is to be removed from the Divine pattern, and to be brought nearer to the likeness of the Evil.

1. peri tou toû] ‘Moreover a man’s real ability, or else his nothingness and want of manhood, is concerned with this.’ The genitive is accounted for by the vagueness of the relation expressed. anâdria is suggested by andros.

6. fortukai—bâanavou] ‘vulgar’—‘mechanical,’ or ‘mean.’

7. tô oûn âdikouû, k. t. l.] This very favourite thought is developed in the Gorgias.

9. ôpâ panourgias] ‘Not to admit that villany constitutes him a clever man.’

10. òv lêros] ‘that they are not mere absurdities, cumbering the ground’:—‘not sole-
cisms,’ as Carlyle might say.

γῆς âllas âxhê] ëtâsou âxhos
ârwphs (Π. XVII. 104., quoted
1203 : próbas’ âllos.—Milton,
Areopag. : ‘Many a man lives
a burden to the Earth.’

lêrou] Charm. 176. ëmê mên
lêros ëgewthai ënai kai adûnaton
lêph òtouous çtiwv. Phaed. 72 :
teleutwta pâta lêrou tôn ‘En-
dumana âpodeizein kai oâdamou ën
fânavo.

11. toûs svdêrômous] Who
deserve to live in it, i. e. for
whose interest the laws are to
be made. Cf. Soph. Ant. 189 :
ês’ ètûn ën ñáivousa.

p. 176. τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιω-
tάτου, οὐχ ὀργῶτες ὥστε οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ἥλιοτητοῖς
tε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοι-
p. 177. οὕμοιοι διὰ τὰς ἀδικοὺς πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιύμενοι.
οὐ δὴ τίνοις δίκην ὄντως τὸν εἰκότα βιών ὁ ὁμοιό-
μοῦνται. ἐὰν δὲ εἰπωμέν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγοῦσι τῆς
dεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ὁ
tῶν κακῶν καθαροὺς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τῇ
tῆς αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητας τῆς διαγωγῆς ἂεὶ ἔξωσι, κακοῖς
cακοῖς συνόντες, ταύτα ὑπὸ καὶ παινάσασιν ὅσ δεινοὶ καὶ
tοῖς πανοργοὶ ἀνοίητων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

ΤΟΙ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὁ Σάκρατες.

b ΣΩ. Οἶδα τοι, ὃ ἐταῖρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμ-

592 : 'Ἀλλ', ὅν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐν οὐρανῷ
ἐώς παραδείγμα ανάκαιστο τῷ βου-
λομένῳ ὄραν καὶ ὀρωτε έναντίον κα-
tούκες. 1. τοῦ ἰδέου] 'From which
the Divine has fled.'

6. τῆς δεινότητος] 'From this
cleverness which is their boast.'

πλάθες καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ
ἀγρίων ἐρότων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κα-
cῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Phed. 81.

καθαροὺς] Phed. 83. ἐκ γὰρ
τοῦ ὁμολογεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς
αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα, οἴμαι,
ὁμορρόπος καὶ ὁμόφορος γίγνεσθαι
καὶ ὅσι μηδέποτε καθαρὸς εἰς 'Ἀλλον
ἀφίκεσθαι ἄλλ' ἀλὰ τοῦ σώματος
ἀναπλάζειν, δοτε τῷ πάλι
πάλιν ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ τῷ σώματι καὶ δοπήρ
σπευδομένη ἐμφάνεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶ-
των ἄμοιρων εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τε
καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μοιχεῖδος συνο-
σίας.

Ibid. 69: καὶ ἡ συφροσύνη
κ. τ. λ. καὶ αὕτη ἡ πρόφυσις μὴ κα-
thαρόμενος τις ἥ, καὶ κυθίνωσι καὶ
οἱ τὰς τελετὰς—καταστήσατε—

πάλαι αἰνίτεσθαι ὅτι δὲ ἐν ἀμύητος
καὶ ἀπέλεστο εἰς 'Ἀλλον ἀφίκεσθαι,
ἐν βορβόρῳ κεῖται, δὲ κακαθαρ-
μένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖνος
ἀμύητος μετὰ θεῶν οἴκησε.

τῆς αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητας τῆς δια-
γωγῆς] 'They will always re-
tain their way of life like to
themselves—evil as they are,
associating with evil things.'
κακοῖς is neut. Compare the
well-known passage of the
Phedo, p. 81. 'Ἀλλα διελημμέ-
νης γε, οἴμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς
κ. τ. λ. imitated by Milton, Co-
mus, circ. ν. 460 :

'The soul grows clotted by
contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till
she quite lose
The divine property of her
first being.'

See especially the words κατὰ τὰς
αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης.

10. καὶ παινάσασιν ὡς δεινοὶ]
i.e. their feeling of superiority
will only be confirmed.

13. Οἶδα τοι, ὃ ἐταῖρε] 'I am
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

βέβηκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγου δέχοιτο τε καὶ δέξα- p.177. σθαί περὶ ὅν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἄνδρακὼς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρομοι φεύγειν, τότε ἀντίπας, ὦ δαμιόν, τελευτώντες οὐκ ἀρέσκομαι σ αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὅν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ηρημικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὡστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν δια- φέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστάμεν' εἰ δὲ μὴ, πλείον ἀεὶ ἐπιφρέοντα καταχώσει ἕμων τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον ἐπὶ ε 10 δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν ἴσωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεί.

ΘΕΟ. 'Εμοί μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὃ Σῶκρατες, οὐκ ἀρ- δέστερα ἄκουειν' ῥά χαρ τηλικῷδε οὖν ἐπακολού- θεῖν' εἰ μὲντοι δοκεί, πάλιν ἐπανίσθεμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ποι ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν δὲ ἐφαμεν τούτῳ τῇ φερομένῃ οὐσίᾳ λέγουσας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοὺν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ δὲ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀλλοίς ἔθελεν διϊσχυρίζεθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἕκεισα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὅσ παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἀ ἂν θηταὶ δ

I. 7. Third criticism of the doctrine, 15

What appears to me, is to me.

We found that even

quite aware of it, my friend!'

I. e. 'I know the full extent of the ridicule that they will pour on us.' He refers to the emphatic answer of Theodorus.

3. καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρομοι φεύγειν]


5. ἡ ηρημικὴ ἐκείνῃ πως ἀπο- μαραίνεται] 'That brilliant rhetoric of theirs fades utterly, leaving them to appear no better than children.'


8. πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιφρέοντα κατα- χώσει ἕμων τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον]

'They will bury us under the discussion to be commenced afresh, i. e. the arraies of dis- cussion, which will gather against us with an ever-increasing stream.' He means, that if the main stream of the inquiry is dammed up any longer, it will come in upon us with overwhelming force. Cf. Rep. p. 450: δοῦν λόγον πάλιν διασέρ δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ζείτη perι πολιτέας. Polit. p. 302: τοῦ γὰρ ἐπικεχυ- μένου λόγου κατ' ἀρχῆς.


18. περὶ τὰ δίκαια ... περὶ τα- γαθοῦ] 'In regard to what is just—concerning what is good.'
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 117

p. 177. πόλις δόξαντα αὐτή, ταύτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἐωστερ ἅν κέπται: περὶ δὲ τάγαθος οὐδένα ἄνδρεῖον ἔδ ούτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἂ ἅν ὅφελμα οἰδήποτα πόλις ἐαντῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὗν ἅν κέπται ὅφελμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι: τούτο δὲ που σκῶμι ἅν εἶ ἐπὶ πρὸς ὁ λέγωμεν. οὐχὶ;

ΘΕΟ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα ὁ ὄνομαξομένον θεωρεῖται.

1. τῇ θεμήν[] So Bodl. with Vat. Ven. II.

2. περὶ δὲ τάγαθο[] Rep. 505:

δὴ διώκει μὲν ἐπαγα γυμνή καὶ τούτου ἄνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντοφάρμαν γε εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ—

What is good cannot be apparent merely. (Compare the saying of Des Cartes and Spinoza:
The idea of God implies His existence.) This was not, however, universally admitted. Ar.

Eth. N. I. 2: τοιαύτην δὲ τιμα πλάνην ἵναι καὶ τάγαθα, κ. τ. λ.


—γάμως—ποιητήμεν ἕρωτι ἐπὶ δύναμις ὅτι πάλιοτα ἐλέν ὁ ἐρωτὶ ὁ ὅφελμαμίστην.

We have not yet risen to the conception of the ideal good ἐπίκενα τῆς ὀνίσθαι: good is still a relative term, though knowledge begins to find a resting-place there. In the concrete the good and expedient are identical. See Spinoza, Cog. Met. I. c. 6. § 7. § 11. Res sola considerata neque bona dicitur, neque mala, sed tantum respective ad aliam, cui conducit ad id quod amat acquirendum, vel contra; ideoque unaqueque res diverso respectu eodemque tempore bona et mala potest dici—Deus vero dicitur summe bonus, quia omnibus conductit, nempe uniuscujusque esse quo nihil magis amabile, suo concursu conservando. Ma-

lum autem absolutum nullum datur, ut per se est manifestum.

Porro uti bonum et malum non dicitur nisi respective, sic etiam perfectio, nisi quando perfectionem sumimus pro ipsa rei essentia, quo sensu antea diximus, Deum infinitam perfectionem habere, hoc est infinitam essentiam, seu infinitum esse.


7. πρὸς δὲ λέγωμεν] In respect of that which we mean.

9. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα] Let him not intend the name but the thing which is contemplated under it. (γὰρ add. Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.) Dr. Badham con-
ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἂν τῶτο ὄνομαζῃ, τοῦτο δὴ ποιν

στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους,

καθ' ὅσον οἰσταὶ τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὁφελιμωτάτους

ἐαυτῇ τίδεται. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθε-

τείται;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἂν, ἡ πολλὰ καὶ δια-

μαρτάνει εκάστῃ;

ΘΕΟ. Ὅμως ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τοῖνυν ἐνθεῦς ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶσ τις ὁμο-

λογήσειε ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τις τοῦ εἰδοῦς

ἐρωτήσῃ, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁφελίμως τυγχάνει ὅν.

ἐστι δεὶ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομο-

θετάμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὁφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέ-

μεθα εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ [μέλλου] ὀρθῶς

ἀν λέγοιμεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἰδι δὴ, οὕτως ἐρωτώμεν Πρωταγόραν ἦ

ξέλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκεῖνον τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων

μέτρων ἄνθρωπός ἦστιν, ὡς φατέ, ὃς Πρωταγόρα,

From the following point of view.

For the method cf. Rep. 491: λαβοῦ τοῖνυν διόν

ἀυτοῦ ὀρθῶς ——— πάντος περὶ

στέρματος ἢ ψυχῆς.

Sc. τὸ ὁφελεμον.

Whatever is expedient, is also referrible to future time.

The MSS. vary between μᾶλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven.

II.) μέλλει μᾶλλον (Coisl.) and μέλλει μᾶλλον (cett.)
ΤΗΛΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 178. λευκῶν, βαρέων, κουφών, οὐδενὸς ἔστοι οὗ τῶν τοι- ούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐ πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἴομενος, ἀληθῆ τι οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὅντα. οὐ χὰ οὔτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὅ

1. λευκῶν βαρέων κουφών οὐδε-

mὸς ἔστοι αὐτῷ) Cf. supr. 172: τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταῦτα καὶ ἢστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμῶ, ἡπα, γλυκία, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου.

2. τὸ κριτήριον] The word is formed from κριτής, on the analogy of δικαστήριον. Cf. Legg. 767: ὅτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐστο κρι-

τήρω. The present is probably one of the earliest instances of its use.

οὐ πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἴομενος] sc. αὐτὰ. Or rather the accusa-

tives are cognate. Vid. supr. p. 152. Οἷα γὰρ αλοθάνεται—.

4. ἄντα] There is a slight stress on the present tense in opposition to μελλόντων ἐσεσθαι.

5. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐσεσθαι φήσομεν] As here knowledge seems to emerge with the mention of future time, so in the Protagoras, p. 357, virtue is shown to be knowledge, because it implies the power of comparing the future with the present. (Cf. the line of Homer, Οἶνος τι οἴεται ἄμα πρόσωπο καὶ οἵπωσον.)

7. ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ] "The tribunal for deciding these things is within him." 'The decision rests with him.'

9. οὐν θερμά]. The word is placed absolutely. Heid. com-

pares Crat. 393: οὖν τὸ βήτα-

δρᾶς δη τοῦ ὑ καὶ τοῦ ἑ καὶ τοῦ ἃ προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἀλήθειν εὐπλεῖται κ.τ.λ. ἑρα—καὶ τὴν ποτέρον δόξαν] "Surely we must suppose (must we not?) that the result will be according to the opinion of one of them, or shall we say that it will be in accordance with both?"
It is implied in what follows, which opinion is probably right.

14. ἦν τῆς ἀμφότερα, ὅ καὶ

ἐνείμενα αὐτῷ τῷ παυσίριῳ δόξαι εὐάρμοσται εὐαί—τὸ μὲλλον—καὶ δόξαι καὶ ἐσεσθαι] These words contain the point of the argument.

ἑαυτὲ δὲ ἀμφότερα] Viz. καὶ
The musician is a better judge of future harmony than the gymnast, as the latter will himself confess when he hears the sounds.

Surely Protagoras himself professed to be a better prophet than those he taught, of the probable effect of a rhetoric.

The repetition of the word is curious.

The certainty of present impressions is swept away together with the doctrine of motion, infr. p. 182. The relation of present to past impressions is further discussed under the guise of a new inquiry, pp. 191, sq. (See espec. the word μημείον.)

A further home-thrust at Protagoras.

That which each of us will find persuasive to be spoken in court.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Νη Δία, ὁ μέλε· ἢ οὔδεις γ' ἀν αὑτῷ διε-
p. 179. λέγετο διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἰ ἔμητι τοὺς συνόντας ἐπειθὲν ὃτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἑσεθαῖ τε καὶ δόξειν οὕτε μάντις οὕτε τις ἄλλος ἀμειὼν κρίνειν ἀν ἢ αὑτὸς αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. 'Αληθεύσατα.

2. εἰ ἔμητι] εἰ ηὺ τοὺς συνόντας —Profecto in futurum quo-
que rerum cognitione omnibus praeclerere se Protagoras profi-
tebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnum doctrine meredem solvisset, si
quo modo persusisset disciplinis, etiam de futuris rebus neque vatem neque alium quemquam melius posses judi-
care, quam ipsum sibi unum-
quamque. V. ad Gorg. § 75,
p. 47. Platonis autem senen-
tiam restituimus unius litterulae-
mutatione. Quippe vulgo scrip-
tum εἰ μὴ τοὺς συν., unde con-
trarius prorsus et absurdus sen-
sus efficitur. Quam scipturum
nequis tuendam arbitretur ver-
bo αὑτός αὑτῷ ad Protagoram tra-
hendo et αὑτῷ mutando in αὑτῷ (sc. τῷ συνόντι), manifesta h. l.
est superiorum verborum πότε-
ρον αὑτός αὑτῷ ἀριστος κριτὴς re-
petitio, neque tum ferri posset
hoc αὑτῷ: adeo id moleste re-
dundare. Idem vitium insedit
Phileb. p. 34 c. "Ἰνα μὴ τὴν ψυ-
χήν ἡδονὴν χαρίς σώματος ὁτι μά-
lιστα καὶ ἑπαργάστατα λάβομεν.
Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ὄργων ἀμηγέτη
προσέοικε, τὸ γὰρ λεικών τῷ μέ-
lαν ἔστιν δ μῆ (l. ἔστι) προσέοικε
καὶ τὸ σεληρῶν τῷ μαλακῷ. Heind.
This reasoning is probably
correct. But δῇ, which is the
received correction of Phil. l. c.
seems more forcible here than

η, which has no particular
aptness in this passage. 'If he
had really persuaded them of
that which has been now sug-
gested.' Cf. p. 166. εἰ δὴ οὐναίτων
γε——: alib. The corruption pro-
probably originated in the slightly
obscure reference of αὑτὸς αὑτῷ,
or perhaps simply from the
neighborhood of μῆ. (i. e. Νη.)

Schleiermacher solved the
difficulty by omitting αὑτῷ, and
referring αὑτός to Protagoras.
But this destroys the force of
καὶ, and the question is not be-
tween one oracle and another,
but between the opinion of the
master and of the common in-
dividual. For αὑτῷ referring
to an indefinite subject, cf.
Apol. 39: οὖ γὰρ ἐσθ αὑτή ἢ
ἀπαλλευεῖσθαι σὲ πάνω δυνατή σὲ
καλῆ, ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ
μάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κοιλώνει;
ἄλλ' ἐπούλων παρασκευαζέων ὅπως
ἔσται ὁς βολτιστός. The change
from plural to singular has been
elsewhere illustrated.

The μάστης is introduced as
being ἐπιστήμων of the future
generally, just as the physician
is of future health or sickness,
the musician of future harmony,
&c. τις ἄλλος points distantly
at Protagoras himself, and his
position as the prophet of his
school is hinted at. Cf. supr.
162. ἐκ τοῦ ἄδου τῆς βυθοῦν
ἐφθάσατο.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὁφέλιμον π. 179. περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔστι, καὶ πᾶς ἄν ὁμολογεῖ νομοθετοῦν-
μένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὁφέλιμοστά-
tου ἀποτυγχάνειν;

ΘΕΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου
eἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς ὁμολογεῖν σοφότερον τε ἢ
ἀλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιούτου μέτρον εἶναι,
ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὁπωσοῦ ἀνάγκην
εἶναι μέτρον γίγνεσθαι, ὅσ' ἄρτι μὲ ἡνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ
ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἴτε μή, τοιούτοι εἶναι.

ΘΕΩ. Ἑκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα
ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, γὰρ τὰς
τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐταὶ δὲ ἐφανήσαν
τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους υἱδαμή ἀληθεῖς ἤγοιμεναι.

ΣΩ. Πολλάχρη, ὁ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἄν τὸ γε 
τοιούτων ἀλοίπη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι.
περὶ δὲ τὸ παρόν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, εἴ δὲν αἱ αἰσθήσεις
καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξας γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον
ἐλεῖν ὡς πρὸς ἀληθεῖς. Ἡσυχὸς δὲ σύνει σείσθαι ἀνάλοιπον
γάρ, εἰ ἐνυχθοῦν, εἰσὶ, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς
τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήματα τάχα ἄν ὅτα λέγοιεν, καὶ

2. πᾶς ἄν ὁμολογεῖ] Both from experience and from the analogies just adduced. We pass from the individual to the state, as in p. 172.

18. ἐκ δὲν] 'The momentary effect produced on each man, from which arise the sensations, and the beliefs which are in accordance with them.' Vid. p. 156; and note the incipient distinction between ἀληθεῖς and δόξα.

22. ὅστα] Ast. conj. τά ὅστα, but see above, p. 178. ἀληθῇ τε 
οίεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὅστα.
Π. 179. Θεαίτητος ὁδὲ οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἶρηκεν ἀϊσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦταν θέμενος. προσιτέοις οὖν ἐγνυτέρω, ὁ δ' ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἑπέταττε, καὶ σκΕπτέοι τῆς φερομένης ταύτης οὐσίας διακρόνοντα, εἶτε ύγιὲς εἶτε σαθρῶν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ 5 φαύλη οὐδ' ὅλγοις γέγονεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πολλοὺ καὶ δὲι φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἐταίρου χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μᾶλα ἐφρώμενοι.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τοι, ὃ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέοι καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.


3. σκεπτέοι—διακρόνοντα] Soph. 246: Τογαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἀμφοτητοῦντε μᾶλα εὐλαβος ἀν—ωθεν εἰς ἀδρατον ποιδὲν ἀμφιτεται, νοητὰ ἀτα καὶ αὐσίματα εἰθὶ βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθον οὐσίαν εἶναι τὰ δὲ εἰκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀληθειν κατὰ σμικρά διαβραζόστην ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένης τῶν προσαγροφοῦντον. εἰ μέσω δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἀπέλεω ἀμφιτετρωσ μαχή τις δ' ἡθαίτητε, δὲ ἑνειστηκε. Τhis combat is somewhat differently described in the present passage.

4. τῆς φερομένης—οὐσία] This is the ground on which the 'semi-Protagoreans' take their stand, the last stronghold of the doctrine, as it was the first point it occupied.

10. ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ] 'Makes rapid strides,' 'gains in importance,' 'is waged with increasing energy.'


τούτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγος is here almost equivalent to "school of thought." Cf. supr. τοῦ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ κ. τ. λ. infr. τῶν ἐπισκοπομαζομένων λόγων.

11. Τῷ τοι] 'We are the more bound to consider the question, and that in the light of its first principle, even as they present it to us in the discussion.' Gorg.
principle, All is motion.

Final rejection of the doctrine of sense.

Great has been the conflict

448: ὃσπερ σοι τὰ ἐμπροσθὲν ὑπε-
τείνατο Χαμαίφαν. (καὶ add. Bodl.)
(12.) ὃσπερ αὐτῷ ὑποτείνονται
Viz. in referring every thing to a
first principle, whether of fire
or motion.

2. τῶν Ἰερακλειτῶν] Ἀκ. δογμα-
των. περὶ τούτων κ. τ. λ. depends
verbally partly on διαλεξῆναι,
partly on ἐμπροσθ. really upon
the notion "there is no discus-
sion possible." Cf. infr. διερ
ἵον ὑπάρχειν. If the genitives were
masculine, and out of construc-
tion, the use of ἐμπροσθ. without
an object would be too abrupt.
Compare, however, παρὰ μὲν τοῦ
των, below.

Cratyl. 439: φαίνονται γὰρ καὶ
ἐμπροσθ. οὕτω διαλεξῆναι.

ἐπὶ παλαιοτέρου Ὀρφανον
intelliget: conf. Cratyl. § 41.
(p. 402.) Heind.
4. εἶναι] Om. Bodl. with se-
ven other MSS.

5. τοῖς οἰστρῶν] 'with men
in frenzy.'

6. ἀτεχνᾶς γὰρ] "For, in true
accordance with their master's
writings they are ever in mo-
tion; but as for dwelling upon
an argument or question, and
quietly asking and answering
in turn, they are absolutely
without the power of doing so;
or rather they possess in a sur-
passing degree the most perfect
absence of all quietness, even in
the minutest respect."

The weak point in this ren-
dering of the last words is πρὸς
τὸ μὴδε σμερθατον = 'in respect of
what is less than little.' For
πρὸς, compare Soph. p. 248:
ὅταν τὰ παρὰ ἦ τῶ πάντων ἢ ὅρη
καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμερθατον δύνασθαι.

60 c. φράσην — ἡδονῆς μὴδε
tὸ σμερθάτον ἐχοννεπαινναι. But the
article still presents some diffi-
culty. We can only suppose
that in the accumulation of ne-
gatives μὴδε σμερθάτον has taken
the place of σμερθατον.

Another possible rendering is:
'Or rather the utter nega-
tion of it (τὸ οὐδε οὐδείν) sur-
passes every thing, in regard to
the absence of all quietness in
the men.' But it is difficult to
find a parallel for this use of τὸ
οὐδε οὐδείν.

In either case ὑπερβάλλει is
probably used absolutely, and
not with reference to μὴδε.

The point is, not that οὐδε οὐδείν
is a stronger expression than
μὴδε, (it should be compared
with ἦττοι — ὃ τὸ μὴδε), but (1)
the negation is put more
strongly by being affirmed;
(2) ὑπερβάλλει assists the climax,
as being a stronger word than
any in the former clause; and,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 125

ἐπιμείναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἱσυχίᾳ ἐν p. 180. μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἤπττον αὐτῶν ἐν ἡ τοῦ μὴδεν μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μὴδε σμικρὸν ἐνείναι τοις ἀνδράσιν ἱσυχίαις· ἀλλ' ἂν τινὰ τι ἔργη, ὡσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματισκαί αἰνγυμα- τῶδη ἀναστούντες ἀποτοξεύουσιν, κἂν τούτου ζητῆ λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἰρηκεῖ, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήξει κανώς μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ' εὗ πάνω ψυλλόττουσι τὸ μηδέν βεβαιόν ἐὰν εἴναι ἢ μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἥγουμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἴναι τούτῳ δὲ πάνω πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται πανταχόθεν ἐκ- βάλλουσιν.

ΣΩ. 'Ἰσως, ἡ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἀνδρας μαχομένους εἴδοκας, εἰρηκεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγένοις. οὐ γάρ σοι ἐταῖροι εἴσιν. ἀλλ', οἴμαι, τὰ τουαίτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζοισιν, οὐδ' ἂν βούλονται ὁμοίους αὐ- τοῖς τοίησι.

(3) if the former rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally. Cf. infr. μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς. Compare with ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν—ἐνώπιον, Arist. Eth. N. IV. 1. § 39. ὑπερ- βαλῇ τοῦ μηδεν ἂν διδόναι.


ῥηματισκαί αἰνγυμ. 'Pluck ing up as from a quiver sayings brief and dark, they let them fly at you.'


τούτου] Sc. τοῦ ῥηματισκίου.

7. τί εἰρηκε] Sc. τὸ ῥηματισκὸν.

κανὼς μετωνομασμένῳ] 'Of words new-fangled ill,' 'of terms strangely twisted to an unheard-of sense.'

10. βεβαιὸν—στάσιμον] 'Fix- ed or settled—stationary.'

ἐλαῖν] γενίσθαι is purposely avoided.

16. οὐ γὰρ σοι ἐταῖροι εἴσων] The dislike of a geometrician to the Heraclitean method is not un- natural.

17. τὰ τουαίτα] Sc. εἰρήκα τα βεβαια ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
ΤΕΟ. Ποιος μαθητής, ὁ δαμόνε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται p. 180. τῶν τοιούτων ἔτερος ἔτερον μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματος ε ἀναφύνονται, ὅποθεν ἄν τύχῃ ἑκατοσ τοιῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἔτερον οὐδὲν ἥγεται εἰδέναι. παρά μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦν ἐρώτ, οὖκ ἄν ποτὲ λάβοις λόγοι οὐτε ἐκόντων οὐτε ἄκοντων: αὐτοὺς δὲ δεὶ παραλαβόντας ὡσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἄρχαίων, μετὰ 10 ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς παλλούς, ὥς ἦ γένεσις ἀ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὡκεανῶς τε καὶ Τηθὺς ἰεύματα

2. αὐτόματος ἀναφύνονται] 'They spring up unbidden, wherever each happens to have caught the afflatus.'
3. ὅποθεν ἄν τύχῃ—ἐνθουσιάσας] Contrast with this Hegel, G. d. Ph. p. 55. 'It is the very spirit of this whole recital, that the more developed Philosophy of a later age, is really the product of the previous labours of the thinking mind: that it is required and determined by these earlier views, and has not sprung of itself independently from the ground.' (Nicht isolirt für sich aus dem Boden gewachsen ist.) For the expression αὐτόματος ἀναφύνονται, cf. Rep. 520: αὐτόματος γὰρ ἐμφύνονται ἀκόντων τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ. As in pp. 172 sqq. we had a description of the man corres-ponding to Protagoras' theory, so here we have the men of Heraclitus. The wildness and the enthusiasm, at once specu-lative and irrational, are Oriental rather than Greek, and are probably due rather to the soil than to the germ. Comparatively little of this is to be found in Heraclitus himself, although for their abrupt quaint-ness his sayings might be called ῥηματισκά αὐτηργατώδη.
5. οὐκ ἄν ποτὲ λάβοις λόγον] Ar. Met. 4. 1006. a. γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθάνιν ἔχοντα λόγον, ἡ μὴ ἔχει δύνασα γὰρ φυτῇ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἡ τοιοῦτος ἴδιον. K. 1003 a: μηθέν γὰρ τίθετες ἀναφύνοι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἄλος λόγον, ὅστη πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιοῦ- τους οὐκ ἐστι λόγος.
6. αὐτούς δὲ δεὶ παραλαβόντας] 'But we must take the doctrine out of their hands, and con it over by ourselves like a geo-metrical theorem.' The object of παραλαβόντας is vague; nei-ther λόγον in the sense just used, nor ἄρχην; but τὰ Ἑρα-κλείατεια ταύτα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.
8. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα] 'Well, the theorem, as you call it.' Compare with the repetition of τὸν διὰ the double use of γὰρ, ἀλλα, k. t. l.

πεύματα τυχάνει [Sc. οὖν,
which is purposely (or instinc-
tively) omitted. *Ωκεανός τε καὶ
Τρόφε are in apposition with ἡ
γένεσις, and ρεμάρα is predicate.
Arch. expresses not what the
poets said, but what they meant,
depending partly on παρελθόν.
3. σκυτοτόμοι] I. e. ‘The mean-
est artificers.’ Cf. Prot. 324. :
ὡς μὲν—ἐκάστος ἀποδέχονται—καὶ
χαλέπιος καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβοῦ-
λέοντος τὰ πολιτικὰ: alib. They
do not inquire whether they are
understood or not.
7. Οἶνο] MSS. oīn. But the
words of Simplicius in Aristot.
Phys. f. 7. a. are decisive: άκι-
νητον αὐτῶ άνωμεί καὶ μόνον ὡς
πάντων ἐξερήμηνον.
8. τελέθαι, τῷ παντὶ] So all
the MSS. Buttm. conj. ὡς μὲν,
τῷ πάντῃ. This is gathered from
the quotations of Simplicius,
and is probably right.
10. ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν οἷς] ‘All
Being is One, and standeth
self-contained, not having any
space in which it moves.’ The
nearest approach to this latter
assertion in the fragments of
Parmenides is in the lines—
(78—85 Mull.) οἴδη διαμετόρ
ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὄμοιον, οἴδη
τῷ μᾶλλον τῷ κεν εἴργας μν
ξυνέχεσθαι, οἴδη τὶ χειρότερον πᾶς
δὲ πλέον ἐστὶν ἄ ντερ τῷ: ξυνέχει
πᾶν ἐστὶν, ἐν γὰρ ἄντερ πελάσξει.
Ἄλλαρ αὐτών μεγάλων ἐν πελάστω
δεσμών ἐστιν, ἀφαρχὸν, ἀπαντοῦν,
ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὀλθήρας τῇ μᾶλ
ἐπιλάγχθαι, ἀποκεῖσθαι τῇ πλατῖ
δήν. ταῦτιν ὡς ἐν τούτῳ τῇ μένον
καὶ κατὰ τὸ κεῖται.

He asserts, however, that
Being is not without bounda-
ries, else it would be imperfect.
Zeno appears to have said,
that being was neither with nor
de Xenoph. Gorg. et Melissos,
c. 3: 'Αἰῶνὸς δὲ διὰ καὶ ἕνα καὶ
σφαιραίδη, οἵτινς ἄπειρον, ὅταν πε-
περάσθαι "Ἀπειρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐκ
———τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅταν τῷ οἷς ἄντι
οὗτο τοῦ πόλου ὀμοιοθαν. Ἡ ἡ
γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς ὅτι περικεί.
The Eleatics did not abstract
the idea of Being from that of
extension, although its fulness
destroyed the idea of space. It
was here that the Atomists
joined issue with them. To
οὖν, οὐ ἔταΐρε, πᾶσι τι χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν p. 180. γὰρ προϊόντες λειλήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον
tεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μὴ πη ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν,
dίκην δώσομεν ὀσπέρ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιότεραις διὰ p.181.
γραμμῆς παίζουσιν, ὅταν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες
ἐλκωνται εἰς τὰναντία. δοκεῖ ὁδ’ ἂν οἱ τοὺς ἐτέρους
πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ’ ὀσπέρ ἀρμήμασεν, τοὺς ἑόντας.
καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνονται λέγοντες, συνέλ-
ξομεν μετ’ αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν
περιόμενοι. ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ δλούν στασιῶται ἀλήθε-
στερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ’ αὐτούς ἀπ’ αὖ
τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινοῦντων. ἀμφοτέροι δ’ ἄν φαινόσι

Leucippus and Democritus the
relations of body were not
symbolical but real. They felt
that they must account for mo-
tion. Hence their assertion of
the existence of empty space,
tὸ κενὸν, or, in other words, τὸ
μὴ δὲν in the material sense.

2. ἐις τὸ μέσον] Viz. by hav-
ing partly discarded and partly
retained the principle, ἐπιστήμη
ἀληθῶς,—τὸν Πρωταγόρον λόγον
μὴ παντάσσει λέγοντες.

4. διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες] A game,
like our French and English,
was called διελθοσία.

6. δοκεῖ ὁδ’ ἂν μα] “I think
therefore we ought first to ex-
amine the one faction, in the
direction of whom we started,
these wavering movers of un-
rest; and if we find any truth
in them, we will join our efforts
with theirs to pull us to them,
endeavouring to shake the
others off. But if those who
stand for the unbroken Whole
of Being seem to speak more
reasonably, we will desert to
these again from the revolu-
tionary violence of the move-
ment party.”

7. τοὺς βιόστατας] They are hu-
morously identified with their
principle. Vid. supr. ἄρχοντες γὰρ
κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα βέβαια.

For a similar reference to a
set of persons by an epithet,
cf. Philob. 46: οἷς οὕτως μετα-
χείρισθη. Soph. 248: τὸ νῦν δὲ
p. 488: τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιμε-
στάτων.

11. ἀπ’ αὖ τῶν] (ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν
παρ’ αὐτῶν Bodl. Vat. Ven. P. Παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀπ’ αὑτῶν cett. αὖ ἀπ’
tῶν Bekk.) We pass from the
image of the game to that of a
civil war, in which the Hera-
cliteans are the ‘movement,’ or
revolutionary, party. There is
probably a slight play on the
word στασίωτα.
p. 181. μηδὲν μετριόν λέγουτες, γελοίοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίονς δὲ καὶ παστόφοις ἄνδρας ἀποθεωκικότεσθαι. ὅρα οὖν, ὥ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυντελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι κἂν δυνον.

ΘΕΟ. Οὔδεν μὲν οὖν ἄνεκτόν, ὥ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὖ διασκέψασθαι τι λέγουσιν ἐκάτεροι τῶν ἄνδρων.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προδυμομένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἄρχῃ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι, ε ποὺν τι ποτε ἄρα λέγουτες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιοῦτο: πότερον ἐν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ἄστερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτο, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἦν καυχή πάσχωμεν, ἁν τι καὶ δέχῃ. καὶ μοι λέγει ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χάραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐν ἑστω εἰδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ, ἢ μέλαιν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἄλλοιῳ...
On their granting this, we ask, Do you mean that all things move in both these ways? And they must say, Yes; or else it will be as true to say that things stand still, as that they move.

5. ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν] Coeial. τὴν μὲν ἄλλ., τὴν δὲ περιφ. —quod glossa sapit. Stallb. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent φορά. The answer probably is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cf. 7. διαλεγόμεθα ἢδη] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable. ὑποθέτομεν νομιμοτέρον αὐτῶς ἢ νῦν ἐθλοντας ἢ ἀποκρίνασθαι. (Soph. 246.)

Perhaps also the revolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolical of the Heraclitean cycle of elements. (Lassalle.) For περιφορα Ἀριστοτ. τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν λαβοντες—ἀντιρομπλαν Ἐλευθ., φοράν ὀδον βιάζουν.

7. διαλεγόμεθα ἢδη] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable. ὑποθέτομεν νομιμοτέρον αὐτῶς ἢ νῦν ἐθλοντας ἢ ἀποκρίνασθαι. (Soph. 246.)


19. ἑνίαν] Almost all the MSS. have ἑνίαν. But the correction of the Bodl. MS. appears to be in an ancient hand.
2. Ἑκάστη δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν] Cf. p. 149: Ἀριῶν ἢτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἔσθησαι;
5. τὸ μὲν πάσχον ἀλοθήτων] ἀλοθήτων is inconsistent with the context, and with the language used elsewhere in the dialogue. Buttmann conjectured ἀλοθήτων, to which Schleiermacher objected that τὸ πάσχον means the sensorium, and not the sentient subject. But the distinction between them is not clearly marked from the Protagorean point of view. Indeed the conception of a ‘sensorium’ nowhere appears, at least in this part of the dialogue. It is only in speaking of a particular sense that τὸ πάσχον means, for instance, the eye. (p. 157.)

In p. 159 it appears doubtful whether τὸ πάσχον means the tongue or Socrates, or more indefinitely the ‘recipient.’ And even if τὸ πάσχον is limited to the organ of sense, there is no reason why ἀλοθήτω should not be used of this. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 5: ἡ γλῶσσα γνώμον τοῦτον ἐνεργάσθη.)

The noun ἀλοθήτης appears to be suggested in p. 160, (if it is not coined on the spot,) by the use of ἐπιστήμων just before.

In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recall a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488. οἱ ἐπισκόποι. Supr. 180. τὸ γὰρ δὴ πρόδρομα.) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present passage. (ἰσως οὖν ἡ ποιήσεις ἀμα ἀλλόκοτον τα φαινέται δυναμα κ.τ.λ.)

Apart from these considerations, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argument in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be allowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also be urged, that the masculine gender of ἀλοθήτης would impair the effect of the passage, in which every thing seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and impersonal.

The other conjectural reading, ἀλοθανόμενον, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes, and it is quite possible that ἀλοθήτως may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist.

6. ἦτι] i. e. when we carry our analysis so far.
subject and the object.

tó dé poiôn poiôn ti álλ' oú poiôttta; ἵσως oûn ἤ p.182. poiôttas áma āllókotôn te φαίνεται ónoma kai oú maνθάνειs áðróon λέγομενον катά μέρη oûn ἁκούε.
tó γάρ poiôn oûte tērēmótis oûte leυκότηs, tērēmōn ἢ 5 dé kai leυkōn γίγνεται, kai tάllα oûtω. mémνημαι γάρ πον ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὧτι oûtωs ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μιδὲν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδ' αὐτῷ τό poiôn ἢ ἰάςχων, ἀλλ' εξ αμφοτέρων πρὸs ἀλληλα συγγενο-
μένων tάς αἰσθήσεις καὶ tά αἰσθητά ἀποστίκτοντα tά 10 μέν poiών ἂττα γίγνεσθαι, tά δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι. πῶς δ' οὖ;  ἢ γάρ;

ΣΩ. Τά μέν poiówn ἀλλα χαρεῖν εἰσομεν, εἴτε τά 15 ἀλλάς εἴτε oûtωs λέγουσιν οὖ δ' ἕνεκα λέγομεν,  τούτῳ μόνῳ φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτοῦμεν. Κινεῖται καὶ  ὅς φατέ, τά πάντα; ἢ γάρ;

1. poiôn ti] MSS. poiônti. But the Bodleian margin has poiôn ti, with marg. F, corr. E. ἢ poiôttas] Two difficulties stand in the way of the reception of any new 'term of art'; the strangeness of the word, and the effort required to follow the generalization which it presupposes.

2. ἀλλόκοτον] 'Strange and uncouth.'

3. ἀδρόν λέγομεν] 'The collective (i.e. general) expression.' This harmonizes with the language adopted above, p.157. δεὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὔτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀδρουσθέντων, ὧ δή ἀδροίσματι ἄνθρωποιν τε τίθεθαι καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ἰών τε καὶ ἐδον. The conception of quality is of later growth than that of kind or form; this being less abstract, and still retaining a tinge of metaphor.

8. ἀλλ' εξ ἀμφοτέρων—al-
σθανόμενα] The construction alters as the sense develops itself; at first scarcely more is intended than γίγνεσθαι ὡσα δὲλ γίγνεται: presently the genitive becomes the subject of the infinitive. 'But out of both as they come together—they become, while producing sensations and sensible things, the one of a certain kind, the other percepient.' 14. φυλάττωμεν—Ἧνα μὴ ἀλῆ-
ταιτή μένον] Cf. supr. p.154: φυ-
λάττων μὴ ἑκατία εἶπο. Infr. p. 183: ἤνα δὴ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀπάκρυις ὅρος φανῇ. And, for the argu-
ment, Cratyl. 439: 'Αρ' οὖν οὖν τά τε προεκεῖνοι αὐτὸ ἄρθος, εἰ δὲν ἔντεξχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὃ πεκάκω ἑστώ, ἐπείνα τις τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἄμα ἡμῶν λέγομεν ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς
ΤΟΙΑΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 182. ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἂς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις,

θερόμενα τε καὶ ἄλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ᾿ οὐ; εἰ πέρ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μέν τοῖνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἰλλοιούτο δὲ 5

μή, εἰχόμεν ἂν ποῦ εἰπεῖν, οὐδ’ ἄτα ρεῖ τὰ φερόμενα;

ἡ πῶς λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ῥεῖν

tὸ ῥέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην

χρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἁλὸ ταύτη μένον· ἀρά ποτε οἶν τε ς τι

προσεπείν χρῶμα, ὡστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, δ’ Σάκρατες; ἡ ἀλλο γέ

τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, εἴπερ αἰεί λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ὀτε 15

dὴ ῥέον;

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὑποικοῦν,

οἶνον τῆς τοῦ ὀράν ἡ ἀκούει; μένειν ποτὲ εἰν αὐτῷ τῷ

ἐ ὀράν ἡ ἀκούει;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὀρᾷ προσρητεῖν τι μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ

ὁ ὀρὰ, οὔτε τιν’ ἄλλην αἰσθήσιν μᾶλλον ἡ μή, πάντων

gε πάντως κινούμενων.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀισθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὥσ ἐφαμεν 25

ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. Ὡν ταῦτα.

γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξίσταται καὶ μηκέτι 12. τι προσεπεὶν χρῶμα] To give the name of any color (to an object) — To use the

οὕτως ζήχειν;

name of any colour so as to apply it rightly.

17. Ti dē peri 'aisthēseis] So far of 'aisthēta, now of 'aisthēseis.
The principle of motion has proved a fallacious support, since according to it every answer, whether Yes or No, is, or rather becomes, equally true, except that both Yes and No are falsified while we are uttering them. A new dialect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only word for it

4. Καλῶν ἃν ἡμῶν] “Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first answer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both ‘it is so’ and ‘it is not so,’ or, if you choose, ‘becomes so,’ that we may say nothing that would bring them to a stand-still.” Heind. compares Rep. X. 602: χαρισεις ἂν εἰς κ. τ. λ.
8. οὖτω τ᾽ ἔχεις φάναι] In opposition to ἀπόκρισις. While you are naming a quality, it is altered and slips away; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words Sense is knowledge, your theory of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable.

12. Πλήν γε, ὁ Θεόδωρος] μὴ is changed to όμη, because the words are taken out of their hypothetical connexion. Compare the language of the Parmenides, e. g. p. 158: ἐν τῷ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μέση ἐν μέση πολλά.
13. οὔδε γὰρ] “For when we think of ‘so,’ there is no motion in it: nor yet in ‘not so.’”
15. ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλῳ φωνῆ θετοῦ] Cf. supr. 157. Soph. 252: τῷ τε εἰσάγοντο αὐτά ἀναγκάζονται χρήσαι καὶ τῷ χαρίς καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ τῷ καθ’ αὐτό καὶ μηδεὶς ἔτηροι, ὅν ἀκρατεῖς δοτες ἐγρήγοροι καὶ μὴ συνάπτεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ
p. 183. τὸν λόγον τούτον λέγουσιν, ὅς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ρήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὖθ᾽ ὅπως. μᾶλλον δὲ οὖτως ἀν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἀπειρον λεγόμενον.

ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς. 5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὖτω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἔωι, ἀν μὴ φρόνιμος τὸς ή ἐπιστήμην τε αὐτόθησιν οὐ συγχωροῦμεθα κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μὴ τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.


Aristotle points out (1), that it does not follow, because quantity is wholly relative, that quality need be so also; (2) that it is not the quality, but the subject of it, which changes.

Sensations are wholly shifting and relative. They could not be the objects of the mind, unless we perceived resemblance and difference in them. In every act of sense, therefore, there is a universal element, and the mind gives to it its own stamp of unity.

Arist. Met. T. 1008 a: καὶ γίγνεται δή τοῦ Ἀναξιόγρου, ὡμοῦ πάντα χρημάτα· διότι μὲν οὖν ἀλήθες ὑπάρχειν, τὸ ἀρμόττον οὖν ἐοκαίτι λέγειν, καὶ οἴκοι οὖν τὸ δὴν λέγειν, περὶ τοῦ μὴ διότος λέγουσιν τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει δὴ καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχεία τὸ ἀρμόττων ἐστιν.

2. τὸ οὖθ᾽ ὅπως—ἄπειρον λεγό—

μενον] With most of the Greek philosophers the Infinite was a purely negative idea.

At this point sensation appears to be annihilated. And yet if we view the dialogue as a whole, the impression we receive from it is rather this:—Sensations are purely relative to the individual, and infinitely diverse: taken alone, therefore, they cannot be the objects of knowledge and thought: but it is not denied that they are the occasions of thought and the conditions of knowledge. (p. 186. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.)

3. οὖτως ἄν αὐτ. Βιζ. οὖθ᾽ ὅπως.

6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου] This τέ is answered to by ἐπιστήμην τε—, καὶ is exegetic.

Aristotle, Met. T. 1009 a, expresses the same sense of relief, καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν εἰ—

ημεν τοῦ ἀραστοῦ καὶ καλούντος τι τῇ διανοίᾳ δρίσατο.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΟ. "Αριστ' είρηκας, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς τούτων γὰρ p.183. περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκριμό-
μενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρω-
tαγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίνη.
5 ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρὶν γ' ἄν, ὡς Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθητε, ἃ
ἀσπερ ἄρτι προσθέσθη.
ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὄν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἄδικους διδάσκεις Ṽμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ
10 παρασκενάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εάνπερ γε βούληται, ἥδιστα μέντ' ἄν ἥκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.
ΘΕΟ. 'Ιππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτης εἰς
15 λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα ὁ νῦ καὶ ἀκούσει.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μοι δοκῶ, ὡς Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε τὸν κε-
λεύει Θεαίτητος, ὅν πέισθαι αὐτῷ.
ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ ὁ νῦ ὅπως πέισθαι;
ΣΩ. Μέλισσων μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὃ ἐν ἔστω
20 λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνομένοις μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶ-
μεν, ἤτοιν αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἐνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρ-

4. σχοίνη] The optative de-
pends on συνθήκας. As it was
greed I should, when the dis-
cussion of Protagoras' argument
should be completed.
14. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον] "You
challenge cavalry to an encoun-
ter in an open plain."
Schol.: Ἰππέας προκαλεῖσθαι
εἰς πεδίον, ἐπὶ τῶν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς
βελτίων καὶ ἐπιστημονικῶτεροις
αὐτῶν εἰς ἰον προκαλοῦμενοι.
Πάλαιν ἐν Θεαίτηρ καὶ Μένα-
δρος Καταψυχομένης γράφεται δὲ
καὶ Ἰππον εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖσθαι
ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ἄ βουλευταί τις προκα-
λοῦμεν. The latter interpreta-
tion is alone suitable here.
18. Τί δὴ οὖν] Either 'in what
respect?' or 'for what reason?'
The former is preferable. Comp.
Rep. p. 449: Τί μᾶλλον, ἡφη,
ὅμως σὺν ἀφιετε; 24, ἦ δ' ὅτι.
Ἐπὶ ἐγώ εἰςον, τί μᾶλλον; Ἀποφάσσα-
μεν ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, ἡφη.
19. ἔστῳ] So Bodl. (though
rather doubtfully) with Vat.
Ven. II.
p. 183. μενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδιόις τέ μοι ἄμα [εἶναι] δεινός τε. συμπροσέξειξα γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτηρ, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος
p. 184. τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναίον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῷμεν, τί τε διανοούμενοι εἴπε πολὺ 5 πλέον λειτώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος ὁρμηταί, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν, ἀσκεπτὸν γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκομαζόντων λόγων, εἰ τις αὐ-

1. τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου] Π. III. 172: αἰδιός τέ μοι ἑστιν, φιλε ἐκφρ., δεινὸς τε. (Post ἄμα Zitt.Ven. Π. Par. C. εἶναι inserrunt. Stallb. This is very possibly right.)

2. συμπροσέξειξα γὰρ—τὸ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτηρ] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides? Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he had conceived it; or do they refer to a fact or to a supposition which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217: οἷον (δὲ ἔρωτισον) καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμίῳ καὶ δισθόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγκόμην ἐγὼ νέος δὲν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ἄνω τε σπεδύτων. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated reference helps to mark the Parmenides as belonging to this series of dialogues. The same conception of the time at which Parmenides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Elean stranger,

(he professed disciple), Soph. 237: Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μεγας, δὲ παῖ, παιῶν ἡμῖν οὖν—ἀπεμαν-
τόρατο—ἔδει ἐκάπωτε λόγων.


4. οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα] It is remarkable to find in Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the! grammatical sense and the real drift of an author.

5. ἀσκεπτὸν γένητα] "Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry."

6. ἐπεισκομαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (sup. 177.) to that of a disorderly crowd of discussions. Compare Philebus, p. 62: βούλει δήτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ’ ἄχλου τις ἀθούμενος καὶ βαλόμενος, ἤτοι ταῖς ἀναπαύσας τὰς θύρας ἀφώ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑαυτῶν καὶ μίγνωσθαι ὅμω καθαρᾷ τὴν ἑνδε-
estérαν; See also Shakespeare, Rape of Lucrece: 'Much like a press of people at a door through her inventions, which shall soon go before.' For the use of the verb, see Rep. p. 500: ἐπεισκομαζό-
tas—said of the bad philosophers.
πλάτωνος

τοῖς πείστει: ἀλλὰς τε καὶ, δὲν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθεις ὁ 184.
ἀμήχανον, εἰ τε τις εἰ παρέργον σκέψεται, ἀνάξια ἢν
πάθοι, εἰτε ἰκανῶς, μηκυνώμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
ἀφανεί. δεὶ δὲ οὐδὲτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὁν κυίθ
5 περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειράσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαυετικῇ τέχνῃ
ἀπολύσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσοῦτε περὶ τῶν
eἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αὐσθησον γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην
10 ἀπεκρίνω. ἢ γὰρ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὁδὸν ἑρωτήσῃ τό τὰ λευκὰ καὶ
μέλαια ὀρᾷ ἀνθρώπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξὺ καὶ βαρέα
ἀκούει; εἴποις ἂν, οἴμαι, ὅμοις τέ και ὅσις.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερές τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων τοῦ
καὶ μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας ἐξετάζομεν τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ
ἀγεννέ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτον ἐναυτὸν ἀνελεύθε-
ρον, ἐστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἶων καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ-
λαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῇ.

2. εἰ τε τις κ.τ.λ.] The reasons
given here for avoiding acriticism
of Parmenides and the Eleatic
doctrine are not such as would
prevent its being discussed in
another dialogue. It would
therefore be a mistake to argue
from them against the genuine-
ness of the Sophists. Compare
with the expression ἐν νῦν ἐγεί-
450: οὐκ ἰστέ οἷον ἑσομὸν λόγον
ἐπεγείρετε.

4. ἦν κυίθ] Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.
6. οἰκολόγα] ἵνα ἄρος εἰς τὰ τοὺς ἀκριβεῖς τοῦ-
τον, διότι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβο-
λαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθε-
ρον εῖναι τοιοῦ δοκεῖ.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣΟΣ.

p. 184. σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρως ποτέρα ὅρθοτέρα, ὃ ὅρωμεν, τούτῳ εἶναι ὁφθαλμοὺς, ἡ δὲ ὁ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ὃ ἄκουο-μεν, ὅτα, ἡ δ' ὁ ἄκουομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' ὧν ἔκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, μᾶλλον ἡ δις.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὃ παί, εἰ πολλάι τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὁσπέρ ἐν δουρείοις ὑποίσ, ἀισθήσεις ἑγκάθην-
tai, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ὑμηὴν εἴτε ὃ τι
dei καλέοιν, πάντα ταῦτα ἕωτεῖνει, ἡ διὰ τούτων ὁιο
ὠργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἡ ἐκείνως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἑνεκά αὐτά σοι διακριθοῦμαι, εἴ
twi ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μέν ὁφθαλμῶν ἐφι-
κνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελανῶν, διὰ τῶν ἄλλων
ε ἐτέρων αὐ Τῳδῶν. καὶ ἐξεἰς ἐρωτῶμεν πάντα τὰ τοὐ-
αὐτά εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἁναφέρειν; ἵσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ
λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἡ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ
πολυπραγμονείς. καὶ μοι λέγεις ἑρμᾶ καὶ σκληρὰ
καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἢρα οὖ τοῦ
σῶμας ἔκαστα τίθης ; ἡ ἄλλου τινὸς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενός ἄλλου.

6. Δεινὸν γάρ που] 'Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perched, as in a sort of Trojan horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, with which, through these as instruments, we perceive the various objects of sense?'

7. ὁσπέρ ἐν δουρείοις ὑποίσ] The plural is caused by ἡμῖν. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Trojan horse.—Man cannot be regarded as a bundle of separate faculties having no higher unity: that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term 'organ of sense' perhaps originates with this passage.

12. Τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἑνεκά] It is with a view to this that I am so exact with you, namely, to the inquiry whether, &c. τούδε has a double reference to eis μίαν τινὶ ἰδέαν—αἰσθητά and to eì τινὶ κ. τ. λ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δ' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δ' ἄλλης ταὐτ' p. 185. αἰσθέσθαι, οἴον ἃ δ' ἄκοψι, δ' ὁψεως, ἥ ἃ δ' ὁψεως, δ' ἄκοψι;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι ἂν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δ' ὁφωνης καὶ περὶ χρώας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρῳ ἐστών;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕγογγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκὼν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρω μὲν ἐτερον,

15 ἐαυτὸ ὅτε ταυτὰ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκατέρων δὲ ἐν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκὼν καὶ ἐτε ἀνωμοίω εἰτε ὁμοίῳ ἀλλήλουν,

20 δυνατὸς εἰ ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσος.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτῶν δια-

νοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δ' ἄκοψι οὔτε δ' ὁψεως οἶον τὸ τοῦ

25 κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἑκτη-

[1. ἄ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως] The object of one sense cannot be perceived by another. Therefore if I perceive anything about the objects of two different senses, it cannot be through either of them.

23. τὸ κοινὸν] That which regards them both. You can re-

fer any particular sensation to its proper organ. Can you do so in the case of these common perceptions?

Cf. Rep. p. 522: Ὄλων τούτω τὸ κοινὸν, ὃ πᾶσαι προσχρώνουσι—ἐπι-

στήματι—τὸ ἐν, τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγγέλλονται.
ΤΕΑΙ. Τι δ’ οὐ μέλλει, ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης.

dύναμις;

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τῶν δύναμις τὸ τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν κοινῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις δῆλοι σοι, ὃ τὸ ἐστὶν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀ νῦν δὴ ἡ ἡρω-
τόμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τοῦτοι πᾶσι ποιά ἀποδώσεις ὁργανα, δι’ ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔκαστα ἔκαστα;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὕσιαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιό-
τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταύτων τε καὶ τὸ ἔτερον,

δ’ ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἄριθμον περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον
dὲ ὧν καὶ ἄρτιν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἑρωτᾶς, καὶ τάλαλα

ὀσά τοῦτοι ἐπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος

τῆ ψυχῆ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὡπέρεω, ο Θεαίτητε, ἀκολούθεις, καὶ ἐστὶν ἀ

ἔρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἐ

ἐκόμιν εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γ’ ὧν μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχήν οὐδῆ

 esports τοῦτον οὐδὲν τοῦτοις ὅργανον ὰδίον ἀστερ

ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ δ’ αὐτής ἡ ψυχή τὰ κοινὰ μοι

φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὅσ ἐλεγεν ἐς

6. τὸ τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν κοινῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις] Which is common not only to all the senses, but to all things.

8. ἀ νῦν δὴ ἡ ἡρωτᾶμα] Viz. as Thesetetus understands it, ὁμοιό-

τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐ-

τόν τε καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄριθμῶν περὶ αὐτῶν, re-

ferring to what has just pre-

ceded.

9. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the objects of sense.

22. ὅργανον ἰδιον] The Bodl. MS. has ὅργανον.

25. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ] The enthusiasm with which Socrates accepts Thesetetus’ acknowledg-
ment of the truth that the mind has its perceptions, independent of sense, belongs to the most interesting aspect of Greek Philosophy. "Gradually it threw off the garment of sense; it revealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their first freshness: they were not ideas but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race; objects not of speculation only, but of faith and love." (Jowett.) Comp., as another instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265: ὅν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων σέσθαι σε κατὰ γε θεῶν αὐτὰ γέγονεν, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νεώμακα. Καλῶς γε δὴ Θεαίτης. καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλοι ποιοτέρῶν εἰσα, νῦν δὲ τὸ λόγον μετὰ πεθοῦν ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειρούμεν ποιεῖν ὀμολογεῖν ἐπειδή δὲ σοῦ καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρ' ἀυτής λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσειν ἔφεισεν ἐπὶ τῷ νῦν ἐλευθερια γέγονεν, ἢ ἐκ περὶ τοῦ γέγονος ἀφό. 'Ευγοῖ μὲν ἄν αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτῆν ἐπορεύεται.

Σ. Μὴν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταύτων καὶ τὸ ἔτερον;

Τ. Ναι.

2. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] Ἀδ καλῷ ex præced. mente repetendum ētā, quæ notatu dignum est ellipsis, quum post has prōs δὲ τῷ καλῷ non inferatur nominativus, verbo it vel addito vel subaudiendo, velut inferatur Sympos. p. 195 c. Νέος μὲν οὖν ἄκοψι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλῶσι. Hein. Præter hoc pulchrum, quod in te laudavi. Stallb. The latter is right.

'Not only beautiful, but you have done me a kindness'— Cf. Eurip. Hec. 382. Καλῶς μὲν εἰπsville, ὥσιτε, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ἐκείνου.
Τι δε καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἀλληλα-σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἐαυτῷ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλ-λοντα.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δή ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληροτήτα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὁσαύτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νάι.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὲ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὁ τι ἐστῶν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίότητα πρὸς ἀλλῆλον καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχή ἐπανοίγεται καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γεγομένους πάρεστι ὁ φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα

3. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] In this and similar phrases the article retains its demonstrative force, as is evident where the words are separated; e.g. Euthyd. 303: ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῖς μεγαλο-πρεπεῖστοις. Soph. Οἰδ. Φυλ. 746: ἐκ δὲ τῶν μαλιστέρεοι.

4. πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι] Viz. as opposites.

Theaetetus is probably thinking of the recent argument in which ἀγαθὸν, ἀφελέμον, μέλλον, were identified. Throughout this dialogue we can hardly be said to rise to the conception of an existence or a goodness above time, except almost mythically in p. 177. That goodness in its actual working is always relative, is asserted Rep. 457: καλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τούτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀφελέμον καλὸν, τὸ δὲ βλα-βερὸν αἰσχρὸν.

ἀναλογιζομένη] ‘Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.’

11. Τὴν δὲ γε οὐσίαν] Sc. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the consciousness of his reader.

13. ἐπανοίγεται καὶ συμβάλλουσα] Returning upon (reviewing) the sensations, it perceives the Being of their objects, and comparing these together, perceives their opposition, and the Being of this again.
διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνειν p. 186. τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὀφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγγεται ὁδὲ ἄν καὶ παραγίγγηται.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἰόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὃ μηδὲ οὐσίας;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὔ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτων ἐπιστήμων ἑσταὶ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἑκείνων συναλλογισμῷ οὖσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἔουε, δυνατὸν ἄψασθαι, εἰκεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

1. ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνειν] 'Extend to the mind.' Cf. Tim. 64: τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνησεν—καὶ βραχὺ πάθος—ἐπιβαίνει—ἐπὶ τὸ φρύνομαι—τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ἡραίων ὑπὶ—ἀναλογίαν παρέχει το παθόν.

Phileb. 33: δὲν τῶν περὶ τὸ σώμα ἡμῶν ἐκπόντος παθήμαται τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασκευαζόμενα πρῶ τιν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθοῦν, ἀπαθῇ ἐκείνην ἐόσοντα, τὰ δὲ δ’ ἀμφίων ὑπότα, καὶ των δύστερ συμβόλων ἐννιεῦτα θίδων τε καὶ κοινῶν ἐκτέρπεται.

2. ἀναλογίσματα] 'But what the mind discovers by reflecting upon these.' The idea of proportion (τὸ ἀναλογία) does not seem to enter into the verb ἀναλογίσματα and its derivative noun.

6. ὃ μηδε οὐσίας] Ad dat. hunc quod ne oviscan quidem assequi potest is), ut declarant illum max.

Σίμπαν ἄρ’ αὐτὸ καλεῖς ἀλήθειαν;
ΘΑΥΜΟΣ. Ἄλλε, φάμεν, οὐ μέτοικον ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὖσιας.

Heindorf.

But in the present connexion ὃ is probably masculine. 'Is it possible for him to reach truth who misses being?' There is a transition in the next question from the subject to the object, from αἰσθανόμενος to αἰσθητοῦ. 'But can one have knowledge of that, the truth of which he misses?'

12. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἑκείνων συναλλογισμῷ] Something very different from syllogism is meant, and more nearly analogous to generalization. Cf. Phaedr. 249: Δὲν γὰρ ἰδοὺ ᾠδορουμένον συνιέμαι καὶ εἰδοὺ λέγομένον, εἰκόνων ἠν αἰσθητοῦ εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναρμόμενον.
p. 186. "Η οὖν ταύτων ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ τούτῳ καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφοράς ἔχοντε; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, ὁσφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;

ε ἘΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Ἀισθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; 

ΣΩ. Ἐμματὶ ἄφει αὐτῷ καλεῖς αἰσθήσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὄμε γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄφασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄφει ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄφη ἕν εἴη ποτὲ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθήσις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταύτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὁ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανεῖστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὅν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.

12. Οὐδ' ἄφει ἐπιστήμης] The gen. is governed by μέτεστιν alone. ἀληθείας and οὐσίας are governed partly by μέτεστιν, partly by ἄφασθαι.


17. καταφανεῖστατον γέγονεν] The criticism of sensation is now complete. We see it clearly, as relative, shifting, momentary, inseparable from physical conditions: we have placed ourselves above it, and proceed to explore the region next beyond, that of opinion.

To recapitulate the criticism of ἐπιστήμη αἰσθήσις. 1. Certain presumptions are raised against the saying ἄθρωπος μέτρον, as that it makes all beings equally wise, and that it implies that we can at once know and not know the same thing. 2. Protagoras is convicted out of his own mouth, for in confirming the opinion of other men he confutes himself. 3. There is at least one sphere of knowledge which is above sense, the foresight of consequences, the perception of what is good. 4. And within the sphere of sense, if sensation depend on motion, and motion include change, no quality can have a
is not. We set out to find what it is. Yet we have gained something. We shall not seek for it any more in sensation, but in whatever that is called, when the mind is by itself engaged with being. Opinion is the name for this.

II. Knowledge is true opinion.

name of its own. 5. The mind receives impressions from without through certain bodily organs; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impressions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind.

We have made sensation objective, and have risen to the consciousness of that which contemplates and pronounces upon sensations.

5. ἑκινόν τῷ ὀνόματι] 'But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind when engaged alone with being.'

The form of expression is partly influenced by the words Τί οὖν ἑκινήν ἀποδίδοις ἄρμα κ. τ. λ.

10. πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας] As if in a mathematical demonstration.


17. ἄλλω τί] Not adverbial here.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 187. ἐὰν γὰρ οὐτὸ δρῶμεν, δυνών θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσουμεν ἕφ' οὗ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἢττον οἰσάμεθα εἰδέναι ὁ μὴ δοῦσιν. καὶ τοι οὐκ ἂν εἶ ἡμῶν μεμπτὸς μυσθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τι φῆς; δυνών οἴνον [εἴδεον] δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδός δὲ τοῦ ἐπερεύ, τὴν ἀληθῆς δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὑπάρχει;

ΘΕΑΙ. *Ἐγώες* τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. *Ἀρ' οὖν ἐτ' ἀξίων περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν;*

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Θράττει μὲ ποιν νῦν τε καὶ ἀλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτόν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλον γεγονεῖναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τούτῳ τὸ πάθος παρ' ἦμι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγυνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;?

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν των ψευδή. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐστωμεν αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπισκεφάλεια ἀλλον τρόπον ἡ ὅλγον πρότερον.

4. [εἴδεων]] MSS. ἰδέαν.
8. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] ‘To take up a thread of the previous argument.’

Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἐδώ (fantasia being συμβολὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως), yet the same question returns upon us in regard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connexion between the present inquiry and the foregoing. Cf. Cratyl. 429: 'Ἀρ' ὅτι ψευδή λέγειν το παράσαν οὐκ ἔστω, ἀρα τοῦτο σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συγκρινὸ γὰρ τινα οἱ λέγοντες, ὅπε περὶ Κρατίλης, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλιν.

See also Euthyd. 284, 286, where the ἀπορία (ὅτι ψευδεσθαι, ἀντιλέγειν, οὐκ ἔστω) is ascribed to the followers of Protagoras amongst others.

13. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἦμι] ‘This experience of the human mind.’

16. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐτι] Though the past discussion has been “wiped out,” this still remains “to trouble the mind’s eye.”

18. ἀλλον τρόπον ἡ ὅλγον πρότερον] i. e. Not with reference to sensation and motion, but in a more abstract way. The ‘manner’ has something in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression, compare Soph. 245. τοῦ δὲ ἀλλως λέγοντας αὐτὸν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὁ Ἑὐκρατεῖς, εἰ πέρ γε καὶ ὑπή- p. 187. γοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἀρτί γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοι- οὺς δὲ κατεπείγει.

5 ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας. ἵσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καὶ- ε ῥοῦ πάλιν ὁσπερ ἵσως μετελθὲιν. κρείττον γὰρ τὸν σμικρὸν εὖ ἡ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανῶς περιναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ἴσως φαμὲν τοῖς ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τινα ἰμῶν δοξάζων ἴσως, τὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἑξώντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ δὴ.

ΣΩ. Ὁμοιόν τὸδε γ’ ἐσθ ἵμων περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 188. καθ’ ἐκαστον, ἢτοι εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλαυθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαῖ- ρειν λέγον ἐν τῷ παρόντι. νῦν γὰρ ἰμῶν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδὲν.

6. πάλιν ὁσπερ ἵσως μετελθέιν)] We seemed to ourselves to be launching into a wholly new inquiry, but we have fallen into the same track by a different route. Cf. Aristot. Eth. I.: μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς πάλιν ἀφίγεται. Aesch. Prom. 864. τοῖς μετελθὼν τῶν πάλαι λόγων ἵσως.

4. ήτοι εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι] This takes up the thread of reflection introduced above, p. 165: δὴ οὖν τε τῶν αὐτῶν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο δὲ οὖν μὴ εἰδέναι; It was one weakness of the 'sensational' doctrine that it led to this con- tradiction. The same opposition considered in the abstract is now used to prove the impossibility of falsehood in opinion.

The discussion which follows probably bears some relation to the notions of Gorgias, and perhaps of Antisthenes. At all events it would seem to be a fragment of Elasticism; being exactly parallel to the diffi- culties raised by Zeno against the possibility of motion. It runs parallel also to the subtleties of the later Megarians.

6. νῦν γὰρ ἰμῶν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδὲν] Because we choose to dwell on the absolute alterna- tive, knowledge or ignorance. Cf. supr. p. 158. μὴ ὑπολαμβα- νεῖ—.

Plato thus hints at the true solution of the difficulty, viz. the conception of a gradual process, which is afterwards presented under the image of the impressions on wax, &c.

The doctrine of recollection, developed in the Meno and Phaedo, is also held in reserve.
p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἔκαστον πλῆν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ ἐιδέναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὅν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς οὖ; 

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδή δοξάζων, ἀ οἶδε, ταῦτα οίεται οὐ ταῦτα εἰναι ἀλλὰ ἔτερα ἄττα ὅν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδότος ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφότερα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἀ μὴ οἴδεν, ἤγειται αὐτὰ εἰναι ἔτερα ἄττα ὅν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τούτ' ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεα- τητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὅσ ο Σωκράτης Θεατητος ἢ ὁ Θεατητος Σωκράτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν; 

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔ μήν, ἡ γε τις οἴδεν, οίεται που ἀ μή οἴδεν αὐτὰ εἰναι, οὔδ' αὖ ἀ μή οἴδεν, ἀ οἴδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν τις ἐτι ψευδὴ δοξάζειν; ἔκτοσ γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατον που δοξάζειν, ἐπεὶ πέρυ πάντ' ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτως οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται ὑπατῶν ψευδὴ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεύτατα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ ταῦτα σκέπτεν ὁ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰναι δ καὶ μή;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

27. ἄν] So the Coislinian MS.
ΣΩ. Μή ἀπλοῦν ἃ ὅτι ὅ τὰ μὴ ὑντα περὶ ὅτου ὁν ὑπ. 

δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδή δοξάζει, καὶ ὅπωσον 

ἀλλος τὰ τῆς διανοιας ἔχη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὢ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖ; τι ἐροῦμεν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἐὰν τις 

ἡμᾶς ἀνακρινη; Δυνατὸν δὲ ὅτι οὗ ὁ λέγεται, καὶ τις 

ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὅν δοξάζει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων τοῦ 

εἴτε αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς 

ταῦτα φήσομεν "Οταν γε μὴ ἄληθη ὄνται οἰόμενοι. ο

ἡ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὖτος,

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἀλλοθ' που τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τις ὁρᾷ μὲν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδὲν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔν γε τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. 

ἡ σὺ οἰεὶ ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;

1. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἃ] "May it not 

possibly be simply thus:" μὴ 

expresses συπρικίαν = "I should 

donot wonder if." Cf. Phaed. 67. 

μὴ οὐθεμοῦν ἃ. Ibid. 69.: μὴ 

γάρ οὖς αὐτὴ ἢ ὁ ὁρᾷ ἀλλαγή 

κ. τ. λ. μὴ σκεπασματία τε ἢ ἡ 

τοιούτη ἀρετή. ΟΕΙΚ. 48: μὴ — 

ταῦτα — σκέψεως ἢ: and see Ast. 

Lex. sub v. For ἀπλοῦν in this 

sense, v. supra λ. 147: ἀπλοῦν εἰ- 

πείν. Symp. 184. Polit. 306: 

πότερον οὖσα ἀπλοῦν ὧτε νοῦν τοῦ, 

ἡ — ἔχει διαφοράν — ἀριστολ. 

Εστ. N. V. 9. 9: ἢ ὀδὴ τοῦτο 

ἀπλοῦν.

6. ἀνέγερται] Which is assert-

ed. Buttmann and Bekker conj. 

ἀνέγερται, which seems probable, 

but not necessary. Cf. Phaed. 

77, where there is a similar 

doubt.

14. E[ ] Interrogative.

16. εἰ ἔν γε τι ὁρᾷ] The con-

verse argument is used Rep. 

478, where it is asked, 'What 

is opinion concerned with?' ἤ 

ὁ οὐθε το αὐτοῦ ἄδοξαζεν 

μὴν ἄδοξαζεν δὲ μὴν; Ἀδώνιον. Ἀλλ' ἐν 

γε 

το άκοφα ὁ δοξαζοῦν; Ναλ. Ἀλλὰ 

μὴν μὴ ἐν γε οὐχ ἔν 

τι, ἀλλὰ μὴ 

δοξαζεται ἐν προσαγωγεῖον. Πάνω 

gε. This close relation between 

the ideas of unity and being, 

derived from Parmenides, ap-

pears frequently. See esp. 

Sopb. 238: ἀνέγερται τῶν το 

κέρατα 

ἐν γε τι 

λέγεται. The mind can-

not recognise being except 

where it finds its own impress 

of unity.

Ἀρ. Μετ. 1006. b.: οὐ 

δεῖχεται νοέων μὴ 

νοεύσα 

ἐν.
p. 189. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ ἐγώγε.
ΣΩ. Ὡ ἁρα ἐν γέ τι ὅραν ὁν τι ὅρα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἁρα τι ἄκοινων ἐν γέ τι ἄκοινει καὶ ὁν ἄκοινει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Νάι.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δή του, ἐνός γέ του ἀπτεται καὶ ὀντος, ἐπερ ἐνός ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτο.
ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων σοῦ ἐν τι δοξάζει ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄναγκη.
ΣΩ. Ὁ δ’ ἐν τι δοξάζων σοῦ ὁν τι ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐνυχωρὸ.
ΣΩ. Ὁ ἁρα μὴ ὁν δοξάζων οὐδεν δοξάζει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Ἄλλα μὴν ὁ γε μηδέν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὔκ ἁρα οὖν τε τὸ μὴ ὁν δοξάζεων, οὔτε περὰ τῶν ὀντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι ἅρ, ἔστι τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζεων τοῦ τα μὴ ὁντα δοξάζει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλο ἐοικεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐ [τε] γὰρ οὖτως οὔτε ὡς ὄλγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδὴς ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δῆ.
ΣΩ. Ἄλλ’ ἁρα ὡδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύμενον ;

19. περὶ τῶν ὄντων] Arist. μαρ ἐκλάς λέγομεν δει οὐκ ὑπάρχει
Met. Γ. 2. 1004 : ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στήρισαν μᾶς ἐστι θεωρήσας 25. MSS. οὐ γὰρ. τε seems re-
καὶ στήρισαν μᾶς ἐστι θεωρήσας τὸ ἀμφιτέρος θεωρίσασαι τὸ quired, but γάρ is bright. Cf. p.190.
ἐν, οὐ ἂν ἀπόφασις ἢ στήρισις (ἡ 28. Ἄλλ’ ἁρα ὡδε γιγν.”) But
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὐσαν ψευδὴ φαμὲν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὑπὸν ἄλλο αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπῶν, οὐκ ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φη ἐστί. οὕτω γὰρ ὅν μὲν ἂει δοξάζει, ἐτέρου δὲ ἀνθ᾽ ἐτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρτῶν οὐ ἐσκότη δικαίως ἀν καλοῖτο ψευδὴ δοξάζων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὢρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γὰρ τις ἄντι καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄντι αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὅσ ἄληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλος εί, ὁ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μον καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα;

ΣΩ. Όυκ ἂν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἄληθὸς ψεύδους διὰ ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἀρόμενος εἰ οἷον τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κούφων βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίον γίγνεσθαι ἐαυτοῦ ἐναντίος. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην βαρή−

ΦΙΣΗ. "Εμοίγε.

may it be supposed, then, that the following occurrence is what we express by this name? 'What?' 'That what we call false opinion is really a sort of

transference of opinion.'

2. Ἀλλοδοξίαν] This seems to have been a prevalent conception. Vid. Arist. Met. γ. 5. ιοιο. ε.: φασι δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὄμηρον ταύτην ἕχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησεν τὸν Εκτὸς, ὡς ἐξίστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, κείσανθι ἀλλοφρονεῦσα, ὅσ φρονήσατο μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονεύσας, ἀλλὰ οὖ ταῦτα. He ascribes this application of Homer to Democtitus, de An. I. 2. Cf. Herod. I. 85: ἀλλο-

γνώσας τὸν Κρόισον.

φαμὲν] In apposition with the preceding verb; introduced by ὅτι.


ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΣΩ. "Εστιν ἀρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἔτερον τι ὅσ ἔτερον καὶ μὴ ὅσ εἰκείνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἐστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. "Ὅταν οὖν τούθ' ἡ διάνοια τοῦ δρῆ, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτήν ἦτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἔτερον διανο-, s εἰσθαί;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. "Ἡτοί ἂμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει;

ΤΕΑΙ. Κάλλιστα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὁ περ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;

ΤΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν;

ΣΩ. Δόγων δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχή διεξέρχεται περὶ ὅσ ἄν σκοπῆ. ὡσ γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τούτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοομένη, οὐκ p. 190. ἄλλο τι ἡ διαλέγομαι, αὐτή ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, ἐπε βραδύτερον, ἐπε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπιτάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φη καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὡστ' ἐγὼ τὸ δοξάζων λέγειν καλῶ

2. ὡς εἰκείνο] Referring to the first ἔτερον.

8. "Ἡτοί ἂμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει;] The bearing of these words is not quite clear. Perhaps they are meant to introduce the analysis of thinking, in which things are present to the mind at first successively, afterwards in one view.

Compare with this account of thinking Phileb. pp. 38, 39, where the mind not only talks with itself, but has a writer and a painter within it. "Ἀρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς —— κ. τ. λ. Soph. 263: Ὅθ' οὖν διάνοια μᾶς καὶ λόγος ταύτ' πληρ' δέ μᾶς ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄμετφωνος γεγομένος κ. τ. λ.

14. τούτω γάρ μοι] Plato was probably thinking of Odyssey 19. 224: ἐρίω, ὡς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἤτορ. Compare the φάσματα in the beginning of the dialogue. 'The semblance it presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in question and answer with itself.'

16. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα] 'But when it has come to a determination, whether slowly, or having flown rapidly to its conclusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.'

X
καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον π. 190.
οὐδὲ φωνὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῆ πρὸς αὐτὸν. οὐ δὲ τί;
ΘΕΑΙ. Κάγω.
ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ
5 φησίν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον εἰναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;
ΣΩ. Ἀναμμηνήσκοι δὴ εἰ πῶς οὗτος εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ τοι καλὸν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν
ἡ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον, ἥ καὶ, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον,
10 σκόπει εἰ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον ἐστὶν, ἡ πάν τούτων ὁμοῦ ἐν ὑπνῷ πῶς ποτὲ ἑτολμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν

8. παντὸς μᾶλλον—παντάσαυν ἄρα—ἀναγκῇ] The dramatic force of such particle is noticeable: cf. Phil. 38: αἰτῶν—ἀναγκὴν ὃν ἀδειὸν ἐπιστὶκον παρὰ τὴν πέτραν—

The Greek language from Homer downwards was peculiarly apt to suggest the above reflections on the nature of thought. Διαλεκτικῆς was its proper development. The following remarks of Col. Mure (Lit. of Greece, B. II. c. xiv. § 1.) on the self-dialogue of Homer, apply in some degree to all Greek literature. “Exclusively proper to Homer is his power of dramatizing, not merely action, but thought; not merely the intercourse between man and man, but between man and himself, between his passions and his judgment. The mechanism of which the poet here chiefly avails himself is to exhibit the person under the influence of excited feelings as comming with, or, as Homer defines it addressing his own mind; discussing the subject of his soliciude under its various aspects as a question at issue between his judgment and himself. The conflicting feelings are thus, as it were, personified; while the current of the language, often the very sound of the words, is so nicely adapted to the turns of the self-dialogue, that the breast of the man seems to be laid open before us, and in the literal sense of the term, we read his thoughts as they flit through his bosom.”

12. ἐν ὑπνῷ—ὑγιαλνορὰ ἢ μακάμενον] Note the liveliness with which fresh touches are thrown in. It must be remembered here that sensible perception is excluded from consideration for the present, as well as learning and forgetting. Everything is either known or unknown; present to the mind, or not present.
The words ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει must therefore be rejected as a mistaken gloss.

If the words ἐπειδὴ—ταῦτα ἐστὶ are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου must either be omitted or transposed. But it is possible that this explanation has also crept in from the margin, and this suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the Bodl. p. m. wrote ἔστιν. We should thus revert to the reading of several MSS. ἐντεινότει καὶ σοὶ τὸ βῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου. περὶ is often used rather vaguely, e.g. Rep. p. 538. καὶ περὶ δικαίου ἰσαστάτως καὶ ἄγαθον. καὶ is a little difficult. It seems to belong to the whole sentence rather than to any particular word. Cf. Soph. Εδ. Τυρ. 44. ὥσ τοῖσιν ἐμπείρους καὶ τὰς ἐμψυχοδος ἀφυβάλλεται τῶν βουλευσάμων. Ant. 280. παῦσον πρὸν ὁργῆς κάμῳ μετούσαι λέγων. Εδ. Κολ. 1582. τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἡδονά καὶ ὑποθετοῦμα πρέπον. See Eeldeut's Lex. Soph. sub voce καὶ, C. 4. "Now as regards the word 'this or that,' you must e'en let it alone.

Or, 'the cow must be a horse,' or 'two is one.'

Therefore when I mistake this for that, I cannot have both in my mind.
περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου· [ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἑτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ p. 190. κατὰ ῥῆμα ταύτῶν ἑστὶ.] λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῷ ὁδοῖ, μηδένα διὰ δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἀλλὸ τὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

5 ὙΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ᾽, ὁ Σάκρατες, ἔως τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ ἑτερον ἑτερον δοξάζειν.

ὙΕΑΙ. Ἐοίκεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἑτερὸν γε μόνον δοξάζον, τὸ δὲ ἑτερον μηδαμῇ, οὐδέποτε δοξάζει τὸ ἑτερον ἑτερον εἶναι.

ὙΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἑφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

ΣΩ. Οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀμφότερα οὐτε τὸ ἑτερον δοξάζοντι οὐ εἴχωρεὶ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὡστε εἰ τις οριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη οὐτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἕμών οὐσίᾳ δόξα.

ὙΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐοίκεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὃν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα.

ὙΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποιὰ δή;
p.190. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι πρὶν ἀν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκο-
τῶν. αἰσχυνούμην γὰρ ἄν ὑπέρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ψ ψ ἀποροῦ-
μεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οὐλα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐάν
p.191. εὐρομεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενόμεθα, τότ' ἡδη περὶ τῶν
ἀλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς παχύτων, αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γε-
λοίου ἐστῶτες· ἐὰν δὲ πάντη ἀπορήσαμεν, ταπειω-
θέντες, ἀλλα, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς νυκτῶντες
πατεὼν τε καὶ χρήσθαι ὅ τι ἄν βούληται. ὑ οὖν ἐπὶ
πόρον τινὰ εὐρίσκω τοῦ ἔγνηματος ἡμῶν, ἀκονε.

5. αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοῖου ἐστῶ-
τες] 'When we are ourselves
free from the absurdity,' 'ex-
empt from the ridicule.'

7. παρέξομεν—πατεὼν] Gorg. 476: γενομεν τῷ λόγῳ δοσθὲ
ιατρῷ παρέξομεν ἀποκρινο. alib.
There is probably an allusion
to Soph. Ἀ. 1142 seqq.: Ἡθή
ποτ' ἐδοξον ἄλωρ' ἐγὼ γιάλωση ὑπα-
στήν ναυτᾶς ἐφορμήζαντα χειμῶνος
tο πλείν' ἵθεν' ἵνα ἄν εἰρεῖ
ἡμεῖς ἐν κακῷ χειμῶνος εἰκε'; ἀλλ' ἵν' εἰματος κρυβεϊς πατεὼν παρεῖχε
τῷ θελομε ναυτῶν.

The argument from p.187 to
p.191 may be thus condensed.

We no longer search for
knowledge in sensation, which
is neither true nor false, but in
opinion, where the mind is en-
gaged with its own objects by
itself. But here an old difficulty
meets us in another form. It
seemed that sensation could
not be false, because it was re-
lative to the subject. It now
seems as though opinion can-
not be false, because we cannot
separate a thinking subject
from knowledge and being.
What I do not know cannot be
present in thought. Neither
can I lay hold in thought on
that which is not. But can I
take one thing which is for an-
other which also is? Thought
being silent speech, if I lay
hold of both, (i.e. if both are
present to the mind,) I cannot
mistake them; e.g. No one
ever said to himself, Good is
evil. And if only one is pre-
sent to me, I cannot discourse
about them, e.g. if I am think-
ing only of the good, I cannot
say, Good is evil. We are in
great straits. For the result
at which we seem in danger of
arriving is contradictory to
most important facts.

We must not appeal to these,
however, until we have extri-
cated our minds, if possible,
from this metaphysical tangle.
For logical and metaphysical
difficulties are not to be solved
"ambulando," but by a higher
criticism of the forms of
thought which have occasioned
them.

In what follows, we are
brought gradually back from
the simple to the complex,
from the more abstract to the
more concrete. We are com-
pelled to image to ourselves,
what was discarded at a former
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὅρθως ὀμολογήσαι, ἦνικα ὀμολογήσαμεν, ἄ τις οἴδει, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἴδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ψευδθῆναι· ἀλλὰ πὴ δύνατον.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡρα λέγεις ὅ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπόπτευσα ἦμικ αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶμαι, ὅτι ἐνιοῦ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκον Σωκράτη, πάρρωθεν δὲ ὁ ὅρων ἄλλων ὁν ὑι γιγνώσκω, φήσθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὅν οἶδα; γίγνεται γάρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅνις λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἂ ἵσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι·

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ’ ὁδὲ ἰσωσ πη ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἵσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν stage of the inquiry, a process between the relativeness of sense and the absoluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of motion returns upon us in a higher form.

The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clearness into contact with the new. This is to think falsely.


13. ἀλλ’ ὅδε.] This is the punctuation of the Bodleian MS., which seems better than that usually followed. καὶ ἵσως, the reading of the later MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes thus introduced before ἀλλὰ—without any particle of connexion with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 430: σμερὰ μὲν τάδ’, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἰσώ, δὲς αὐτή.

Eur. Alc. 353: σκληρὰν μὲν, οἶδα, πάθεις’ ἀλλ’ ἐν γὰρ μόνον

τὰ πάντα λόγος ταύτ’ ἐποὺς μορφήματα.

Supr. p. 171: εἰςὸς γε ἁρα—

ἀλλ’ ἵμαν ἀνακῆ— — — Compare also the frequent asyndeton with πάντως. For ἵσως—ἳσως de cf. Apol. p. 18: ἵσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἰσωσ δὲ βελτίων ἄν εἰσι—


παρεικάθη τὸ μὲ ἐν λέγονσιν ὡς ἵσως ὡς ἁρα μὴ δὲ ἀνθῆσε ἀπαλ-
ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ.

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p. 191. τοιούτω ἐχόμεθα, ἐν δὲ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα

ἀλόγων βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν ἐν τι τέλος. ἄρα ἔστι

μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὑστερον μαθέων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡστί μεντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν καὶ αδύθις ἐτερον καὶ ἐτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τι δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Θές δή μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν

ἐνοὺν κήρυνον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἐλαττων,

καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδοτέρου,

d καὶ σκηνοτέρου, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἐστι δ' οἰς με-

τρῶς ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυπ αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν

(14.) ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ 'But we must

 riske the chance of failure, for,' 

&c.

3. μαθέω] The tense is no-

 ticeable. Whatever difficulty

may attend the conception of

the process of learning and for-

getting, (μαθάων, ἐπιλαμβάν-

οντας), it is certain that things

are learnt and forgotten (μαθέων,

ἐπιλαμβάνοντας.) In what follows

the process itself is imagined

rather than analysed.

7. Θές] Cf. Phileb. 34: θεὶς

tῶν περὶ τὸ σώμα ἡμῶν—παθημά-

tων τὰ μὲν, alib.— The image is

not unlike Locke's illustration

of the different kinds of mem-


§§ 4, 5: 'The brain in some

retains the characters drawn

on it like marble, in others

like freestone, and in others

little better than sand.' Ib. 29.

§ 3. 'If the organs or faculties

of perception, like wax over-

hardened with cold, will not

receive 'the impression of the

seal from the usual impress

wont to imprint it, or like wax

of a temper too soft, will not

hold it when well imprinted;

or else, supposing the wax of a

temper fit, but the seal not ap-

plied with sufficient force to

make a clear impression—in

any of these cases the print left

by the seal will be obscure.'

8. κήρυνον ἐκμαγεῖον] Plato's

image is not the common one

of a waxen tablet, but of a

'block of wax,' such as was

used for sealing. ἐκμαγεῖον is

used first of the whole mass,

afterwards of those parts of it

which have received the parti-

cular impressions.


ἀπόστων μουσιμήτωρ ἐργάτων.— 

Plat. Euthyd. 275: καθάπερ 

οἱ ποιηταὶ δέομα ἀρχόμενοι τῆς 

διαγγέλειν Μοῦσας τε καὶ Μημο- 

σόνην ἑπιμελέσθαι.
Μουσών μητρός Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἀν p.191.
βουλθούμεν μημονεύσαι ὅν ἀν ἰδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτῷ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἐννοίας, ἀποτυπωθεῖται, ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σημεία ἐν σημαίναμενον. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἔκμαγη, μημονεύει καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἦσος ἂν ἐνή ὁ ἐδώλων αὐτοῦ ὅταν ὃ ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἶν τε γένηται ἔκμαγην, ἐπίλει-ἀ λήσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστο οὖτως.

ΣΩ. Ὅ τοῦν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δὲ τι ὅν ὅρα ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἁρὰ τοὐδεὶς ὁ τρόπῳ ἰενὐὴ ἂν δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πούρ δὴ τις;

ΣΩ. Ἀ οἶδεν, οἰηθεῖς εἶναι τοῦτο μὲν ἂ οἶδε, τοῦτο δὲ ἂ μη. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὁμολογήσαμεν ὁμολογούντες ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Δεῖ οὖδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἄρχης διο- p.192.

1. ἐς τοῦτο — ἀποτυπωθεῖται
'To stamp them upon this, as if we were taking on it the impressions of seal-rings.'

3. ὑπέχοντας αὑτὸ] Holding it (the wax) to receive our perceptions and thoughts, we stamp them there, as if taking the impression of a seal. The infinitives are med., because the impressions are taken from our own sensations for our own use.

4. ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σημεία ἐν- σημαίναμεν] For the image of the seal, cf. Phaed. p. 76, where it is used of the mind impressing its idea of Being upon things.

6. ἦσον ὃ ἐξαλειφθῇ] Ven. Π. corr. ὃ ἂν. Bodl. et Vat. δὲ omittunt. The Bodl. however, has δ in the margin by a later hand. The common reading is sufficiently probable: the regularity of the sentence is broken by the introduction of ἦσον ὅν, so that instead of ὃ δὲ ἂν we have ἦσον δὲ. Cf. supr. p. 159, δ ἂν—ἐσταν.

10. αὐτά] Viz. δ ἂν ὅν καὶ ἀκούσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἐννοήσῃ. (supr.)

Although I know what is present to me in sensation, i.e. though I may have in me a previous impression of the same thing, yet I may mistake it, i.e. fail to identify it as the original of that previous impression.

4. ὃ γε οἶδεν] i. e. not supposing him to have a sensible perception of it.

6. καὶ ὁ ἀισθάνεται γε] i. e. not supposing him to know it. Both the above cases are distinguished from that in which a thing is both known and perceived.

II. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν] He holds the stamp left by the former sensation in a line with the present sensation, so that the two impressions coincide. Vid. inf. 194. κατανακρὸς μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἴδος.

14. ἔχουν τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς] Cf. the common expressions ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς, ἐξ ὀρθῶς φρενός.

The above statement may be put shortly thus: Mistake is impossible—1. When one thing is perceived by sense, when we know both or one or neither of them. 2. Between things not known, when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them.

3. Still more impossible, if that may be, between things, (a.) both of which are known, both perceived by sense, and the knowledge of each of which is identified with its proper sensation: (b.) One of which we know and also perceive sensibly, and identify the knowledge of it with the sensation: (c.) Both or either of which we neither know nor perceive sensibly.

The only cases left in which mistake is possible are (1.) when one thing is known and another perceived sensibly; or (2.) when two things are known and also present to sense, but we fail to connect knowledge and sensation rightly.
πλατωνος

οίδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταύτα, ὁ αἰσθάνεται. p. 192.
καὶ ὁ αὖ μὴ οίδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οίδε μηδὲ ὁ αἰσθάνεται.
καὶ ὁ μὴ οίδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οίδε καὶ ὁ μὴ οίδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται.

5 πάντα ταύτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδύναμι τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς
ψευδή τινὰ δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ
πέρ ποι ἄλλως, τὸ τοιούτον γενέσθαι.

θεαὶ. ἔν τισί δὴ; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον
μάθω νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὖν ἔτομαι.

10 σω. ἐν οἷς οἴδε, οἰδὴν τι αὐτὰ ἄττα ἐναι
ὅν οίδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται; ἡ δὲ μὴ οἴδε, αἰσθάνεται
dε; ἡ δὲ οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, δὴ οἴδε αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.

θεαὶ. Νῦν πολὺ πλεῖον ἀπελεύθην ἡ τότε.

15 σω. ὡδὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυλ ἄκουε. ἔγω εἰδὼς θεό-
δωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμημένον οἷος ἐστι, καὶ θεαί-
τητον κατὰ ταύτα, ἀλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὅρω αὐτούς,
ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἀπτομαὶ ποι ἀυτῶν, τοτὲ δὲ οὖ, καὶ
ἀκούω ἡ τινα ἀλλην αἰσθήσεων αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δὲ
20 αἰσθήσεων μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ύμῶν, μέμηναι δὲ
ὑμᾶς οἴδε ἢττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ;

θεαὶ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

2. καὶ δ' αὖ μὴ οἴδε] In order to exhaust every conceivable case, the converse or negative of each of the foregoing cases, in which knowledge and sense were combined, must be fully stated.

5. ὑπερβάλλει ἀδύναμι] Cf. supr. αἰσθανότερον ἐτι ἐκεῖνον εἰ
οἶν τε. The gen. is governed by ἀδύναμι. ὑπερβάλλει is abs.
All these cases are beyond every thing in regard to the impossibility of any man's thinking wrongly in any of them.'
8. ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω] 'For perhaps if you state
them, I may perceive your meaning better.'
14. ἀπελεύθην] For this use of the aorist when a person reflects on his own state, cf. Soph. Aj. 678: ἔφηκε ἐρωτεὶ πε-
ριχαρῆ δ' ἀνεπόμαν. alib.
ΤΟΥΤΟ ΤΟΙΝΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΜΑΘΕ ΔΝ ΒΟΥΛΟΜΑΙ ΔΗ- ΛΑΩΣΑΙ, ΌΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΜΕΝ Α ΟΙΔΕ ΜΗ ΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ, ΕΣΤΙ ΔΕ ΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'ΑΛΗΘΗ.

ΣΩ. ΟΥΚΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ Α ΜΗ ΟΙΔΕ, ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ ΜΕΝ ΕΣΤΙ Σ ΜΗΔΕ ΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ, ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ ΔΕ ΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ ΜΟΝΟΝ; ΘΕΑΙ. 'ΕΣΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΤΟ.

ΣΩ. 'ΙΔΕ ΔΗ, ΕΑΝ ΤΙ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΒΝΝ ΕΠΙΣΠΗ. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ Ρ. 193. ΕΠΙΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΝ, ΟΡΡ ΔΕ ΜΗΔΕ- ΤΕΡΟΝ, ΜΗΔΕ ΆΛΛΗ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ ΑΥΤΩ ΠΑΡΕΣΤΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΙΟ ΟΥΚ ΑΝ ΠΟΤΕ ΕΝ ΕΑΥΤΩ ΔΟΞΑΣΕΙΕΝ ΌΣ Ο ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ. ΛΕΓΩ ΤΙ Η ΟΥΔΕΝ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ΝΑΙ, ΑΛΗΘΗ ΓΕ.

ΣΩ. ΤΟΥΤΟ ΜΕΝ ΤΟΙΝΝ ΕΚΕΙΝΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΗΝ ΔΝ ΕΛΕΓΟΝ.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'ΗΝ ΓΑΡ.

ΣΩ. ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ ΤΟΙΝΝ, ΌΣΤΙ ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΟΝ ΎΜΩΝ, ΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΜΗ ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΟΝ, ΑΙΣΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΔΕ ΜΗΔΕ- ΤΕΡΟΝ, ΟΥΚ ΑΝ ΠΟΤΕ ΑΥ ΟΙΣΘΕΙΝ, ΟΝ ΟΙΔΑ, ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΝ ΜΗ ΟΙΔΑ.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'ΟΡΘΩΣ.

ΣΩ. ΤΡΙΤΟΝ ΔΕ, ΜΗΔΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΟΝ ΜΗΔΕ ΑΙΣΘΑ- ΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΟΥΚ ΑΝ ΟΙΣΘΕΙΝ, ΟΝ ΜΗ ΟΙΔΑ, ΕΣΕΡΟΝ ΤΙΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΝ ΜΗ ΟΙΔΑ. ΚΑΙ ΤΑΛΛΑ ΤΑ ΠΡΩΤΕΡΑ ΠΑΝΘ ΕΧΕΙ ΝΟΜΙΣΕ ΠΑΛΙΝ ΑΚΗΚΟΕΝΑΙ, ΕΝ ΟΙΣ ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ ΕΓΩ ΠΕΡΙ ΣΟΥ ΚΑΙ 25 ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΥ ΤΑ ΨΕΥΔΗ ΔΟΞΑΣΑΙ, ΟΥΤΕ ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΟΝ ΟΥΤΕ ΑΓΝΟΩΝ ΑΜΦΑ, ΟΥΤΕ ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ, ΤΟΝ ΔΟΥ ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΟΝ. ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑΥΤΑ, ΕΙ ΑΡΑ ΕΠΕΙ.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'ΕΠΟΜΑΙ.

ΣΩ. ΔΕΙΣΤΕΙΑ ΤΟΙΝΝ ΤΑ ΨΕΥΔΗ ΔΟΞΑΣΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΡΙΔΕ, 30 ΌΤΑΝ ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΟΝ ΣΕ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΞΗΧΩΝ ΕΝ ΕΚΕΙΝΩ Ο ΤΟΥ ΚΗΡΙΝ ΘΑΠΤΕΡ ΘΑΚΤΥΛΙΩΝ ΣΦΩΝ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΑ ΤΑ ΣΗΜΕΙΑ,
False opinion is the wrong union of thought and sensation.

1. προσβημηθώ] 'I endeavour to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to make this stand in its own foot-print, so as to fit, that recognition may take place; and then failing to do so, and bringing the ideas crosswise like men who put their sandals on the wrong feet,'—

2. ἐμβασάς προσβαμώσα] Sc. τὴν ὄψιν. These words and the following (ὅτι γίνεται ἀναιγνώρισι) suggest an allusion to Choeph. 203—210. καὶ μὴ στίβοι γε κ. τ. λ.

5. παραλλάξας] Cf. for the metaphorical use of this word (which here retains something of its literal sense) Tim. 72. οἵδεις γὰρ ἑνοῦς ἐφάπτεται μαντικη, ἢ καθ ὑπνον—πεθετεὶς—ἡ διὰ νόσου ἢ διὰ τιν τίνι ὑθονοιασμῷ παραλλαξά.

6. ἢ καὶ οἷα] 'Or my mind errrs being affected in the same way as the sight is affected in looking at a mirror, shifting as it does, so that right becomes left.' Vision is conceived of as flowing from the eye to its object. Cf. Tim. p. 43.

7. δεξιά εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταφράσσε] 'Shifting, right-side to left.' The words have given some trouble. Buttmann conjectured μεταφράσσεσ, Heindorf says "medalam a libros expecto." Stallb. conj. δεξιά εἰς ἀριστεράν. But may not δεξιά εἰς ἀριστερά be an adverbial expression, originating in apposition? Thus: ἢ διὰς μεταφράσε δεξιά εἰς ἀριστερά (i.e. τὰ δεξιά αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά) —when the case of ὄψεις changes δεξιά remains unchanged. Compare ἀνῶ κάτω στρέφων, Phaedr. 278; and esp. Soph. Ant. 340. Ἀλομένων ἀρότρων ἦτος εἰς ἦτος, where some MSS. have ἦτος εἰς ἦτος metro repugnante, showing that a similar difficulty had been experienced there.

10. ὅτα] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. et z. ctt. οὐ. 'Your description tallies wonderfully with one's experience of what Opinion is.'
p. 193. τον μεν προσ τω γιγνόσκειν αισθάνομαι, τον δε μη, την δε γνώσιν του έτερου μη κατα την αισθησιν έχω, δε εν τοις πρόσθεν ούτως έλεγον και μου τύτε ουκ έμανθανες.

ΤΕΕΑΙ. Όυ γαρ ουν.

ΣΩ. Τούτο μη έλεγον, δι' αυτις γιγνόσκοις τον έτερον και αισθανόμενος, και την γνώσιν κατα την αισθησιν αυτού έχων, ουδέποτε ουσεται ειναι αυτιν έτερον των δε γιγνόσκει τε και αισθανεται και την γνώσιν αδ και έκεινον έχει κατα την αισθησιν. ην γαρ ιο τούτο;

ΤΕΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Παραλειπετο δε γε που το νυν λεγόμενον, εν φε δη φαιμεν την ψευδη δόξαν γίγνεσθαι το άμφω γι'ην γνώσκοντα και άμφω ορκωντα η των άλλων αισθησιν εις έχοντα άμφων, το σημεϊον μη κατα την αυτού αισθησιν εις έκατερον έχειν, άλλα οιν τοξότην φαύλον ιεντα παραλλάξαι του σκοτού και άμαρτειν, δε δη και ψευδος αρα άνυμασται.

2. του έτερου] Viz. of the former.
6. Heind. would insert δε before γιγνόσκοις: but for the transition from the 1st to the 3rd person, when the nom. is indefinite, cf. inf. 196. οιδητιη—μεν—οιδήτιη.
9. δε γιγνόσκει] This is the Bodleian reading, which seems preferable. The reference of έκεινον is thus made more distinct.
10. ην γαρ τουτοι] 'We agreed to this!'
16. την αυτον αισθησιν] Translate, adopting Stallbaum's conjecture, έκατερον, 'Or having some other sensible perception of both, to fail in holding your previous impression of each person over against your present sensation of him.'
17. αλλα οιν τοξοτην φαυλω] Or retaining the common reading, τω σημειω—εκατερω, 'Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.' But it must be confessed that this is not so good.
18. δε δε και ψευδος αρα άνυμαται] We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the movement of the mind and of the remoteness of sensible things from our notions of them.
ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκότως γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοινυν τῷ μὲν παρη ἀισθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μὴ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀποφύσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἡ διά-


5. ἐπη- σθετο πόμπου, οὐκ ἔστω, ὡς ἑικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι ὡ


6. θυ ψευδής δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγίες λέγομεν. περὶ


7. δὲ ὅσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, εἴν αὐτοῖς τοῦτος στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἡ δόξα ψευδής καὶ ἀληθῆς 10 γινομένη, καταντικρύ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὑθὺ τὰ οἰκεία συμάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅυκοιν καλῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, λέγεται;

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοινυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ 15 ἔρεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξάζεω καλῶν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὲ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτα τοινυν φασίν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν


18. φασίν] This need not imply a reference to any contemporary doctrine. It rather indicates the half mythical tone which Socrates has assumed.

20. ἀργασμένος] 'Tempered.' This word has been restored from Timaeus and Suidas, the latter of whom quotes this passage. MSS. ἀργασμένος.

1. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους] τύπος is here the present sensation, which we endeavour to fit into the former impression, (ἀποτύπωμα.) τύπος can scarcely be 'the form of the object'. This would be inconsistent with the previous use of the word, p. 192.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 167

p. 194. αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημανώμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη ὁ Ὀμηρὸς αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὀμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τοῦτοι καθαρὰ τὰ σημεία ἐγγιγνώμενα καὶ ἰκανὸς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνα τε γένεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιούτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, 5 ἐπειτα μνήμονες, ἔτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθή- σεων τὰ σημεία ἄλλα δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμοντον ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἣ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ ὀστοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖσθαι; 2

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν τοὺς Λάσιους τοῦ τὸ κέαρ ἢ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνευεν ὃ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὄγρον σφόδρα ἢ σκλη- ρόν, ὃν μὲν ὄγρον, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήμονες δὲ γὰρ-


2. κέαρ] The Homeric form is κέαρ. But Plato avoids bringing poetical words too abruptly into his prose. See above, p. 173, and n.

6. τῶν αἰσθήσεων] The gen. depends on παραλλάττουσι, like τοῦ σκοτοῦ above.

7. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα—καλίται] There is here a similar irregularity to that just noticed. The sentence begins as though it were to be σαφῆ γὰρ—ὄντα (sc. τὰ σημεῖα) ταχὺ εὑρίσκεται, or something of the kind: but the thought grows as we proceed: and σαφῆ—ὄντα is left as a sort of accusatius pendens. What follows is to be construed thus: ταχὺ διανέμοντον (οἱ τοιοῦτοι ταύτα) δὴ δὴ ὄντα κα- λίται, ἔκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκμα- γεῖα. ‘Such persons quickly distribute things (as we term them) each to the place of its own former impress upon the block.’

9. ἡ δὴ ὄντα καλίται] The later part of the dialogue does not forget the earlier part.


13. ὧν πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής] To appreciate the irony here, it is necessary to compare Soph. p. 234, where the parallel is drawn between the man who ‘creates’ every thing and the man who knows every thing; as well as Rep. B. X. p. 596, sqq.


1. λάσιον] 'Shaggy.' Here, as in the case of ἱθορός, we experience what is a frequent difficulty in Plato, that of determining the precise ethical meaning with which he adapts an Epic word.

2. λιθωδές τε] The difficulty of the MS. reading is, that it presents as one case what were spoken of above as two, (λάσιον—ἡ—κοπρόδες), 'Those in whom it is shaggy and rugged, a gritty substance filled with an admixture either of earth or dung.' This is not an insuperable difficulty in a writer like Plato. But the correction λιθωδές τε (Ficin. Heud.) is extremely probable; 'In whom it is shaggy and rugged and stony, or full of the admixture of earth or dung.'


10. ἡ ἐπινοούσῃ] Cf. supr. 191. ἡ αὐτὸν ἐννοήσωμεν. It may be asked, whether these expressions do not provide for the difficulty that is raised afterwards about 11 and 12? The answer probably is, that the difficulty, which is brought into full light afterwards, is here silently anticipated. (Compare the introduction of ἄγαθών and καλῶν in p. 157.) ἐπινοοῦσιν however does not necessarily imply an abstract object of thought. As we dwell upon the image we have raised, we find that it is too simple to express more than the relations of sense and memory, and instead of multiplying ἱματα πλάσματα, a fresh image is introduced in Plato's usual manner. The touches of humour have led some critics to suppose that Plato is alluding to contemporary opinions. But may he not be laughing at himself!

The description of the act of recollecting in the Philebus, p. 34, is worth comparing with the present passage. Ἑτερᾷ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ἐπισκεφθῆ πάθη ἡ ψυχή, ταύτ' ἀκεῖ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὑπὲρ τὰ μᾶλλον ἀναλαμβάνει, τότε ἀναμφισβητούσα τούτο συγνοεῖ. ἡ γὰρ; Π. μ. οὖν. Καὶ μαρτύρον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπον μὴ λέγη χορηγεῖν διὰ τοῦτον ἀποκαλλήσθη ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταύτα ἐξωματικα ἀναμφιτεθεῖν καὶ μεθήμας
p. 195. ταχ̄υ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι. καὶ ἀλ- λοτριονομοῦντες παρουσία τε καὶ παρακούοντες καὶ παρανοοῦντες πλείοντα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐ̄ς ὀντοι ἐφευ- σμένοι τε δή τῶν ὁπων καὶ ἁμαθεῖς.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰ. Ορθότατα ἄνθρωπον λέγεις, ὡ̄ Σώκρατες. Σ. Φάιμεν ἀρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.
Σ. Καὶ ἁληθεῖς δή;
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἁληθεῖς.
Σ. Ἡδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἰκανός ἀμολογήσονται ὃτι ἐπι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τῶν δόξα;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥ. Ὑπερφυός μὲν οὖν.
Σ. Δεινὸν τε, ὡ Ἀθηνητήτῳ, ὡς ἁληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἁνεῖς εἶναι ἄνηρ ἀδολεσχίας.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τι δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ’ εἶπες;

13. Δεινὸν τι The old editions had γε. The abruptness of the reading in the text is better than such a meaningless connection. Socrates breaks out, after a pause, with an expression, the relevancy of which does not at once appear.

18. ἂν κατῶ τούς λόγους ἐλεγ- 
ρε] Compare with this expression, which frequently occurs, the still livelier image supra.

p. 191. ἐπὶ άναγκη πάσα μετα- 
στρέφοντα λόγον Βασιλίεων.
But, when we consider it, the hypothesis is not adequate to the phenomena, e.g. The numbers eleven and twelve are not objects of sensation, but of thought, i.e. they are impressions on the waxen block, and yet in adding 7 and 5 people sometimes take eleven instead of twelve.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὃ τι ἐπὶ 195· ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἃν τις ἔρηται μὲ 'Ωμεῖνα, εὑρήκας δὴ ἡθεὶν δόξαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεωιέν ἑστι πρὸς ἅλλας οὐ' ἐν ταῖς διανοίασι, ἅλλ' ἐν τῇ συν.- 9 ἀνεί αἰσθήσεωι πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἴμαι, καλλοπικόμενοι ὡς τι εὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὐ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἐπὶ διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὐ, ὃποιον οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰκεῖμεν εἶναι, ἀν αὐτ' ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δ' μόνον καὶ ἅλλ' οὔτε ἀϊσθανάμεθα, τῇ αἰτίᾳ; Ταύτα, οἴμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὁρθώς γε.

15 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, φήσει, τὰ ἐνδεκα, ἀ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἂ ἔ διανοεῖται τίς, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰκεῖ ἑώρεσε ἐνδεκα εἶναι, ἀ μόνον αὐ τὶ διανοεῖται; ἢι οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενοι οἰκεῖσθαι τὰ ἐνδεκα ἑώρεσε εἶναι, ἀ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐχεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περί αὐτῶν ταύτα δοξάσεις αὐτὸς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἴει τινὰ πάτοτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἐπτά καὶ π. 196· 25 πέντε προθεμένοι σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἅλλ'...

9. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὐ[...]

'Is it not then part of your hypothesis, he will say, that on the other hand.' If mistake arises upon the wrong union of sensation and thought, thought cannot be mistaken when unaccompanied by sensation. The opposition between these two cases is expressed by αὐτός. Soocrates proceeds to what Bacon would call a negative instance.

MSS. φησι.

11. ἐν αὐ[...] 'Which again,' i.e. 'as well as the man.'


Π. cett. φησι.

23. οἴει τιν[...] If the sentence
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p. 196. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, ἃ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεία ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδή ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσας, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἰ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἶπεν οἰνθείς ἐνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἥ 5 πάντες λέγοντι τε καὶ οἴσται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνδεκα· εἰν de γε ἐν πλείον ἁρίμῳ τις σκοπήται, ἢ μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἴμαι γὰρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλ- λον ἁρίμῳ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οἴει. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μὴ τι ἥποτε γίνεται ἀλλὸ ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἐνδεκα οἰνθήναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λό- 15 γος; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθῶν, ὃ οἶδεν, ἔτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται εἶναι ὅποις ἢ ὧδε οἴδεν. ὃ ἐφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ

had proceeded regularly, it would be followed by σκηφάμε-νον—εἰπεῖν.

1. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά] The insertion of the article does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be right.

ἐκεῖ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ.

μνημεία] 'Records.'

3. εἶ τις ἀνθρώπων] The question is resumed with εἰ, depending on λέγω, which has broken the regularity of the sentence. 'I mean to ask if——.' The Bodleian MS. has ἢ, with Heindorf and Bekker.

λέγων πρὸς αὐτῶν] Socrates refers to his own description of the process of thinking, supr. p. 189, 190.

8. ἡν de γε] Theaetetus is permitted to enlarge a little upon his own subject. We seek to identify the sum of 7 and 5, of which we have thought (ἐπε- νοῆσας) with the corresponding number in our minds: and by mistake we identify it with 11 instead of 12.

The statement of this case shows the inadequacy of the figure we have adopted. For where are the 7 and 5 and the sum of them of which we think? They are not in sensation: must they not then be in the waxen block? The former difficulty returns—we have taken one thing which we know for another thing which we know.


15. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους] 'The discussion has returned to its first stage.'
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ήραγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδὴ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ π. 196: αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοντο εἰδῶσ μὴ εἰδέναι ἁμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοὶν ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν δεὶ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ 5 ψευδὴ δοξάζειν ἡ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλαγὴν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἢν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοὺς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἐστὶ ψευδῆς δόξα, ὡς ἄ τις οἶδεν, οἶδον τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα αἱρεῖ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. 'Απορον αἴρεσιν προτίθης, ὥς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος ὃς οὐκ εἰάσειν. ὡς δὲ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέων, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν ἀναίσχυντεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

15 ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποιόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τούτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. 'Εικάς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὰς ἡμῶν ἄρχη ως λόγος ἥμισις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ἡς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί 20 ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔννοω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Επειτ' οὐκ ἀναίσχης δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστή-

1. ήραγκάζομεν — αναγκάζομεν] 'It was by this very argument we tried to make the non-existence of false opinion inevitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the same person should know and be ignorant at once.'

4. Ἀλ' ὁτιοῦν] 'Any thing but this.' Most MSS. give ἀλα τι οὖν.

Π. ἀμφότερα] Viz. τὸ εἶναι ψευδὴ δόξαν κ. ἂ τις οἶδεν οὐχ οἶδον τε εἶναι μὴ εἰδέναι. The distinction here indicated is analogous to that noticed by Aristotle between ἐπίστασθαι and ἔρωται; which is his favourite example of the difference between ἐξεις and ἐπεργεῖα. Vid. Eth. N. I. 8. διαφέρει δ' εἰ μικροὶ ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν ἡρώος τὸ ἄριστον ὅπολαμβάνειν. The tendency to this distinction appears in Sophocles Ant. 1278. ὡς δεσπόθ, ὃς, ὃν τε καὶ κεκτημένως, κ. τ. λ.
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p. 197. μην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οίνῳ ἔστιν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃ Θεάιτης, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεσο τού μὴ καθαρὸς διαλέγεσθαι. μυρίακες γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνῶσκομεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὡς τι συνιέτες ἅλληλον ἐν ὃ ἔτι ἐπὶ στήμην ἄγνοομέν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παράοντι κεχρήμεθα ὁ τῷ ἄγνοοι τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσήκοι αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι, εἰπέρ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὁ Σάκρατε, τοῦτων ἀπεχόμενος;

2. ἀνάπλεσο τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγοντω. "Infected with logical imperfection."

Τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγοντω] In other words, we have felt our way hitherto, not by abstract definition and inference, but (as it is expressed Rep. 533) τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ἀναρροώντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν. We first ventured the hypothesis αἰσθητοῦ ἐπιστήμης. This was rejected, but the difficulties we met with pointed to a further hypothesis, ὅτι ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ. Here again we are met by fresh difficulties, but the discussion of them leads to a fresh hypothesis, that we may know, without having knowledge in hand.

3. μυρίακες γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν] We are haunted throughout by a difficulty respecting the search for knowledge akin to that respecting its first definition. Can we know it, and yet not know it? To inquire about it implies ignorance of its nature, and yet how can we use the name even in inquiry without knowing the meaning of the name? p. 147. ἥ οἴει τίς τι συνιέσθη τινος ἔνως ἄρομα, ὁ μὴ οἶδα τί ἔστι; 210. καὶ πανταπώσις γε εἰθηθείς ἡμών ἐπιστήμην δόξαν φάναι ὅρθον εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης.

10. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὁ Σάκρατε, τοῦτον ἀπεχόμενον. [Σ.] Compare what was said of being, p. 156. τὸ δ' ἐστὶν πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετοῦ, οὐχ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς πολλά καὶ ἄρτι ἡμαγκάμεθα ὑπὸ συνθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημονίας χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ.

That there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and absolute being is the postulate of Plato's mind. That he himself or any man had wholly grasped either, is more than he dares to say. The sacredness of this belief, which it would be impious to relinquish, appears also in Theocritus' answer: τοῦτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεκομένω ἢσται σοι πολλῇ συγγράμμῃ. For a similar feeling in regard to the practice of virtue, cf. Rep. 407. ὅ δ' ἐς πλούσιος, δ' ἔφαμεν, οὐδέν ἦκεν τοιοῦτον ἑγαρχεῖται, οὗ ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀπέκτασθαι ἄβλωτον. Apol. 38. ὃ δ' ἀνεξίτατος βλέψοι σοι βιοτός ἀνθρώπη.
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ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ὃν γε ὃς εἰμί· εἰ μὲντοι ἂν ἀντίλο- p. 197. γικός, οἷος ἀνήρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρὴν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἐφή ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῶν σφόδρ' ἂν ἂ εἰγὼ λέγω ἐπέπλητ- τεν. ἔπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαύλοι, θούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν 5 οἷον ἔστι τὸ ἐπιστασθαί; φαίνεται γὰρ μοι προοργοῦν τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸλμα τοίνυν ἡ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπε- χωμένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

ΣΩ. Ἀκῆκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπιστασθαί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἱσως· οὔ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνη- μονεύοι.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασίν αὐτῷ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλήθη.

ΣΩ. Ἦμεις τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταδομεθα καὶ εἰ- 15 πωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τῇ οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον διαφέρειν;

ΣΩ. Ἱσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν πέρ γε οῖος τ' ὃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτον φαίνεται τῷ κεκτήσθαι 20 τὸ ἔχειν. οἷον ἱμάτιον πριμαμένος τις καὶ ἐγκρατής ἂν μὴ ἄφοροι· ἔχειν μὲν οὖκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, κεκτήσθαι δὲ γε φαίμεν.


σι μέντοι ἂν ἀντιλογοκός] The apodosis is omitted, and the construction changed, because from supposing himself ἀντιλο- γοκός, Socrates proceeds to imagine the effect of the presence of such a man upon the dis- cussion.

2. τούτων τ' ἂν ἐφή ἀπέχεσθαι] Not exactly with Heind. Stallb. ' abstinere nos jubeatur,' but (sub. δεῖ) ' would have dwelt on the necessity of abstaining,' or, possibly, (throwing an emphasis on ἂν) ' Would have professed to abstain.'

12. ἐπιστήμης—ἔξιν] Euthyd. 277. τὸ δὲ παραστασθαι—Ἀλλοτιθέχειν ἐπιστήμην ἓδη ἑστιν; Phed. 76.

21. ἱμάτιον] Stallb. attempts to defend the optative without ei (which has only slight au- thority), from Rep. 549. ἄγριος ἄν, which is not quite parallel, (and there is MS. authority for ἂν.) The comparison of p. 193. Σωκράτης γεγράφωκε κ. τ. λ. sug- gests the conjecture ἄφορει.
3. μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ`] This opposition between minute parts of a sentence is very characteristic of the Greek idiom.

δοσπέρ] The apodosis is to be sought in Παλῶν δή κ. τ. λ.

16. κήρυκον τι] 'We established in the mind a sort of moulded form of wax.'

19. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἄγιλας] The distinction indicated is probably that between, 1. individuals in the aggregate, (πολλὰ ἄθροισθον, p. 157.); 2. intermedi ate abstractions, as the virtues, numbers, &c.; 3. the highest abstractions, as Being, Goodness, resemblance, difference, &c. These are thought, however, of any process of abstraction, as appears from the interchange of the terms μονήμων and διανόημα in what precedes.

20. κατ' ὄλγας] e. g. The virtues, arts, &c.
Ο ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ τι τουτεῦθεν; 

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν οὐτων, φάναι χρῆ, εἶναι τούτο τὸ ἁγγεῖον κενὸν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι ἢν δὲ ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθερξίτεις τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτῶν μεμαθηκέναι ἡ ἐπιστήμην κὲ πράγμα οὐ ἢν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τούτω εἶναι.

Ο ΘΕΑΙ. ἩΕστω.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τούνων πάλιν ἢν αὐν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστη—p. 198.

μον θηρεύων καὶ λαβώντα ἅχεω καὶ άθις ἁφίναι, σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὁμομάτον, εἰτε τῶν αὐτῶν δὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτάτο, εἰτε ἐτέρων. μαθήσει δὲ ἐντεύθεν σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἁριμμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγω τέχνην;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δη ὑπόλαβε θηραν ἐπιστήμων ἄρτιον τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπολαμβάνω.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ, οἴμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτοῦ τε ὑποχει-ρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἁριμμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἀλλὰ παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδίδωσι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμεν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κε-25 κτῆσθαι εἰ τῷ περιστερεών ἑκεῖνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

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2. φάναι χρῆ, εἶναι] Although φάναι χρῆ is introduced parenthetically, the sentence receives an indirect turn from it.

3. ἐφηδὼν] ‘Receptacle.’

12. ἐντεύθεν] From this point of view, viz. where I am already standing.

Σ. Τῷ δὲ ἐνεύθεν ἦδη πρόσοχες τὸν νοῦν.
ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὄν τελέως ἀλλο τί πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμα τῆς ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;
Σ. Ἡ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἦν ποτέ τι ἡ αὐτῶς πρὸς αὐτῶν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τί τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμοὺν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;
Σ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήρομεν τοῦ ιο
σκοπεύοντα πόσον τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει οὖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.
Σ. Ὡς ἡ ἐπίστασα, σκοπούμενοι φαίνεται ὃς
οὐκ εἰδὼς, διὸν ὑμολογήκαμεν ἀπαντὰ ἀριθμῶν εἰδέναι.
ἀκούεις γὰρ τὸν τὰς τοιαύτα ἀμφισβητήσεις.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕγογξεν.
Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάκουντες τῇ τῶν περιστε-
ρῶν κτῆσει τε καὶ θήρα ἑροῦμεν, οὐτὶ διπτῇ ἦν ἡ θήρα,

1. τῷ δὲ ἐπείθεν] δὲ δὴ, the reading of the Bodl. and its two companions, has probably slipped in from ἔχειτα δὲ δὴ above.
6. ἡ αὐτῶς πρὸς αὐτῶν αὐτὰ] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. Α., which omits αὐτὰ; the reading ἄτος is a conjecture of Cornarius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτὰ is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting αὐτό for αὐτά. But there is no real flaw, for τι is cogn. accusative, and ἀριθμοὶ τί = cast up a sum. The second accusative in the plural of the things which constitute the sum is therefore perfectly admissible; and it is also pointed, referring to αὐτὰ πάντα καὶ ἵπτεν above. Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of the things about him?

As in the Parmenides, where unity is negated, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Knowledges themselves) appear in loose bundles which fly as we approach them.

11. πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὅν] ‘What such-and-such a sum amounts to.’
13. ἤ] The past tense implies ‘We found it to be——’
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἡ μὲν πρὶν κεκτηθοῦ τοῦ κεκτηθοῦ ἐνεκα. ἦ δὲ κε- ρατικῶς τοῦ λαβέων καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσίν ἀ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὖτω δὲ καὶ δὲν πάλαι ἐπιστήμησιν ἦγον αὐτῷ μαθόντες καὶ ἡπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἐστι παρακαθαρθάνειν ὑταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστοτε καὶ ἠσχοντα, ἢν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόξειρον δ' οὐκ ἔλεγε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἡρότων, ὅπως χρῆ τοῖς ὅνο- ε μασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσως ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός, ὃς ἐπιστάμενος ἂρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθήσῷς ἡμῶν παρ᾽ ἑαυτῷ ἄπισταται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοστον, ὅ Σώκρατης.

15 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἣν ἐπιστάται φῶμεν αὐτῶν ἀναγνω- σεῖσθαι καὶ ἀρίθμησεις, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα ἡ ἀριθμῶν ἐπιστάθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτ᾽ ἀλογον.

ΣΩ. Βούλεις οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὅνομάτων ὡς ἄκουσιν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅτι τις χαίρει ἐλκών τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι καὶ μαθάναι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ώρισάμεθα ἑτέρον μὲν τι τὸ κεκτηθοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἑτέρον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν τις κεκτηθείμη διένατον φαμεν εἶναι, ὡστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις ὁδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδὴ

6. πρόξειρον δ'] The way in which the language is humourous ed to meet each image is very noticeable. As we say, ‘at his fingers’ ends.’

9. τοῦτο] A sort of cogn. ac cusative, as ταῦτα is very frequently used. ‘This was my drift in asking,’ &c.

19. δοτε οὐδέτερον) ‘So that it results in no case that a man is ignorant of what he knows, but still that he may get hold of a wrong notion in regard to it; for he may not have in hand the knowledge of the particular thing in question, but another instead, when in hunting up some particular knowledge from his stock (τοῦ δε κεκτησαι) he gets hold of the wrong one by mistake as they flit
across him: that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve,—in other words, the rock-pigeon that was caged within him instead of the dove.'

1. μὴ γὰρ ἔσχεν] These words are put emphatically forward in antithesis to μὴ εκκενθᾶ. When hunting for some particular knowledge amongst what he possesses and knows, he catches one for another as they fly about: e.g. the arithmetician makes a mistake in regard to number when he seeks in the tribe of numbers for that which = 7 + 5, and takes hold of 11 instead of 12.

The germ of the present metaphor appears in the Euptychides, pp. 290, 291. θηρευτικοι γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ οὗτοι (οἱ λογιστικοί) κ.τ.λ. αὕτω γὰρ (οἱ στρατηγοί) οὐκ ἔπιστανται χρήσιμα τούτους δὲ ἔθηρευσαν, διὸπερ, οἷμαι, οἱ ὀργυγηθέσαι τοῖς ὀργυγυγόρφοις παραδέδωσιν—ἀλλ’ ἡμεν πάντων γελοίοι, διὸπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοῦτο κορίδιου διάκονον, ἀλλ’ φόβεισα ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημών αὐτίκα λήψεοςθ’ οἱ δὲ ἄλλη ἐπιστήμην. Compare also Arist. Met. I. 5. 1009 b. τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διάκονο τὸ στρατευματικὸν εἰς τὴν ἄλληθαν.

3. ἄν' αὕτω] The difficulty of the sentence lies in these words. They probably refer to δ’ κεκτη-ταὶ—οὖν above. For it is difficult to imagine that ἄν' αὕτω and ἐπὶ αὕτω above do not refer to the same thing. If this be so, the meaning is, that he makes a mistake concerning some general subject, e.g. concerning number in general, when he takes one particular thing contained in it for another. τούτου therefore means, ‘of this particular thing,’ viz. which he is in search of. For a similar use of τούτου, without anything to which it immediately refers, cf. supr. 180. καὶ τούτου τοιαύτη λόγον λαβών, τί εἰ-ρησε. Infr. p. 202. τὸν μᾶθεν-μενον —ἀνεπιστημόνα ἐλέπῃ περὶ τούτου.

4. δεν ἄρα—φόβηθε εἰναι,— λαβῶν] We pass from ὅταν to δεν ἄρα, because reference is now made to the actual case supposed. The participle λαβῶν is epegegetic to the verb understood in what precedes. He has hold of something else: that is, in the above case, taking the knowledge of eleven for that of twelve. As if ἔσχεν—οὖν τε were τάξιν ἄν ἔχοι. Or the nominative is due to a kind of attraction from the intervening clauses.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ὄταν δὲ γε ἂν ἐπικεφαλεῖ ὀλβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀφενδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὁντα. δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὖν δὴ εἶναι ἀληθὴν τε καὶ ψευδὴ δόξαν, καὶ δὲν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν τοῖς ἑδυσχεραίον μεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδῶν γίγνεσθαι; ἦσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεισ. ἡ πῶς ποίησεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἂ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπιστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα; ἂ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσαθαι οὐδεμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὐτε ψευσθεὶσ τινός οὖν μὴ. δευτερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίων;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγῆ ψευδῆς γενεῖσταί ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινὸς ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τούτο δι' αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωστὶν ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπετα ἐτερον αὐ τοῦ δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἐτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὖ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενο-

8. ἐπίσταναι] So the Bodleian with all the other MSS. except pr. Ven. II. This is hardly sufficient authority for the change to ἐπιστασθαι. The transition from sing. to plur. is not more remarkable than that from the 3rd pers. to the 1st. It may be accounted for by the fact that Socrates is speaking generally, and no longer with reference to the case supposed above.

11. παραφαίνεσθαι] As it were, 'looking in at the window.'

17. τὸ τινὸς] These words depend immediately on δευτερον, in common with el ἡ τῶν—δόξα: but πῶς οὖ πολλὴ ἀλογία has also reference to them.

18. ἀγνωστὶν] Used here in its most literal sense, 'from being unacquainted.'

τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ] Viz. which he possesses, δ' τι δὴ ἐκεῖ τε καὶ κέπτεται, referring to ἔχοντα.

20. πῶς οὖ πολλὴ ἀλογία κ.τ.λ.] The clause which follows is a more particular statement or explanation of that which precedes. Compare the structure of Rep. p. 445, τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτος τοῦ δ' ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὼν ἀρα ἐστα, έπ' ἐν τίς τοιγ δ' ἀν βουληθῇ ἄλλο
THEAITHTOS.

p. 199. μένθο γνώναι μέν τήν ψυχήν μηδέν, ἀγνοήσαι δὲ πάντα; έκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνώναι τι ποιήσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ιδεῖν, εἰπέρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοήσαι ποτὲ τινα ποιήσει.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ισως γάρ, ο Ὀσκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὀρνιθὰς ἐπίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονίας τιθέναι ὁμοί συνδιπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τοῦ θηρεύοντα τοτε μέν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτε δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι 10 ψευδὴ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ράδιον γε, ο Ἡθαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε. ὁ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς p. 200. λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδὴ 15 μὲν, φήσι, δοξάσει. ἡ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ ποι καὶ ἠγήσεται γε ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ;

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἶδος διακείσται περὶ 20 ὃν ἔφευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἴησεται τεθηρευκὼς ἐξειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δήλοιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκών μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος δ' γελάσας φήσει: Πότερον, ὁ βελτιστοὶ, ἀμφιτέρας πλὴν τούτο ὁπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγήσεται κ.τ.λ.


27. ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος] Supr. παράτυπον αὐτοῖς [p. 166. 197.]

Casus of error!

Perhaps there were ignorances flying about amongst the knowledge, and he has taken one of them.

But if he has the ignorance in hand, how can he mis-
τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν p. 200. οἴδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτήν οἶδαν τινα εἶναι ὑπὸ οἴδεν; ἣν οὐδετέραν αὐτῶν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὑπὸ οἰκείον οἴδεν; ἦ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δὲ οὐ, ἦν οἴδεν, ἦν μὴ 5 οἴδεν; ἦ ἦν μὴ οἴδεν, ἦν οἴδεν ηγεῖται; ἦ πάλιν αὐτὸ μετέτρεψε ὁ θεός, ἵνα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην ἐσώμεν σοι ἐπιστήμην, ὡς οἱ κεκτημένοι εἰς ἄλλους τοὺς γελοιοὺς περιστρέφοντι κηρύνοις πλάσματι καθεστώτος, ἕως περ ἄν κεκτημέναι, ἐπιστήμην, καὶ ἐάν μὴ πρὸ 10 χείρος ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθῆσας εἰς ταύτων περιτρέχειν μυρίάκις οἰκείον πλέον ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταύτα, θεάσθητε, ἀποκρυψθήσετε;  

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, οὐ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ γε οὐκ ἔχω τι χρῆ λέγειν.  

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, οὐ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδὰς δόξαν προτέραν ἄρχομεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν ἄδυνατον γνώναι, πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην 15 ἵκανος λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.  

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, οὐ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὅσος λέγεις οἴεσθαι.  

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γὰρ ποι ἀπεροῦμεν γέ πω.  

8. γελοίοις περιστρεφόμεν] It would be rash to infer from this that the image is not Plato's own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of absurdity? Rep. 354. oú μένων καλῶς γε εἰσὶν ἄλλως οὖ διὰ σί. Prot. 340. εἰμί τις γελοίοις ἀπεροῦμεν. 

The value of such inferences must depend on the tone of the particular passages from which they are drawn.  

16. ὁ λόγος] Either this particular argument, or rather the discussion in the form of an imaginary disputant.  

18. τὸ δὲ] Sc. ψευδής δέξα τί ποτ' ἐστίν.  

24. γὰρ ποι is said to be the reading of Ven. Π., and is probably right.
ΤΗΕΑΙΤΗΣΟΣ.

p. 200. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστα, ἐάντερ μη σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσης.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτό μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἦκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθείμεν; 

e ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν' οὗ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τήν ἀληθή δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἰναι. ἄνα-μάρτητον γέ σου ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγονόμενα πάντα καλά καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγοῦμεν, οὗ Θεάτητε, ἐφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό καὶ τούτο ἐὰν ἱόντες ἐρευνῶμεν,

p. 201. τάχ’ ἀν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνει τὸ ξεπούμε- 

νον, μένουσι δὴ δὴν οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθως λέγεις ἀλλ’ ἵσομεν γε καὶ σκο- 

πῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε βραχείας σκέψεως τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μή εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.


8. καὶ τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγονόμενα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide.

10. Ὅ τὸν ποταμὸν] The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported to have said, Go on, and you will find. For the expressions αὐτὸ δείξει, τάχ’ ἀν αὐτὸ φήνει, cf. Phileb. 20. πρῶτον δ’ ἔτι σαφ- 


γελάσατος, αὐτὸ δείξει. The Scho- 

liast says: Δείξειν αὐτό. ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ πειράσ γεγονωσκομένων. καθου- 

tῶν γάρ των εἰς ποταμὸν πρὸς τὸ 

dιαπεράσατε ἱπτό τῷ τῶν προηγοῦ-

μενον εἰ βάδος ἔχῃ τὸ οἴκα. δ’ ἐν ἐφη, αὐτὸ δείξει.

The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncertain.

See above, πλεῖστα δὲ ἐκφρά- 

στα—τῶν ἔχ αρχής λέγει; and 

compare Rep. 454. ἵνα τέ τις εἰς 

κολαμβόθραν μικρὰ ἐμπέσῃ ἕνα τε 

εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, 

ὅμως γε χεῖ σοδόν ἤτοι σος. 

12. ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον] Those 

forcing the river were feeling the 

bottom with their feet. 

Compare the way in which 

Justice ‘turns up’ in the Re- 

public, 433. Πόλις, ὁ μεκάρι, 

φαίνεται ὁ πόλον ἡμῖν κυλι- 

δουμένον.
2. ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν

The irony is almost as transparent as in Polit. 266. γένει τῆς τῶν ἄνθρωπων γεννημάτων καὶ δίω γεννημάτων. Cf. Phaedr. 260 sqq. Gorg. 462. alib. μεγίστως is masc. antec. to ὅσοι. (ἡ om. Bodl. Vat. Δ. Ven. π.)

8. πρὸς ὁδῷ τομίρον] κατεξε-


Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge that it is true opinion. We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of judicial evidence, a true opinion may be formed by the judges without the possibility of Knowledge; since in questions of fact nothing short of personal observation ensures certainty. The definition ‘Knowledge is true opinion,’ is therefore inadequate.

The question returns, Are the above conceptions and images Plato’s own, or is he repeating in them some contemporary theory? The comparison of other dialogues and the close examination of the passage itself tend to the conclusion that although they may have been suggested to him from without, they may be fairly regarded as his own creation. See especially the passage of the Philebus, in which, after certain men have been brought forward as ‘soothsayers’ or ‘allies,’ there follows the analysis of the pleasure derived from Comedy, which is one of the most original and ‘modern’ passages in Plato. The image of the ‘impressions’ on the wax has not only been revived in speculation, but perpetuated in common language. And to that of the aviary has probably been less fortunate only from its greater boldness and subtlety.

In what follows the Bodleian MS. gives τούτως with Vat. Δ. Ven. Π. This is better than τούτων, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. ‘Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose being robbed or otherwise assaulted the hearers were not eyewitnesses?’
The implied antithesis is διὰ τοῦ ὀνομάτος. Cf. Rep. 475. ὄνομα, ἐπονομάζω, ἀλλὰ ομοίως μὲν φιλοσόφοις. Τοῦ δὲ ἄληθος, έφη, τῶν λέγεις; Soph. 240. ὄνομα ἄληθινόν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ έσωκέ μὲν.

13. ἄληθος ἄληθεν.] Several MSS. read ἄληθεν. These words have been rejected by the critics, except Buttmann, who conjectured καὶ δικαστήρια, very aptly for the sense, if the word can be made to signify 'worthy of a good judge.' See the words εἰς ἐπιστάμεθα — ὅρθα ποτ' ἄν δικαστήρια ἄκρος ἄλη- θεν. It is in Plato's manner thus ostentiously to restrict himself to the case in point. Cf. p. 152. ἐν τῷ θυρμῷ καὶ πάση τοῖς νοοῦσιν. p. 204. ἐν γε τοῖς δοκεῖς ὅτι ἀδικημένον ἐστιν.

Possibly καὶ δικαστήριον δέδοξα may be the true reading. Cf. Apol. 18. δικαστήριον γὰρ αὐτήν ἑρῆμην. And see Phileb. 13, where the Bodl. has περιστάμεθα for περιστέρα- μεθα. Ib. 36, where παραφράσωμαι in the same MS. is a correction for πάσας ἀφροσύ-

νας, which the first hand wrote. But it is after all conceivable that δικαστήρια may be the feminine of an adj. not found elsewhere, except in the neuter substantive δικαστήριον.

To resume the argument from p. 195.

Viewing the mind as a receptacle of impressions (or ideas), we said that to think falsely was to fail in identifying present impressions with the ideas already existing in the mind. And thus it seemed impossible to be mistaken about these ideas themselves apart from impressions from without. But in fact we do mistake in things independent of sensation. E. g. an arithmetician who possesses the knowledge both of 11 and 12, will sometimes say that the sum of 7 and 5 is 11. We resort therefore to a less simple conception of knowing, and to a more complex image. To know is to possess knowledge. We may possess it without
III. Theseutetus now remembers to have heard that true opinion, unless accompanied with an account of its object, is not knowledge.

Socrates identifies

Diakasthis akros edoxacen ane ev episthmis, vin de eoukev p. 201. Alllo ti ekateron einai.

Theai. "O ge evo, o Skarpates, eipontos tou akoynas pepelhismen, vin te enoiv. Ephi de ti mene 5 metata logon alithi dioxan episthimen einai, tin de id allogon etkost episthimes' kai oin men mhi esti logos, oin epistheta einai, oustoli kai onomazoun, a te exei, epistheta.

Sigma. 'H kalos leges. Ta de de epistheta tauta

Having it in hand. We therefore image to ourselves false opinion thus. We have caught, as it were, (in learning) various species of knowledge, some gregarious, some noble and solitary, (i. e. abstract), and have caged them in the mind, like birds. We try to take in hand one of these birds which we possess, and as they flutter about, we take hold of another instead of it. But then, if we have this one in hand, how can we mistake it for the other? How can Knowledge be the means of error? Perhaps (Theseutetus suggests) there were ignorances flying about amongst the knowledges, and we have taken one of them. But if I have an Ignorance in hand, how can I take it for a Knowledge? Must we imagine another cage or waxen block to contain the Knowledge of the knowledges and ignorances? This would be endless.

4. tin mene metata logon alithi dioxan] Cf. Meno, p. 97, 98. kai gar ai dioxai ai alithes, oinon mene xronon paramevou, kalon to chrismma, kai pantana tayadha ergasthai. pollon de xronon oin evelounai paramevou, alla drapanousin ek tis psychis tov andreptou, doute oin polloi azei eisin, eous an tis autan thesi aitias logourg.--epiada de de-bbain, prouton men episthema ginountai, eiteina mown kai dia tauta de timaltero episthema orhthes dixei esti, kai diapherei thesmos epistheta orhthes dixei. See the whole passage. Polit. p. 309. tin -- oontos oostan alithi dioxan metata bethasio. Symp. 202. h oin psathnai oti esti te metaf sou thelas kai amablas; ti touto; to arba dioxazen kai anu tou exewn logon doinai oin outhe, ephi, oti oti episthesei estin allogon xer pragma yvo an eis episthima; othi amabla; to xer tou oostou yugikos yvo an eis amabla; esti de de pou touostan o arba diox, meteux fros- nisto kai amablas. Rep. 506. oin psathnai tis anu episthima dioxan, eis panta aicrhai; dein ai bletetoi tufila; te dokounai to i tufilon diapherein odoi odoi peruxesin oin anu vou alithes to dioxazen;

7. oustoli kai onomazoun] i. e. using this strange term episthema. infr. ta de de epistheta tauta. episthemos, like aiosthesis and pouth, was a novel word, formed on the analogy of aiosthesis.
The saying thus quoted with what he himself has heard from certain "as in a dream;" viz. that the elements of all things cannot be expressed in a proposition, but can only be named. You cannot give them any attribute, since even such common predicables seeing that you can only speak of the element by itself.

14. συνατοιο] This has given needless trouble. Heindorf thought the article was required as with the other words, and inserted it. Buttmann objected to τοιοι being so far separated from έκεινο, and ingeniously conjectured συνατοι το. Both objections are obviated by observing that αυτο, έκεινο, έκαστον, μονον, occur in the preceding lines. For this reason they are put first, and with the article, and συνατοι—συνατοι πολλα τοιαοιτα is added afterwards. Cf. supr. p. 157. το δε ειναι πασαχοθεν έξαρσοτον—συνατοι—οδα έντα τι ενυχαρειν οδα του αυτη έμοι οδα τοια έκεινο. οδα άλλοι οδαν άνωμαι το δε αν ιστη. Accordingly in the reference to this passage, p. 205, (which Buttmann must have overlooked) the article is introduced,—οδα το τοιοι.
as "this" and "that" are separable from the things to which they are applied. As the elements are combined in Nature, so definition is a combination of names. That which is named is the object of Sensation; the combination of these elements is 

1. περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέροντα ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέροντα, p. 202. ἔτερα δὲντα ἐκείνων ὅσ προστίθεται, δεῖ τὸ δὲ, εἰπὲν ἂν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἑαυτὸν οἰκεῖον αὐτῷ λόγον, άνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. ὅν τότε ἄλλα ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁμοιῶν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγον· οὔ γὰρ εἶναι ὁ αὐτὸς ἂλλος ἡ ὁνομαζόμενον μονὸν ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν· τό δὲ ἐκ τούτων ήδη συγκείμενα, ὡσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὄνοματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέτα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὁνοματος γὰρ συμπλοκῆν· εἶναι λόγον οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἁλογα καὶ ἁγνωστὰ εἶναι, αἰσθητα δὲ τάς δὲ συναφᾶς γνώσις στὸς καὶ ῥητάς καὶ ἀληθεί δύξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀνεύ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δοξάν τινὸς τῆς λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γυνώ· 

A passage of Aristot. Metaph. H. 3. is closely parallel to this. He has just shown that sensible reality (ἡ ἁλεθὴ ὁσία) consists of matter or potentiality (ὁ ἄληθεν), and form or actuality, (ὁ ἁλεθής ἐφικτήμα). ὡστε ἡ ἁλεθία Ἰνα τὰ ἐμπεκόν καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαιτεῖτο ἐπίτροπος, ἔχει τινὰ καὶ—

12. καὶ ῥητάς] There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical use of the word. Cf. Rep. 546. οἶα προσέχομαι καὶ ῥητά πρὸς ἀλήθείαν ἐπίστημον. But the immediate reference is to ῥηθῆναι λόγος, 'Capable of expression.'

14. ἀληθεύειν—περὶ αὐτό] 'Is exercised truly with regard to it.'
Τ. 201. σκεύει δ' οὖ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δούναι τε καὶ
δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμων εἶναι περὶ τοῦτον
προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα
γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Ὅτως
σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν παυτάτασιν.
ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη, δόξαν
ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.
d ΣΩ. Ἀρπ', ο Θεαίττε, οὖν οὔτω τῇ τῇ ἁμέρᾳ
eἰλήφαμεν ὁ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ἔτη
πρὶν εὑρέων κατεγράσαν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐκεῖ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὡς Σάκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι
tὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὀφθαλμός ἔχειν· τὸς γὰρ
ἀν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην εἶψε χωρίς τὸν λόγον τε καὶ ὅρθης
δόξης· ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

1. The an-
swer may be a true one, and yet the
alone the
object of
knowledge. For
that im-
pression deserves
not to be
called
knowledge, which can-
not be ex-
pressed in a
proposition.
Knowledge
then is true
opinion
giving an
account of
itself. This
is our third
answer.
Can we
prove it
true?

2. peri toûntoû] Sc. οὗ ἢ μὴ
dûnta deûnai lógon.
dûnai te kai deûxastha lógon. It
is a curious form to use in re-
ferring to such a simple thing.
Possibly γνωρίσκεων and ἀληθέων
are included.
Contrast with this Arist.
Phys. Ausc. I. 1. (who points
out that the elements, or simple
ideas, are known not by sensa-
tion, but by analysis; and that
definition distinguishes, while
the name signifies an undivided
whole.)

*Esti δ' ἠμῶν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα
cai σαφῆ τὰ συγκεκριμένα μᾶλλον
ὑστερον δὲ ἐκ τοῦτον γίνεται γνώ-
ριμά τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ, δια-
ροῦσα ταῦτα.—Τὸ γὰρ ἄλων κατὰ
tὴν ἀνίκησιν, γνωριμώτερον. Τὸ δὲ
καθόλου, ἄλων τὶ ἄστι. Πολλὰ γὰρ
περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου.
Πέπωθε δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτο τρόπον
των καὶ τὰ ὄνομα πρὸς τὸν λόγον.
"Ολον γὰρ τι καὶ αὐτοπροτύπως σημαί-
νει, ὅλον δὲ κύκλος ὃς ἐκ ὁμοίως αὐ-
τοῦ διαρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ ἐκαστον.
10. νῦν οὖτω] i. e. 'In a casual
conversation.'
11. kai] Is to be taken with
the whole clause as if it were
δ καὶ.—. For instances of this
hyperbaton, see Ellendt. Lex.
sub voce kai, C. 4.

15. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] The definition
itself, whatever may be said of
the theory that has been put
forward. Heindorf's conjecture,
eikós γ' ἀυτὸ τοῦτο, would give a
different turn to the sense. 'It
is natural to suppose that we
have said well.'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΩΣ

ΤΟ ΠΟΙΩΝ ΔΗ;

ΣΩ. Ὅ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΚΕΙ ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ ΚΟΜΨΟΤΑΤΑ ὢΣ ΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ ἈΓΝΩΣΤΑ, ΤΟ ΔΕ ΤΩΝ ΣΥΛΛΑΒΩΝ ΓΕΝΟΣ ΓΝΩΣΤΩΝ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ΟΫΚΟΪΝ ὌΡΒΟΙΣ;

ΣΩ. ἩΣΤΕΟΝ ΔΗ ὍΩΣΠΕΡ ΓΑΡ ὙΜΗΡΟΥΣ ἘΧΟΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΤΑ ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑΤΑ, ΟΙΣ ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ ΕΙΠΕ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΤΑΙΤΑ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ΠΟΙΑ ΔΗ.

ΣΩ. ΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΣΥΛΛΑΒΑΣ. Ἡ ὈΞΕΙ ΆΛΛΟΣΕ ΠΟΙ ΒΛΕΠΟΝΤΑ ΤΑΙΤΑ ΕΙΠΕΝ ΤΟΝ ΕΙΣΠΟΝΤΑ Ἀ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ΟΥΚ ἈΛΛΈ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΙΤΑ.

ΣΩ. ΒΑΣΑΝΙΖΩΜΕΝ ΔΗ ΑΥΤΑ ΑΝΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΝΤΕΣ, ΜΑΛ—Ρ. 203.

10 ΛΟΝ ΔΕ ἩΜΑΣ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ, ΟΥΤΩΣ Ἡ ΟΥΧ ΟΥΤΩΣ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ ΕΜΑΘΟΜΕΝ. ΦΕΡΕ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ἈΡ ΑΙ ΜΕΝ ΣΥΛΛΑΒΑΙ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΥΣΙ, ΤΑ ΔΕ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ ΆΛΟΓΑ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἩΓΩΣ.

ΣΩ. ΠΑΝΥ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΜΟΙ ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ. ΠΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

20 ΓΟΥΝ ΕΙ ΤΙΣ ΕΡΟΙΤΟ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΩΤΗΝ ΣΥΛΛΑΒΗΝ ΟΥΤΩΣI, ᾃΩ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ, ΛΕΓΕΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ ὙΕI, ΤΙ ἈΠΟΚΡΙΝΕΙ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὍΤΙ ΣΤΥΜΑ ΚΑΙ Ὡ.

ΣΩ. ΟΫΚΟΪΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΕΧΕΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΛΛΑΒΗΣ;

2. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] 'To be the cream of the whole theory.'
3. Ὅωσπερ—ὁμήρου] So that if we put them to the torture, we shall bring him (τὸν λόγον) to terms.
7. τά παραδείγματα] Cf. Polit. 277, 278, where the same example, that of letters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example—ὍΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΝ ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ ἘΝ ΤΑῖΣ ΒΡΑΧΥΤΑΤΑΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΡΑΣ-

ταῖς τῶν συλλαβῶν λεκάνως διασθά-

νοῦνται—μετατιθέμενα δ' εἰς τὰς

τῶν πραγμάτων μακράς καὶ μη μέ-

δίαις συλλαβαῖς ταύτα ταύτα πάλιν

ἀγροεί.

ἐκι] Sc. the person from whom Socrates and Theodetus heard the theory 'in a dream.'
Cf. supr. Θεο. εἰσότος τοῦ ἀκού-

οῦν.

14. μᾶλλον δὲ ήμάς αὐτοὺς] This is done presently, p. 206.
p. 203. ὉΕΑΙ. 'Εγώγε.

b ΣΩ. Ἰθι δή, οὖτος εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σίγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεί στοιχεία; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὃ Σῶκρατες, τὸ τε σίγμα τῶν ἁφῶν ἐστὶ, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἶον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττ- 5 τῆς τοῦ ὃ αὐτῆς οὕτε φωνὴ οὕτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ἀστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ἐὰν γε τὰ ἐναργεστάτα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ φωνῆν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὖν ὁντων.

ΣΩ. Τοιτὲ μὲν ἁρα, ὃ ἐταῖρε, κατωρθὼκαμεν περὶ τοῦ ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φανόμεθα.

c ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ δή; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον,
ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβῆν, ἂρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεξέγυμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβῆν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐάν πλείον ἢ ἡ δύο, τὰ πάντα,
ἡ μίαν τυλί ἱδεαν γεγονότα ςυνεθετέων αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἀπαντὰ ἕμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυνῶν, σύγμα καὶ ὁ ἀμφότερα παρατίθεται ἡ πρώτη συλλαβή τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀνώματος. ἄλλῳ τί ὁ γεγονόςκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ σύγμα καὶ τὸ ὁ ἀρα γιγνώσκεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἐκάτερον ἂν ἄγνοεί, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἴδος ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὁ Σωκράτης.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἰ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, ἐπεὶ ἀμφότερα τις γιγνώσκειν, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτε γιγνώσκει αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὔτως ἢ μὲν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰκήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλὸς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἰσως τὴν συλλαβήν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεία, ἂν' ἐξ ἐκεῖνων ἐν τῇ γεγονός εἴδος, ἰδέαν μὲν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἐτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα γ' ἄν μᾶλλον οὔτως ἢ ἐκεῖνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκέπτεσθω, καὶ οὐ προδοτεύων οὔτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

13. ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰκήσεται] Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Phaed. 89. Τῆμερον, ἢ τήμερον, ἢ τήμα τὸ ἡμᾶς καὶ οὐ ταῦτα, ἐάνπερ ἢμῶς ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτῶν ἀναβάσεσθαι. καὶ ἓγὼ ἃν εἴ οὖ εἴην καὶ με διαφορός ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον αὐτῷ ποιησάμην ὅπερ Ἀργείου, μὴ πρότερον κομίζεσθαι πρὶν αὐτῷ ἀναμαχώμενος τῶν Συμμίων τε καὶ Κέθηται λόγον.

18. εἴδος, ἰδέα] εἴδος is here rather more concrete, ἰδέα more abstract; but ἰδέα is used for εἴδος a few lines below. Generally, εἴδος is more logical, implying distinction; ἰδέα more metaphysical, implying unity. See Appendix C.
ΕΘΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 204. ΣΩ. 'Εχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα εἴς ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἐν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ δὲν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τι εἰδος ἐτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕγογε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτά ἐκείνα ἓ ἐτερον ἐκάτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔχω μὲν οὖν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἐτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ὅρθη' εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρυσις, σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δέι δὲ γε δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέρει ἄν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος;

1. 'Εχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν μία ἰδέα] There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to conjecture μίαν ἰδέαν: ἐχέτω ὡς ἐστώ δ—. Cf. Rep. 547. τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ φανόμενα οὖν φαντάσματα, ἐν τῇ γνωστῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡ τοῦ ῥαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μέγας ὀρθιάθαι.

'Let it be then as we have now put it, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of each combination of harmonious elements.' The words ἐχέτω δὴ δὲ take up the thread of τὰ, οὐδὲν δὲν ἔχειν ἐξα προθύμως μίαν ἰδέαν would of course refer to ἰδέαν μίαν εἴδος ἰδεάν ἐξαν.

For μία ἰδέα = εἴδος ἰδεάν μίαν ἰδέαν, cf. Euthyphr. 6. τὸ εἴδος ὁ πάντα τὰ δοσιν δοσιν ἐστιν; ἐφορθα γὰρ ποι ἢ ἰδέα τα τα αὐτα αὐτα ἐστι καὶ τα δοσιν δοσιν. Infr. 205. μία τις ἰδεα = συλλαβή ἂν εἴη.


ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐσθ' ὁ τι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὴν λέγομεν ἐν, δύο, τρία, τέταρτα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ εάν διὰ τρία ἢ τρίς δύο ἢ τέταρτάς τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πάσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἔτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτάν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔδέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔδέν.

ἐφ' ἐνι, ἐπὶ τούτοις πάντα ὡς διηγημένοις πᾶσι οἷον ἄριστος, πάσαι αὕται αἱ μονάδες.

5. ἡ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν] The words ἡ πέντε καὶ ἕν, which were introduced by Comarius, are anticipated in the simple enumeration ἐν, δύο, ἕν. They do not occur in the Bodleian or any other MS.

10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν.] So far the MSS. give a meaning perfectly clear and natural. The words which follow are not so clear. The only way in which it seems possible to construe them as they stand, is by laying an unnatural stress on ἐν. "Again, while we speak of all (in the plural), is there no one thing of which we speak?" This is brought out more distinctly by C. F. Hermann's conjecture, ἐν ἕν.

But this sense of πᾶλιν as a mere particle of transition, = τί δή; is hardly admissible in Plato (contrast p. 197. πᾶλιν δή, δοπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις κηρύσσει τι κ. τ. λ. —νῦν αὖ—περιστρέφεται κ. τ. λ. 

infr. p. 205. πᾶλιν δή, δοπερ ἐρν ἑπεκήρυξεν— Cf. however, Phil. 14. πολλῶν εἶναι πᾶλιν.) And this objection is not obviated by substituting the awkward expression πᾶν τὰ ἕξ for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous line. For ἓν alone would not be a satisfactory rendering. The present passage is one in which a reader of Plato will expect extreme clearness and minuteness of logical sequence. To put πᾶν τὰ ἕξ in the beginning of the argument would be to assume bluntly that which it is intended to prove, viz. that an aggre-
ΤΩ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 204. ΣΩ. Ταυτών ἄρα εὖ γε τοῖς ὡσα εξ ἄριθμοῦ ἐστὶ, τό τε πάν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἄπαντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φάινεται.

ΣΩ. Ὡς δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. ὃ τοῦ πλέθρου ἄριθμος καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταυτών ἡ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νάι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὠσαυτῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νάι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατόπεδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδου, καὶ πάντα τὰ τουαῦτα ὁμοιῶς; ὃ γὰρ ἰδιὰ ἄριθμος πᾶς τὸ ὄν πάν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἑστὶν.

But all (plural) implies number, and number implies parts.

Gate may be regarded as one thing. With this object it is necessary to reason from the plural to the singular, and to do so by gentle steps. The above argument might lead to the substitution of τὸ πᾶν for τὰ πάντα. But the objection against πᾶλω would still remain: and there would be needless obscurity in the logical inversion by which, after reasoning from the number, we should then reason to it. 'In counting six, we said 'all six' (in the plural.) Again, in speaking of all, in the singular, is there nothing which we express? 'There must be.' 'And is not this six?' 'Yes.' The desirable sequence is restored if for πᾶλω (which is itself a source of difficulty), we read πᾶν, (which in the MS. character could be changed into something very like πᾶλω by the repetition of ρ.) The passage may then be rendered, 'Have we not, then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?' 'Yes.' 'But while speaking of them all, is there no one thing all of which we express?' 'There must be.' 'And is that any thing but the six?' 'Nothing.' Compare with the resumption of the last admission in τὰ πάντα λέγομεν, Soph. 328. οὐκοιν τὸ γε εἶναι προσάπτων πειράμενον ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον: Φαίνει. Τί δὲ; τεῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἐνι διελεγμένων: After ἀρκείη, we must understand πᾶν τὶ λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192. οὔδ' ὡς ἄν εἰς ἐξαρτηθεὶ—ἀλλ' ὡς ἄν (ἐς. πᾶς τὶς) κ. τ. λ. alib. For what has been said of minute sequence, compare, amongst other passages, supra. 164. Μὴ οὖν ἓν ἑκάς ληπός κ. τ. λ. 188. 'Η οὖν καὶ Θε- λοῦσι ποι κ. τ. λ.

1. Ταυτώ—προσευ.] We give the names πᾶν and πάντα to the same thing.

4. λέγομεν] Several MSS. have λέγουμεν. If λέγομεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole.

10. ὃ γὰρ ἄριθμος] i.e. ὃ ἄριθμος πᾶς ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν πὰν ἐκαστὸν. 'The number of each taken altogether is each real thing.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. 'Ό δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς μᾶς ἄλλο τι ἡ μέρη ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. 'Οστα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἃν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φάϊνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, ἐπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκείσοδος.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλων ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐστίν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἃν εἴη, τὰ πάντα ὃν μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔωκεν.

ΣΩ. Μέρος ὃ ἐστὶ ὧνο ἄλλον ἐστίν ὑπὲρ ἐστίν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Τού παντὸς γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὃ Θεαίητε, μόχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ π. 205. οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῆ, αὐτὸ τούτο πᾶν ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅλον δὲ οὗ ταύτων τούτο ἐσται, οὗ ἃν μη-

But this is absurd.

10 therefore, if all (singular) and the whole are different, the whole is without parts.

taken altogether, or 'each taken altogether so far as it exists.' ἐκάστων would be more convenient, but we cannot venture to say that ἐκάστων is wrong. τὸ δὲ—ἐκάστων—ἐκάστων, δ ἐστιν. Cf. Rep. 490. αὐτοῦ δ ἐστιν ἐκάστων τῆς φύσεως. But it must be admitted that the text becomes more uncertain in the last few pages of the dialogue.

2. ὧν ἐκάστων αριθμὸς] The word ἀριθμὸς implies plurality. Hence ἐκάστων, unless it is corrupt. We are now reasoning from singular to plural, as before from plural to singular.

16. ἀνδρικῶς μᾶχει] Viz. for the θέσις he has chivalrously taken up, p. 204. παρακεντηθείσιν λέγω ἕτοι ἔτερον.

17. αὐτὸ τούτο πᾶν ἐστὶ] Is this very thing all, just as above, ἐστιν ὑπὲρ ἐστίν. πᾶν, being predicate, does not need the article.

p. 205. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεὶ μου νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πάντα καὶ ὁλον.

ΣΩ. Ὅντοιν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐ ἂν μέρη ἦν, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πάντα πάντα μέρη ἦσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἑπεχεῖροι, ὤν, εἴτε ἡ συλλαβή μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη αὐτήν μὴ ἔστω μέρη ἔχειν ἐαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταύτων οὖσαν αὐτῶν ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὅντοιν τούτο ὦν μὴ γένηται, ἔτερον αὐτῶν αὐτήν ἐθέμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἔστιν, ἔχεις ἀλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖς, ἡ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεία γ' ἐκείνης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γὰρ, ὦ Σύκρατε, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροῦμεν, γελοίον που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ιέναι.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δή, ὢ Θεαίτης, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἱδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβῆ ἄν εἴη.

3. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from p. 204. Ὅτι ὃ ἄν ἢ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι.

6. Πάλιν δὴ—ἀνάγκη] This was said before, pp. 203, 204. προγνώσκει τὰ στοιχεῖα διὰ τής ἀνάγκης τὸ μέλλοντι ποιεῖ γνώσειν συλλαβῆς,—οὕτων μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεὶ εἶναι.

8. ἢ ταύτων οὖσαν αὐτῶν ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι] ταύτων οὖσαν ὁμοίως was proved (p. 203.) to follow from their being parts. For the turn of the sentence, compare Rep. 490. ἦγεῖτο δ' αὐτῷ εἰ μὴ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλοις, ἢ διὰκεῖται αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντη ἢς ἢ ἄλλου οὐκ ἢ μεθαίμην πολιορκήσῃς. ib. 503. ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μη-μοιούσιν, δει—τὸ δόγμα τούτο μή ἐν πύκνοις μη' ἐν φόβοις—φαίνεται ἐκβάλλεται τὸν ἀδυνατίτα ἀποκριθέν. ib. 525. διὰ τὸ τῆς ουσίας αὐτῶν εἶναι γενόθεν εξαναδύεται ἢ μεθεπετε λογιστικῶς γενόθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὁ φίλε, ὦ τὸ ὀλγόν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὐ λέγεσθαι ὦ τοῖς πρῶτοις οὐκ ἐξ ὅ λογος, ἐξ ὀ ν ἡ ἀλλα σύγκειται, διὸ ἀντὶ αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ἐξ ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅρθως ἔχω προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ τούτο, ὅσ ἐτερα καὶ ἄλλοτρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὐτὴ δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἀλογῶν τε καὶ ἀγνωστον αὐτὸ πω ὧν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὐτή ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονο- ἀ εἴδες τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτῷ εἶναι; ἔγω μὲν γὰρ οὖν ὅρω ἄλλην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτευκεν ἡ συλλαβή 15 εἴδος ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἱδέα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβής ἔστι καὶ ὅλων τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵτις συλ-

20 λαβή γνωσται καὶ ρηται καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτών ἐφανή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γε ἐν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλ- ὦ λαβή, ὡσαύτος δὲ στοιχεῖον ἀλογῶν τε καὶ ἀγνωστον 25 ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποτέσες αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ εἴρω ἄλλος εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τότο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅσ ἀν λέγῃ

10. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις] Ἐρ is not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompoundeded) the cause of its having a simple form without parts?

15. εἴδος] Used here without reference to the sense in which it occurs above. Cf. p. 148. ἐὰν ἐδώ δει περιλαβέων. 27. μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅσ ἀν λέγῃ] For ὅσ ὧν without antecedent, (which is not unfrequent), cf.
ΑΘΕΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 199

p. 206. συλλαβήν μὲν γνωστόν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχείων δὲ τοὐ‑

µαντίων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ, ἄτερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ; τοῦναντίων λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μᾶλ‑

λον ἄν ἀποδέξατο εὖ δι' αὐτὸς σύνωσθα σειτωρ ἐν τῇ σ

tῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιὸν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὔδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσα ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ 

tóς διαγιγνώσκειν πειράμενον καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐκαστον, ἵνα µὴ ἡ θέσις ἰο

σε ταραττοῖ λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλήτατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κυθαριστοῦ τελεῶς μεμαθηκέναι µῶν

b ἄλλο τι ἂν ἢ τὸ φθόγγον ἐκάστορ δύνασθαι ἐπακο‑

λουθεῖν, πολας χορδῆς εἰς ἃ δὴ στοιχεία πᾶς ἂν ὀµο‑

λογήσειει μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔδέν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Ὡς µὲν ἄρ' αὐτὸ ἐπειροὶ ἐσµὲν στοιχεῖων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δὲὶ ἄπο τούτων τεκµαίρεσθαι καὶ ἐἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἑναργε‑

στέρας τε τῇ γνώσις ἔχειν φήσῃν καὶ κυριωτέραν 

tῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελεῶς ἐκαστον µά‑

θημα, καὶ εάν τις φῆ συλλαβῆµεν µὲν γνωστόν, ἄνω‑

στον δὲ περικεῖται στοιχείον, ἐκώντα ἢ ἀκοντα παίζειν 

ἡγοµένθ' αὐτῶν.

Soph. Ant. 35. ἄλλ' δὲ τοῦτων τι δρῆ, φῶνων προκειθαὶ δηµολε‑

στον ἐν πότει.

1. γνωστόν] ἁγιωστόν Bodl.

sed à erasum.

8. ὡς οὔδὲν ἄλλο] 'That in learning you continued doing

nothing else but endeavouring
to distinguish, &c.' Cf. Men. 80.

ὅτι οὔδεν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀφορίζει.

24. ἐκοντα ἢ ἀκοντα παίζειν

'That he is either playing with

us, or talking nonsense.'

The tendency of the present passage is to rise from the con‑

ception of elementary objects of sense (simple ideas of sensa‑

tion) to that of abstract ideas, (universals, predicables), as the

true elements of Knowledge.

This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of the example of letters, elementary sounds, etc. to represent the Ideas and the mode of becoming acquainted with them.

The following passage of Rep. p. 402. is an instance of this:—

"ὤσπερ ἄρα—γραμμάτων πέρι τὸτε λέγωμεν ἔχομεν, ὥστε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λειτουργού μᾶς δίοντα δοτα ἐν Ἀπασίᾳ οὖς ἐστίν περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὕτων ἐν συμφρόνησιν ὡς ἐν μεγαλῶ ἡγεμόνων αὐτά, ὡς οὖν δεός αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ παπταιχοῦ προϊσομένω Ἐνεγράφεσιν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσώρουσι γραμματικό πρὸς οὕτως ἔχομεν. Ἀληθῶς, Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰδώς γραμμάτων, εἴ τι ή ἐν ἔλασιν ἢ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐμπλαίνομεν, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἢ αὐτὰ γνώμην, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ τῇ καὶ μελέτῃ: παπταίσαι μὲν οὖν.

"Ἀρ' οὖν, δ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως ὡδε μοι πρότερον ἔστωση, ὡς αὐτοῖ, οὐκ ἂν ὑπερήφανον ἡμῖν παῦσετε εἰναι τοιοῦτον, πρὶν ἐν τῇ τῇ σοφορίσσῃ εἴδε καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μεγαλοποιεῖται καὶ δοτα τούτων ἀδελφά καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀν ἐκείνα παπταίχομεν περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνδοτα εἰς ἑαυτῶν ἀλογονίται καὶ αὐτά καὶ εἰδώς αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν συμφρόνῃ καὶ ἐν μεγαλὸις ἡγεμόνοις, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτῇ ἐκείνῃ τέχνης εἰς 

At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, so far as each of them can be regarded as one individual thing, are also the objects of Knowledge.


To resume the argument from p. 201. Theusetus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge: and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given—they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Knowledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of any thing. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable σω an account can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its constituents σ and ω. But is the syllable known, the letter unknown? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts, unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distin-
guished from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself unknown; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own memory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them.

Though the theory is rejected, we gain from it the notion of a simple idea and of a complex whole.

(2.) καὶ ἄλλα φανεῖν ἀποδείξεις The train of thought, here broken off, is resumed in the Sophist, where the ἀδιάματα ἄθροι are treated as elements, and combinations of them are shown to be possible.

6. τί ποτε βούλεται] The subject is either ὁ ταύτα λέγων, (cf. infr. τὸν ἀποφημικὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν σκοποῦμεν), or ὁ λόγος, viz. τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθῶς λόγου προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονότα

τὸν λόγον σημαίνειν] id. qu. τ. λ. εἰσπένθος. ἢ 'What are we to understand by this λόγος?' Three meanings are put forward as possible: 1. Expression in words. 2. Analysis. 3. Definition.

11. δοσιν κατατηρου] Cf. Phileb. 38. Καὶ τίς ἄτην παρη, τὰ τε πρὸς αὐτῶν ὑβέλθα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς φωνὴ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἄν πᾶλιν φθεγξαι, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγομεν οὕτως ὁ τὸν δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

12. ἐκτυποῦμεν] 'Imaging.' Compare also the saying of Democritus, λόγος ἔργον εἰκῆ.

For τὸν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥόμην, cf. Tim. 75. τὸ δὲ λόγων νάμα ἰδοὺ μένων καὶ ὑπερτευότης φρονίμης καὶ λογίων καὶ ἀριστεύων πάντων παράματα Soph. 263.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΘ. Ἐμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν p. 206. θεμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς βάπτων ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου σαυ[φός, ὁ μὴ ἔνεος ἢ κοφός ἢ ἀρχής· καὶ οὐτῶς ὡσοι τί ὅρθων δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανобрανταὶ ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμον ἐτί ὅρθη δόξα χωρίς ἐπι- ὑ τον στήμας γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΘ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τούνν ῥαδίως καταγγυνόσκομεν τὸ μη-δὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφημάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν σκοπούμεν. ἠσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τούτῳ ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐκαστὸν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρι- σιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ.

ΘΕΑΘ. Οἶον τί λέγεις, ὡ Σάκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οἶον καὶ 'Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ ἐκαστὸν δὲ τε δούραβ' ἀμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἴμαι δὲ οὕδε σὺ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπώμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες τί τί ἐστιν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τροχοῖ, ἄξων, ἡ ὑπερπερία, ἀντυγες, ἰγων.

ΘΕΑΘ. Πᾶν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ γε ἠσως οἶοι' ἂν ἢμᾶς, ὡσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὅρθος μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ θ

3. Οὔκοῦν] Ven. II. and another MS. give οὖκοῦν αὐ.
20. ὑπερπερία] The Bodleian with the other MSS. has ὑπερπε- ρία.
22. 'Ο δὲ γ' ἠσως οἰοι' ἂν ἢμας] The apodosis is deferred, as is so often the case when an illustration is introduced with ὡσ- περ. It is finally resumed with ὡσπερ ἀρα— Cf. Rep. 402. ὡσπερ ἀρα—γραμμάτων πρὶ—
ΔΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 207. λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικὸς τὸν τοῦ Θεο- 
τήτου ὁνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημώνως
οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἀν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς
ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἔκαστον περαινὴ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 5
πρόσθε που ἐφρήηθη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐφρήηθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐτω τοῖνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξις ἡμᾶς μὲν ὅρ-
θην ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνά-
ο μεν διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσαλβόντα τούτο, 10
λόγον τε προσελπήσεις τῇ ἁληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ
δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικῶν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμωνα περὶ ἀμάξις
οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὄλον περάναντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὃ Σῶκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοι, ὃ ἔταρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ 15
στοιχείων διέξοδον περὶ ἐκάστου λόγου εἶναι, τὴν δὲ
κατὰ συλλαβᾶς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἐς ἀλογίαν, τοῦτο
μοὶ λέγε, ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπισκεπῶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμωνα εἶναι ὑπτυμὸν 20
ὀντων, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ
εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν
ἔτερου, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερου δοξάζῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μᾶ Δί οὐκ ἔγνωρε.

ΣΩ. Εἶναι ἀμημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μα-

---'Αρ' οὖν, δ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, 25
οὕτως οὐδὲ μονυκοὶ κ. τ. λ.
3. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἰσί] 'Whereas it is impossible.' Cf. p. 157. τὸ δ' οὐ δι, and note.
5. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] p. 206, ἀς
οὕτως ἀλλ' ἀκόμα διελεύςας
κ. τ. λ. is most probably re-
ferred to.

15. Εἰ σοι] εἰ is interrogative, depending on τοῦτο μοι λέγει.
21. τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν—] e. g. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τς and θς.
22. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν] e. g. thinking the first letter of θς at one time θ, at another τ.
θῆσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας p. 207. αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτε μὲν ἐτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτερον ἡγομένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ ἐς αὐτὸ τοτε μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέτας συλλαβῆν;

ΣΩ. Ταύτα λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δ' οὖ τοῖνυν ἀμημονω, οὔδὲ γέ πω ἡγούμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχουσα

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἴ οὐγαί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράφῃ, καὶ αὐ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦτα καὶ τ. p. 208. εἰ οὐγαί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράφῃ, ἂρ' ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτῶν τὴν πρότητα τῶν ὑμετέρων ὁνομάτων συλλαβῆν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τί καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβῆν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔδέν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράφας Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν εῇς γράφῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δήλον δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὁν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξά- b 

ΣΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχουν μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ

2. αὐτὰ] 'What I have described.'

20. οὔδέν γε] 'Certainly not.'

γε assents to the meaning of the question. Cf. Phil. 38. οὔδέν γε. ἄλλ' ἀπερ ἄκοιν λέγο.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 208. διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἧν δὴ λόγον ἀμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἐταίρη, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἥν οὐποί δὲι ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κυδωνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅποι δὴ, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐπιλουτῆσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἐχεῖν τῶν ἀληθεστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγου. ἡ μὴπο κατηγορομεθε; ἦσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις αὐτὸν ὀριεῖται,

όλλα τὸ λοιπὸν εἴδος τῶν τριῶν, ὅν ἐν γε τὶ ἐφαμεν τὸ λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζομενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως ὑπεμνησας· ἐτί γὰρ ἐν λοιπῶν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὡσπερ εἰδόλων, τὸ δὲ ἄρτι λεξικῶν διὰ στοιχείων ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλου. τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτων τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐπερ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔστων, τὸ ἐχεῖν τι σημεῖον εἰπτεῖν ό τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁλον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπτεῖν;

Δ. ΣΩ. Οἶον, εἰ βούλει, ἥλιον περὶ ἱκανῶν οἶμαι σοι εἶναι ἀποδεξάσθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατον ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἱόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.


8. ἐπιστήμης λόγον] λόγος is used here in a double sense. 1. Definition of Knowledge.] Cf. p. 149. ἐν λόγῳ προσείνει. 2. That ‘account’ of a thing which (with right opinion) constitutes Knowledge. The play of words may be preserved, "when we thought we had found the most indubitable 'account' concerning Knowledge."

9. τις] Viz. the nameless author of our theory.

17. ὅποι ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔστων] The two former were inferences from different meanings of λέγειν.;—to express and to enumerate. See p. 206. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δράστα λέγειν φαμέν.
ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ ὁδ χάριν ἐφηταί. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι p. 208.
ἐλέγομεν, ὅσ ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἀν λαμβάνῃς
τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὅσ φασί τισ, λήψεις.
ἐως δὲ ἂν κοινῷ τινὸς ἐφάπτῃ, ἐκεῖνων πέρι σοι ἔσται
ἢ λόγος ἀν ἂν ἡ κοινότης θῇ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸς ἔχειν λόγον ε
τὸ τοιοῦτον καλέων.
ΣΩ. 'Οσ δ' ἂν μετ' ὅρθης δοξῆς περὶ ὑπουοῦν τῶν
ὁμοίων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ αὐτοῦ,
10 ἐπιστήμων γεγονός ἔσται οὐ πρὸτερον ἢν δοξαστής.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὔτος.
ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ τὰ, ὦ Θεαίτης, πανταπασίν ἔγωγε
ἐπειδὴ ἔγγυς ὅπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τῷ
λεγομένου, ἐμνήμῃ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν· ἐως δὲ ἀφεστήκῃ
15 πόρρωθεν, ἐφαινετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τὸ τοῦτο; 
ΣΩ. Φράσω, ἐὰν οὖσ τε γένωμαι. ὅρθην ἔγωγε p. 209.
ἔχων δοξάν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σοῦ
λόγον, γιγανόσκω δὴ σε, ei δὲ μὴ, δοξάξω μόνον.
20 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Λόγος δὲ γε ἢν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος
ἐρμηνεία.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.
ΣΩ. 'Ἡνίκ' οὖν ἐδοξάζων μόνον, ἄλλο τι ὁ τῶν

9. αὐτοῦ.] This punctuation appears preferable when it is
observed that there has been a
13. σκιαγραφήματος] The image
is a familiar one. Cf. Phæd. 69.
μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἡ τοιαύτη
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 207

p. 209. ἀλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἦπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔσχεν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενούμην, ὃν οὐδὲν οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἀλλος ἔχει.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Δίος· πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σε μᾶλλον ἐδάφαξον ἢ ἄλλον ὄντυνοι; θες γὰρ μὲ διανοούμενον ὁς ἐστιν οὕτως Θεαίτητος, ὅσον ἂν ἦ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐχθρὶς ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ ὀφτω δὴ ἐν ἐκαστὸν τῶν μελῶν. αὐτὴ οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἐσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖται, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἑχοντα ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμὸν τε καὶ ἐξ- ῥίνου ὀφθαλμοῦ, μὴ τι σὲ ἀὖ μᾶλλον δοξᾷσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσον τοιοῦτοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ πρότερον γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὐτὴ τῶν ἀλ- λων σιμοτήτων ὄν ἐγὼ εὐρακα διάφορον τι μημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημανμένη κατάθηται, καὶ τάλλα οὖτως

5. ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει] The verb is attracted by τις ἄλλος.

13. τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν] The phrase Μυσῶν ἔσχατος is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The editors (under protest from Buttmann) read τὸ λεγόμενον. There seems no reason for this. Cf. supr. οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χήρες. Arist. Eth. N. VIII. 3. de γὰρ τούς λεγομένους διὰς συναπαλλάσσαι. In the examples quoted by the Scholiast the proverb is used to express contempt. Here it means only remoteness.

22. μημεῖον — ἐνσημανμένη] Cf. pp. 191, 196. This is an instance of the way in which a theory which is rejected is still permitted and intended by Plato to leave an impression on the mind.

23. κατάθηται] So Bodl. with Vat. Ven. II.
πλάτωνος

ἐξ ὅν εἰ σὺ, [καὶ ἕμε,] εάν αὐριῶν ἀπαντήσω, ἀνα- p. 209. μυήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθώτατα.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἁρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα δὲ ἁν εἰῇ ἐκάστου περὶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τῇ ἁν ἐτὶ εἰῆ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἡ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοΐα γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡμ ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων δια- ϕέρει τοῦτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἡ ὑπεροῦ ἡ ὅτου ὡς λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγων, τυφλὸν δὲ παρακέλευσι ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον τὸ γὰρ, ἢ ἔχομεν, ταύτα προσ- λαβεῖν κελεύει, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γεν- ναῖος ἐσκότω μένη.

1. καὶ ἐμέ.] Bodl. εἰ σῦ ἐμὲ καὶ: Vat. Δ. εἰ σῦ ἐμέ καὶ: Ven. Ζ. et pr. Ε. εἰ σῦ ἐμὲ καὶ (Bekk. Stallb.) : cet. εἰσ ἐμέ καὶ: Ven. Ζ. γρ. ἐσθ ἐμὲ. ἤ is awkwardly remote from its antecedent, and sets aside τὰλα εἰ δὲν εἰ σῦ, which answers to ἐξοφθαλμόν in the previous sentence. And the ἤ may have originated in the similarity of sound between ἤ and ἤ, as in p. 200. many MSS. read οὐθν for οὐθοῦν. Heindorf's conjecture, Ἰ, referring to μη- μείου, is unsatisfactory, because it is rather the object of sense, which, by fitting the μημείου, would be said to remind. Hence Ἰ ἐμὲ καὶ would seem a fair emendation. But the above is chosen as the simpler, and as accounting more naturally for the corruption. If it is right, the sentence must be supposed to revert by a conversational licence to the indicative mood. See p. 149, ποιών καὶ — ὁμιλήσουν, and note. Schleiermacher's conjecture, Ἰ, leaves the subject of ἀναμψησαν doubtful. That of the Zurich editors, εἰσε σῦ ἐμὲ καὶ ἐμὲ, introduces an abrupt and awkward inversion. And the use of οὐδα in this sense is very questionable.

14. ὑπεροῦ—περιτροπῆ] ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦντον πολλὰς καὶ μηδὲν ἀποντῶν, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ταχεῖος τὶ πραττόντων. μέμνηται δὲ αὐτῆς Φιλήμων ἐν "Ἡρωι καὶ ἑναβα Πλάτων. (Schol.) οὖθεν δὲν λέγοι, ἰ. ἑ. λύρος ἄν ἐμὲ.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 209. ΘΕΑΙ. ἢ ἐὖ ἓ δὴ τὶ νῦν δὴ ὡς ἔρων ἐπίθου;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγου, ὥς παῖ, προσλαβέων γνωναι κε-

λευει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δεξίατε τὴν διαφορότητα, ἰδὲ χρῆμα,

ἄν εἰπ τοῦ καλλιστοῦ τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ,


5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστὶν ἐπι-

στήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὡς δόξα ὁρθῇ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης

dιαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τούτῳ ἄν εἰπ

κατ᾽ ἐκείνον.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔσοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασι γε εὐθές, ζητοῦντον ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην,

δόξαν φάναι ὁρθὴν εἶναι μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης
eἰς ἀπαφορότητος εἶτε ὄπως εἴτε. ὦτε ἀρα ἄσθησις,

ὁ Θεαίτης, ὦτε δόξα ἀλήθης ὦτε μετ᾽ ἀληθοῦσιν.

15 ἓν δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμην ἄν εἰπ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐσοικεν.

1. δὲ δὴ So the MSS., except Vat. D., which has ἢ δὲ. The Bodleian continues without punctuation from ἐπιστήμην, and accents as above. But the accents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible some words may have slipped out? such as τὶ ὡν δὴ; ἢ δὲ δὴ τι—

'Well, what then? For I presume your question just now implied that you had something to say.' The reading of Vat. D. admits of being rendered, however, 'Well, but if,—what were you just now going to say, when you asked the question?' Most of the editors give Εἰπτε. The question referred to is τὸ ὡν προσλαβεῖν—τὶ ἐν ἐπὶ εἰπ; This is a little difficult; and Badham, retaining Εἰπτε, most ingeniously con-

jectures τὶ νῦν δὴ ὡς ἀρχηγὸν ὑπέ-

βου, i.e. 'what was the sup-

pressed alternative implied by

the use of μὲν? But this is

hardly required. Theaetetus

very properly recalls Socrates

from his unwonted discursiv-

eness.

2. ἡδον χρῆμα ἀν εἰπ τοῦ] The genitive is due to a sort of at-

tractive ethical force in ἡδον, cf. ἀποτομὴ τῆς συμμορολογίας above.

Soph. Phil. 81. ἀλλ᾽ ἡδο γὰρ τοῦ

κτῆμα τῆς μικροῦς λάβειν.

'An amusing sort of creature

must be our fairest of the ac-

counts of knowledge!'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

Σ.Ο. Ἡ οὖν ἐτὶ κυψιμέν τι καὶ ὁδινομέν, ὁ φίλε, ὢν 2.10
περί ἐπιστήμης, ἡ πάντα ἐκτετοκαμέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δί' ἔγωγε πλεῖω ἢ ὥσα εἰχον
ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα.

5 Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μανευτικὴ ἡμῖν
tεχνὴ ἀνεμαία φησι γεγενήσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τρο-
φῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Σ.Ο. Ἔαν τοῖςν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἔγκυμων ἐπὶ-

χερῆς γίγνεσθαι, ὁ Θεάιτητε, εάν τε γίγνη, βελτιω-
νων ἐσεὶ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἔξετασιν, εάν τε κενὸς
ἂν, ἢττον ἐσεὶ βαρύς τοῖς συνούσι καὶ ἡμερότερος,
σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενοσ εἰδέναι ἄ μη οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον
γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ
15 τι οὐδα δὲν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὁσοὶ μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄν-
δρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μανείαν ταῦτην
ἔγὼ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἠλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν
γνωσιῶν, ἔγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γεγεννῶν καὶ ὅσοι δ
καλοὶ. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ
20 βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, ἢν με
γεγραπται ἐσθεν δε, ὁ Θεόδωρε, δεύρῳ πάλιν ἀπαν-
τῶμεν.

3. Καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δί' ἔγωγε πλεῖω] καὶ πλεῖω, 'even more,' ναὶ μᾶ
Δί' ἔγωγε is interposed.

9. 'Εἰν τοῖς] I.e. 'The power
of rejection is one of the great-
est powers in thinking.'

19. τὸν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν] Indictments for impiety were

laid before the ἄρχων βασιλεύς,
who was the representative of
the ancient kings in their ca-
pacity of High-Priest, as the
Rex Sacrificulus was at Rome.
(Smith's Dict. of Ant.) It is

at this point that the Euthy-
phro is supposed to open.
APPENDIX A.

On some peculiarities of style and idiom in Plato.

'Ἄλλ' οὖ πρῶτον γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτης ὑπὸ ἐμοί δοξασθήσεται, πρῶτον ἡ συμφορὰ αὐτῆς τῶν ἄλλων συμφορῶν ἐν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορον ταῦτα μνήμεων παρ' ἐμοί ἐφημερισμένη κατάθεται. Theat. p. 209 c.

The words of Socrates, it is said in the Euthyphro (pp. 11, 15), are like the works of Daedalus; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato's style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, reappearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of light and aspect.

The reader of the Theaetetus, for example, is disappointed, if he looks for perfect consistency with the Republic, or if he expects to find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished; — the figures are erased, — and yet further discussion is made, not without reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doctrine of sense, for instance, is wholly negatived, and yet it cannot be said that we are not intended to gather something from it.

Plato's metaphors are 'living creatures' rather than figures of speech; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities; he recours to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no expression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled, it is with some additional or altered feature: if a conception is resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made, or the argument is carried further. Thus the photograph, as it has been called, of the connexion is apt to be blurred, from the thought moving as we read. Even in the same passage, where an ordinary writer would
be contested with referring to an example or illustration just ad-
duced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one, which per-
haps gives a new direction to the current of thought. A fair
instance of this occurs in Theæt. p. 168, where Theodorus says:
'It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse me
and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the Lacedæmonians
do. You are rather to be compared to Sciron: for they tell one
either to strip or go away; but you are rather like Antæus in your
way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you have
stripped him (like Sciron) and compelled him to wrestle with you
(like Antæus).

The argument itself (ὁ λόγος) is continually personified and is
spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.

It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who
runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away
'like a tale.' More frequently it has power over us, like a general
commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives,
while it rolls its successive waves over us, or like a wind which car-
ries us we know not whither. Sometimes 'its name is legion,' and
it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes
a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape
from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves
from the driving shower. The argument talks with us, it goes
through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some
threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair treat-
ment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help, it has a
father, and guardians of its orphanhood.

This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole
of Plato's writings, is closely connected with their conversational
form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of
language.

The observation of both these elements of Plato's style is of im-
portance to the student, because it saves him from the necessity of
resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon
each occasion of grammatical perplexity.

I. Conversationalisms. In Plato we often meet with irregularities
of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred
to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dia-
logue more easy and lively and natural.

a. Changes of construction. The following are a few out of
several instances in the Theætætus:

(1.) p. 144. τὸ γὰρ εἶμαι διὸν—πρὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι—ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ' άν
γέμισαν γενέσθαι othe ἥμω νενομένους. Theodorus begins by simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon his previous anticipations and experience to account for it.

(2.) p. 153. ή δ' εν τῇ ψυχῇ ζεϊς—κτάτα τε μαθήματα κ. τ. λ. cf. p. 173. σπουδαί δ' ἐπιρρέουν ἐν ἀρχαί—οὔτ' ἄνω πράττειν προσ-

The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds.

(3.) p. 167. ποιημέναι ψυχῆς ζεῖν διδάσκοντας συγγενῆ διανυ. Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the reflexive pronoun, as if ψυχῆ were the subject of διδάσκοντας: a transition from the persons who think to the mind which thinks.

(4.) p. 172. οὐκ ἔσται τολμήσει φάσαι (ὁ λόγος) . . . ἐθέλοσιν ἱσχυρίζεται. He passes from what the argument would say, to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite plural.

To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of nouns: e. g. Theæt. p. 147 ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ὑμνησει, without περί: just as we might say in conversation, 'the mud-question,' for 'the question about the mud.'

β. Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun αὐτός, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this.

e. g. p. 155. ἵνα σοι ἄνδρῶν—τῇς διανοαῖς τὴν ἀλήθειαν—συν-

Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Thé-

etetus occurs p. 171, μᾶλλον δὲ ὕπο γε ἑκένων ὁμολογήσεται, διὰ τῆς ἐντευτον λέγουτι ξυγχωρή ἀληθῆ αὐτῶν διδάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτῶς συγχωρήσεται.

γ. Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression.

e. g. p. 153. Ὑπὶ οὖν σοι λέγω νηνελάς τε καὶ γαλήνα καὶ δοκα-

p. 172. τούς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἔτι σχολής ποιοῦσαι, διότι ήμεῖς

}"θετον ὅθεν λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκων, εἰναυτῶν ὅ ἐπελθὼν τού προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέση.
APPENDIX A.

p. 199. μὴ γὰρ ἦκεν τὴν ἑπτάετήμον τούτου ὅλην τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέρων ἀνίκεισθαι, ἦν—ἀλλ' ἑτέρων ἑτέρων ἄμισθα λέθη, ὥστε ἐν τῇ ἑνδεκα δέκας φήσῃ ἑνα, τὴν τῶν ἑνδεκα ἑπτάετήμον ἀνίκει τῆς τῶν δέκας λάθεω, τῷ τε δαυτῇ οὖν φάσται αὐτὶ περιτετράπε. An occasional consequence of this fulness of expression is the deferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after ἀπετρέ: e. g. Rep. 402 ἀπετρέ ἐρα ————. Ἀρ' οὖν, δ λέγω, πρὸς θείων, οὖν κ. τ. λ. Theæt. p. 207. ἀπετρέ δὲ—οὔτε τοίνυν κ. τ. λ.

δ. Also connected with the conversational form of Plato's writings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the imperfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a saying of Aristotle's that Dialectic deals tentatively with those subjects on which Philosophy dogmatizes, (ἡ διαλεκτική πειραστικὴ περὶ ἄν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριμική); and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induction. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the respondent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example (the example often covering more ground than seems quite fair,) and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular to universal.

The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later age, but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative and inductive spirit.

An instance occurs in the Theætetus p. 159, when it is argued that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus ironically adopted, appears from Protag. p. 350, where Socrates is checked for it by Protagoras, who says, Ἐγὼ γαρ ἐρωτηθείς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνθρώπους τρισί μεγάλοι εἰςίν, ἀμελώσας: εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλεῖς ἀνθρώποι, εἰς ἡμῖν τοῦτο γὰρ ἐποιεῖ. And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensively limited with persuasive modesty: as in Theæt. p. 152. Ἐπεράτεια ἄρα καὶ ἀνθρώπος ταῦτα ἐν τῇ τερμωσί τε πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. —Ἄνθρωπος ἄρα τοῦ ὅτις ἄντι ἀντὶ.

Ib. p. 204. Ταῦτα ἄρα ἐν τῷ τους διὰ διὰ ἀμφοῦ ἄντι, τὸ τε πῶς προσαγωνόμεν καὶ τὰ ἀπαρτα. e. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power of 'saying any thing.' Just as there is a freedom of expression
possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid.

II. This leads us to the Poetical use of language. Plato's words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is Sophocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature.

a. Poetical use of single words.

(1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (πρὸ δημάτων ποιεῖν).

p. 150. ἐναργές δτι for δήλων δτι (\textit{as clear as day}).

p. 154. ταύτα τά φάσματα.

p. 156. συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη.

p. 160. μὴ πταλων τῇ διανοίᾳ.

p. 162. διωλόγιος φλυάρια.

p. 165. σφαλεῖ γὰρ ἤττον ἀσχημονός.

p. 169. μαλι ἐν ἐνυγκέκοψες.

p. 171. ταύτη ἄν—ἰσταος τὸν λόγον.

p. 172. ἁνάγκην ἢχων ὀ ἀντιλέος (wielding coercion).


To which may be added the 'hypocoristic' use of diminutives.

p. 149. φαρμάκια.

p. 195. ἵν του σμικρὸν ἃ τὸ ψυχάριον.

(2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes spiritualised.

p. 149. μαίας γενναίας καὶ βλοσυρᾶς.

p. 162. δέξιος οὖθ' ἐνὸς μόνου.

p. 174. πολὺ βδάλλωσα.

p. 189. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι ἰδιόλεκτα διανοομένη.

p. 194. Ἐστεχαί τοῖς λάσιοι τὸν τὸ κέαρ ἃ.

(3) Playing upon a word.


p. 152. τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

p. 181. τοὺς βέστατας.

p. 194. τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ.

p. 208. ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον.

Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i.e. when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning.
p. 149. ἐῖ ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἰληχεν.
p. 152. (perhaps) ἐξεμφερέσθων (let them march one way).
p. 161. τὰ ἀμφιθρόμα αὐτοῦ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἐν κόλπῳ περιμεθετένω.
p. 193. ἀντωρ ὁ ἑραμαλν ἵπποδούμανοι παραλλάξας.
p. 198. πρόχειρον δ’ οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ.

(5) Poetical use of particles: e. g. the frequent use of ἄρα, helping to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard, the occasionally difficult reference with γάρ (p. 152. οὐ γάρ—and note), the hyperbaton of καὶ (p. 154. καὶ μὴ ἡγωγή. p. 193. εἰς τὸ καὶ σοι τὸ ἱμικα—), and generally the dramatic liveliness, with which successive clauses are contrasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person. Speech thus becomes literally a ‘self-dialogue.’ See especially p. 155, δ’ μὴ πρότερον ἢ, ἄλλα δυτέρων τοῦτο εἶναι: and p. 190, ὃς παντὸς μᾶλλον—ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον—ὡς παντᾶπιστῶ ἄρα—ὡς ἄναγκη—, with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are introduced.

Compare Phil. 38. τὶ ποτε ἄρα ἢντι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ’ ἐστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διέσφερ.

β. The same poetical energy shows itself in the expansion of some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects the general tendency of the Greek language.

(1) Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form of exegesis) deserves to be reckoned among the more salient peculiarities of Plato’s style. One example from the Theaetetus will suffice to indicate what is meant.

p. 175. πάλιν ἀδ τὰ ἀντιστροφα ἀποδίδοσιν—ἀνάγγελον τε ἄφ’ ἐφηλτο κρεμασθείν—ἀδημοίν τε καὶ ἀποροίν καὶ βαρβαρίζων—γέλωτα—παρίχει κ.τ.λ.—where another writer would probably have inserted γάρ.

Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun such as τοῦτο (p. 189 ad fin.) or δ’ (p. 158.) Compare the use of τὸ δέ, e. g. p. 157. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in apposition to the sentence, which may be viewed as an extension of the ‘cognate accusative.’ Instances of this are p. 153, ἐπὶ τοῦτοι τὸν κολοφώνα κ.τ.λ.; p. 161, τὰ ἀμφιθρόμα αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. (Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred to would fall grammatically under this head.)

(2) Attraction. E. g. where a main verb was to be expected, we find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another participle, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle.
APPENDIX A. 217

p. 173. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον θεϊλέος διελθόντες ἡ ἐδ-
σαπτες πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τρεπόμεθα; where we should have
expected διελθόντες.

p. 150. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φὰίνονται καὶ πάντες ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προσω-
ποιη τῆς συνοφορᾶς θαυμαστὸν δανον ἐπιδιδότες, ὥς αὐτὸι τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν: where, but for the proximity of ὥς—-, ἐπιδιδότες would probably have been ἐπιδιδάσαυν. See also
λαβὼν, p. 199, which but for ὅταν—λάβῃ would be λαβόντα.

γ. To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself
in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of anti-
thesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly
so in Plato.

p. 150. ἐμὸς δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὅπ' ἄλλοις πεισθέντες.

p. 151. ἐνος δὲ ἐγ', καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιδιδάσαν; where the sub-
jects of the two verbs are opposed.

p. 197. εἰ δυνατὸν αὐτῷ εκτητοῦν μὴ ἠκίνη, ἄλλα δοπερ κ. τ. λ.

δ. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in
adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument.

E. g. p. 152, where we are gradually led from the example of
the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the
position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See
also pp. 158, 159, where, as the argument proceeds, (ἐρευνώ
δου τοῦτο δὲρ ἀκίνη is substituted for δῶς ἕταν.

ε. The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity
of Plato's style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is
especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from
poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding
prose, and, (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to
something like a metrical cadence.

(1.) p. 173. In the quotation from Pindar, φέρετα is probably
substituted for πέφερα (see note on the passage), the words τὰ ἐπι-
τεδα γεωμετροῦσα are inserted, and τῶν δυτικον ἐκάστον δῶς is added at
the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the
sentence, so as to embellish it without interrupting its harmony.

p. 194. The substitution of the Attic ἐκαρ for the Homeric ἐκαρ
is probably due to a similar motive.

(2.) Dithyrambic and lyric cadences are more frequent in some
other dialogues than in the Thesetetus. See especially Sympos. pp.
196, 197, the close of Agathon's speech, especially the last few

f f
lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: Phædr. 238, 241, alibi: Rep. 546, 7; 617, 8; and several places of the Timeaus, e. g. p. 47. ἄν ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος διὸ θηρνοὶ μάτην. With such passages may be compared Theæt. 175, 6, οὐδέ γὰρ ἄρμαν πάνω λαβών ὦρδέω ὑμησαι θεῶν τε καὶ άνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βιῶν ἁληθῇ.

The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inversion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis.

p. 158. οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αύτῶν οἰκεῖοι εἶναι.

p. 160. καὶ δὲ Πρωταγόρας τὸν σοφότατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄθροπον μέτρων εἶναι.

ζ. A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato’s dialogues, of which the Theætetus is acknowledged to be a prominent example.

There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism:—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part:—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted.

And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and interpenetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to mark the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another.

An instance of this is the way in which the reader is prepared for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as p. 157, ἄγαθον καὶ καλὸν. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, p. 144, ἐποκρατήσας ἄν ἐὰν μουσικὸς ἄν λύγει, of the conclusion arrived at p. 179, σοφότατον τε ἄλον ἄλον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρων εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wisdom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, p. 167, and presses for solution as an element of the common opinion of men, p. 170, καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγάλοις καθότιοι—παρὰ σφικτὰ.

These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in pp. 171, 2, of the ‘semi-Protagoreanism’ of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is expedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the
enemy's lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bearing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words p. 177, πλὴν εἰ τοῦ δοσμα λέγου τούτο δέ που σκάμμα δν εἰπη πρὸς δ λέγομεν οὐχί; κ.τ.λ. At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began.

A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion.

Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, pp. 184–187, and from 'true opinion' to 'true opinion giving an account of itself,' p. 201.

And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry proceeds. See p. 194, ἀ δὴ δντα καλεται, compared with p. 152, ἀ δὴ φατεν εἰναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς: and p. 209, μημειον παρ' εμοι ἐναπιστημόν τα τάθηται,—an application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block.

Plato's philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests.

The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art,—or rather of Nature conscious of itself,—which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to the parts and to the whole.

His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle surrounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind.
APPENDIX B.

µη οὗ.

§ 1. The most familiar use of µη οὗ is after verbs of fearing and the like, with the subjunctive: where a fear is expressed that something is not, or will not be; e.g. Plat. Men. p. 89. πρὸς τι βλέπων δυσχεραίνει τινά καὶ ἀνιστήσει, µη οὗ ἐπιστήµηµα ζη ἀρετή;

But there are other cases of a different kind, in which µη οὗ has only the force of a single negative.

These are, (1) With a conditional participial clause depending on a negative sentence, e.g.

Hdtus. II. 110. οὗ οὗ πεποίησαν ἵργα οἷά περ ἱεσώστηρι τῷ Διονυσίῳ.

- - - - οἵκεν διακεφαλέαν εἰσάναι ἤμπροσθε τῷ ἱεσώστηρι ἀναθηµάτων, µη οὗ ὑπερβαλλόμενον τούτω ἵργους.

Hdtus. VI. 106. εἰνάγε ὅν ο PriorityQueue ἑξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν, µη οὗ πλήρεις ἤκοντο τοῦ κύκλου.

Soph. Οἰ. Εὖ. Rex, 220. οὗ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἥκεν τὸν οὕτως ἤκεν αὐτῶς, µη οὗ ἤκεν τι σόµβαλον.

(2.) With an infinitive or participle dependent on a negative sentence, when the clause so introduced explains or supplements that which is denied. What is so explained has of course something in it of a privative meaning. The commonest instances are those of verbs of refraining, being able (to avoid), admitting (a negative), and denying; e.g.

Soph. Οἰ. Εὖ. Col. 361. ἦκεν γὰρ οὗ καὶ γε, τοῦτ' ἐγὼ σαφῶς ἤκεν, µη οὗ ὑπερ' ἐµοὶ φέροντα τι.

Soph. Οἰ. Εὖ. Rex, 1088. οὗ τὸν Ὀλυμπίον ἀπείρου, ὁ Κιθαρίδα, οὗ ἦκεν * * * µη οὗ κεῖ γε κ. τ. λ.

* To the same head should probably be referred the use after ἀλοχόνως with the infinitive, mentioned by Rost (Grammatik, p. 764); of which I have been unable to find an example. But for the converse, see Plat. Gorg. p. 461. ἀλοχόνη µη προεσμολογήθησαι.
(3.) With the infinitive or participle after ἀλοχρόνος ἵστι, and some other expressions of reproach.

Plat. Theaet. p. 151. ἀλοχρόνοι μη οὕτω παντὶ τρόπῳ προσβεβώσθαι δη τι τις ἢν λέγειν.


Plat. Symp. πολλὴ ἄνων μη ὁχὲς καὶ ταῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ κἀλλος.

Plat. Phaed. 85. μη οὖχ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἔλέγχειν—πάντως μαλζακοῦ ἄφθαρτος.

Soph. ὉEd. Rex, δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἐν οἷς, τοιῶθα μη οὕτω κατακεύτερως ἔδειν.

§ 2.

1. There is a simple and obvious explanation of the two passages of Herodotus, which may perhaps be found with some modification to apply to the other cases above mentioned.

Both in II. 110. and VI. 106. the clause introduced with μή οὕτω expresses not a merely hypothetical condition, but a condition which was also a fact. It is not merely said that Dariuses should not stand before the image if his deeds were inferior, it is also asserted that they were inferior. The Spartans did not say that they would not come unless it was full moon, but that they would not come on the ninth day, because the moon was not then full.

The same explanation applies to Soph. ὉEd. Rex, 220. ὉEdipus says, not 'that he could not have made the investigation, unless he had had some clue:' but that 'not having any thing to guide him, it was impossible for him to conduct the investigation by himself.'

In all these instances therefore οὕτω is clearly significant: not destroying the negative force of μή, but strengthening into a subordinate assertion what might otherwise be understood as an hypothesis. It gives a degree of objective reality to the clause, and brings it into prominence as an integral part of the predication.
But why is this only done when the whole sentence is negative? For instance, why could not the priest have said, 'ἀδικοὶ αὐτῶν προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἐκεῖνον ἀναθήματα, μη ὅπερ ὑπερβαλλόμενον τοιοῦ ἐργοῦτ;'

The answer is probably to be sought (1) in the tendency of negative particles in Greek to multiply themselves,—which acts here in two ways, the negative turn of the sentence leading the mind onwards to a further negative, and the negation in the principal clause making it necessary to strengthen the subordinate but independent negative expression:—(2) in the indefiniteness of the negative sentence, which makes the necessity of avoiding ambiguity to be more distinctly felt.

2. These last remarks apply equally to the second case, that of negative sentences, (or interrogative with negative meaning,) to which a negative clause is appended, explanatory of that which in the chief clause is denied. But it is less easy here to determine the exact significance of οὐ. The subordinate clause in this case does not run parallel to the whole sentence, but to a part of it, i.e. it corresponds, not to what is negatively asserted, but to what is denied. Still it is a fair hypothesis that it is not merely subordinate, but that it enters into the predication. It is co-ordinate with the predicate, if we do not include in that term the negative particle. It is a fact consistent with this hypothesis, that what is thus introduced with μὴ οὐ is generally dwelt upon with some emphasis, and is often more important to the sense than the preceding verb, which has something of an auxiliary character. Thus Plato Phæd. 72, τίς μηχανή μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα ἀναλοθήναι, might be more briefly expressed thus,

πῶς οὐ πάντα ἀναλοθήσεται;

and ib. 88. οὐδὲν προσήκεις ὑπάσαντον βαρβαρίαν μὴ οὖκ ἀναθήτως βαρβαρίαν, is nearly equivalent to οὐδὲν ὑπάσαντον βαρβάραν οὐκ ἀναθήτως βαρβαρίας.

It is not necessary for the validity of an hypothesis of this kind to show that where οὐ is omitted, (as in Soph. CEd. Rex, 1388. οὐκ ἄν ἐσχόμην τῷ μὴ ποιεῖσθαι τοὐμὸν ἀδικίᾳ δήμας. Philoct. 348. οὐ πολὺν χρόνον μὴ ἐπεσκοπῇ μὴ με ναυσταλεῖν ταχύ,) the clause is purely subordinate, though the case would be considerably strengthened if this could be proved. And though an account could be given of both the above instances, (in the first the remoteness from fact of an imaginary act in past time, in the second the emphasis being on ἐπεσκοπῇ, and his 'not sailing’ being in this case so purely imaginary), still it is better, especially when dealing with poetical instances, not to seem to strain them to our theory. It is noticeable that οὐδὲν καλὸς is generally followed by the infinitive without either μη or μὴ οὖ. It is in effect an affirmative expression.
3. The last case is in form nearly analogous to the first, with this difference, that the clause introduced with μη ου, instead of being co-ordinate with the predicate, is itself the subject of the sentence. Here μη indicates that the expression is hypothetical, while ου shows that what is thus supposed is conceived of objectively, and as taking place in the region of fact. The supposition generally refers to the case which is immediately before the speaker, and it is usually a supposition of something not done in that case. Here a ‘negative instance’ comes to our aid. Soph. ΟEd. Rex, 12. δυσάλγητος γάρ διν εἰπεν τοιάνυς μη ου κατοικτείρων ἔδραν. But ib. 76. τηνικαίτε' ἐγώ κακός μη δρῶν ἀν εἰπέ πᾶνθος δο' ἀν δηλοί θεός. Again, Plat. Soph. 1. c. Διογον μη ου τέμνειν. But, where it is a mere abstract supposition, πώς ου πολλή Διογία—γρώναι τήν ψυχήν μηδέν. (Theatr. 199.) οὐκ Διογον μη —δεῖν, (Phaed. 62.)

What has been already said of the tendency of negatives in Greek to suggest negatives must be applied to this case also. Thus: καλὸν ἦστι, μη—. αληχρῶν ἦστι μη ου—.b

§ 3.

Although the MS. authority for ου in Theatr. 153. a. is weak, (Par. C. E. Flor. a. c. Palat. Coisl. ex em. Ven. Π. ex em. Par. B. ex em.), yet the comparison of similar passages, especially Phaed. 88. οὐδενὶ προσήκει δώσαντον θαρρούντι μη οὐκ ἀνοίγοντος θαρρεῖν, tends strongly to confirm the reading which has been retained in the text. According to Hermann, the omission of ου in such cases is a frequent error: and, after what has been said above, it may perhaps be added, that the use of μη ου is in harmony with the general vividness and reality with which the whole passage is conceived.

b It is possible that the use of μη ου after such expressions as οὐκ ἄν δυσάλμην, οὐδεμία μιχάλη, τίς μιχάλη, should have been placed under this rather than the foregoing head.
APPENDIX C.

eidos, idéa.

§ 1. The words eidos and idéa are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender. eidos seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd. II. 20 τὸ eidos τῆς κόσμου means simply the nature of the disease, but in II. 21 νοών ἦν ἐκ πᾶν τῆν idéan, should be translated, 'was such in its general phenomena.' Here idéa calls up a picture, while eidos simply designates a class or kind of thing. So πᾶσα idéa—θανάτου Thuc. III. 81 is not 'every kind of death,' but 'death in every form.'

§ 2. The word eidos occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theæt. p. 157. ἄπροστον τε τιθοντα καὶ λέειν καὶ καθ ἐκαστον ζῶν τε καὶ eidos, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus I. 94. τὰ —τῶν παιγνίων eída.

A more philosophical application of the same use occurs p. 181, where we have the δῶ eída κινήσεως.

§ 3. But it occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. eidos then means a class, or species, as that to which particular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theætæus, p. 148. τῶν πολλὰς ὄντας ἐνὶ eidei περιλαβές. p. 205. εἰς ταὐτῶν ἔμπειρωσεν ἡ συλλαβή eidos eixeîn.

§ 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word eidos ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he frequently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ast, Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philosophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to idéa. Or if we choose to put it so, eidos expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; idéa implies also the colour and the whole appearance. eidos is a colourless idéa. See Theæt. p. 203. ἐν τῇ γεγονὸς eidos, idéan
And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that *eidos* is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another; *idéa* rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theæt. l. c. we have ἐν τῇ γεγονός *eidos*, *idéa* μιᾶς αὐτῶ ἀντικείμενο. Ἐπερ investing each of them. *Idéa* ἐξ ἐκάστω ἐν τῶν συνορμοτόνων στοιχείων γνωριμία. Ἐν ἐν τῇ *eidos* ἐπερ οὐ πάντων μερῶν. *Idéa* ἐν τῇ *idéa* ἀμφίπολος σύλλαβῃ ἐν εἰς. 205. καὶ μία ἐν ἐν τῇ *idéa*—συντελεῖ. Cf. supr. p. 184. εἰς μιᾶν τῳδε ἐν τῇ *idéa*—συντελεῖ.

It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adaptation of the ordinary use, than of technical phraseology. Plato may perhaps be teaching the doctrine of ideas by example; but he does not avowedly give to the words the 'second intention' with which they are used in many passages to express the eternal forms of Being. There is also an intermediate transition noticeable in the use of *idéa*, from the abstract to the concrete, i. e. it passes, by a kind of *synecdoche*, from meaning the sum of the attributes to mean that to which they belong. So in Thuc. l. c. πᾶσα *idéa* ἑνάντιον *dunameis* ἐν ἐν τῇ *idéa* is used synonymously with ἐν *eidos*, ἐν τῇ μιᾶς αὐτῶ ἀντικείμενο. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe generally, that the word *eidos* tends to a use at once more logical (ἐπερ *eidos*, διὰ ἐν *eidη*, καὶ ἐν *eidi* διϊστάσει, καὶ ἐν *eidi* ἰσμεν) and more concrete: (the *idéa* is spoken of as inherent in it): the word *idéa* to one more metaphysical, (εἰς μιᾶν *idéan* συνορμοτόνα ἐν τῷ πολλῶν διαστάσει, μιᾶν *idéan* διὰ πολλῶν πάντων διασταμένην ἰσαμεν διαστάσει,) more abstract, and at the same time more figurative.

The word *idéa* is a fair symbol of the union of reason and imagination in Plato.

APPENDIX D.

*Ω θαυμάσιε, & δαμόνε, & ἐταύρε, & μέλε.

These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in translating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connexion. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as δαμόνε, δαμονίη, ἕθεσ, in Homer (II. VI. 407, 486, 518, 521. cf. Plat. Rep. 344. & δαμόνε Ὠρασύρακε) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of & δαμόνε, & μέλε, in Aristophanes.

In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or countenance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conversation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respectful, ironical or familiar.

& θαυμάσιε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, 'I wonder at you.' The most decided instance is in the Phædo, p. 117. Οἶνον, ἕφε, ποιήτε, & θαυμάσιον. 'What are you doing! I am amazed at you.' It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has nothing to do with the person addressed: e.g. Cratyl. 439, where it indicates Socrates' intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation & μακάρι (see Aristoph. Nub. 167.) to express Socrates' own delight at some great discovery: e.g. Rep. 432, where Justice is discovered; Phæd. 69, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life.—So when Hamlet says, 'O good Horatio, I'll take the ghost's word for a thousand pound,' the address is prompted
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not this time by Horatio's worth, but by the relief caused to his own mind by the discovery of the king's guilt. Thus in Theæt. p. 151. ἄ θαυμάσε can hardly be rendered except by a note of ad- miration. 'Do you know that many have been ready to bite me!'

Nearly the same is true of ἂ θαυμόν, p. 180, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. 'Disciples, my good sir!' 'Disciples, did you say?' While in p. 172 it wears quite a different expression, conveying really Socrates' admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. 'Ah! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar!'

The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in ἆ τραπε, ἅ φιλε, ἃ φιλε τραπε, acquires, in ἃ μήλε, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. Theæt. p. 178. ἁδία, ἄ μήλε, 'My dear fellow! I should rather think he did.'

The use of quaint adjurations and addresses in Shakspeare affords an interesting illustration of this feature of Plato's style.

ERRATA.

Page xxiv. line 30. for invocation read invention
xxviii. line 5. for θεαμάν read θεαμάν
xxxvi. line 8. for hard read had
lxxiii. line 25. for experiences read experience
152. c. St., add note on πάνωφως I. e. 'Wiser even than we esteemed him;' referring to σοφὸς άνδρα above.
In the note on p. 155. b. St., for ἵμοι τοῦ δικαοῦ read τοῦ δικαοῦ ἵμοι
208. line 18. ἦκαστρο εἷστε read ἦσαστοτείνυ